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FOREWORD 
The origins of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) are 
documented in the Proceedings of the two previous Workshop~. so do not require repetition 
here. Suffice it to say that the PECC, at its meeting in Osaka in May 1988, agreed that its 
future programme of analysis and debate of agricultural trade and development issues 
ought to encompass a wider range of agricultural products than had been the case in the 
Livestock and Grains Study Programme. As a result, the Task Force on Agricultural Policy, 
Trade and Development was created to combine and continue the work of the above Study 
Programme and the Working Group on Agriculture of the PECC Trade Policy Forum. 
The new Task Force was asked to give urgency to tho~e matters deemed to be of 
assistance to the Uruguay Round of negotiations on agriculture, but in a cooperative spirit 
that was sympathetic to national positions, objectives and priorities with regard to 
agricultural trade and development. 
The Task Force's work programme has been planned within two sub-groups : one to 
continue the policy analyses that have been a feature of the Livestock and Grains Study 
Programme, while the other would utilise this and other materials to enhance the GA TT 
negotiations on agriculture. This volume of Proceedings relates to the initial Workshop of 
the first of these sub-groups, in Seoul during May 1989. 
The participants at the previous (1987) Workshop identified three major areas for 
future action. The first was a study of ASEAN comparative advantages in livestock and 
feeds production, which has now been completed and is summarised in the current volume 
of Proceedings. The second work area involved cooperative approaches to researching and 
evaluating alternative national policies, including those to do with adjustment. The Task 
Force has since been active in this area also, as indicated by several of the papers in these 
Proceedings. Thirdly, it was recognised that there exists a pressing need to strengthen the 
regional data base, particularly with respect to the developing countries. The Task Force's 
ongoing work programme has contributed to this objective, with the ASEAN comparative 
advantage study being especially noteworthy in this regard. 
Finally, the Coordinators of both sub-groups reported the findings of the Task 
Force's activities to the Seventh Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Auckland, 
New Zealand during November 1989. Fu1ther Workshops are to be hosted by the Task 
Force during 1990. 
Allan N. Rae 
Coordinator 
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CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW 
Allan N. Rae 
THE GATT ROUND : NEW POLICY INITIATIVES 
By April 1989, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations had agreed on the need to 
provide for substantial reductions in agricultural support, and to discuss food security 
concerns and the interests off ood importing developing countries. 
Past research into the impacts of trade liberalisation, ~uch as that reported in 
previous PECC Workshops, has contributed to general agreement that freer agricultural 
trade would result in significantly higher commodity prices, and an acceptance of the need 
for an agreed measure of the level of agricultural support. 
The question addressed in the Workshop's opening session was not, therefore, the 
likely gains from free trade but rather the design of new farm support packages that would 
reduce trade distortions and would be politically acceptable through recognising a range of 
national farm policy objectives. The latter are recognised in the proposals put forward to 
the GATT by various countries or country groupings and include insulation of small 
farmers, protection of the environment, and food security. Many such objectives conflict 
with that of reducing trade distortions, and it would be useful to be able to evaluate policies 
in terms of the achieved reduction in distortions per dollar of farmer support. 
The papers by Hayes (Chapter 2) and Blandford and De Gorter (Chapter 3) 
presented two ~uch approaches: production entitlement guarantees, and limited profit 
guarantees. Both would do away with current packages of subsidies, supports and quotas, 
would still allow governments to support (small) farmers and achieve minimum levels of 
self -sufficiency, but would contribute to improving the trading environment by allowing 
world prices to influence marginal production and consumption decisions. 
LIBERALISATION AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN NORTHEAST ASIA 
Seven papers were presented in this session, focussing on Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
Huang and Coyle's presentation (Chapter 4) described the significant structural 
changes that have already occurred in the agricultural sectors of these countries, and 
complemented paper~ pre&ented at earlier Workshops. Farmers have diversified from 
&taples into horticulture and livestock while consumption of livestock products has 
increased relative to cereals and roots. As a result imports of both final products and feed 
have increased rapidly, with the former trade relatively more restricted than the latter. 
Structurally, farm si:.re~ in each country are very small, and efforts to amalgamate 
farms and therefore achieve lower production cost~ face i,evere comtraints. Out-migration 
of labour has been fostered by rapid economic growth and part-time farming has developed 
further in Japan and Taiwan than in Korea. In Japan, farm household incomes on average 
exceed those of urban households, although this situation does not yet exist in Korea or 
Taiwan. 
In order to better encourage the process of agricultural reform, Yamauchi and Kwon 
in Chapter 5 argue that it is useful to understand more completely the interventionist 
behaviour of national governments. Their approach involves the measurement of the 
importance of special interest groups (such as farmers, consumers, and government) in the 
formulation of agricultural policy, and how changes in their relative influence are linked to 
changes in the macro-economic environment. Their model is applied to rice procurement 
and pricing policies in Korea the 1961-85 period of dramatically increased protectionism. 
Some of the impacts of the liberalisation of Korean imports of beef are described by 
Huh and Lee in Chapter 6. This topic was of great interest to participants given the recent 
partial freeing of this trade. A self-sufficiency policy was simulated and used as a 
benchmark against which could be compared beef importing scenarios with various levels of 
tariff protection. Read in conjunction with the prcviou~ two chapter~. the results clearly 
indicate the political difficulties of achieving significant trade reforms. Comparing a self -
sufficiency policy with imports and a 50% tariff, for example, indicated that domestic beef 
production and cattle prices would halve, although consumption per capita would increase 
by over 25%. With an import tariff of 20%, the domestic beef production industry was 
simulated to disappear by the turn of the century. This, along with the prevalence of 
smallholders in the Korean beef sector, lead the authors to suggest the use of a system of 
quotas to balance the interests of producers and consumers. 
Chapter 7 seeks, like Yamauchi and Kwon in Chapter 5, to understand government 
policy-making behaviour but extends the model further by taking account off oreign interest 
groups. A question is why do countries restrict imports with quotas and voluntary restraint 
agreements that can transfer benefits to selected foreign exporters, and the answer has to 
do with the politics of international bilateral relationships. The model was applied to 
Japan's management of her beef and wheat import quotas. The results point to quota 
manipulation to favour the USA over other exporters because of that country's political 
importance to Japan. As a consequence, it is concluded that the USA is likely to lose as a 
result of successes in persuading the Japanese to liberalise food trade policies. 
Chapters 8 to 10 are papers prepared by Workshop participants from Taiwan. The 
first of these, by Woo, reports Taiwan's efforts to free her trade in soybeans, corn and 
sorghum. These efforts include reduction in import tariffs and the freezing of guaranteed 
prices to producers. Despite these changes, nominal protection rates have hardly reduced 
and remain around 20-30%. 
The impacts of trade liberalisation in live&tock products in Taiwan, and consequent 
adjustment schemes were analysed by Fu (Chapter 9). Examination of levels of government 
support, as measured by producer subsidy equivalents, showed protection on chicken, beef 
and dairy products was lower than in Japan and the EC, but higher than in the USA. 
Protection-levels in the pork sector in Taiwan (an export commodity) were similar to those 
in the USA. Fu's analysis of the impact on consumers and producers of a reduction in 
import tariffs lead to the conclusion that movement of producers out of the beef and dairy 
sectors would produce high consumer benefits with relatively low adjustment costs. This 
was not the case in the chicken sector, where a removal of tariffs would lead to significant 
producer losses and therefore adjustment costs. 
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Chapter lO presents the third Taiwanese paper. As presented to the Workshop, this 
covered general trade and structural adjustment issues, followed by a detailed analysis of 
farmland policy and economic efficiency. The latter was a production function analysis of 
technical and economic efficiency, and has been omitted from this edited volume. The 
chapter therefore discusses the nature of recent structural changes in Taiwan's agriculture, 
with some emphasis on Taiwan's trading relationship with the USA. 
POLICIES INFLUENCING PACIFIC BASIN BEEF TRADE 
Two papers presented to the Workshop continued the Task Force's studies of the 
Pacific Basin beef trade. Chapter 11 describes a model developed at the Australian Bureau 
of Agricultural and Resource Economics to analyse beef trade policy issues. Five 
alternative simulation experiments were conducted; maintenance of Japanese import 
quotas, phase-in of the 1988 Japanese beef import agreement, removal of USA beef import 
controls along with implementation of the new Japanese agreement, an increase in Korea's 
beef import quota plus the new Japanese agreement, and free trade involving the removal of 
all quantitative and tariff restrictions in Japan, Korea and the USA. The results indicate 
how each policy scenario would impact on producers and consumers in the above three 
countries plus Australia and New Zealand. Generally, it is shown that removal of trade-
distorting import policies would produce substantial benefits to the major exporting 
countries of the region. 
Jarratt's contribution (Chapter 12) concentrates on an aspect of the management of 
beef marketing in Japan, namely the ability of exporters to benefit from brand promotion 
and product differentiation. Brand promotion is an important component of the marketing 
of many products in Japan, and brand names have been established at wholesale and retail 
levels for certain types of domestic beef. However, brand names of imported beef have not 
been promoted as successfully as domestic brands, and reasons for this are discussed. The 
analytical section of the chapter tests the hypothesis that import brand premiums did not 
exist, by examining 1986/87 monthly beef auction price data for 52 brands and 25 cuts of 
imported beef. Grass-fed and grain-fed beef imports were subject to separate analyses. 
The major conclusions were that some exporters were able to earn significant brand 
premiums, that the associated product differentiation effort was not particularly expensive, 
and that such opportunities will expand under the new Japanese beef import agreement. 
GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE 
LIVESTOCK AND FEEDSTUFFS SECTORS OF THE ASEAN REGION 
This section is devoted to a summary of results from a major regional study, for 
which funding was obtained from the Asian Development Bank. The Proceedings of the 
Task Force's First Workshop records the intention to undertake such a study, and some 
preliminary results were presented at the Second Workshop. 
Chapters 13 to 16 summarise the study findings in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand respectively, and in the proces& much detail has had to be 
omitted. Readers interested in further information should contact the authors directly. 
In each country, policies that impact directly or indirectly on the livestock and feeds 
sectors were described, and their influence on production and consumption incentives were 
measured. This involved estimation of nominal and effective protection rates for a range of 
products and feeds, along with estimates of private and social profitability. This allowed 
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the isolation of those commodities in which the various countries appeared to possess 
comparative advantage, and an assessment of whether or not government assistance 
targetted such commodities. 
The regional location of production was also studied, since transportation costs can 
be considerable in countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. This highlighted some 
interesting issues such as the economics of transporting live animals relative to carcasses, 
and the location of raw material production (e.g. liquid milk, grains or live animals) in 
relation to the location of processing facilities. In a few cases, for example, dairy 
production appeared socially profitable in regions some distance from the major import 
points, to supply local markets. 
LIBERALISATION ISSUES IN SOME NON-ASIAN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The Workshop concluded with three papers from Canada (Chapter 17), New Zealand 
(Chapter 18) and the United States (Chapter 19). 
The first of these chapters explored the likely impact of trade liberalisation on 
Canada's dairy and poultry industries that are currently regulated via supply management 
programmes. A world trade liberalisation analysis was conducted to determine free-trade 
prices, which were then input to a regional model of Canadian agriculture. The analysis 
indicated that some potential exists for Canadian milk and poultry producers to expand and 
compete internationally. Net sector earnings would increase despite the higher feed costs 
that would result from trade liberalisation. Currently, these supply-managed sectors are 
restricted to relatively stagnant domestic markets. 
The majority of agricultural trade liberalisation studies, including those undertaken 
by this Task Force, pay little if any attention to the impacts of such liberalisation in the non-
agricultural sector. Chapter 18 takes a wider view by assessing the benefits to New 
Zealand's manufacturing sector from reductions in farm subsidies. It was found that for 
every dollar of gross assistance provided to either the agricultural or manufacturing sector, 
less than one quarter was received as net benefit. The remainder was offset by higher input 
costs resulting from these protectionist policies. The question was then raised about the 
efficacy of nominal subsidies to support farm incomes. 
Debate on the 1990 US Farm Bill differs from that on earlier bills in that it is taking 
place at the same time as the USA is playing a major role in the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT. Chapter 19 reviews some of the alternatives facing US policymakers with respect to 
the 1990 legislation. Three options were evaluated in a world trade model - confrontation 
(which assumed little progress in the GATT Round), compromise (which involved reduced 
expenditure and a move to more GATT-compatibility) and compatible (in which 
government interventions that presently distort trade would be removed). 
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CHAPTER2 
TOWARDS A MULTILATERAL ALIGNMENT 
OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
Dermot J. Hayes and Andrew Schmitz* 
INTRODUCTION 
A recent estimate values the annual dead-weight loss and of agricultural 
protectionism in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) at $50 
billion and the annual costs of these policies to consumers and taxpayers at $150 billion 
(Sanderson). In addition, the agricultural protectionism issue has created tension among 
international trading partners and promises to escalate and to affect nonagricultural trade. 
Governments responded to these losses by making agricultural trade a priority on the 
agenda at the ongoing 1986 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) Negotiations. The Ministerial Declaration from the September 1986 meeting in 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, states that the GATT negotiations are expected to achieve greater 
liberalisation in agriculture and to bring "all measures affecting import access and export 
competition under strengthened and opera ti on ally effective GA TT rules and disciplines" 
(BNA, p. M-1). 
All the OECD participants have tabled proposals, which provide insight into the 
attitudes of the participants. The U.S. proposal, Harvest 2000, calls for the elimination of 
all trade-distorting policies within 10 years and a Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) to 
monitor compliance. This PSE proposal has been adopted by all the negotiating groups 
except the Nordic countries and Japan. The PSE is simply a measure of the magnitude of 
the benefit of all trade-distorting producer support divided by the agricultural output 
valued at either domestic or world prices. If only the trade-distorting policies are included, 
the PSE is comparable to an ad valorem tariff. This trade-distorting PSE measure will 
likely be used in the GA TT negotiations (Tangermann, Josling, and Pearson). 
The European Community (EC) responded to the U.S. proposal with one that 
initially emphasised short-term measures to stabilise the sugar, cereal, and dairy markets 
and that used a PSE measure adjusted for supply control and exchange-rate variation to 
monitor compliance. The EC proposal promises to cut the levels of support significantly 
over an agreed time period and to achieve a better balance between commodities (IATRC). 
During a second agreed time period, the EC would replace trade-distorting support with 
supply-neutral aid to farmers and negotiate maximum levels of support to stabilise markets 
(IATRC). 
*Dermot Hayes is an assii.tant professor of economics at Iowa State University and Andrew 
Schmitz is a professor of agricultural economics at the University of California at Berkeley. 
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The Cairns group (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay) 
proposed that both the short-term measures proposed by the EC and the long-term 
measures proposed by the United States be adopted. The U.S. government has indicated 
that it will support the Cairns group's proposal. Japan and the Nordic countries wish to take 
immediate measures to prevent further increases in excess supply and to gradually remove 
export subsidies and improve market access (IATRC). All the proposals would encompass 
domestic policies and border measures. 
On April 8, 1989, the ministers at the midterm review of the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT negotiations reached a provisional agreement to provide for "substantial progressive 
reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time" 
(BNA, p. M-1). The text of the agreement states that this goal will be achieved by 
negotiating on policies and on aggregate measures and that the rules will apply equally to all 
parties. The ministers also agreed to discuss food security concerns and the treatment of 
net food-importing, developing countries. The participants also agreed to decouple income 
support and to harmonise sanitation regulations. 
Although many issues remain unresolved, a surprising degree of similarity and 
agreement exists among the negotiating positions of the developed countries. Should an 
agreement be reached to gradually reduce trade-distorting producer support, many 
legislative bodies will need to make major agricultural policy changes that will be 
unpopular with some producers. These legislative groups may not have the political will or 
power to enact these policy changes. These groups, some of which are only indirectly 
represented at the negotiations, may be somewhat surprised that their representatives have 
agreed to reduce national control over agricultural policies. Examples include the United 
States, where any agreement must be ratified in the houses of Congress, and Europe, where 
national governments will be asked to effect changes agreed to by their EC representatives. 
The U .S.-Canada free-trade agreement created so much dissension that the Canadian 
government was forced to call national elections. A GA TT agreement that incorporates 
even the common aspects of the proposals will likely lead to political repercussions. To 
date, much of the research relevant to the GATT negotiations has been targeted towards 
choosing suitable measures of protectionism and estimating the likely impacts of 
liberalisation at the international and domestic levels. The almost unanimous acceptance of 
the PSE measure and of the gradual elimination of trade-distorting policies indicates that 
this research has been effective. 
A further challenge that now becomes relevant ho that of designing politically 
acceptable agricultural policies that reduce or eliminate trade distortions. This task will not 
be easy; current agricultural policies distort trade for good political reasons that will not 
disappear just because countries accept the PSE reduction concept. It is not clear whether 
the best approach to this problem is to design country- or commodity-specific policy 
alternatives or to develop a policy for all commodities and all countries that can be easily 
adjusted for specific nations' needs. The latter approach has some obvious advantages. 
Should all countries adopt a single agricultural policy, the inevitable argument over the 
measurement of the degree of support would be weakened. By aligning agricultural 
policies, governments could use specific multilateral policy parameters as a basis for 
negotiation. 
The obvious disadvantage of the multilateral alignment approach is that current 
programmes have been designed to satisfy numerous objectives. The Tinbergen Rule states 
that the number of instruments should at least equal the number of objectives (Harvey). 
Any policy package that contains a sufficient number of instrument!> may be excessively 
complicated and may involve a large and politically unacceptable change in current policies. 
This problem does not, however, preclude a solution. The purpose of this paper is to 
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examine the attribute1> that are important to the individual countrie~ or regions involved in 
the GATT negotiations and to propose a new policy that integrc tes as many of these 
desirable attrib lites as possible. 
The authors will show that, although some compromises on the issues of trade 
distortions, economic efficiency, and food security may be nece~ sary, a policy can be 
designed that meets many of the participants' stated objective~ but that does not contain 
changes that might be deemed politically unacceptable in any of the negotiating countries. 
In the first section of this paper, the authors outline the required properties for any 
successful policy. The authors then discuss four proposed policies .rnd combine the most 
promising aspects of the four to create a fifth proposed policy. This fifth policy is the 
principal contribution of thi1> paper. 
DESIRABLE PROPER TIES FOR A PROPOSED POLICY 
For any policy to be successful, certain criteria must be met. From the perspective of 
all the participants, any policy must be politically acceptable and administratively feasible. 
A successful policy must reduce or eliminate trade distortions and must not be financially 
open-ended. 
From the perspective of the EC, any policy must ensure that at least some of the 
many producers who operate small farms and whose assets prevent them from earning 
reasonable wages at protected prices are insulated from the full range of the policy changes 
(Harvey). The EC also requires that any policy be both unbiased towards producers of any 
commodity or in any country and socially efficient (Harvey). 
In addition to the properties already outlined, Japan and the Nordic countries will be 
favorably inclined towards a policy that maintains a minimum level of self-sufficiency in the 
basic food products (IATRC) and that allows certain inefficient husbandry practices and 
laws to continue or to expand; i.e., small rice fields and animal rights laws 
From the perspective of the United States and of the members of the Cairns group 
(IA TRC), the policy mu~t also require that world prices influence marginal decisions, that 
consumers in all countries have access to agricultural products at world prices, and that 
countries with a comparative advantage in the production of a commodity be encouraged to 
produce that commodity. The policy must not become an overt producer welfare 
programme. 
To promote economic efficiency and welfare maximisation, some additional 
properties may be desirable. The Ricardian rents from any policy change should accrue to 
the producers of agricultural commodities rather than to the fixed production factors. The 
policy should encourage producers to reduce production costs and to differentiate and 
market their output. The beneficiaries of any government spending should be located in the 
country or region ruled by that government, and the policy should be amenable to 
multilateral negotiations and should provide sufficient flexibility for individuals or regions 
to customise certain aspects of the policy that are not trade distorting. Finally, the policy 
should not differentiate among producers on a commodity basis. 
Many of these objectives are in direct conflict. For example, the Japanese insistence 
on provisions that maintain a degree of food security (IATRC) conflicts with policies that 
eliminate government influence over output. The emphasis placed on maintaining a viable 
rural infrastructure by subsidising producers with small farms (Commission of the 
European Communitie1,) conflicts with the propertie~ of efficient re~ourcc use and with the 
idea that policies should not be biased in favor of any commodity or region. Trade-offs will 
need to be made. The United States and the Caimi. group will likely be forced to address 
the food security and farm size issues. Several comprehensive negotiating frameworks have 
already been proposed. Four of the most promising policy proposals are discussed next. 
Multilateral Decoupling 
Senators Boschwitz and Boren introduced the multilateral decoupling concept into 
the 1985 U.S. policy debate, and the concept has become the cornerstone of the U.S. 
proposal at the ongoing GATT negotiations (NCFAP). The U.S. proposal offers no advice 
on how to implement decoupling but does point out that the programme should be 
"independent of the current and future level of a farmer's production and marketing, input 
use, or commodity prices" (NCFAP, p. 2). 
Essentially, decoupling transfers income from taxpayer& to producers and, applied in 
its purest form, allows each producer in a particular country to receive the same monetary 
payment. This policy meets many of the outlined objectives. Under certain conditions, 
however, the policy would be politically unacceptable. And when bureaucrats begin to 
define who would be entitled to the payments, the policy would be difficult to implement. 
Many farmers, as defined on census forms, sell such small quantities of output that they 
earn the majority of their income from off-farm jobs. Although the EC Commission has 
decided that the continued trend towards part-time farming should be encouraged, the 
incentives produced by a decoupling scheme would eventually ensure that the number of 
part-time farmers with low output levels would increase. 
Difficulties occur in developing a method to define who would merit the payments 
without omitting the producers in genuine need. Presumably, farmers could be means 
tested; however, governments would find it politically unacceptable to pay farmers more 
money than urban welfare recipients are paid. In addition, the owners of large farms would 
receive visible cash payments, regardless of the profitability of the enterprise or of the year. 
Media attention would inevitably focus on situations in which agricultural profits were high 
because of favorable prices or climatic conditions yet farmers were receiving government 
"welfare" checks. One could argue that this situation exists now, but an important 
advantage of current programmes is that the income redistribution effects are not publicly 
visible. 
Other disadvantages of this approach are that many producers would be repelled by 
the concept of welfare and that, if most of the producers with small farms qualified, 
payments to producers with medium-sized farms would be low. Although many of the small 
farms are operated by part-time producers, the full-time producers operating medium-sized 
farm would be worse off than they were before decoupling. Finally, many countries, such as 
Australia and Canada, could not afford to provide income to producers. 
Limited Support Payments 
A limited support payment (LSP) reduces the total payment that a government will 
make to any one producer (Harvey). The LSP policy, in effect, reduces to a two-tier price 
system in which producers with certain small farms would receive price supports on all of 
their production while producers with large farms would receive support on only part of 
their output. The policy seems promising in terms of the previously stated requirements 
and solves the problem of defining who is a farmer. Producers with small quantities of 
output would receive small total payments. The policy is administratively feasible, is not 
financially open-ended, and allows for the support of producers with small farms. The 
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policy would :ichieve a trade-off between self-sufficiency and the absence of trade 
distortions, wh 1ch is an essential requirement of any agreement. 
From th'.! perspective of the United States and of the Cairns group, the&e payment& 
might be acceptable because, at the margin, the bulk of the agrictl' tural output would be 
produced in response to world prices. This approach might be acceptable to those 
governments interested in food security because a proportion of every producer's output 
would be responsive to supported prices. The trade-off between these two properties would 
depend heavily on the total output quantity for which the higher price would be paid, a 
negotiable variable. 
The problems with this approach are that the costs are more transparent than those 
of other policies and that individual countries or regions within trading blocs would find it 
difficult to agree on a suitable upper production limit for which payment& could be made. 
For example, typical grain producers in the United Kingdom produce significantly more 
grain than those in Germany produce. An upper payment limit that was politically feasible 
in Germany would be low in the United Kingdom; consequently, total payments to German 
grain producers would be greater under thi& policy than are current payments. The LSP 
method would have some unu&ual effects on income distribution among producers of a 
particular commodity within a country. In years when commodity price& are low, payments 
per unit of production would be high; therefore, the total production output eligible for the 
subsidy would be small and would favor producer:> with small farms. In years when 
commodity prices are high, per unit subsidies would be low; consequently, only the 
producers with large farms would receive the maximum payment, and producers of small 
quantities of output would receive little assistance. This factor could become a problem in a 
mixed farming situation. 
Another problem with the proposed LSP is that it applies to specific commodity 
programmes--in particular, those programmes that receive the most support under current 
policies (Harvey). Apart from encouraging the production of commodities that are either 
the most uneconomical or the most in surplus, this single-commodity approach would lead 
to unequal distribution of agricultural support, and the visibility of the payments would be a 
political liability. Consider the following example. Producer A operates a small or medium-
si:zed farm and produces equal quantities of commodities X and Y. Commodity Xis covered 
by an LSP, commodity Y is not. Producer B operates a much larger farm than does 
producer A and produces commodities X and Z. Commodity Z is not covered by an LSP. If 
profits for commodities X and Z are high and profits for commodity Y are low, producer B 
would receive a larger government support payment than would producer A because the 
programme favors producers with large quantities of output when prices are high. The LSP 
policy creates incentives that might alter the typical enterprise mix on farms in a way that 
runs counter to the purported policy aims. 
Production Entitlement Guarantees 
The production entitlement guarantee (PEG) policy was recently proposed by a 
consortium of American and European agricultural economists (Blanford, de Gorter, and 
Harvey). A PEG is simply a prespecified limit on the quantity of production eligible to 
receive support payments. The PEG policy i~ similar to the LSP policy except that the PEG 
emphasises the total output quantity supported by governments rather than the total 
payments that each producer can receive. The PEG policy's proponent& suggest that the 
PEGs be allocated to producers on the basis of &ome fraction oi historical production and 
argue that this policy would not be distortive needs as long a& the supported producer-
specific quantity wa& le5s than the output that would be produced under world price 
conditions. 
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This policy comes close lo satisfying all the objectives outlined earlier. It is 
nondistortionary and both politically and administratively feasible. No individual producer 
would lose at the expense of other producers, and the policy does not seem to be any more 
biased in favor of one set of producers than are current policies. The policy's disadvantages 
include payment visibility and the accrual of Ricardian rents to those producers who possess 
the PEG rather than to future producers. 
The PEG policy seems like an excellent trade-off between food security needs and 
the elimination of trade distortion. By allocating PEGs according to historical production, 
countries could ensure that they retained a degree of self-sufficiency, even if the country no 
longer possessed a competitive advantage after liberalisation. Although this freezing of 
production runs counter to the objective of eliminating all trade distortions, it does so in a 
way that would not be readily apparent to policy makers. The proponents of PEGs have 
made the claim that the policy would not distort trade, but they neglected to qualify this 
claim with "any more than current policies do." 
The policy's principal disadvantage is that the EC, the Nordic countries, and Japan 
would not be allowed to support their small farms because producers would receive their 
PEG allotments on the basis of some percentage of historical production. Although PEG 
payments would allow many uneconomical farms to remain in production longer than they 
would under complete liberalisation, this situation would occur only where producers 
wished to remain in production independently of any economic incentives. The producers 
who operate small farms and who are open to economic incentives would eventually sell 
their PEGs to producers with large farms, thereby obtaining a lump sum payment to exit 
agriculture. The producers with large farms would have the incentive to purchase PEGs 
until LOO percent of their output was covered. The offsetting alfects of both of these forces 
on the number of small farms is difficult to determine, and PEGs would not stabilise this 
number. 
The Ecological Way 
In a special 1987 edition of the European Review of Agricultural 
Economics ,academics responded to an EC Commission Green Pa per on the future of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Gunther Weinschenck contributed an excellent paper 
wherein he proposed the ecological way to policy reform. He focuses on maintaining a 
substantial number of workers in agriculture without increasing the financial burden and 
rejects the standard solution of reducing prices to equilibrium levels. Weinschenck argues 
that the necessary price adjustments would be so drastic as to be socially unacceptable and 
that lower prices would remove marginal producers from mountainous areas, a move that 
would be undesirable for regional policy and ecological rea&on'>. He proposes an 
alternative solution whereby nitrogen use i:> taxed either overall or when usage exceeds 
specified amounh per hectare. He also proposes that direct income payments be made to 
guarantee a minimum income in less favorable areas but doe:> not :>pecify how to achieve 
this goal. 
Unlike the other three policy proposals, this policy is not designed to be useful for 
more than one country. For example, many wheat producers in Canada use little nitrogen, 
and countries that depend heavily on nitrogen export revenues would likely veto the 
measure. An interesting feature of the proposal is that most producers would be affected; 
i.e., dairy producers would pay more for grass, and hog and cattle producers would pay 
more for grains. It would, however, be difficult to determine which producers and which 
regions were most affected by the tax. Nevertheless, the proposal seems sound. 
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By Uf>ing duality theory, increase& in production co&l'> can be !>hown to have effect<; 
&imilar to tho<;c of price rcductio.'' The benefit& of the forme1 ,1pproach arc th.it a 
reduction in per farm output has less effect t'<' producer illrorne'> th rn do price reducti•m~ 
and that the financial burden is reduced (Weins<.-nenck, p. 58). 
Given the intuitive appeal of this proposal, all that is required i& a framework within 
which 50me countries or regions can experiment with thi5 propo&1l and can apply the5e 
mea&ures towards their liberalisation efforts and a specific propo!>al for guaranteeing 
incomes. 
Other Policies 
The four policies already discussed represent a small &ample. Other policie& have not 
been discussed because each seems to be fatally flawed. For example, the policy of 
providing producers with quota rights that would allow them to maintain, but not exceed, 
current production would be politically unacceptable to American producers. Thi& concept 
was proposed in 1987 by ~enator Harkin and Congres&man Gephardt and was quickly 
defeated by those who viewed it as exce~sive government interference in agriculture. The 
&et-aside programme operating in the United State& and under trial in the United Kingdom 
and Germany would ah.of ail because of the enormous expem.e of taking enough land out of 
production in Europe to reduce the oversupply of temperate f ood<>tuff& in the EC. In 
addition, this programme would have a free-rider problem; thal i'>, each region would have 
an incentive to allow its producers to find ways to harve&l lhe set-aside acres, and the 
impact of this additional production would affect everyone. 
A New Proposal: Limited Profit Guarantees 
The limited profit guarantee (LPG) policy combine& the mo<;! useful properties of the 
four proposals discussed earlier but reduces or eliminate~ some of the problems mentioned. 
The LPG if> a more sophisticated version of a concept originall) proposed by the authon m 
1988 (Hayes and Schmit?). 
Under the LPG policy, each country must mea&ure farm revenue distribution. Each 
revenue distribution would have a &hape similar to lhat of the other distribution" but a 
different mean. Countric~, would then negotiate lhc point on e,1ch di'>lnbution that '>hould 
be most heavily favored. This point could be expressed in term-. ol the mean. FM example, 
if countries agreed to most favor the mean minus 10 percent, then the farm" most favored in 
a country in which the mean farm had gross annual revenue.., of $10,000 would he lhMe 
farms yielding gross annual revenues ol $9,000. The value of the point cho:>en (expre&scd 
relative to the country's :r,pecific mean) &hould be the same tor all counrries. The lower this 
number, the less would be the interference with internatt0nd.l trade. If the negotiated 
values for this number were large, the number of small and medium-"i.7ed farms would 
stabilise or increase. A minimum level of self-sufficiency tor a particular commodity could 
be guaranteed. 
The following &teps outline the procedure for implementing the LPG policy. 
l. Negotiate the point at which to make explicit the trade-oli between the pnlicies that 
have minimum impact on trade and thme that maintdin the rural infrastructure and 
the degree of self-'>ufficiency. Once negotiators &ee that th1:, trade-off exists, they 
will be able to determine immediately whether an internationdl alignment is feasible. 
If this point can be ~ucce5sfully negotiated, the importance of this trade-off will 
lessen. 
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~. Collect the production co'>t data I rom the I arm~ ol the lMgcted '>Ill t nr edch 
commodity in each country, given the prcviou'> year''> a\ crage prtCC'>. Fm example. 
each government would need to mca~urc the co'>I of producing one tonne ol wheal on 
I arm~ with total revenue<, equal to the targeted revenue I qr that country. 
Announce the propo'>cd policy adjuqmcnb Jnd make 1t clear that only producer<., 
who provide hi'>toncal and current farm account'> would be clig1hlc. All producer'>, 
rcgardlcs~ ol oil-I arm employment income or ol entcrpri>.e mix. '>hould be 
encouraged to enroll. 
L Obtain annually every country'~ ~pccil icd total finance cap I or agricultural '>Upporl nr 
a total rclcrcncc income for the farm of the targeted ~11c. f<or cxdmplc. a country 
might indicdlc that I or I Mm'> with '1>40,000 annual gros~ revenue, the maximum annu,tl 
reference income 1~ ~ 10,000. To maintain the propo~al'~ political fea~ibility, each 
country or region must be allowed to determine this finance cap or reference income. 
Once the targeted farm site has been specified and provided that thi~ <it7e i~ below 
average, change~ in the rel erence income for that farm '>tic would have little aft cct 
on output. 
Countrie'> could delerm1nc a fair value I or the I indn<.e cap a'> I olloW'>. fir..,l. let 
production rc~pond lo world price level'>. Then e~timale the lollowmg price dnd 
quantity vcclor.., by U'>ing the equation 
where P 
Q 
N 
p 
c 
pncc vector of all commoditie~ produced in the country or region. 
quanl1ty vector of all commodities produced in the country or region. 
current price~ or quantitie~, 
acludl price~ and quantitie~ produced al tcr liherali~ation, and 
average co1-.t of production for each commodity. 
The difference between the two term~ in brace~ i1-. the financial burden that mu<,t he 
borne by taxpayer~ '>O that producer'> in the aggregate arc ju~t as well off under the 
new policy a1> they arc now. Notice that thi& burden would be le'>'> thdn it is now 
because the dead-weight los~es would disappear. For example. there would be no 
need to '>Ubsidi'>c export'> Con\umer& in the EC would pav le"" I or certain 
commoditic'> than would con'>umer& in other countrie:-.. 
5. Mea&ure annually the actual agricultural pnce'> m each country. 
6. Estimate annually the quantitie~ of output, o"', that the !arm of the targeted sin m 
each region would produce, given prevailing price~ and climatic condition,,. 
Estimate the target pncc, PT, for each commodity from the formula 
(PT - c"')o"' = reference income, 
where c' refers to the average cost that an cff icient producer of Q x would incur. 
8. Estimate the per unit producer &ubsidy, ~.for each commodity t rom the equation 
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). Sell all l•Utput al the price that the market will beat. (P pl· Pre duL~r-. would recuv•_" 
governmcr.t cheque bd~ed on their 5alc~. The maximum .illo\.\ahlc outpul tn be 
subsidi~Gd 1n this manner. (Os), should be determined by u-.in~. the equation 
~os + (pp - c") os ~ref e rcnce income. 
10. Determine the commodity I or which mull1commodity prodmers choose to earn the 
subsidy. It mo~t producers choo<;e the -.ame commodity. the Cll'>t or pnce 
measurements for that commodity are in error; consequently. the targer price. PT. 
and therefore ~ should be revised d~)W!'JWard. It producer<, ;; <;K that more than one 
commodity be included, estimate L: P10 1"' such that 
i"" ~ ~iQi + (pi - Cj )Qi~ reference inCl)me. 
i=l 
Although this proposed policy seems somewhat complex, the underlying motivation 
is simple. Producers would be guaranteed a minimum income level for as long as their 
output wa<; equal to or greater than that of the farm of the targeted si/c In th1<> sense, the 
proposal contains the essence of decoupling except that there would nnl be a problem in 
determining who qualified for payment5 because producers with output lcveh below the 
targeted price would receive the <,upport price only on their actual outpul. If this output 
level was small, total payment'> would be 5malL 
The LPG policy i'> '>tmilar to the L~P policy in that the total paymcnb to producers 
would be fixed and that there would c<>sentially be a two-tier pricrng system. The LPG 
policy avoids some of the problems of the LSP policy by focusing on total farm profit'>. 
Government expenditure'> would stop if world price!> ror,e ~ufficiently, increasing the 
political acceptability ol the programme. Producers as a group would be no wor'>e off under 
the programme in term~ ol net farm income than they arc now. Taxpayer'> would he at lea~! 
as well off as they are now and would benefit from world price increa5cs as farm payment'> 
fell. This reduction in government <>pending would, however, be balanced by increased food 
pnces. 
The LPG policy al-,o ha'> much in common with the PEC1 policy. Both policies focu-. 
on the 5ub:;idy per unit ol production, and both would seek lo limit total pavments in a 
manner that is le~i> trade d1<,lnrl1n!! than arc current programme'>. The LPG propo~al would 
he acceptable to government<, that wish lo maintain the numher of small farm~. Whcreaf:. 
the PEG system would hdvc, at bc~t, a neutral effect on farm silc, the LPG could be U5ed a~ 
a tool to maintain the number of small farms in countrie5 where the target farm ..,i/e was the 
smallest unit that individual governments would like to see contrnue to operate. 
The LPG policy could be used to maintain '>elf-sufficiency in certain ba~ic 
commodities because producer~ would be free to choose any commodity for which to 
receive their LPG. Producers with small farms would receive an incentive to produce al 
prices greater than world market prices, and the degree of government interference would 
depend on the targeted farm ~ize. Any acceptable policy mu:'>t inevitably force this trade-off 
between trade distortion<,, farm -,i1c, and self-sufficiency. 
The LPG policy extend<, the minimum income property of the ecological way to all 
producer5. The motivation for thi~ cxten~ion is that low mcome. not location, motivatef:. the 
provision of producer income ~upport. The policy also offer'> c1 ! rdmework within which the 
production costs nccc~~arv in '>lep 2 would he adju~tcd to compensate producer-; fairly tor 
cost increases. 
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To :;cc how the LPG policy would influence the income po::.1t10n and incentivef> to 
producers, con:>idcr Figure 1. The three marginal co&t curve'> represent producers with 
f.mall, medium-si7ed, and large farms that produce a commodity. 
The producers with small farms receive PT for all their output, which encourages 
them to expand output to Q 1 by adopting a more intensive enterprise or by intensifying 
their present one. The producers with medium-si:red and large farms are guaranteed the 
reference income, abed, plus the income they earn by producing beyond Q *. 
All producers have an incentive to increase the price they receive for their output, 
which they could do by marketing their produce so as to earn a price greater than Pp or by 
differentiating their product. The government would estimate Pp a~ a nationaf level. 
Producers would have an incentive to reduce cost& below tho&e u5ed to estimate C(Q *),and 
the producers of Q * at a higher average cost would be penalised. The government would 
mail a cheque for ahfg to the producer with a small farm, and the producers with medium-
sized and large farm:; would receive at least abed either from actual profits or from the 
government. Notice that if Pp if> well above the commodity':; production cost, producers 
with large farms would require no government payments and would earn the reference 
income without government assistance. Because most output is produced on large farms, 
the large:>t percentage of output would be produced in response to world prices. Also notice 
that, unlike most attempts to transfer income, this proposal would not reduce the incentive 
to work because the cost and output prices are for average or t) pica! producers and not for 
individuals. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Thi:> paper has focused on the requirements nece5sary for any policy to be suitable as 
a basi:; for multilateral policy alignment. Although the probability for the succes& of any 
such policy is low, the issue i:; of sufficient importance to merit research. Academic debate 
could be useful in demonstrating to politicians the problem& with the multilateral alignment 
approach and in propm,ing alternate policies. If this approach fails and the GATT succeed&, 
numerous lawsuib will inevitably be required to compare the degree of trade distortion of 
particular policie5. 
The LPG policy proposed here is an attempt to combine the more useful propertier. 
of four proposed policies. The LPG policy involves a two-tier pricing scheme in which 
producers sell all their output at the price that the market will bear and later receive a 
government cheque for part of their output. The magnitude of the per unit subsidy should 
be set so that the producers with the smallest farms (in terms ot gro1>s annual revenue) that 
a government would like to ~ce remain in production would receive the maximum benefits. 
All producers with farms larger than targeted &i?C would receive a minimum guaranteed 
profit. In some ycar5, thi~ profit will come only from the market, but in other years, the 
profit would depend only on government r,,upport. 
14 
REFERENCml 
Blanford, David, Harry de Gorter, and David Harvey. "Production Entitlement Guarantees 
(PEGS): A Minimally Distorting Method of Farm Income ~upport." Background 
paper prepared for the 1988 summer meeting of the International Agricultural 
Trade Research Consortium, Annapolis, MD, Augu::.t 1988. 
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA). "Framework Agreements Adopted April 8, 1989, at 
Midterm Review of Uruguay Round Negotiations under General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade in Geneva." In Regulation. Economics and Law Text. Section 
M, no. 68. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, April 11, 1989, pp. M-
1-M-3. 
Commission of the European Communities. "Prospectus for the Community Agricultural 
Policies." Brussels, Belgium, July 15, 1985. 
Harvey, David. "Decoupling and the European Community Agricultural Policy." Paper 
presented at the 1988 annual meeting of the International Agricultural Trade 
Research Consortium, San Antonio, TX, 1988. 
Hayes, Dermot, and Andrew Schmit?. "The Price and Welfare Implications of Current 
Conflicts Between the Agricultural Policies of the United State:> and the 
European Community." In Issues in US-EC Trade Relations, Edited by Robert 
E. Baldwin, Carl B. Hamilton, and Andre Shapir. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988. 
International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC). Bringing Agriculture 
into the GA TT: Designing Acceptable Agricultural Policies. Summary Report 
Prepared by the IA TRC, Annapolis, MD, 1988. 
National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy (NCFAP). Decoupling Farm Programs: 
A Briefing Book Issued in Conjunction with Washing ton Briefings Held on April 
28, 1988. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1988. 
Sanderson, Fred H. "Agriculture and International Trade." Washington, D.C.: The 
Council on U.S. International Trade Policy, 1988. 
Tangermann, S., T. Josling, and S. Pearson. "International Negotiations on Farm Support 
Levels: The Role of PSE's." IATRC Working Paper No. 87-3, International 
Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, Stanford University, CA, June 1987. 
Weinschenck, Gunther. "The Economic or the Ecological Way? Ba::.ic Alternatives for the 
EC's Agricultural Policy." European Review of Agricultural Economics 
14(1987):5, 50-60. 
15 
Cl'l 
-
·= :::r 
>-u 
c: 
~ 
:::r 
u 
c: 
ca 
aJ 
c. 
0 
::; 
UJ 
Pr a 
s 
Pp g 
c d 
0 Ql Q. Q2 
Reference incbme = abed 
Avefage cost of a hyJXJthetical producer 
to produce Q. = c·(Q.) 
Figure 1. Price incentive facing producers, by farm size. 
Source: Hayes and Schmitz, p.92. 
16 
CHAPTER3 
FARM INCOME SUPPORT WITH MINIMAL TRADE 
DISTORTIONS IN THE PACIFIC REGION 
David Blandford and Harry de Gorter* 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural policies are being scrutinised closely in the current Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The 
prominence of agriculture in these negotiations reflects the critical state of world 
agricultural trade, and the unsustainability of current agricultural policies in many 
countries. Most industrial countries recognise that their agricultural policies are costly, 
inefficient, and self-defeating, and that significant mutual gains can be made by a 
multilateral reduction in trade-distorting policies. Less-developed countries, faced with 
rapid population growth and growing foreign debt, need the export opportunities that would 
be created by the elimination of protectionist trade barriers in developed countries. The 
newly emerging countries, many of which are in the Pacific region, are facing increasing 
pressures for protection from domestic farm groups. They need policies which will help 
them address the "farm problem" without replicating the mistakes of the mature industrial 
countries. As yet, there has been little indication in the GA TT negotiations of how policy 
reforms will be achieved, and still ensure that important domestic agricultural policy 
objectives are met. One of the most fundamental of these objectives is the provision of 
income support for agriculture. 
Several Pacific countrie& have played a major part in putting agriculture on the 
GA TT agenda. The Cairns group of countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, 
Uruguay), which is dominated numerically by countries from the region, has made a 
substantial contribution in this regard. Because of their economic importance, other Pacific 
countries, most notably Japan and the United States, will play a key role in reaching 
agreement on agriculture in the GA TT. For these, and other countries, such as the 
European Community, a resolution of the income support issue i~ essential if there is to be a 
successful outcome to the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the problem of farm income support from the 
perspective of the industrial countries. The paper discusses the need for reform in these 
countries; the implication~ of current agricultural support policies for trade; how income 
support objectives can be met with GA TT-compatible policy measures; and identifies the 
* Blandford and de Gorter are professor and assistant profer-r-or, respectively, in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14850, 
USA. 
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implications of an Agreement for the reform of current agricultural policies in the United 
States. A major reason for the lack of progress on agriculture in the GATT has been the 
preoccupation with reducing or eliminating farm income transfers rather than the trade 
di:;tortions they create. This paper assesses current policies by their degree of trade 
distortion and the characteristics of minimally-distorting policies. The paper then discusses 
a method of income support which could form the basis for an agreement on agriculture in 
the GATT. The Production Entitlement Guarantee (PEG) would permit countries to 
provide income support to farmers and still allow them to meet a GA TT commitment to 
eliminate trade barriers and reduce trade distortions. Finally the paper assesses the 
adjustments required in current U.S. policies to implement a PEG scheme. 
THE STAKES IN THE MULTILATERAL REFORM OF 
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
Industrial countries pay heavily to support agriculture through direct transfers from 
taxpayers to producers and indirect transfers from consumers to producers through high 
consumer prices (USDA). One measure of the cost of such transfers is the producer 
subsidy equivalent (PSE) and its counterpart the consumer subsidy equivalent 
(CSE): two indicators which have been widely used in recent years. The PSE measures the 
gross producer subsidy created by government programmes relative to the market value of 
output. It incorporates the cost of direct and indirect transfers to agriculture by taxpayers, 
through input, output, and marketing subsidies, and the direct and indirect transfers to 
agriculture by consumers through policies which increase dome&tic consumer prices. The 
CSE measures the explicit and implicit consumer tax created by such policies. It is 
important to note that the PSE is a gross, cost-based measure of agricultural income 
transfers. It does not give the net effect of support on producer incomes nor provide an 
indicator of the trade-distorting effect of these transfers. Net producer transfers and trade 
distortions are dependent on the level of output, supply /demand elasticities, the method of 
transfer and the level of intervention. Indeed the transfer efficiency differs across 
different support instruments. While the PSE may capture the total costs of agricultural 
support it is likely to overstate the benefits of such support to farmers and hence any 
compensation which may have to be paid if these policies are eliminated. 
Recent information on aggregate PSEs for industrial countries is given in Figure 1. 
The estimates show that the costs of agricultural support relative to the value of output is 
highest in Japan, followed by Canada, the European Community, and the United States. 
Among the major industrial countries, Australia and New Zealand have the lowest relative 
support costs. In most countries, the PSEs have been increasing during the 1980s. The PSE 
for the European Community rose from 30 percent in 1982-82 to 50 percent in 1986. In the 
United States, the corresponding increase was from 22 to 36 percent. Only New Zealand, 
which has implemented major unilateral reforms in agricultural policy, has reduced the 
relative costs of support for agriculture. 
Figure 2 &uggest& that the elimination of the existing agricultural policies by 
industrial market economies would lead to significant net gains in economic welfare. An 
estimate of the gain for the United States is $9 billion in 1986. In the major industrial 
countries as a whole the gain would be roughly $33 billion. 
Trade liberalisation would increase world agricultural prices substantially and hence 
benefit Pacific exporters such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. 
Estimates of the world price changes resulting from complete elimination of current 
support policies are given in Table 1. The estimates differ because of the different base 
years chosen. The level of protection varies with the level of world prices, and the 
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percentage efl ect of eliminating protection also varies with the b1se. The rise in world 
prices would prnbably be greatest for dairy products and beef. Government support is high 
for these commodities and industrial country trade i& a major part of world trade. The 
effects of trade liberalisation for grains was predicted to be modc&t until the increased m.e 
of subsidies by the United States and European Community. The es1imatcs for 1986 reflect 
the effects of the increased subsidisation of grain production and exports in these countries 
in that year. 
The types of policies used affect the total costs of support in the industrial countries. 
Many policies depress consumption and increase production. Imports fall or exports rise 
and world prices are depressed. This increases the cost of mainrnining a given level of 
support. Figure 3 showr. that in the United States and Canada, a si~nificant proportion of 
the apparent support provided to producers merely offsets the the price-depressing effects 
of the policies of other countries. Significant savings to consumers and taxpayers could be 
made if policies were liberalised unilaterally, but the effectf> on domestic producers would 
be severe because world prices would remain depressed. Figure 3 indicates that the 
maximum effect on producer incomes of unilateral liberalisation in the United States in 
1986 would have been over $26 billion. This figure i& reduced to $15 billion with 
multilateral liberalisation. Hence, the mutual benefits of multilateral disarmament in 
agricultural support are very real and need to be pursued because the cost to national 
governments of achieving farm income goals through le&&-distorting measures would be 
greatly reduced if world price& were higher. 
Existing support policies are costly and extremely inefficient in tram.ferring income 
to producers. Taking the United States as an example, partial estimates of the transfer 
efficiency of policies for 1986 are set out in Table 2. In that year, the costs of support to 
domestic consumers and taxpayers was roughly $36 billion, of which roughly 75 percent 
came from taxpayers, primarily through direct government payments and price support 
expenditures. This $36 billion translated into a gross transfer to producers of just over $26 
billion. The 28 percent difference was due to inefficiencies in production and consumption 
generated by the support policies. This is due to several leakages. First, some of the 
benefits get swallowed up in increased production costs due to idled resources (e.g. through 
quotas and set-asides) or over-production. Second, some of the transfers are captured by 
foreigners because they obtain products below prices paid by Americans, e.g. through 
export subsidies and production subsidies. 
Of the $26 billion gross transfer to producers, a further $11 billion wa& required 
simply to offset the price-depressing effects of agricultural support policies in other 
industrial countries. The ratio of benefits to costs when this los& i& subtracted falls from 
over 70 percent to just over 40 percent. Of this presumed net benefit lo producers (net of 
the impact of all other countries' policies), only a part actually translates into increased 
producer income because of benefits received by up-stream and down-stream industries 
(Alston, Carter and Wohlgenant). Under current policies, part of the transfers are 
captured by output-using and input-supplying industries (e.g. export subsidies result in 
extra profits to exporting firms, dairy supports result in extra processing and storage costs 
of cheese, as well as additional profits to cheese processors, etc). Estimates of these 
additional losses are not available, but could conceivably reduce the benefit/cost ratio to 30 
percent or less. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF TRADE REFORM FOR CURRENT 
AG RI CULTURAL POLICIES 
Governments employ a myriad of instruments to provide farm income support and 
these produce different levels of trade distortions. There is no direct link between the level 
of income transfer or protection and the level of trade distortion created by support 
policies. To assess the "desirability" of alternative policy measures in agriculture requires 
an explicit definition of "GATT compatible" policy: a policy that minimises distortions in a 
country's trade volume while transferring income to farmers. This recognises the 
prerogative of national governments to transfer income to farmers. Hence, it is not 
necessary to reduce or eliminate income transfers or protection (as measured by the PSE) 
in order to reduce world market distortions. Whether a country should use part of its 
national wealth to increase agricultural incomes is essentially a domestic political issue. 
The primary objective of the GA TT negotiations should be to reduce the adverse impact of 
policies on agricultural trade and not necessarily income transfers to farmers. 
Consequently, the method of intervention becomes as or more important that the level of 
intervention in terms of distorting world markets and should be emphasised in the GATT 
negotiations (de Gorter and McClatchy 1984). 
At the outset, it is necessary to acknowledge that there does not exist a distortion free 
income transfer scheme. Any feasible scheme will lead to some behavioural adjustment, be 
it changes in entry /exit, work/leisure or saving/investment/consumption choices by agents 
in the economy that are taxed or subsidised (Harberger). The issue becomes one of a 
second best nature: can one rank alternative policies that transfer income to or from 
farmers according to the degree to which international trade is distorted'? In deriving such a 
ranking we focus on traditional commodity support policies found in industrial countries. 
Direct income transfers (welfare payments), income insurance, negative income tax 
schemes and other schemes currently being discussed as alternatives to current programmes 
are not analysed. Other transitory compensation or adjustment policies, such as trade 
adjustment assistance, are also not considered here. 
A taxonomy of major types of policy interventions for income support is outlined in 
Table 3. The categories of government programmes are based on the relative impact of the 
interventions on the volume of international trade (de Gorter). Emphasis is placed on 
commodity-specific income transfer programmes (between producers and 
consumers/taxpayers) which, except for terms-of-trade improvements or second-best 
situations, result in economic welfare being diminished for an individual country. Policy 
measures identified in category A of the table result in a divergence between the domestic 
and world market price by either placing a "wedge" between the excess supply and demand 
functions or to induce a shift in the excess supply (demand) curves. Measures identified in 
category B result in a divergence in the domestic supply and demand price and the world 
price or cause the supply and demand curves to shift. 
Border measures are inferior to domestic support measures because the former 
affect both production and consumption directly. Domestic measures can target income to 
farmers directly through production subsidies or indirectly through input subsidies. All 
other domestic policy measures are inferior compared to production subsidies because they 
target farmers indirectly and also have indirect consumption effects which adversely affect 
trade. Of the border measures identified, import/export tariffs or subsidies distort trade 
the least because these allow changes in international prices to be reflected in domestic 
prices and trade volumes, unlike quantitative restrictions, variable levies, and price fixing 
schemes. Domestic quantitative restrictions are inferior to production subsidies because 
they affect domestic prices and consumption. They are potentially superior to border 
20 
measures, but this depends on the size of their effects on prices and t ·ade. The difficulty of 
monitoring the effects of domestic quantitative restrictions on trade volumes make them an 
undesirable method of income support under the GATT. 
A combination of policy measures is typically found in most countries such that one 
cannot attribme trade distortions to a single instrument. There '::xists a continuum of 
distortions for every "package" of policy measures employed by governments. Current 
policies of acreage control and deficiency payments for grains in the United States and 
formula pricing with production and import quotas, super-levies and a two-price scheme for 
dairy in Canada are examples of how a combination of measures prcvide producer income 
support but generate very different levels of trade distortions, depending on the type of 
output restrictions in place and whether or not consumer prices are affected. 
IMPLICATIONS OF TRADE REFORM FOR FUTURE 
AGRICULTURAL POIICIES 
If the GATT negotiations are to reduce the trade distortions resulting from domestic 
policies, a critical question is whether there are policy instruments which allow national 
governments to continue to pursue their farm income support objectives, and reduce or 
eliminate trade distortions. Some economists have advocated the use of "decoupled" 
income transfers, which have generally been interpreted as direct payments without a 
production requirement. This would have desirable characteristics in theory and should be 
encouraged, but fully decoupled payments have several major shortcomings. First, the use 
of completely decoupled payments (welfare payments) is likely to be unattractive to 
policymakers and farmers since they represent a radical departure from traditional 
commodity-based transfer policies. Farmers have a psychological preference for obtaining 
a "fair" price, preferably from the market, for what they do, rather than for who they are. 
There is a welfare stigma associated with income transfers unrelated to production. It is 
unlikely that fully decoupled policies will ever by sufficiently acceptable politically to 
replace existing support instruments completely. Second, decoupling is a general principle 
not a programme. Its implementation would require modification of existing policies on a 
case-by-case basis. There is no clear-cut criteria under which decoupled policies can be 
implemented by governments or monitored through an international body such as the 
GATT. Third, decoupling has typically been discussed in the context of explicit support 
payments (e.g. deficiency payments), not in the context of indirect support payments (e.g. 
through the price increasing effect of import quota:;). The reduction of production 
distortions through the modification of existing direct payment schemes is a benefit of 
decoupling, but it does not necessarily solve the problem of consumption distortions. 
An approach that has similarities to traditional commodity programmes, but 
minimises both production and consumption distortions is Production Entitlement 
Guarantees (PEGs) (Blandford and de Gorter; Blandford et al. 1988, 1989). With a PEG 
programme, a limit is placed on the quantity of production of individual farmers eligible to 
receive support payment&. The per unit payment could be based on historical levels of price 
supports. Governments would have the option of tying payments to production and 
therefore be free of the political objections often voiced against direct payment. 
The actual production of each farmer would not be controlled. Farmers would be 
free to decide how much to produce above the quantity receiving payments. In order to 
minimise consumption and trade distortions, all existing horder measures would be 
eliminated as would all internal agricultural income transfer measure& (as identified in 
Table 3), except for payments (taxes) on the specified PEG quantities. This meam that 
consumers and users would pay the open-market price and farmers would receive this price 
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for their marketing&. The important point is that the farmer would realise returnl> for a part 
of his/her production af'. the market price plus the PEG payment. But for the remaining 
production and any increasel> in production, the anticipated return would be determined by 
market prices. 
If PEG is to be a part of the reform of agricultural policies under the GA TT, the 
quantity of production eligible for support in each country must be determined as part of 
the negotiations. As an illustration, however, Figure 4 shows the estimated adjustment of 
current world prices towards free trade levels for selected commodities, with PEGs 
established at 80 percent (PEG80) of 1986 production for industrial countries only. The 
actual level of producer support per unit is kept at that actually estimated for 1986 through 
the PSE, with all other market intervention eliminated so that consumers pay market prices. 
The results show that all commodities would experience a substantial movement 
towards free trade prices if a PEG were introduced at this level. With the exception of rice 
and sugar, a PEG 80 scheme would increase prices to over 98 percent of their free trade 
level. Even for rice and sugar, whose prices are heavily distorted by domestic support 
programmes, PEG80 prices would be roughly 93 percent of free trade prices. Hence if 
historical levels of support are maintained, but the form of support is switched to a direct 
payments system based on a fixed quantity of production, most of the benefits resulting 
from freer trade can be realised. The level of income support can be maintained but 
international distortions are greatly reduced. 
While the national volume of production eligible for support under the PEG 
programme would need to be determined through GA TT negotiations, full discretion could 
be given to national governments to determine how and to whom the initial PEGs should be 
transferable among farmers or farms on efficiency grounds. If PEGs are not transferable, 
high-cost producers would be encouraged to continue farming in order to receive benefits 
under the programme. With a transfer option they could sell their PEGs to low-cost 
producers or to the government. 
Individual PEGs could be issued to existing farmers on the basis of production quotas 
currently held (for example, in Canada) or on land "base" and "programme" yields in the 
(for example, in the United States). New entrants to farming would either purchase (lease) 
PEGs from other farmers or obtain them directly from their governments. Otherwise, they 
would produce at world market prices and receive no government payments. PEGs could be 
tied to land and be transferred with the land. Alternately, they could be given to individual 
farmers or farm workers (in which case the value of PEGs would be reflected in the value of 
a certificate of eligibility if the government allowed thil> to he transferable). 
If governments wish to have a pool of PEGs for new entrants, then a fixed percentage 
of all private PEG transactions (farm-to-farm sales, parents to son/daughter, etc.) could be 
automatically reclaimed to pass on to these entrants. Reclaimed PEG!> could also be used to 
reduce the national quantity of production eligible for support to less than free-trade output 
levels. Government purchases of PEGs could also be used to transfer support eligibility to 
new entrants, to eliminate ("buy out") high cost production causing trade distortions, or 
even to phase out support payments completely. 
REQUIRED ADJUSTMENTS IN THE AG RI CULTURAL POLICIES 
OF THE UNITED STA TES 
The specific adjustments which would have to be made in U.S. agricultural policies 
would he dependent on the exact terms of a GATT agreement on agriculture. The 
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conversion of existing non-tariff barriers to ta riffs ("ta riffication "), for example, would 
require a radically different approach than the phased eliminati )n of trade-distorting 
support based on an aggregate measure, such as the PSE. However the general directions 
of domestic reform can be identified under the assumption that trade distorting forms of 
support are phased-out, and replaced by decoupled payments or a PEG-type scheme at least 
during a period of transition. 
A GA TT agreement to eliminate trade-distorting support would require the phase-
out of protection from import quotas for dairy and sugar, support prices (dairy support 
price, loan rates, target prices etc.), import tariffs and export subsidies (e.g. export 
enhancement programmes) and acreage and production controls. For grains, rice, and 
cotton, U.S. target price/deficiency payment programmes have already evolved towards a 
PEG-type scheme. Consumer prices are at world market prices and, in principle at least, 
U.S. policy can be adjusted so that production is determined on the margin at the world 
market price. That is to say, "programme" yields and base acreage provisions restrict the 
amount of production on which payments are made, not production itself. However, the 
levels of base and programme yields may be too high. Many polential problems exist 
(because of current or past programmes) which may distort production and trade. These 
problems, categorised under their effects on yield and acreage, can serve as an example of 
the potential problems the GATT must be aware of in implementing a PEG type scheme or 
other decoupled options. 
Factors Affecting Yield 
A number of factors may shift the yield curve to the right, including: 
o Average quality of land in production increases because lower quality land is 
diverted; 
o Additional gains in productivity (family labour and management) on land in 
production as a result of allocating fixed resources over a reduced number of 
acres. 
o A uniform target price across crop qualities induces production of lower-quality, 
higher-yielding varieties. 
o Diverted land planted the following year has more moisture to increase yields 
(like summer fallow). 
Furthermore, an increased intensity of resource u&e may occur on land in production 
because deficiency payments are a function of programme yields, which in previous years 
were a function of historical yields. This phenomenon re:>ult:> in a move along the yield 
function. The extent to which this is occurring depends on: 
o Expectations on when programme yield will hccomc "unfro/cn '; 
o How programme yields adjust lo optimal yield:>, at the target pri{e, i.e., the 
nature of the policy rule; 
o The gap between programme yields and the optimal yield at target prices; 
o The discount rate farmers use on future earnings; 
o The expectations of future programme benefits, i.e., the expected level of target 
prices relative to market price:>. 
Indeed, it is possible that the programme yields fro'.len in the 1985 Farm Bill are well above 
the free market yield, potentially resulting in output above free market levels (this depends 
on the relative level of programme yields to the free market yield and the level of acres 
diverted). 
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In summary, in order to make the yield part of current U.S. policy compatible with a 
GATT agreement to minimise trade distortions, land diversion must be eliminated, 
deficiency payment1> must be differentiated across commodity qualities and programme 
yields upon which payments are based ("payment eligibility yields") should be fixed 
permanently below free market levels. This latter aspect would need to be evaluated 
carefully in its determination, implementation and monitoring, particularly if technology 
increases actual yields so much that programme yields need to be adjusted in the future. 
Factors Affecting Acreage 
Factors that affect the level of aggregate acreage in the U.~. and hence potentially 
distort trade include: 
o Acreage diversion and/or set-aside; 
o The level of base acreage (upon which deficiency payments are based) could be 
greater or less than acreage under free markets; 
o Base acreage can be expanded because it is a function of a five-year moving 
average of historical plantings or considered plantings (the latter includes 
diverted acreage), resulting in an expansion of base acreage to take advantage of 
programme payments (by non-participants or participants who historically have 
not planted their allowable maximum). 
Acreage diversion and an "endogenous" base acreage can affect entry /exit decisions, 
production and hence distort trade. The existence of deficiency payments has and doei> 
induce entry into crop production in terms of increasing the number of farmers, the base 
and hence aggregate output. In addition, the exit of productive land in crops that may 
otherwise have occurred has been stymied. Hence, acreage diversion would have to be 
abolished and "payment eligibility acreage" in the form of current base acreage should be 
fixed (i.e. frozen) permanently (but made tradeable between farmers) and be set at levels 
well below current levels to ensure current target prices have no effect on trade. 
To make other programme elements compatible with a GA TT agreement to 
eliminate trade distortions, non-recourse loans would need to be eliminated. The 
government could still hold stocks for security reasons, but all purchases and sales would 
have to be made at market prices. Related policies such as export subsidies and surplus 
disposal through payment-in-kind certificates would be eliminated. Payment limitations 
could be maintained, tightened or eliminated as U.S. political conditions demanded. 
For other supported commodities, notably sugar, dairy, tobacco, and peanuts, a 
scheme similar to the one described above for the target-price crops would be implemented. 
Existing measures which distort consumer prices, such as import quotas, would be phased 
out. For example, for dairy, the government could issue a production "base" to each farmer 
determined by some fraction of historical production. Payments could be set at the current 
level of price support. The fluid price differential, import quotas and tariffs, and support 
purchases would all be eliminated. 
The Bochwitz-Boren bill, which was debated by Congress in 1985, closely 
approximates a PEG scheme for crops. It proposed free7ing payment bases at or near 
current programme levels and making future payments at a declining rate, independent of 
output or input decisions. The Boschwit7 approach has so far failed to be enacted, but its 
time may come as part of multilateral agricultural policy reform. Although a PEG 
programme would not nece1>sarily require a phase down of the level of support, it would 
require the extension of the Boschwitz approach to other commodities currently receiving 
support in the United States. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The lib,~ralisation of international agricultural trade through the GATT process 
would lead to significant gain& in the economic welfare of P:tcific Rim countries. 
Substantial savings hy consumer& and taxpayers would outweigh producer losses I rom freer 
trade in those countries that subsidise farmers. The phased elimination of current trade-
distorting agricultural income support measures in all countries will increase world market 
prices and reduce adjustment costs. A substantial part of current farm subsidies merely 
offset the effects of other countries' policies on prices. Nevertheless, mechanisms will have 
to be found to provide at least transitory compensation or adjustment assistance to those 
affected by trade liberalisation. 
A system of direct payments (taxes) such as Production Entitlement Guarantees 
(PEGs) which are coupled in design but decoupled in effect could provide income transfers 
to farmers with minimal trade distortions. A PEG scheme can be implemented 
independently of the type of agreement reached on how to phase out trade-distorting 
policies (e.g. through tariffication or the use of phased reductions in existing policies based 
upon an aggregate measure of support). It provides policymakers with the necessary 
flexibility since this type of scheme can either be a transitory mechanism for compensation 
and adjustment assit-.tancc under a negotiated agreement on the reduction of trade-
distorting policies, or a more permanent vehicle for income trant-.fer& within such an 
agreement. Finally, it is a more efficient vehicle for achieving compensation, adjustment 
assistance or income tram.fers than most existing programmes. 
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Study 
The predicted effects of industrial country trade liberalization on world agricultural prices 
Period Wheat Coarse 
grains 
Rice Beef (a) Dairy 
products 
Sugar 
- - - - - - - - - - - - per cent change in world price - - - - - - - - - - - -
OECD (!) 1979-81 -I -3 l 15 44 10 
Tyers and Anderson (2) 1980-82 IO 3 l l 27 61 11 
Roningen and Dixit (3) 1984 7 11 18 22 30 48 
Tyers & Anderson (4) 1985 2 J 5 16 27 5 
Roningen and Dixit (5) 1986 30 23 24 18 50 39 
r::irikh et al. (6) 2000 18 l l 21 17 31 NA 
"(a) all ruminant meat in sources (2), (3), (4) and (5); bovine and ovine meat in source (6)" 
NA = not available 
Sources: (I) OECO (1987); (2) Tyers and Anderson (1987); Roningen and Dixit {1987); (4) Tycrs and Anderson (1986) 
table 13; (5) Roningen an<l Dixit (1989); (6) Parikh et al. (1988). 
Table 2. Costs and benefits of U.S. agricultural policies, 
1986 
Taxpayer and consumer costs $36.3 billion 
Maximum producer benefits $26.3 billion 
Loss through policy offsets $11.3 billion 
Maximum net benefits $15.0 billion 
Ratio of net benefits to costs 41% 
Table 3. A taxonomy of policy interventions in world agriculture 
A. EXTERNAL (Border measures which directly result in a wedge (or sever the link) 
between international and domestic prices] 
I. Import tariffs/quotas (including countervailing, anti-dumping and excise 
duties, undervalued exchange rates, state-trading and domestic price supports 
with variable import levies). 
2. Export taxes/quotas (including "voluntary" export restraints, minimum price 
agreements, orderly marketing arrangements, overvalued exchange rates, 
state-trading and domestic price ceilings with variable export taxes).· 
3. Export/import subsidies (including concessional credit, export enhancement 
programs and domestic price suppJrts with variable export restitution 
payments). 
B. INTERNAL [Domestic measures which directly affect supply /demand] 
l. Production subsidies (including price supports with deficiency payments, 
"stabilization" payments and government procurement) and taxes (including 
co-responsibility levies). 
2. Production/marketing quotas (including two-price schemes, super-levies, 
maximum guaranteed quantities) and input controls (e.g., acreage set-asides). 
3. Consumption taxes, quotas (rationing) or subsidies (including domestic price 
ceilings with consumer deficiency payments and domestic food aid). 
4. Input subsidies (for credit, fertilizer, irr;gation, crop insurance, interest rates, 
etc.) and taxes (e.g., land). 
5. Marketing taxes (e.g., value-added tax) and subsidies (e.g., transportation 
subsidies). 
6. Imperfect market structure (producer monopolies, monopolist/monopsonist, 
consumer (parastatal) monopolies, etc.). 
Note: Several categories of government policies affecting agriculture are explJcltly excluded: 
foreign food aid; public stock holding activities; "market failure" corrections (including 
public provision of cost-reducing public goods such as R&D, health standards, etc,); 
"structural" and rural "development" type policies; and macro (monetary and fiscal) policies. 
Source: de Gorter. 
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CHAPTER4 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN EAST ASIAN AGRICULTURE 
Sophia Wu Huang and William T Coyle* 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural trade liberalisation is an important issue in current GA TT negotiations. 
East Asial -- Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan--has long been the object of complaints by its 
trading partners because of its highly restrictive trade policy. Typical examples are the 
lengthy and recently concluded U.S.-Japan talks on liberalisation of beef and citrus imports 
and U.S.-Taiwan talks on imports of turkey parts. There are still other agricultural issues 
like the U.S. rice millers' complaint about East Asia's near ban on rice imports, and the 
current GA TT case against Korean beef. 
Despite rapid economic development in the past three decades, East Asia has 
maintained an inefficient, small-farm economy by heavy Government protection. Under 
the pressures of trade liberalisation and increasing import demands, East Asia has 
gradually and reluctantly opened up its markets to imports of agricultural products. 
Further liberalisation of its farm markets seems inevitable. A:;, East Asia proceeds from 
emphasising food self-sufficiency to accepting a more market-oriented approach for its 
agriculture, structural adjustment issues will become increasingly important. 
In fact, agricultural structure in East Asia has continuously changed, and more 
rapidly during the past three decades. In the 1960's when South Korea and Taiwan, 
together with Singapore and Hong Kong, began to emerge as the newly indu:;,trialised 
economies of the Far East, Japan's agriculture faced the problem of adjusting to rapid 
economic development. The problem was later shared by both South Korea and Taiwan in 
the 1970's. During the course of rapid economic growth, changes were dramatic in the 
agricultural sectors of the three. The pattern of their structural changes provides useful 
information about future adjustment to trade liberalisation. 
The purpose of this study is to compare the agricultural sectors of Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, focusing on the structural changes that have occurred since 1960. 
Changes in supply of and demand for agricultural products, land utilisation, farm 
households, and farm family income are discussed. An examination of these structural 
changes may provide us with a better understanding of the prospects of East Asian trade 
liberalisation and its effects on East Asian agricultural sectors and on trade prospects in the 
Pacific Rim. 
* Sophia Wu Huang and William T. Coyle are agricultural economists with the Economic 
Research Service, US Department of Agriculture. 
1 East Asia is used synonymously for "Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan'' or the "the three" 
throughout this paper. 
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CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Ever since it recovered from World War II, East Asia has enjoyed much faster 
growth in manufacturing than in agriculture, resulting in a dramatic decline in the role of 
agriculture. Among the three, Japan began its "miraculous" postwar economic growth from 
a relatively larger industrial base. Japanese agriculture's contribution to the net domestic 
product declined from 12.9 percent in 1960-64 to 2.9 percent in 1985-87. Both the South 
Korean and Taiwanese economies have been more dominated by agriculture. In the early 
1960's, about 40 perc~nt of South Korea's output was from agriculture and about 30 percent 
of Taiwan's. The importance of agriculture declined to 12.8 percent and 6.5 percent in 
1985-87 for South Korea and Taiwan (Table 1). 
Supply of Agricultural Commodities 
Over the years, the most obvious change in the agricultural production mix (Table 1) 
has been the decline in the relative importance of rice and other field crops and the rise in 
higher valued, land-saving products such as fruits, vegetables, and certain livestock 
products. The most dramatic example is Taiwan. Once rice and sugar were Taiwan's major 
agricultural exports and sources of foreign exchange earnings-- about 47 percent of total 
exports in 1960. The share of rice and sugar in total exports declined to an insignificant 0.07 
percent in 1987 (Council for Economic Planning and Development). 
Although the importance of rice production is decreasing, rice--the staple of East 
Asia--is still the dominant crop. Among the three, Taiwan decreased its rice production 
share the most. The value share of rice in agricultural production in Taiwan decreased from 
40 percent in the early 1960's to about 18 percent in 1985-87. Recent declines were mainly 
related to Taiwan's riceland diversion program initiated in 1984 to shift rice area to other 
crops. Compared with Taiwan, the decrease in the share of rice in agricultural production 
was moderate from 54 percent to 37 percent in South Korea and from 46 percent to 33 
percent in Japan during the same period, even though Japan has a longer history of riceland 
diversion programs than Taiwan. 
In contrast to declining crop production, the importance of the livestock sector rose 
dramatically. South Korea has the smallest livestock sector among the three, but gained 
ground from less than 10 percent of value share in the early 1960's to about 25 percent in 
1985-87. Over the same period, that share in Japan increased from 17 percent to 27 percent 
and in Taiwan from 26 percent to 40 percent. There was a rapid increase in the importance 
of swine and poultry in Taiwan, and of cattle and swine in South Korea and of milk and 
cattle in Japan. One major characteristic of the East Asian livestock sector is that it 
depends almost entirely on imported coarse grains and oilseeds because of scarce land 
resources and comparative disadvantage in feed production. Despite Taiwan's dependence 
on imported feed, its hog sector has been transformed from a backyard farm activity before 
the 1970's into a commercially competitive export enterprise in recent years. 
Demand for Agricultural Commodities 
Sustained income growth, urbanisation, and westernisation in East Asia have caused 
substantial shifts in the composition of food consumption. Greater quantities of a wider 
variety of foods than before have replaced traditional foods--predominantJy rice. The 
consumption of meats, dairy products, fruits, and vegetables increased substantially over 
the past three decades (Table 2). 
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Over the years, per capita consumption of cereals in Japan decreased substantially 
from 135 kg in the early 1960's to 107 kg in 1985-87; similarly in Taiwan, consumption 
decreased from 158 kg to 114 kg in the same period. Per capita con mmption of cereals in 
South Korea stayed at about 186 kg in the 1980's. Among the three, cereals provide the 
largest source of calories in South Korea. 
The consumption of meats and milk in East Asia increased over the years. In 
particular, per capita consumption of meats in Taiwan increased from 17 kg in the early 
1960's to 56 kg in 1985-87. Meat consumption in Japan and South Korea--about one-half of 
Taiwan's--increased steadily from less than 10 kg lo about 26 kg during the same period. 
Fish is another important protein food in East Asia. Per capita consumption of fish in 
Japan and Taiwan increased and stayed around 35 kg after the 1970's. with some increase in 
Korean consumption which reached about 31 kg in 1985-87. However, caution is needed in 
making cross-country comparisons on meat and fish consumption; J.1pan and South Korea 
apparently report edible weight, while Taiwan reports retail weight. Milk consumption has 
steadily increased in East Asia; the consumption level in 1985-87 was 68 kg in Japan, 33 kg 
in Taiwan, and 23 kg in South Korea (Fig.2). While animal products as sources of protein 
supply increased in all three over the years, animal products have had a far less significant 
role in South Korea than in Japan or Taiwan. 
Per capita consumption of vegetables and fruits in East Asia increased substantially 
as diet diversified. The consumption of vegetables and fruits has increased remarkably in 
Taiwan with vegetables increasing from 58 kg in the early 1960's to 124 kg in 1985-87, and 
fruits increasing even more rapidly from 20 kg to 85 kg. Although both per capita 
consumption of vegetables and fruits in Taiwan was lower than Japan in the 1960s, the 
consumption passed that of Japan in the late 1970s. The consumption of vegetables and 
fruits in South Korea also increased rapidly, but its level of fruit conr.umption was relatively 
low. 
The rapid increases in the consumption of high-valued foodstuffs such as meat and 
dairy products corresponding to income rises in East Asia has resulted in sharp increases in 
the import demand for food and feed imports. In addition, recent developments such as 
currency realignment and trade liberalisation measures have led to increases in East Asia's 
imports of high-value products. Between 1961 and 1987, the value of farm imports by the 
three increased about two times faster than the world total. In 1987, East Asia's value share 
of world imports amounted to about 11 percent for wheat, nearly 28 percent for soybeans, 
31 percent for corn, 30 percent for cotton, 9 percent for beef, and 25 percent for pork. 
Japan, South Korea, and to a lesser degree Taiwan, however, impose strict 
restrictions on imports to protect their farmers and promote food self -sufficiency. Raw 
materials such as feed grains and oilseeds for livestock production and fibers and hides for 
industrial use face the least significant border restrictions. Imports of other bulk, low-value 
commodities, such as wheat, are discouraged by the Governments. Many high-value and 
processed products face high tariffs, tight quotas, or prohibitions. In fact, agricultural trade 
policies in East Asia have become a major bone of contention with its trade partners, 
particularly the United States, for which East Asia has become the largest market for its 
exports. Under pressure from the United States, East Asia ha& gradually liberalised its 
agricultural trade. 
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CHANGES IN LAND UTILISATION 
Cultivated Land and Farm Size 
Over the years, East Asia has tried to minimise urban and industrial encroachment 
into farm areas through land reclamation and restoration. Nevertheless, cultivated land in 
Japan decreased about 12 percent from 6,068 thousand hectares in the early 1960's to 5,359 
thousand hectares in 1985-87. Cultivated land in South Korea and Taiwan, on the other 
hand, increased about 3.3 percent and 1.6 percent during the same period (Table 3). 
East Asian farms are characterised by extremely small-&cale family operations. 
Even with some decrease in the number of farm hou&eholds during the course of rapid 
economic growth in the last decades, average farm si:ze remain& small (table 3). In Japan, 
the average size of farms increased from 1.04 hectares in the 1960's to 1.24 hectares in 1985-
87. Over the same period, average farm size in South Korea increased from 0.86 hectare to 
1.12 hectares, and in Taiwan from 1.08 hectares to 1.16 hectares. In addition, as indicated in 
many research papers such as Lee and Chen, Moon, and Hayami (1988), it is common in 
East Asia for one household to own several small plots of land scattered in several locations 
so that each plot is even smaller than indicated by average farm size. 
Among many factors, the rigid land tenure system is one major factor that hinders 
enlarging farm size in the region. The similarity of small farm size in Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan is related in part to the historical coincidence of land reform in the early 1950's. 
With the same American land-reform adviser, Wolf Ladejinsky, the three countries 
completed the unprecedented transformation away from a system based on tenants to one 
relying on owner-cultivators (Scitovsky). In a short period, East Asia's agriculture was in 
the hands of a large number of small owners. 
The land tenure system has been a major institutional impediment for the 
development of large farms in East Asia. Some land reform regulations, such as the 
limitation on the size of landholdings, the near impossibility of reclaiming leased land, and 
the difficulty of freely selling farmland, have seriously hampered the enlargement of farm 
size. In addition, urban and industrial development have resulted in high farmland prices. 
Farmers, especially those for whom farming provides only part of the household income, 
maintain their landholdings as an asset and thus hamper full-time farmers from enlarging 
their farm operations. Thus, the rapidly rising price of land coupled with restrictions placed 
on land sales have combined to limit the enlargement of farm size. 
Policymakers in East Asia have been well aware of the need of enlarging the size of 
farm operations, in particular after each of the three reached it& turning point in which a 
labor surplus gave way to scarcity and mechanisation became the only way to overcome the 
labor constraint. In Japan, as indicated in Hayami (1988), the ceiling of 3 hectares (12 
hectares in Hokkaido) on land holdings was removed by an amendment to the Land Law in 
1962. The law was amended again in 1970 and 1980. In addition, with the amendment of the 
Agricultural Development Act of 1975 and finally, the Farmland Utilization Promotion Act 
of 1980, the regulations on tenancy contracts were greatly relaxed. Furthermore, several 
efforts have been made to utilise large machines efficiently on small farms, such as the 
organisation of machinery utilisation cooperatives and contract farm operations by machine 
owners. 
In South Korea, however, the guidelines implemented in the 1950 Land Reform Act 
are still effective. These guidelines are as follows: (1) the Government would purchase 
farmland over a ceiling of 3 hectares from landlords and distribute it to tenant farmers, (2) 
only farmers could own farmland, and (3) the tenant system was prohibited (W-K Kim). 
Suggestions on future productivity increase~ include enlarging the scale of farming by 
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legalising land lea&ing, facilitating contract or group farming, ar d by raii.ing the land 
ownership ceiling for arable land above the present 3 hectare& (Huang). 
In Taiwan, ever since the land reform in the early 1950's, the and tenure system has 
been very rigid. The Government, however, encouraged some important institutional 
changes including joint decisionmaking in specific operations, joint management and 
contract farming, and the promotion of specialised production areas. Beginning in 1983, the 
Second Phase of the Farmland Reform Program was put into practice. With the subsequent 
amendment of other related regulations, the program establishes a new land-tenure system 
that allows the enlargement of farm operations without affecting land ownership (Mao). 
Multiple Cropping Index 
A multiple cropping index defined here as the ratio of planted area to cultivated area 
(expressed in percentage) is a convenient indicator to measure the intensity of land 
utilisation. To increase the utilisation of land, labour, farm machinery, and infrastructural 
facilities, multiple cropping has been an important farming practice in East Asia. However, 
with the labor shortage and opportunities to earn off-farm income, cropping patterns have 
changed to favor a single crop, resulting in a decreasing trend in total planted area in East 
Asia (Table 3). In addition to labor and other factors, climate is also an important factor 
affecting the extent of multiple cropping. 
In Taiwan, the subtropical climate renders possible double cropping and even triple 
cropping in the south, and thus its multiple cropping index is the highest in the region, 
followed by South Korea and Japan. Before the 1970's when there was a serious shortage of 
land but a surplus of labour in agriculture, the chief target of Taiwan's economic planning 
for agriculture was to increase crop production through improving land productivity. In 
addition to introducing technical innovations, labour-inteni.ive farming was emphasii.ed. 
Multiple cropping i.ystem1. were developed and widely practiced by farmers, and thu1. 
Taiwan's multiple-cropping index rose and reached almost 190 percent in 1964. Since then, 
except when the general economy was in recession and the lahour force flocked back into 
the agricultural sector, out-migration has accelerated, and the labour shortage has become 
a limiting factor in the practice of a multiple cropping system. Consequently, a rapid 
downward trend in the multiple cropping index prevailed, and it was only 142 in 1985-87, a 
24 percent drop from the early 1960's, yet still the highest in East Asia. 
The multiple cropping index in South Korea is much smaller than Taiwan's mainly 
because of South Korea's less favorable climate; the index has not risen above 150 percent 
since the 1960's. Double cropping is possible mainly by alternating rice with barley--a 
subsistence crop. If barley had been a commercial crop, there might have been a stronger 
tendency to retain it as a second crop (S-Y Kim). The multiple cropping index in South 
Korea fluctuated between 136 and 147 during 1960-75, when the farm labour shortage was 
not yet a serious problem. Fluctuations were mainly in response to changes in the prices 
paid for the second crop. The cropping intensity has decreased steadily since 1976 with the 
cropping index only 121 in 1985-87, when the farm la hour shortage became acute. 
Japan has the 1.malle&t multiple cropping index among the three, in part because of it~ 
temperate climate similar to South Korea's. Moreover, Japan's agriculture had already 
reached its turning point by 1960 when labour became scarce. Japan's multiple cropping 
index decreased all the way from 131 in the 1960's to about 103 in the 1970's and has stayed 
there since. 
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CHANGES IN FARM HOUSEHOLDS AND INCOMES 
The characteristics of farm households in Ea&t Asia have changed in the following 
two ways: one is a sharp upward trend in the proportion of nonfarm receipts in total farm 
family income, and the other is a substantial ri&e in the proportion of part-time farmers. 
There are, however, some differences in which the pattern in Taiwan and Japan differs from 
that in South Korea. 
In Japan, farm household income from off-farm sources increased from 55.7 percent 
in the early 1960's to 85.5 percent in 1985-87. In South Korea, off-farm income was not 
significant in the early 1960's at only 18.4 percent, but the percentage increased to 37.6 
percent in 1985-87. The available data in Taiwan show that average off-farm income in 1966 
and 1968 was 40.7 percent, increasing to 66.2 percent in the early 1980's, and remaining 
fairly steady at 62.9 percent in recent years (Table 4). 
Farm Households 
Farm households in East Ar.ia can be classified as full-time or part-time. Part-lime 
farm hou&eholds can be further classified into class I if their farm income comprises more 
than 50 percent of total household income and class II for the remainder. In 1985-87, the 
number of full-time farm households represented only 14.6 percent and 11.3 percent 
respectively in Japan and Taiwan, while South Korea still maintained 79 percent of its total 
as full-time farm households (Table 4). 
Of the part-time farm households, the class JI households have increased in 
importance over the years, particularly in Japan and Taiwan. Japan's class II part-time 
farms accounted for 69.5 percent of total farm households in 1985-87, increasing from 40.9 
percent in the early 1960's. Class-II part-time farmers increased drastically in Taiwan from 
22.6 percent in the early 1960's to 68.5 percent in 1985-87. South Korea, however, had a 
much smaller percentage and a slower rate of change in its percentage of class-II farms; it 
was only 12.6 percent in 1985-87, compared with 7.7 percent in the late 1960's (Table 4). 
The rising importance of off-farm activities reflects the competition for labour 
resulting from the growth of the industrial sector. Also, mechanisation of many farm 
operations has made it possible for many members of farm households to seek employment 
elsewhere. In addition, the desire of farmers to maintain landholdings a& an asset despite 
their inability to work full time is also responsible for the situation. In particular, the policy 
and production of rice, the most important crop in East Asia, has been geared to part-time 
farming, particularly in Japan (Hayami, 1988) and to a lesser degree in Taiwan. 
Comparison of Farm and Urban Workers' Incomes 
Although the increased number of part-time farms has decreased the efficiency of 
agricultural production in Japan, the increase in off-farm earnings has helped to achieve the 
prime policy goal of income parity between farm and nonf arm f amities. In Japan, per capita 
income for farm households was about 22 percent lower than that of urban workers' in the 
early 1960's; however, this was reversed in the 1970's when average per capita farm 
household income surpassed that of its urban counterpart (Table 4). This is in part due to 
Japanese policy which bas long shifted from exploiting agriculture for the sake of industrial 
development to subsidising and protecting agriculture after the enactment of the 
Agricultural Basic Law in 1961. The law set equality in income and standards of living 
between farm and nonfarm workers as a prime policy goal (Hayami, 1988). Since then, 
Government interventions, particularly restrictive border measures, have become the 
hallmark of Japanese agricultural policy. 
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Although South Korea shifted its policy orientation towarc greater agricultural 
protection in the 1970's, per capita income for farm households relative to urban workers is 
much less than that in Japan. The ratio of per capita income of farm to urban workers was 
over 100 percent in the early 1960's, but the ratio dropped to about 89 percent after 1975. 
Because farm household!> obtain about one-third of their income from off-farm sources, a 
much lower share than that reported in Taiwan and Japan, South Korea has managed to 
equalise rural and urban incomes primarily through costly agricultural protection. 
Recently, the Government has acknowledged that constantly escalating farm prices to 
maintain agricultural income parity is not a sustainable policy in the long run. Development 
of off-farm income sources has to expand. The Rural Development Fllnd was established in 
1986, among other purposes, to develop rural industries, sideline businesses, and other 
nonfarm income sources for rural residents. Also, the sixth Five Year Economic Plan 
(1987-1991) calls for financial and tax incentives for locating businesses in rural areas 
(Huang). 
In Taiwan, the ratios of per capita income between farm and urban workers' 
households were in general not favorable to farm operators; however, some improvements 
have been made recently. As Taiwan's agricultural development reached a turning point in 
the late 1960's when the supply of rural labour for the first time began to shrink, 
agricultural program!> emphasised improvement in labour productivity and provided 
subsidies to farmer!>. In 1973, the Government carried out an "Accelerated Rural 
Development Program" to 5peed up the process of agricultural modernisation. It brought 
improvements in farm credit and agricultural mechanisation by providing financial and 
technical assistance. In addition to the program, the Government abolished programs 
detrimental to rice farmers, notably the rice-for-fertiliser barter system. The Government 
also established a rice stabilisation fund in 1974 to guarantee producer rice prices. Official 
procurement prices were raised to, and then kept above, free-market levels, while the 
import ban continued. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Postwar economic development in East Asia has caused significant structural 
changes in the agricultural sector. Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in the region 
has brought a similar pattern of change in agricultural production and consumption, and in 
land utilisation and farm households across these countries. 
The agricultural production mix has shifted away from depending mainly on a few 
staple crops such as rice to land-saving, high-value products such as fruits, vegetables, and 
livestock products. A wider variety of foods has gradually replaced the traditional di.et. 
The importance of animal products as a protein source rose substantially, while the 
importance of cereals and starchy roots as sources of calorie supply decreased. 
To meet the increasing demand for farm products, East Asia depends heavily on 
agricultural imports, mainly bulk commodities from the United States, to keep the 
livestock, flour milling, and export-oriented industries of textile and leather goods in 
operation. In fact, East Asia has increasingly become a coveted market for agricultural 
exports, and has become the world's largest net importing region of farm products in recent 
years. The East Asian market will continue to offer both opportunity and challenge for 
exporting countries, particularly in the Pacific Rim. 
East Asian agriculture faces slow deterioration in contrast to the rapidly growing 
industrial sector. The agricultural sector has heen limited by inherent shortcomings such as 
the meagre endowment of land relative to labor. Average farm size has remained about one 
hectare since 1960. Furthermore, as off-farm opportunitie5 and om-migration increased 
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during the cour~c of rapid economic growth, labour, in addition to land, ha~ become a 
primary constraint to further agricultural productivity growth. 
The Governments in East Asia have experimented with various adjustment measures 
to cope with deteriorating terms of trade in agriculture. Measures such as relaxing land 
tenure regulations and enlarging the scale of farm operations have been introduced. But, 
most of all, the Governments have increasingly relied on direct policy intervention, in 
particular on trade restrictions, to protect the farm sectors. 
The structural bottleneck which has existed for decades in East Asian agriculture, 
however, will not break up easily. Despite deregulating land rental markets in Japan and 
Taiwan, the lingering effects of land tenure laws and other factors such as the traditional 
attachment to land and high land prices will still constrain farm size enlargement. Also, the 
fragmented nature of rural landholdings will continue to inhibit farmland consolidation and 
economies of scale. In addition, high levels of protection for rice and other crops that 
reduce the pre~&ure for adjustment is a major impediment to reaching larger, more 
competitive farms. Structural adjustment will be difficult to attain unless the Governments 
are willing to reorient their protection policy. 
Structural reform and trade liberalisation measures would be complementary, with 
the latter satisfying the repeated access demands of foreign food suppliers and putting cost-
cutting pressure on East Asian farmers. There are, however, many obstacles standing in the 
way of speeding up agricultural trade liberalisation in East Asia. The heavy political weight 
of the agricultural population as well as concerns about equalising farm and nonfarm 
income and food security are major deterrents. 
Among the three, Japan, which heavily protects its agriculture, has shown dramatic 
change recently. One notable example was the freezing of rice prices in 1985 and 1986 and 
then significant cuts in these prices in 1987 and 1988, after 20 years of steady increases. 
Another example was the beef and citrus agreement in July 1988 which will remove quotas 
by 1991; the beef and citrus issue had been a bone of contention for the United States for 
over 20 years. Despite these important recent changes in agricultural policy, changes in 
Japanese agricultural and trade policy have been slow and peripheral to the fundamental 
issue of rice policy reform. In addition, the advocacy for the status quo of Japan's 
agricultural establishment--the iron triangle of MAFF-Zenchu-the LDP--cannot be 
underestimated. 
As to South Korea and Taiwan, although both have opened up their farm markets 
over the years, the recent dramatic acceleration of political democratisation in both areas is 
expected to allow the agricultural sector a far greater voice, and thus perhaps complicate 
the trade liberalisation process. For example, in Taiwan, opposition to importing U.S. 
turkey meat became violent, as recent demonstrations by local farmers showed. In South 
Korea, the announcement of limited beef imports under quota was met with stormy protests 
by farmers. South Korea, in particular, has a much more difficult problem with trade 
liberalisation than Taiwan, mainly because of fewer off-farm opportunities and a much 
higher percentage of rural population than Taiwan. 
East Asia's increasing prominence as a global economic power, however, has 
stimulated internal debates and external pressure for structural adjustment in agriculture. 
External pressure for agricultural trade liberalisation will likely continue while the East 
Asian trade surplus remains large, making structural adju~tments within its agricultural 
sector necessary. 
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The di1 ection of future structural adjustment in East Asian agriculture probably 
would focus on making the sector more competitive to cope with foreign competition from 
agricultural r,mports. There are some characteristics that cou Id facilitate structural 
adjustment in the East Asian agriculture--for example, the prevalence of part-time farming, 
particularly in Japan and Taiwan. With the relaxation of the land te1mre system, these part-
time farm operators, who derive most of their income from off-farm activities, are likely to 
rent out most of their land to full-time progressive farmers, perhaps retaining a small 
garden plot. Full-time farmers would then have the opportunity to enlarge their farm size 
and take advantage of economies of scale and reduce their costs. Also, over the years, 
certain sectors of East Asian agriculture have undergone more changes than others, and 
some have even become export competitive such as Taiwan's pork and Japan's citrus 
sectors. Thus, East Asia could continue to concentrate on land-saving types of farm 
activities like horticulture, chicken, and pork production. 
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Table 1: Structure of Agricultural Production 
Period 1960-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-87 
Japan 
- Percent -
Share of agr. products 1,2 
(Gross national product): 12.8 10.3 6.0 5.2 3.4 2.9 
Crop-livestock production: 
Rice 45.7 44.1 35.8 36.9 31. 3 33.1 
Livestock and products 17.4 20.8 25.3 26.0 28.7 27.4 
Others 36.9 35.1 38.9 37.1 40.0 39.5 
South Korea 
Share of agr. products2 
(Net domestic product): 40.3 31. 6 25.8 21. 7 14.9 12.8 
Crop livestock production: 
Rice 53.5 37.8 40.0 40.1 36.0 37.1 
Livestock and products 7.0 13.0 14.4 15.6 24.9 24.8 
Others 45.8 60.9 45.6 44.3 39.1 38.l 
Taiwan 
Share of agr. products2 
(Net domestic product): 29.7 23.6 15.1 12.5 8.7 6.5 
Crop-livestock production: 
Rice 40.2 35.2 30.7 29.l 24.4 17.9 
Livestock and products 25.5 26.4 32.5 35.9 37.4 40.2 
Others 34.3 38.4 36.8 35.0 38.2 41. 9 
1 Data for 85-87 is the average of 1985 and 1986 
2 Including agriculture, forestry, and fishery. 
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Table 2: Structure of food consumption 
Period 1960-64 65-69 70-74 7':J- 79 80-84 85-87 
Japan 
consumption:l Per capita - Kilograms -
Cereals 135.1 138. 3 125.7 118. 3 111. 2 107.3 
Meats 7.1 10.7 15.2 19.9 23.3 25.7 
Eggs 6.8 10.5 14.6 14.5 14.7 15.3 
Fish 26.5 30.5 33.6 3L,. 7 34.7 36.1 
Milk 30.9 42.9 51. 5 51'.2 65.6 67.5 
Vegetables 94.0 117 .4 115 .2 113. 2 110. 7 109.1 
Fruits 28.2 33.7 41.1 41. 2 38.3 37.1 
SQYth Korea 
Per capita consumption:2 - Kilograms -
Cereals 170.l 186.3 20l.7 192.7 185.8 185.4 
Meats 6.4 7.3 8.7 11. 0 13. 9 26.6 
Eggs 1. 7 2.5 3. ':J 4.6 5.7 6.3 
Fish 16.3 15.8 18.3 23.6 27. 5 30.7 
Milk 1.0 1. 8 2.7 7.1 15.6 23.1 
Vegetables 36.0 49.1 62.8 84.3 117. 5 98.6 
Fruits 5.7 8.8 11.4 15.2 22.2 26.6 
Taiwan 
Per capita consumption: - Kilograms -
Cereals 157.8 160.1 164.8 153.2 128.0 114.3 
Meats 16.8 23.8 27.0 34.l 46.0 56.3 
Eggs 1. 8 3.0 4.4 6.6 9.3 11. 2 
Fish 25.7 29.0 35.0 36.1 35.6 40.3 
Milk 6.3 6.0 12.4 20.2 27.1 32.6 
Vegetables 58.3 60.9 91.8 118 .6 121.3 123.6 
Fruits 20.4 3l~. 5 49.l 59.1 73 .1 85.2 
1 Data for 85-87 is the average of 1985 and 1986. 
2 Data for 60-64 is the average of 1963 and 1964, and for 85-87 refer 
only to 1985. 
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Table 3: Structure of land utilization 
Period 1960-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-87 
Japan 
Cultivated land, 1000 ha 6068 5937 5696 5517 5427 5359 
Planted area, 1000 ha 7917 7128 5908 5702 5605 5593 
Farm households, 1000 5827 5438 5202 4842 4567 4330 
Average farm size, ha 1.04 1.09 1.10 1.14 1.19 1.24 
Multi. crop index, %1 131 120 104 103 103 105 
South Koreal 
Cultivated land, 1000 ha 2074 2298 2258 2228 2177 2143 
Planted area, 1000 ha 2964 3295 3117 3052 2724 2582 
Farm households, 1000 2402 2552 2450 2281 2031 1916 
Average farm size, ha 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.98 1.07 1.12 
Multi. crop index, % 143 143 138 137 125 121 
Taiwan 
Cultivated land, 1000 ha 873 901 904 919 897 887 
Planted area, 1000 ha 1623 1687 1615 1575 1359 1262 
Farm households, 1000 811 867 879 879 823 761 
Average farm size, ha 1.08 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.09 1.16 
Multi. crop index, % 186 187 178 172 151 142 
1 Data for 85-87 is the average of 1985 and 1986. 
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Table 4: Stricture of farm households and incomes 
Period 1960-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-87 
Japan 
Composition of farm incomes:l 
Farmer income, 1000 yen 687 1113 2320 4650 6192 70007 
Net agr. income % 44.3 42.4 28.1 25.2 16.0 14.5 
Non-agr. income % 55.7 57.6 71.9 74.8 84.0 85.5 
Composition of farm households: 
Farm households, 1000 5827 5438 5202 481+2 4567 4330 
Full-time farmers % 25.9 22.3 14.2 12.9 13 .2 14.6 
Part-time farmers % 74.1 77. 7 85.8 87.1 86.8 85.4 
Class I part-time % 33.2 32.9 28.1 24.3 17 .6 15.9 
Class II part-time % 40.9 44.8 57.7 66.8 69.2 69.5 
Farm-urban workers' incomes:l 
Ratio of farm/urban % 78 90 105 116 115 113 
South Korea 
Composition of farm incomes:2 
Farmer income, 1000 won 96 158 439 1515 4305 6089 
Net agr. income % 81.6 77 .6 80.3 74.9 66.4 62.4 
Non-agr. income % 18.4 22.4 19.7 25.1 33.6 37.6 
Composition of farm households: 
Farm households, 1000 2402 2552 2450 2281 2031 1916 
Full-time farmers %4 90.9 87.7 80.6 81.1 80.4 79.0 
Part-time farmers % 9.1 12.3 19.4 18.9 19.6 21.0 
Class I part-time %4, 5 na 7.2 10.0 11. 3 9.5 8.5 
Class II part-time % na 7.7 9.4 7.6 10.2 12.6 
Farm-urban workers' incomes:l,4 
Ratio of farm/urban % 112 65 76 89 89 88 
Taiwan 
Composition of farm incomes:3 
Farmer income, 1000 NT$ na 32.1 52.5 115. 7 232.1 284.9 
Net agr. income % na 59.3 46.6 38.5 33.8 37.1 
Non-agr. income % na 40.7 53.4 61. 5 66.2 62.9 
Composition of farm households: 
Farm households6, 1000 811 867 879 879 823 761 
Full-time farmers % 47.6 na 30.2 na 9.0 11.3 
Part-time farmers % 52.4 na 49.8 na 91.0 88.7 
Class I part-time % 29.8 na 40.6 na 35.5 20.2 
Class II part-time % 22.6 na 29.2 na 55.5 68.5 
Farm-urban workers' incomes:3 
Ratio of farm/urban % na 79 78 81 83 86 
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1 Data for 60-64 is the average of 1963-64. 
2 Data for 60-64 is the average for 1962-64. 
3 Data for 65-69 is the average of 1966 and 1968. 
4 Data for 8'.:>-87 is the average of 1985 and 1986. 
5 Data for 65-69 is the average of 1967.69. 
6 Data for 60-64, 70-74, and 80-84 refer to 1960, 1970 and 1980 
respectively 
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CHAPTERS 
POLITICAL MACROECONOMY OF 
AG RI CULTURAL POLICY ADJUSTMENTS IN EAST ASIA 
Hiroshi Yamauchi and Kwon, Yong Dae• 
INTRODUCTION 
In the process of economic change, agriculture's declining share of total output is one 
of a number of variables indicating structural adjustments at the macroeconomic level. This 
phenomenon has been a ~tarting point for many analytical ~tudies that have explored deeper 
into the dynamic patterns and trends of sectoral changes in agriculture (Chenery and 
Syrquim, Hayami and Ruttan, Ercolani, Yamauchi, Ander~on). It is generally appreciated 
that the nature of agricultural policy adjustments that accompany such structural changes 
are characterised by complex politico-economic interrelations. From an historical 
perspective, it has become evident that the economic forces associated with macroeconomic 
changes are sources of primary influences that culminate in government actions in the 
agricultural sector (Rausser). 
Accordingly, it can be inferred that political activities on behalf of farm interests are 
likely to escalate as structural macroeconomic changes result in unfavourable conditions for 
the operating level where the decisions on actual farm inputs and outputs are made. That is, 
political activities of agricultural interest groups to change farm policies are functionally 
related to their needs to adjust to new economic realities. Furthermore, the process of 
agricultural adjustments as reflected at the macro level usually involves government actions 
that are not exogenously given as in many economic models. Rather, such government 
actions are, in fact, endogenous variables in the real political economic systems where the 
evolution of interest groups and their policy-influencing powerl. are functionally related to 
the structural changes in the macroeconomy. 
The recent efforts in the political economy of agricultural protection (Anderson and 
Hayami) have drawn attention to the need to better understand the growth of agricultural 
protection in the three East Asian economies of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. These three 
East Asian economies have experienced rapid structural changes over recent decades, 
necessitating substantial resource adjustments in their respective rice sectors. It has been 
observed that unique and complex systems of political economic relations have evolved in 
each of these countries to modify and implement their particular rice policy rules. In this 
paper, we adopt an analytical institutional economics approach to advancing our basic 
understanding of the nature of agricultural policy adjustments in East Asia, and offer some 
preliminary test results for the case of Korea. These results have encouraged us to extend 
the modeling technique to Japan and Taiwan with the hope of contributing the kinds of 
information needed to properly evaluate and interpret agricultural policy reforms in East 
Asia. 
•Hiroshi Yamauchi and Kwon, Yong Dae, Professor and East-West Centre Grantee, 
respectively Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Hawaii. 
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PERSPECTIVE ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY ADJUSTMENTS IN EAST ASIA 
From an international perspective, East Asia is relatively poorly endowed with arable 
land. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan each have fewer than 60 hectares of arable land per 1000 
people, compared with a global average of more than 300 hectares. The East Asian 
economies have recorded very high economic growth rates by international standards. 
During the two decades up to 1980, annual real per capita income growth averaged 6.3 
percent for Japan, 6.6 percent for Taiwan, and 6.9 percent for Korea. These figures were 
almost twice the average for middle-income and industrial countries in the world (World 
Bank). 
With the rapid economic growth of these economies, the typical signs of structural 
changes are clearly evident (Table 1). The relative contributions of the agricultural sectors 
to the growth of GNP have dramatically fallen. The declines in the shares of agriculture in 
GDP, in employment and household expenditures are clear indicators reflecting such 
agricultural adjustments. During the same period, pronounced increases in the nominal 
rates of agricultural protection in these economies have also become grossly apparent, in 
particular to their major trading partners. In 1960, the average nominal rate of protection in 
Japan was 41 percent, and by 1985 this had increased to 210 percent. Taiwan and Korea 
have followed somewhat similar paths beginning with negative protection rates in 1960 and 
escalating to 55 and 166 percent respectively by 1981. These high nominal protection rates 
have been attributed to, among other things, increased agricultural support programmes 
and tighter import controls. 
While policy prescriptions to reduce these growing protection rates have been 
offered based upon the attempts of economists to measure the social costs of government 
interventions, the traditional prescriptions calling on policy makers to get the prices right 
have not proved to be a sufficient basis for reform. It became evident that if there were to 
be any hope for improving the situation through corrective policy measures, there had to be 
a better understanding of the domestic conditions that give rise to these undesirable 
performances. If protectionist policies were rooted primarily in domestic conditions rather 
than in the international economy, the underlying protectionist forces needed to be 
identified and understood in the context of the changing domestic economies. 
In spite of substantial agricultural adjustment efforts al the micro level, the relative 
productivity of the agricultural sector on a macro level continued to deteriorate vis-a-vis the 
rapidly expanding industrial and service sectors. Domestic agricultural policy attention, 
therefore, had to focus on the issues relating to the growing welfare imbalances between the 
rural and urban sectors. The political economic conditions for policy decisions reflected the 
increasing economic base of the non-agricultural sectors, which served to support the 
declining agricultural populations. 
The implication was that the growth of industry also contributed to political 
economic conditions that were sensitive to the economic survival of the declining 
agricultural sector. Accordingly, it could be expected that the decision criteria of policy 
makers systematically adjusted to the special needs of the farm interests. In a broad sense, 
the political influences of these special interest groups derive from a diverse set of 
historical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors. But in a narrower context, it was the 
effectiveness of their lobbying and campaigning activities in changing the institutional 
"rules of the game" that gave evidence of their political power. 
This brief historical perspective suggests a systematic evolutionary process of 
agricultural policy adjustments in East Asia. Institutional changes reflected in these policy 
adjustments have been occurring within political economic systems concerned primarily 
with domestic policy issues. In these decision systems, the changing political influences of 
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agricultural interest group& and their ability to affect change& in in&titutional rules arc 
closely interrelated to macroeconomic changes. We need, at thi:. point, an appropriate 
analytical framework that can utilise the relevant political economic paradigms and 
empirical modds for testing hypotheses on the endogenous behaviour of intere!>t groups, 
including govemment, in the process of adjusting agricultural policy. 
POLITICAL ECONOMIC APPROACHES AND LIMITATIONS FOR EAST ASIA 
To address questions on why and how economic policies evolve, economist& have 
been extending the analytical framework beyond that of traditional welfare economics, 
which tends to treat government actions as exogenous. The notable attempts at applying 
various political economic approaches to empirically test the endogenous behaviour of 
government actions in U.S. agricultural policies were reviewed by Rausser et al., and since 
then, new test results have been added to the literature. ConceptuaJly, these political 
economic approaches rely on such paradigms as liberal-pluralism (Downs, Buchanan and 
Tullock, Breton, Zeckhauser), Marxist theory of the state (Morishima, Oakley, Perelman), 
theory of economic regulation (Stigler, Peltzman), theory of rent-seeking interest groups 
(Tullock, Krueger, Bhagwati, Zusman, Brock and Magee, Brock), and theory of efficient 
government redistribution (Rausser and Freebairn, Zusman, Becker, Gardner 1981 and 
1987, Rausser and de Gorter). The literature is vast and is widely applicable to many fields 
of economics with varying degrees of success depending upon such factors as the scope and 
focus of decision-making and the particular conditions that govern political economic 
decisions and institutional change in each case. 
For East Asia, the works in Anderson and Hayami rely primarily on the liberal-
pluralism behaviour of politicians whose actions are designed to maximise their chances of 
remaining in office. In their Chapter 4, the results of an econometric analysis of the 
determinants of agricultural protection levels are reported by Honma and Hayami (1986). 
They conclude that the rapid rise in agricultural protection rates (in nominal terms) from 
1955 to 1980 was due largely to three factors: (i) the rapid decline in the comparative 
advantage in agriculture, (ii) the systematic fall in agriculture's share in the total economy 
(in terms of both output and labour), and (iii) the shifts in the international terms of trade 
However, the key empirical estimates that attempt to explain the growth of 
protection rates with declining agricultural shares and weakening comparative advantages 
in agricultural trade both domestically and internationally are not entirely satisfactory, 
particularly for the case of Korea. Aside from measurement and specification errors that 
are always likely to be present in such econometric studies, the liberal-pluralism rationale 
of maximising votes within "political economic markets" for agricultural policies is not quite 
sufficient as an analytical framework for the purpose. Important questions remains to be 
answered. 
For example, it is well known that industrialising countrie& implement agricultural 
policies to shift the burden of adjustment to the non-agricultural sectors. But that in itself 
does not necessarily lead to high protection rates and distortionary trade policies. There 
are always offsetting factors operating in a changing economy. Honma and Hayami allow 
for this by including the comparative advantage and international terms of trade variables 
that imply different natural resource endowments. As long af> the agricultural sectors of 
resource-rich economies can maintain a strong international comparative advantage in 
trade over their resource-poor trading partners, their domestic agricultural support policie& 
need not necessarily result in high protection rates. Thus, the land resource - abundant 
economies of the Pacific such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
have continued to maintain relatively low agricultural protection rates in spite of the fact 
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that they have also experienced similar structural shifts. But in the case of Korea, 
agricultural protection rates were already high by international standards even at the early 
stage of economic development when its agricultural share in the economy was still 
relatively high. The reasons given by Honda and Hayami for such causal relations arc not 
compelling enough, since the key variables through which the declining agricultural shares, 
comparative disadvantage, and international terms of trade operate to explain high 
protection rates are not adequately specified and empirically tested. 
AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL MACROECONOMIC APPROACH 
An alternative approach that provides for the explicit treatment of government 
actions as endogenous factors in empirical models is the efficient government redistribution 
approach. This approach dates back to the works of Rausser and Freebairn and Zusman, 
and focuses on the political economic functioning of a system where the values of economic 
variables and policy instruments are endogenously determined. The critical role of special 
interest groups in the formulation of farm policy are recognised and taken into account in a 
political preference function that reflects the welfare measures (or economic objectives) of 
each interest group. More recently, the potential applicability of this approach to analysing 
changes in agricultural policy has been demonstrated by Sarris and Freebairn and by 
Paarl berg and Abbott, in both cases for the international wheat economy. 
The political preference function is designed to detect and measure the relative 
political powers (weights) of different interest groups in changing the institutionalised rules 
of agricultural policies to their benefit. Conceptually, the resulting weights can be 
interpreted in terms of an equilibrium solution to a political economic bargaining game. If 
the weights are, differentiated according to the effectiveness of each interest group's 
pursuit of its welfare measures, the implication is that the priority rankings of policy makers 
have, indeed, been responsive to the group's interests. Thus, these weights can be 
potentially useful aids in policy analyses. They can be used to detect whether differences 
exist among interest groups and, if so, what directions these differences are taking. Also, 
since these differences can be related to policy changes over time, they have direct 
implications for the direction and degree of changes in policies for the future. 
Further, since macroeconomic changes a re major sources of influence on the 
performance of the agricultural sector, the relationships between selected macroeconomic 
variables and the political weights can be empirically tested. The establishment of such 
empirical relationships would then provide better insights into the effects of 
macroeconomic changes on the political influence of interest groups in agricultural policy 
making. Such an analytical approach offers the possibility of overcoming some of the 
previously discussed limitations of earlier studies and developing more relevant criteria and 
information on the functional economic nature of agricultural policy adjustments over time. 
MODEL FOR EMPIRICAL APPLICATION IN EAST ASIA 
The structural components of the political macroeconomic systems of East Asian rice 
economies can be described by three sets of equations grouped as follows; (i) economic 
structural equations, (ii) endogenous policy decision equations, and (iii) political 
macroeconomic system equations. 
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Structure of the Domestic Rice Economy 
The structure of the domestic rice economy in an East A!.ian society i!. reflected in its 
supply of and demand for rice. In the model, supply and demand am specified in terms of 
the domestic production and domestic consumption that clears the market. The following 
implicit functions may be specified in simple linear terms. Time subscripts are omitted. 
Domestic production is a function of the ratio of domestic producer prices divided by 
the producer cost index. 
DP= Fl(PDP/PAI) (1) 
Domestic consumption is a function of the ratio of domestic consumer prices divided by the 
consumer price index, and per capita income. 
DC = F2(CDP /CPI, PGNP) (2) 
where: 
DP and DC are the quantities supplied and demanded, 
PDP and CDP are the current prices faced by domestic producers and consumers, 
PGNP is per capita income, 
PAI is the index of prices paid by producers, 
CPI is consumer price index. 
The market clearing constraint accounts for changes in storage and net imports. Thu~. 
domestic production is equal to domestic consumption plus net changes in stock minus net 
imports. 
DP= DC+ (ST - STl) - NIM (3) 
where: 
ST and STl are the rice stocks in the current and previou~ years rc!.pectively, 
NIM is net import of rice. 
Endogenous Policy Decisions 
Endogenous policy decisions are reflected in the political preference function 
model. In the context of the rice economies of East Asia, the model attempts to capture the 
influence of the producers, consumers, and government agencies in setting the levels of 
domestic prices for rice to producers (PDP) and to consumers (CDP). The model is 
specified in simple weighted additive terms as follows. 
W = WP*UP + WC*UC + WG*UG 
where: 
WP, WC, and WG arc the political weights attached to the rice 
producers, consumers, and government re!.pectively, 
UP, UC, and UG are the welfare measures of the rice producer!>, 
consumers,and government respectively. 
(4) 
The political weights (WP, WC, and WG) attempt to capture the marginal values 
accruing to the respective interest groups a& a result of political bargaining among 
themselves. These weights are associated with each interest group's welfare measure as 
follows. The producers' welfare (UP) is measured by a profit function that depends upon 
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the price of rice received by the producers. The consumers' welfare (UC) is measured by an 
expenditure function that depends upon the price paid by the rice consumers at a given 
utility level. And finally, the government's welfare is measured by the net fiscal balance in 
implementing the rice management programme after accounting for all receipts from 
consumers and outlays to producers, importers, and for storage costs. 
UP = P(PDP) (5) 
UC= · E(CDP, Ucons) (6) 
UG = CDP*DC · PDP*DP - BPR*NIM +(PDP· CDP)*(ST- STl) (7) 
where: 
P(.) is the profit function of rice producers, 
E(.) is the rice expenditure function of consumers for 
given utility level, Ucons, 
BPR is the border price for rice. 
In equation (7), the first term on the RHS of the equation is the revenue from selling 
rice to consumers, and the second and third terms are costs of purchasing domestic 
production and importing, respectively. The fourth term represents both outlays (negative) 
and receipts (positive) from adding to or drawing down on the rice stock. Thus, the 
government's interest (as viewed from the vantage of policy makers) accounts for the 
distribution of social revenues and costs of agricultural rice policy incident upon consumers, 
producers, exporters, and taxpayers. 
Channels of Macroeconomic Influences on the Domestic Rice Economy 
Once the political weights of interest groups are shown to have significant influences 
on rice policy decisions, our next step is to test for macroeconomic factors that may be 
functionally related to changes in the political weights. Macroeconomic changes and their 
links to the agricultural sector have been shown to have significant causal relations to policy 
developments in the United States leading to government intervention in agriculture 
(Andrews and Rausser). But, the selection of macro-variables depends upon the particular 
political economic conditions of an economy. For the East Asian rice economies, since our 
main focus is on testing the effects of macroeconomic changes on domestic rice policies, our 
initial selection of macro-variables is based on the following previously identified factors. 
WP= F3(SAI/PAI, DP/DC, RRUI, GNPA/GNP) 
WC= F4(GNP/POP, CDP/CPI, LAG(WC)) 
WG = F5(GMFD, GVD, LAG(WG)) 
where: 
SAi/PAI is the parity price index (ratio of prices received 
[SAi) to the prices paid [PAI] by farmers), 
DP /DC is the self-sufficiency rate, 
RRUI is the ratio of rural household income to urban household income, 
GNPA is the aggregated value of agricultural products, 
GNP is the gross national product, 
GNP /POP is the per capita GNP, 
CDP /CPI is the real consumer price for rice, 
LAG(WC) is the lagged consumers F political weight WC, 
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(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
GMFD i:; the deficits of the Grain Management Fund (GMF), 
GVD is the total government budget deficits, 
LAG(WG) is the lagged government political weight WG. 
In equation (8), the price parity ratio (SAi/PAI), self-sufficiency rate (DP /DC), and 
rural urban income ratio (RRUI) are selected as plausible explanatory variables since they 
have been used as major indicators in setting the purchasing price for rice. Also, the 
declining share of agriculture in total income (GNPA/GNP) has been rationalised as a 
major contributing factor in the strengthening of the political bargaining power of 
producers. 
Various studies have shown that consumers tend to become less sensitive to food 
price increase as their per capita income rises. So in equation (9), the retail price for rice in 
real terms (CDP /CPI) and per capita income (GNP /POP) are chosen to reflect the 
consumers' attitude toward the rice policy. 
High farm price support programmes have led to accumulating deficits of 
government food agency budgets in East Asia. As the size of these deficits continues to 
mount and the competition for scarce public resources increase&, the political bargaining 
attitude of policy makers and the government agencies toward increasing farm price 
support programmes tends to get tighter. Thus, in equation (10) the accumulating deficits 
in the government sector, including the grain management fund (GMFD) and total 
government budget (GVD), and the lagged government weight LAG(WG) are used to 
estimate these tighter public attitude effects on the changing political weight of 
government. 
EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE KOREAN RICE ECONOMY 
Estimation of Political Weights 
The revealed preference approach was used to estimate the political weights of the 
three major interest groups in the Korean rice economy. The computational formulas for 
the political weights were derived by maximising the political preference function W given 
in equation (4), subject to the market clearing constraint of equation (3) with respect to the 
two main policy instruments, the producers' domestic price (PDP) and the consumers' 
domestic price (CDP). From the first order conditions, the following formulas were 
derived with the sum of the political weights normalised to equal 300. 
WG = 300/(X+Y+l) 
WP = 300 - WG - WG*Y 
WC = 300 - WG - WP 
where: 
x = {DP+(PDP-BPR)*[a DP/ a(PDP/PAl)]+ST-(STl)}/DP, 
y = {DC+(CDP-BPR)*(a DC/ a (CDP/CPI))+ST-(STl)}/DC, 
a DP I a (PDP /PAI) i& the price coefficient of domc&tic production, and 
a DC/ a (CDP /CPI) is the price coefficient of domestic com.umption. 
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(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
The re&ults of applying these formulas to data from official Korean source& covering the 25-
year period 1961-1985 are shown in Figure 1. As the political economic conditions changed 
over time, so did the weights. The estimated patterns and trends are significantly different 
from the 100 baseline and pairwise among the three interest groups at the 5 percent level. 
There is dear evidence that the relative weights of both consumers and government 
fell steadily over the period (consumers by about -25 percentage points and government by 
about -14 points). On the other hand, rice farmers have increased their relative political 
weight by about +40 percentage points. In other words, the welfare measure of rice 
farmers (income status) have been gaining high priorities from policy makers relative to the 
consumers' (expenditure) and the government's (net revenue) status. This appears to be 
consistent with the historical perspective of rice policy in Korea. The present government 
policy of direct rice purchases from farmers began in 1961. But it wasn't until about 1968 
that the food agency began increasing the purchase prices. The effects of the first oil crisis 
in 1973-1974 is clearly seen in the opposite swings in the political weights as the border 
price of rice shot sharply upwards. This temporary situation corrected itself in a couple of 
years as the government's domestic purchase prices continued to escalate in favour of the 
rice producers and border prices stabilised at a lower level. The second oil shock in the late 
l 970's had little effect on the border prices as the official domestic purchase prices 
continued to increase. A poor harvest in 1980 led to further sharp increases in producer and 
consumer prices, which then tended to correct themselves with better harvests in the 
following years. 
Determination of Endogenous Price Policy 
Once we have established the functional relations between the political weights and 
rice policies, we can derive the formulas for the endogenous domestic prices for producers 
and consumers . By simply rearranging equations (11), (12), and (13) we have the 
following. 
PDP= BPR + (DP*WP/WG -DP-ST+STl)/(3 DP/3 (PDP/PAI)) (14) 
CDP= BPR + (DC*WC/WG -DC-ST+STl)/(3 DC/3 (CDP/CPI)) (15) 
From these equations, it is possible to evaluate how the various political economic 
factors contribute to the establishment of the endogenous price levels. For example, the 
increasing political weight of producers was relative to that of consumers and government. 
From equation (14), we can clearly see how this contributed to the rising producer prices. 
Further, if we move the border price variable (BPR) to the LHS of equations (14) 
and (15), we can see how the political economic factors influence the differences between 
the domestic and international prices in equations (16) and (17). 
PDP-BPR = (DP*WP/WG-DP-ST+STl)/( a DP/ a (PDP /PAI)) (16) 
CDP-BPR = (DC*WC/WG-DC-ST+STl)/(3 DC/ 3 (CDP/CPI)) (17) 
These equations suggest the potential utility of the political weights in evaluating the 
historical changes in nominal protection rates of the Korean rice economy. Equation (16) 
suggests that it was again the surging political power of rice producers that largely 
contributed to the widening price differentials between domestic producer prices and the 
international prices at the border. 
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On the other hand, the difference between producer anc consumer prices is 
determined without regard to international border prices, which cancel out in equation (18). 
Here, the differences are influenced purely by domestic demand and supply factors that 
also are reflected in the political weights of consumers and producers relative to that of 
government. 
CDP-PDP= (DC*WC/WG-DC-ST+STl)/(-11 DC/-ll (CDP/CPI)) -
(DP*WP/WG-DP-ST+STl)/(-ll DP/-11 (PDP/PAI)) (18) 
Macroeconomic Influences on Estimated Political Weights 
The estimated results of the political macroeconomic analysis are discussed for each 
equation. The number in parentheses below each estimated coefficient is the t-vdlue. 
Functional effects on producers' weights 
WP = 35.6 + 0.00872*(SAI/PAI)- 0.225*(DP /DC) + 0.470"'RRUI -
(2.23) (-0.98) (3.3) 
1.198*(GNPA/GNP 
(-6.1) 
R2 = 0.7308 (19) 
Changes in both the parity price ratio (SAi/PAI) and the rural urban income ratio 
(RRUI) have positive effects on the political influence of producers at the 5 percent 
significance level. Improvements in these two indicators were closely related to the 
increasing political weight& of the rice producers. Agriculture's declining share 
(GNPA/GNP) of the growing total economy also contributed significantly to enhancing the 
political attitude toward rice policy. However, we cannot infer that changes in the self-
sufficiency rate (DP /DC) of agriculture are related to the increasing political weight of 
producers since the estimated coefficient is not significant (t-value = -0.98). 
Functional effects on consumers' weights 
WC= 62.97 - 0.0151 *(GNP /POP)- 0.0145*(CDP /CPI) + 0.520*LAG(WC) 
(-3.0) (-2.06) (3.06) 
R2 = 0.87 (20) 
Rising per capita income (GNP /POP) and comumer real prices (CDP/CPI) were 
both found to be significantly related to the declining political weight of consumers. These 
inverse relationships imply that the rising income of consumers may have contributed to 
lessening their sensitivity to rice policy which, in turn, led to increasing consumer prices for 
rice. Also, the strong influence of the downward trend in the consumers' political weight is 
reflected in the significant coefficient for the lagged variable LAG(WC). 
Functional Effects on Government Weights 
WG = 53.42 - 0.00411 *GVD - 0.00224*GMFD + 0.466*LAG(WG) 
(-2.28) (-3.13) (2.76) 
R2 = 0.79 (21) 
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Increasing deficits in the overall government budget (GVD) and the Grain 
Management Fund (GMFD) were both found to be inversely related to the declining 
political weight of government at the 5 percent significance level. The political influence of 
government in the decision criteria for rice policy appears to have weakened with the 
increased spending and accumulation of public debts throughout the government sector. 
Here again the influence of the downward trend in the relative political weight of 
government is reflected in the significant coefficient for the lagged variable LAG(WG). 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Understanding the endogenous behaviour of government actions in agriculture has 
become an important prerequisite for designing alternative policy strategies to change the 
tide of growing agricultural protectionism in East Asia, especially since previous efforts at 
measuring the social costs of protection have not proved to be a sufficient basis for 
agricultural reform. Therefore, the thrust of our efforts thus far has been to analyse the 
endogenous behaviour of government in adjusting agricultural policy. More specifically, we 
have focused on the conceptual and methodological approaches to measuring the political 
weights of special interest groups including producers, consumers, and government in the 
formulation of agricultural policies, and to measuring the macroeconomic determinants of 
changes in the political weights over time. An analytical model has been designed for East 
Asia with three major component parts including (i) structural equations representing the 
supply, demand, and market clearing functions for rice in the domestic economy, (ii) a 
political preference function to estimate the relative weights of the interest groups in 
establishing domestic rice procurement and price policies, and (iii) a set of equations to 
estimate the functional relations between changes in the macroeconomy and the political 
weights over time. 
The model ha& been &ucccssfully tested for the case of Korea with data covering 25 
years (1961-1985) of adjustments in government rice procurement and pricing policies. The 
dramatic increase in agricultural protectionism in Korea during this period can be 
explained principally by changes in the domestic rice economy that contributed to the rapid 
rise in the political weight of producers and the more gradual decline in political weights of 
both government and consumers. The effects of changing rural-urban term& of trade on 
producer&' political weight arc clearly measurable through &elected price and income parity 
ratios and the long-term structural decline in agriculture's share of GDP. The measurable 
effects on consumers' political weight are found in the changing aggregate per capita 
income and real price of rice. Government'& political weight i& &ignificantly related to its 
fiscal balances in the general budget and the more specific grain management fund. 
With further modifications and refinements, thi& analytical framework can be readily 
adapted to the rice economies of Japan and Taiwan. The effects of increased international 
pressures on domestic agricultural policies of East Asia can be tested by the inclusion of a 
foreign interest group in the political preference function. Simultaneous equation 
techniques may be applied to te&t the dynamic effects of forward and backward linkages to 
the micro and macro economie&. The results obtained thus far, and the opportunities for 
further methodological improvements, suggest a fruitful direction of inquiry for advancing 
our understanding of the agricultural policy adjustment process in East Asia. Such 
knowledge can be useful in the design of more effective strategies for desired policy 
reforms. 
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Figure 1. Estimated Political Weights for the Korean Rice Economy 
Table 1: Indicators of economic structural changes in East Asia 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Japan 
GDP per capita (1975 US$) 1549 2376 3834 4456 5442 7817 
Real growth in total GDP (%) 10.1 a 5.0 b 3.8 c 
Manufacturing 11.0 a 6.4 b 7.8 c 
Agriculture 4.0 a 1.0 b 1.6 c 
Agricultural share of: (%) 
GDP 10 7 5 4 3 3 
Labour force 27 21 16 11 9 8 
Engel coefficient (%) 43 39 36 35 31 29 
Nominal rate of ag protection (%) 41 69 71+ 76 85 210 
Taiwan 
GDP per capita (1975 US$) 372 500 686 952 1407 1750 
Real growth in total GDP (%) 9.2 a 9.5 b 6.1 c 
Manufacturing 17.3 a 13.0 b 6.6 c 
Agriculture 3.2 a 1. 6 b 1.2 c 
Agricultural share of: (%) 
GDP 26 22 14 12 7 5 
Labour force so 46 37 30 19 17 
Engel coefficient (%) 61 56 51 52 43 41 d 
Nominal rate of ag protection (%) -3 -1 2 20 52 55 e 
Korea 
GDP per capita (1975 US$) 233 278 415 593 792 1089 
Real growth in total GDP (%) 8.6 a 9.5 b 7.9 c 
Manufacturing 17.6 a 16.6 b 9.0 c 
Agriculture 4.4 a 3.2 b 6.3 c 
Agricultural share of: (%) 
GDP 36 34 24 22 15 14 
Labour force 60 53 46 40 35 25 
Engel coefficient (%) 58 62 56 56 52 37 
Nominal rate of ag protection (%) -15 -4 29 30 117 166 e 
Notes: a. 1961-70 average 
b. 1971-80 average 
c. 1980-85 average 
d. 1983 data 
e. 1981 data 
Source: Anderson and Hayami, adapted from Tables 1.1, 2.5, 3.1 updated. 
CHAPTER6 
THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF 
KOREA'S BEEF IMPORTS 
Shin-Haeng Huh and Chui-Hyun Lee* 
BACKGROUND 
Native cattle have long been important on traditional Korean farms. These cattle 
have been used mainly for draft purposes and production of farmyard manure which had 
been the major source of fertilisers until the 1960's. Raising cattle has also been one of the 
major sources of farm income through the use of family labour on small farms. Most rice 
farms used to transfer their by-products such as rice bran and straw into cash by raising one 
or two heads of cattle. Therefore, the Korean cattle has been of importance especially for 
rice growing farms. 
However, there have been dramatic changes over the past twenty years in relation to 
the cattle industry in Korea. Among other things, continued migration from rural areas to 
urban cities has resulted in rapid farm mechanisation and the reduction of cattle numbers 
since the late 1960's. 
Some farmers began to increase the number of cattle raised for the purpose of beef 
production instead of draft power. Thus the purpose of cattle raif>ing had changed from 
multiple uses to simply the production of beef. In this transitional period, the price of beef 
as well as live cattle increased sharply due to the reduction of domestic production and the 
expansion of beef consumption. Imports rose suddenly to more than forty thousand metric 
tons of beef in 1978. This signalled let a change in government trade policy with respect to 
the livestock sector. As expected, cattle farmers have been protesting against the importing 
of beef, and had lobbied government to restrict the import of beef and to encourage 
domestic livestock farming. 
In 1982, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery adopted a new policy, "Improvement 
of Diversified Farming", which included loans provided to livestock farms to purchase 
calves and so enlarge farm size. This measure created an excess demand for calves, causing 
a price hike of more than three hundred percent within a year and a half. In order to 
stabilise calf and cattle prices, the government began to import calves while increasing beef 
imports. A subsequent increase in domestic production along with continuing imports of 
beef, lead to the price of calves and cattle falling far helow the production cost, and 
resulting in a "cattle crisis" in the mid-1980s. As a rcf>ult, the government suspended the 
import of beef in 1985. 
An unexpected international problem arose. Some of the major beef exporting 
countries put pressure on the Korean government to open up the beef market and finally 
complained to GATT about the suspension of beef imports. Having had two consecutive 
* Research Director and Research Associate, respectively, Korea Rural Economics 
Institute, Seoul, Korea. 
panel meetings with the United States, Australia and New Zealand in Geneva, the Korean 
Government resumed the importing of beef under quota in 1988. However, most cattle 
farmers were not satisfied and protested against beef imports. 
Thus, an important question is "what are the effects of changes in the level of beef 
imports?" The purpose of this study is to estimate these effects. 
ESTIMATION OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
The behaviour of domestic beef producers is described in terms of a calf equation, 
slaughtered cattle equations, the weight of slaughtered cattle, identities of cattle stocks and 
the conversion of slaughtered cattle into meat. 
The quantity of beef demanded is a function of its own price, prices of substitute 
meats, and disposable income. A set of simultaneous equations links the retail price of beef 
and the prices of cattle and calves. In these equations, the retail price of beef is explained 
by its own supply and disposable income. The beef cattle price is affected by the previous 
year's price of cattle, and the number of cattle at the beginning of the year. The price of 
calves is linked with the cattle price through the value added between them. 
Equations were estimated using observations for the period 1974 through 1988, by 
three-stage least squares. All prices were deflated by the wholesale price index to convert 
them to real terms. 
Estimates of the consumer demand equation are reported in Table 1. Per capita 
consumption of beef is explained by deflated retail prices of beef and fishery products and 
deflated per capita disposable income. The coefficient of the beef price parameter is not 
statistically significant, perhaps because this variable wai. constructed as the simple 
arithmetic mean price of both domestic and imported beef without recognition of quality 
differences. However, the estimated price elasticity for beef is -0.17 at the mean price and 
quantity, indicating that Korean consumers do not respond to changes in the price of beef. 
This is not surprising given strong consumer preferences for beef and the relatively low 
level of consumption. The cross elasticity with respect to the price of fish was estimated as 
0.83, and indicates that Korean consumers tend to substitute beef for fish when the relative 
price of fish increases. The estimated income elasticity war. 1.14, indicating that beef is 
considered a superior good. 
Estimates of the equations describing the price relationships between the retail beef 
price and farm prices for the fattening animals are shown in Table 2. The retail price of 
beef can be explained by the combination of such variables as per capita beef allowance, 
disposable income, and the retail price trend itself (reflecting inflation). The {1rice 
flexibility responding to changes in beef allowance was estimated as -0.58, and to disposable 
income 0.42 at the mean. The cattle price received by farmers is positively related to the 
retail price of beef and negatively related to the cattle stock. 
The elasticity of cattle prices with respect to the retail price is 1.32 and with respect 
to the cattle stock is -0.21. The price of calves is very sensitive to changes in the cattle price, 
with the elasticity equal to 2.36. 
Estimates of equations for calf production and cattle slaughtered are reported in 
Table 3. As expected, the breeding of calves is a function of the cow stock in the early year 
and the previous year's price of calvei.. The number of cows slaughtered was negatively 
related to changes in the calf price and the number of cattle (bull) slaughtered was 
positively related to the cattle price and the cattle stock in the beginning of year. The 
weight of slaughtered cattle was positively related to changes in the cattle price and the 
previous year's slaughter weight. 
Identities which complete the structural model are shown in Table 4. Equations of 
cattle stock are linked with the calf crop and the number of slaughtered cattle. The 
domestic supply of beef is specified by the number of slaughtered cattle times the average 
weight of slaughtered cattle. 
PROJECTIONS OF SUPPLY, DEMAND AND TRADE UNDER 
IMPORT POLICY OPTIONS 
Some projection works have been done in relation to the supply, demand, trade, and 
other variables of beef up to the year 2000 under alternative assumptions regarding 
economic and population growth, price level of substitute products, and import policies. 
Assumptions are made, as shown in Table 5, and four scenario are established based on 
import policy options. 
Scenario I : Full self -sufficiency 
Scenario I i& to some extent unrealistic because of limited land availability, small 
farm size, expensive feed, and therefore high production coi'>t. However, evaluation of full 
self-sufficiency will provide estimates of the demand, supply, and prices of beef and cattle 
in a closed economy, as a benchmark for the a&sessment of import policy options. 
Under the assumption that the government maintains full self-sufficiency in the 
production of beef, Table 6 shows that the number of calves, cattle, and !>laughtered animals 
will increase. The native cow stock is expected to increase from 1,058 thousand head in 
1989 to 1,938 thousand head by the year 2000. The number of calve!> is also expected to 
increase from 606 thou&and head in 1989 to 1, 128 thousand head in the year 2000. The 
production of beef would more than double between 1989 and the year 2000 because of a 
high price incentive, as shown in Table 6. Per capita consumption of beef may not increase 
very much because of the high price to be paid by consumers. The most important 
implication of this first scenario is that the real prices of cattle and beef are expected to be 
high enough for the government to adopt a trade policy which allows a certain amount of 
beef to be imported in order to stabilise the retail beef price. 
Scenario II: Liberalisation of trade with a 20 percent tariff rate 
Scenario II i:-i also an extreme case, at leasL in the Korean livc!.tock producer's point 
of view. More than half of Korean farm households raif.e around two head!> of cattle on 
average for multiple purposes of draft use, manure production, other by-products, and meat 
production. Cattle raising on their small farms becomes one of the&c producers' important 
income sources and without rattle, most small farms could hardly increase their farm 
income. Then, the question is how fast would the cattle production base be destroyed if the 
government liberalised beef imports? 
Suppose the Korean government liberalised the import of beef only with the binding 
of a 20 percent tariff rate, i.e., the upper limit level conceded by the government in the 
Tokyo round negotiation, and allows the retail price of imported beef to reach 2,020 Won 
per 0.5 kg. This price i& calculated as the C & F price, tariff cost and marketing margins of 
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grass-fed beef. Then, the beef cattle farms would disappear after the year 2000, as shown in 
Table 7. Per capita consumption of beef would increase from 3.27 kg in 1989 to 6.63 kg in 
2000. To meet this increasing demand for beef, imports would noticeably increase while 
both prices of cattle and beef would steadily decrease. However, the beef self-sufficiency 
level would remain at around 16.6 percent in the year 2000, because of meat produced from 
domestic dairy cattle. 
Scenario III : Liberalised imports with a 50 percent tariff rate 
In this scenario it is assumed that the government maintains the selling price of 
imported beef at 2,417 Won per 0.5 kg, i.e. about the actual cost of foreign beef. Then, only 
a few cattle farmers would be left after the year 2000, as shown in Table 8. Per capita 
consumption and self-sufficiency level of beef would be slightly lower compared with the 
Scenario II case. But the price of cattle and beef would be a little higher than in the 
previous case, as expected. 
Scenario IV: Liberalised imports with a 70 percent tariff rate 
In this hypothetical situation the selling price of imported beef is maintained at 2,683 
Won per 0.5 kg. Projections of major variables are more ore less the same as the estimates 
of scenario III, except for the time delay, as shown in Table 9. The beef self-sufficiency 
level would drop to 30 percent. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Analytical projections show that both options of full self-sufficiency and full 
liberalisation of beef trade are unrealistic in terms of the impacts on the welfare of 
consumers and producers. In the case of full self -sufficiency, the retail price of domestic 
beef appears to be too high from the consumers' point of view while in the case of full 
liberalisation one of the major farm income sources may disappear within fifteen years. 
This would be definitely unacceptable to the majority of small and poor cattle farmers. 
Therefore, realistically acceptable options for the government in establishing beef trade 
policy would be any form of quota system that allowed a demand and supply balance that 
maintained a reasonable price level for both consumers as well as producers. The level of 
beef import quotas would depend on the government's target level of price&. In this way the 
Korean government could satisfy all the domestic interest groups as well as foreign 
exporters. 
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Table 1. Estimates of Consumer Demand Equation 
Normalised 
Equation 
Variable 
Beef DBt 
Explanatory Variables 
Constant 
0.452 
(1. 71) 
RBt 
-0.00011 
(1.38) 
Flt 
0.01633 
(7. 15) 
Note: DBt per capita consumption of beef (kg) 
RBt retail price of beef (Won/500gr) 
Dit 
0.00028 
(2.13) 
Dlt per capita disposable income (Thou. Won) 
Flt price index of fishery (1980=100) 
Figures in ( ) are t-values in absolute terms 
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0.935 
"" -..J 
Table 2 Estimates of Equations for Price Relationships 
Normalised Explanatory Variables 
Equations 
Variable Constant DBt Flt Dlt RBL1 RBt NBt 
Retail RBt 1.944 -848.15 5.7525 1.0121 0.3684 
(6.58) (8.07) (l.98) (5.24) (4.54) price of beef 
Price of 
cattle 
Price of 
calves 
PBt 
PCt 
37.2 
(0.38) 
-580.3 
(4.20) 
retail price of beef (Won/500gr) 
per capita disposable income (Thou. Won) 
per capita allowance by supply (kg) 
0.4595 -0.1392 
(15.8) (4.14) 
PBt 
0.8718 
(7.57) 
Note: RBt 
Dlt 
DBt 
NBt 
PBt 
PCt 
cattle and calves stock, in the beginning of the year (thou. hd.) 
price of cattle (thou. Won/400kg male) 
price of calf (thou. Won/Avg. of male and female) 
F2 
PBL1 
0.920 
-0 . 14 7 6 0 . 96 7 
(2.50) 
0.787 
I\ 
0 
Table 3 Estimates of equations for calf crop, slaughtered cattle, and 
the weight of slaughtered cattle 
Normalised Explanatory Variables 
Equations 
----------------------------------------------------------
Variable Constant PCt PBt NFt NMt PCL1 
Calf crop BCt -49.65 0.3346 0.5311 
in year (0.38) (2.87) (4.78) 
Cow SFt 93.8 -0.3256 0.3766 
Slaughtered (0.22) (3. 70) (5.55) 
Cattle(bull) SMt -277 .1 0 .114 7 0.3336 
Slaughtered (4.50) (3.54) (5.37) 
Avg. Weight of SWt 70.9 0.0406 
slaughtered 
cattle 
Note: NFt 
NMt 
NBt 
SFt 
SMt 
BCt 
SWt 
(3.35) (3.99) 
cows on feed in the beginning of the year (thou.hd.) 
bulls on feed in the beginning of year (thou.hd.) 
cattle and cows on feed in the beginning of year (thou.hd.) 
cows slaughtered in year (thou.hd.) 
bulls slaughtered in year (thou.hd.) 
calves crop in year (thou.hd.) 
average weight of slaughtered cattle (kg/hd.) 
SWL1 
0.4603 
(3 .88) 
R2 
0.627 
0.799 
0.670 
0.832 
Table 4 Identities of Structural Model 
Normalised 
Equations 
Variables 
Cows stock NFt 
Bulls stock NMt 
Numbers of slaughters SBt 
Domestic beef supply QBt 
Variables 
NFt_l + BCt_l / 2 
NMt_l + BCt_l / 2 
SFt + SMt 
SBt * SWt * 0.67 
Beef Supply DBt (QBt +IBt) * 1000/POP 
(kg per capita) 
Table 5 Assumptions for Exogenous Variables 
Year 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
disposable income 2,707.5 3,031.9 3,399.7 3,818.7 4,294.5 
per capita 
(1,000 Won) 
population (1,000) 43,601 44,578 45,514 46,393 47,230 
number of milk 516 591 670 753 840 
cows (l,000) 
price index 172 178 183 188 194 
of fishery 
6Q 
2000 
4,836.2 
48,017 
931 
200 
Table 6 Projections of Major Variables under the Assumption 
of Full Self-sufficiency 
YcAH 1989 19!JO l!l91 1 ggz l!l!l3 19!l4 1995 2000 
------------------- -- -
Total Cal tie 2,039 2,055 2,234 2,556 2,744 2,8!i4 2,964 3,693 
stock( 000 head) 
Native Cow stock I ,058 I ,060 1,204 I, 3!18 I ,•190 I, 536 1. 576 I, 938 
(000 head) 
Calf Crop 606 620 799 851 878 893 911 1, 128 
( 000 head) 
Slaughtered cattle 625 477 516 702 798 834 845 I. 019 
(000 head) 
Beef Production 102.0 114.4 129.4 163.8 180.3 188.2 194. I 254.0 
(000 M/T) 
P/C Consumption 3.27 2.62 2.93 3.67 4.00 4. 14 4.22 5.29 
( kg) 
Price of Cattle I , 361 I ,838 I ,892 I, 694 I ,60!l I ,G20 I, G80 1,887 
( 000 Won/400kg C!; l 
Price of Beef 3,727 4,824 5' 137 4,810 4,608 4,62G 4,780 5,450 
( Wo n-'500g l 
natl.i of meal fr um 28. I 29. 6 2!J. G 2!i. 0 23. !l 24.3 25.2 27. 3 
milk cattle <:5> 
Table 7 Projection of Major Variables with the Assumption of 
Liberalisation with 20 per cent Tariff Rate 
YEAR 1989 1990 1991 1902 1903 19!)4 1995 2000 2001 
Total Cattle 2,039 2,055 I ,960 1 'll55 I, 70G I , ~24 I ,372 984 !J40 
stock(OOO head) 
Native cow stock I ,058 I ,060 949 814 673 527 401 7 0 
(000 head)" 
Calf Crop 606 542 465 384 284 222 168 0 
(000 head) 
Slaughtered cattle 625 694 652 584 501 404 321 19 0 
(000 head) 
Meat Production 102.0 132.0 123.4 112. 7 10 I. 5 89.6 80.3 53.3 51 . 1 
( 000 liVT) 
f'!et Import 39.0 41. 3 63.9 88.4 113.4 !3!l.2 162.7 ?.64.8 282.2 
( 000 M-'1'l 
P/C consumption 3.27 3.98 4.25 4,51 4. 77 5.03 5.29 6.63 6.89 
( kgl 
Price of Cattle I .361 I ,068 973 912 882 870 868 8!13 
( 000 Won/400kg 6 l 
Price of Ueef 3,727 3. 147 2,800 2,579 ?.,436 2,335 2.271 2, 156 2, 153 
(Won,500g) 
Self-sufficiency 72.3 76.2 65.9 56.0 47. 2 39. I 33.0 16.6 15.4 
Level ($) 
Ratio of meat from 28. 1 22.4 25. 0 28.6 33.3 :rn. 9 47. 0 95.2 100.0 
ml lk caltle (I) 
'7fi 
Table 8 Projection of Major Variables with the Assumption of 
Liber~~isation with 50 per cent Tariff Rate 
YEAR 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 
Total Cattle 2,039 2,055 1, 971 1,866 1, 737 1,624 1,536 1,340 
stock( 000 head) 
Native cow stock 1,058 1,060 972 870 756 650 560 277 
(000 head} 
Calf Crop 606 556 497 419 362 318 276 141 
( 000 head} 
Slaughtered catt1e 625 677 641 587 515 446 387 186 
( 000 head} 
Meat Product l on 102.0 131. 0 124.4 116.7 107.3 99.4 93.2 79. 1 
(000 M/T) 
Net Import 39.0 41. 7 61. 8 83. I 105.9 127.7 147.8 236.7 
( 000 M/T) 
P/C cons ump ll on 3.27 3.96 4.22 4.48 4. 73 4.99 5.25 6.58 ( kg) 
Price of Cattle 1 • 361 1, 128 1,062 l,020 1. 001 993 992 I ,020 
( 000 Won/400kg ~ ) 
Price of Beef 3,727 3 ,277 3,023 2,866 2,760 2,692 2,648 2,590 
(Won/500g) 
Self-sufficiency 72.3 75.8 66.8 58.4 50.3 43.7 38.7 25. 1 
Level($) 
Ratio of meat from 28. 1 22.9 25.3 28.5 32.8 37.5 42.4 67.2 
ml lk cat tie ($) 
Table 9 Projection of Major Variables with the Assumption of 
Liberalisation with 70 per cent Tariff Rate 
YEAR 1989 1990 1991 1992 19U3 1994 l!Hl5 2000 
-------·--- -----~ 
Total Cattle 2,039 2,055 1,992 1'915 I ,823 1. 744 1. 686 1. 587 
stock(OOO head) 
Native cow stock 1. 0 58 I ,060 988 907 817 736 667 451 
( 000 head) 
Calf Crop 606 565 518 458 414 381 347 133 
( 000 head) 
Slaughtered cattle 625 665 633 590 532 479 434 277 
( 000 head) 
Meat Production 102.0 130.2 125. 1 119 .4 112.4 106.6 102.3 94.5 
( 000 111/Tl 
Net Import 39.0 42.0 60.4 79. 5 99.8 119. 3 137.5 219.9 
(000 M/T) 
P/C consumption 3.27 3.95 4.21 4.46 4.71 4.96 5.22 6.55 
( kg) 
Price of Cattle 1. 361 1. 168 1,120 1,089 1 • 076 1. 071 1. 074 1,099 
( 000 Won/400kg ~ ) 
Price of Beef 3. 727 3,366 3, l 69 3,050 2,972 2,921 2,8[]0 2,862 
(Won/500g) 
Self-sufficiency 72. 3 75.6 67.5 60. 0 53.0 4 7. 2 42.7 30.0 
Level($) 
Ratio of meat from 28. I 2.1. 2 25.5 28.4 32.0 35. !1 39.6 57.!1 
milk cattle($) ~ 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCRIMINATORY TRADE: THE CASE OF 
JAPANESE BEEF AND WHEAT IMPORTS 
Julian M. Alston, Colin A. Carter and Lovell S. Jarvis* 
"The U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service expects &ales !to Japan) in volume terms to 
rise from 220,000 tonnes last year to about 1.9 million tonnes by the year 2000. The U.S. 
share alone is expected to rise from U .S.$375 million in 1987 to about U .S.$1 billion by 
1992, when import quotas are to be removed." Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 November 
1988. 
"The U.S. Meat Export federation estimates that annual U.S. beef sales to Japan will 
double from $600 million to $1.2 billion in just three year& and reach US$3 billion by the 
year 2000." Forbes, November 28, 1988. 
INTRODUCTION 
Public choice models have been applied in the analysis of trade policy to explain the 
choice of policy instrument and the rate of tariff protection (e.g. Caves; Baldwin). The 
approach has been to specify a criterion function which the government is assumed to 
maximise by trading off the economic surplus accruing to different domestic interest 
groups. Applications to agricultural policy include those by Anderson and Hayami et al.; 
Sarris and Freebairn; Gardner; Riethmuller and Roe; and Babcock, Carter and Schmit7, 
among others. To date these political economy models have been confined to analysing the 
influence of domestic interest groups and thus have been incapable of accounting for 
discriminatory trade policies such as the allocation of import quotas or Voluntary Export 
Restraints (VERs) to politically important foreign trade partners. These are instances 
where commodity trade policy is used in part as an instrument of foreign policyl. Large 
countries like Japan and the U.S. make extensive use of such trade policies, which involve a 
transfer of domestic consumer surplus (or potential import quota rent or tariff revenue) to 
import suppliers. These foreign transfers could be avoided through the use of alternative 
instruments. Feenstra has surveyed estimates of quota rents accruing to countries exporting 
to the U.S. He report& that foreign countries obtain an annual rent of between $3.7 to $5.1 
billion due to U.S. import quotas. There is also an extensive theoretical and empirical 
*Department of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Davis 
The authors gratefully acknowledge able research assistance provided by Constance 
Newman. Helpful comments were received from participants at the 2nd University of 
California Conference on Economic Issues of the Pacific Rim, Davis, April 1988. 
1For a discussion of the use of trade policy as foreign policy &ee Cooper. 
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literature about the ~ocial welfare costs and other effects of quotas in trade (e.g. J. 
Ander&on), but the literature to date ha& not addressed seriously or formally the issue of 
using managed quotas as a means of discriminating among import suppliers. 
In this paper we extend the conventional interest-group model of policy choice to 
explicitly incorporate influential foreign interests. We use this model to illustrate why 
governments sometimes choose instruments that permit discriminatory trade (managed 
import quotas or VERs) and to explain the way in which trade is managed u&ing those 
instruments. Then we develop a case study of the Japanese beef and wheat import quota 
policies. We conclude that the growth of U.S. beef and wheat exports to Japan has been the 
result primarily of managed trade on the part of the Japanese. We do not expect that the 
same result would be achieved in the long run under conditions of free trade, nor probably 
even under substantially liberalised trade. 
U.S. food exports to Japan have been growing rapidly in recent years. Japan, the 
largest importer of U.S. agricultural products, has been the focus of intense pressure from 
U.S. trade negotiators in recent years. Japan offers unusually attractive conditions, 
including somewhat higher prices, payment in hard currency, and stahle purchases from 
year to year. It is perhaps the only major market for which U .~.sales are not dependent on 
export subsidies from the United States under the Export Enhancement Program (EEP). In 
terms of value, the four most important U.S. agricultural exports to Japan are corn, 
soybeans, beef and wheat. Corn and soybeans enter Japan relatively free of trade 
restrictions; beef and wheat imports are controlled through import quota&. 
The U.S. government (with other countries) has been pressing for liberalisation of 
international trade in agricultural products on a number of fronts. In much of the rhetoric, 
Japan has been singled out as having extremely high ratef> of agricuhural protection. The 
U.S. has pressed particularly hard on .Japan (in part on the grounds that the large U.S. 
balance of trade deficit is exacerbated because the Japanese "do not play fair"). Other 
countries (e.g. Australia) have also been critical of Japanese policie&. Japan has bowed to 
some of this pressure and recently agreed to "liberalise" beef imports. Similar moves toward 
liberalisation have not taken place in grains. However the U.S. government is continually 
pressuring Japan to open up its rice market. If this were to materialise, wheat quotas would 
presumably be liberalised at the same time. 
On the surface, at least, the agreement by the Japanese to reform their beef import 
policies would appear to be a success from the point of view of the U.S. government and the 
U.S. beef producing industry. The conventional wisdom in the United States is that 
Japanese trade restrictions are costly to the U.S. We believe this overlooks a key aspect of 
the current policy and the proposed change in policy. Under the import quota 
arrangements the allocation of quotas among alternative &ources of imports has been 
managed by the Japanese government. Quotas have been filled not by sourcing imports 
among suppliers according to competitive forces but, at least in part, according to political 
considerations. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Kym Anderson has examined the question of why the Japanese use beef import 
quotas instead of le&s distortionary production subsidies or tariffs. He suggests two main 
reasons why quotas are used: (a) distributors of imported beef earn excess profits under 
quotas, and (b) quotas "disguise" the level of protection. In addition, he says that quotas 
,.,,., 
have an added advantage because the Japanese government can u~.e quotas to favour one 
supply country over another. This paper focuses on this last point in the context of the 
Japanese wheat and beef markets. 
In this section we present a simplified conceptual framewor~ to illustrate the use of 
managed import quotas by the Japanese government. We show that Anderson's first two 
reasons are incapable of explaining the instrument choice; the third reason - favouring one 
supply country over another - is necessary to explain the u:=.c of managed import quotas. We 
abo illustrate the ambiguous implications of a move towards liberalisation with an 
expanded but undiscriminatory import policy. 
A conventional welfare economic analysis would indicate that if no weight is attached 
to foreign interests, a managed import quota policy (or VER) can never be superior - from 
the point of view of the importing country - to an equivalent tariff or competitively filled 
import quota. The reasoning is that competitive sourcing will minimise costs; managed 
imports are likely not to minimise costs. A desire by the government to mask the rate of 
assistance could explain a preference for an import quota over an output subsidy or even a 
tariff policy, but it cannot explain a preference for a managed quota or VER over a 
competitively filled "global" quota. 
To explain these choices, some implicit weight must be given by the home country to 
the effects of trade policy on foreigners. Let us assume therefore that, in the context of the 
market for an importable, the home country government wishes to maximise a trade-off 
between the welfare of domestic producers, consumers, taxpayer'>, and foreigners. 
Specifically, assume that the government is subject to influence from domestic producers 
and foreign governments so that it wishes to tr an sf er income through the commodity market 
to domestic producers and away from domestic consumers and taxpayers but the policy 
choice is constrained by the welfare impact on influential foreigners. 
Once we attach a positive weight to the welfare of foreigners. a VER (giving the 
implicit quota rents entirely to an exporter) or a managed quota ~ystem (in which quota 
rents are shared somewhat with preferred suppliers) may be ~uperior to a competitively 
filled quota. All that is needed for this to be true is that the government in the importing 
country attaches greater value to the appeasement of the foreign intere5ts than it does to 
the efficiency costs of using an otherwi~c inferior instrument. Thus we can explain the 
Japanese govcrnment'5 use of managed import quota5 for beef <1nd wheat, but to do so we 
must allow for the political influence of import supplierr-.. 
This idea is illustrated below. To simplify we treat the import decision made by the 
Japanese government as a two step procedure. First, a decision is made with respect to the 
division between domestic production and imports. Suppo~e that initially this corresponds 
to a quantity of imports Oo. The second stage of the import process involves allocating the 
"global" import quota o0 amongst exporting countries. The 450 line in Figure l (OoOo) 
shows the range of possible allocations of the "global quota" between imports from the 
United States (US) and imports from other countries (ROW). Possible allocations include 
complete specialisation in sourcing from either the US or ROW as well a5 interior solutions 
such as point A. 
Let point A correspond to the mix of import:, that would re5ult from competitive 
5ourcing of total import& of Oo as would happen under a competitive global import quota or 
an equivalent tariff (i.e when the government i5 indifferent among '>OUrces). However, 
suppose the Japanc5c government prefer5 point B, with greater imports from the United 
States and less from the ROW. The Japanese preference5 are repre5ented by 11 and12. By 
using managed import quola5 - instead of a tariff or a competitively sourced import quota -
the Japanese government can trade off appeasement of U.S. interest!> and ROW interests 
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(against the expense of tariff revenue or import quota rents). Let point B represent the 
optimum mix from the point of view of the Japanese government (i.e. where the 
government's marginal benefits from ROW and U.S. imports arc equal). 
Suppose Japan's food import budget increases and there is a corresponding increase 
in global imports from Oo to o1 in Figure 1. The allocation of this additional quota among 
suppliers is also an object of choice by the Japanese government, depending on the 
perceived relative political payoffs from increasing imports from alternative sources. In 
Figure 1, the new optimum is represented by point C (where 12 i& tangent to 0101)· The 
movement from B lo C show& increased "bilateral" quota for each exporting region, but the 
absolute increa&e for the U.S. is much larger than for the re&t-of -the world. 
Now, suppose Japan is persuaded to liberalise its food import policies by replacing its 
quotas with tariffs and allowing a much lower rate of protection (i.e. greatly expanded 
imports). This is represented in Figure 1 by a new total quantity of imports (02) with 
competitive sourcing of those imports among suppliers. Point D represents the outcome 
assuming that the U.S. would provide a similar share of an expanded market as under the 
managed trade regime (i.e. as at point C). Point E repre&ent~ the outcome assuming that 
the U.S would obtain a similar share of the growth as has happened under the managed 
trade regime. Point F represents the outcome assuming that the U.S. share with 
competitive sourcing would be the same at all relevant quantities. As the diagram is drawn, 
the movement from point C to point F results in a reduction in U.S. food exports to Japan. 
This is certainly possible, if the substitution effect of changing to a regime of competitive 
sourcing is greater than the expansion effect of lowering the rate of protection. 
This model represents in a very stylised way the e~sential elements of Japanese food 
import policies, recent changes and proposed future changes. That is, the Japanese do have 
managed quota systems, there is some evidence that they exercise political preference in 
filling those quotas, and they are being pressed by the U.S. government to expand the 
quotas and replace them with tariffs. One important question is whether U.S. interests will 
be served by such reforms, and the answer to that question is an empirical one, depending 
on the nature of the policy and the extent of the reform (i.e. the sizes of the scale and 
substitution effects). Another important question is, given that the effects on U.S. interests 
are somewhat ambiguous, why is the U.S. pressing for the reforms? A third question is, why 
are the Japanese responding in the ways that they are to the political pressures from the 
U.S. and other suppliers? To answer these empirical questions requires an empirical model. 
Important aspects of reality to incorporate explicitly include difference& in product quality, 
effects acros& commodities (especially linkages between traded input and traded product 
markets), and the detail of the current policies and the proposed reforms. A simulation 
model along the lines of the ones developed recently by Dixit, and Baldwin and Krugman 
could perhaps be developed for this purpose in future research. It is not our purpo&e to put 
together a simulation model in this paper. 
JAPANESE BEEF TRADE2 
In 1987 the Japanese beef industry supplied 565,000 metric tons (mt) carcass weight 
of beef; total consumption of 890,000 mt included imports of about 325,000 mt, over one-
2There have been several excellent comprehensive studies of the Japanese beef industry 
and Japanese beef policies. The background discussion in thi& &cction draws heavily on Teal 
fil._fil. and RiethmuHer (ed.). A fundamental reference is Longworth. Use is also made of 
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third of total consumption. The quantity of beef imported by Japan has been determined 
largely within the framework of Japanese agricultural price and in corr es policies. Although 
the beef industry accounts for only a small fraction (about 4 percen, in 1985) of the total 
value of agricultural production in Japan, it has enjoyed powerful political support. 
reflected in an nominal rate of protection of more than 100 percent (Hayami; see Teal fil.l!L 
for more details on beef). The Japanese beef policy has involved a wholesale price 
stabilisation scheme and producer protection with both objectives heing achieved primarily 
through the use of import quotas. Import policy in this area ha<, moved over time - in an 
expanding total market - toward increasingly specific control;, on import composition and 
increasingly complex quota arrangements. 
Quota changes over time 
Until 1969, beef and veal imports by Japan were less than 25,000 metric tons (carcass 
weight equivalent) and accounted for less than 10 percent of domestic consumption. During 
the past 20 years production has almost trebled and imports have grown tenfold and the 
total quota for 1988 stood at 274,000 mt. This growth in the Japanese import quota was very 
closely managed by the Japanese government. It was primarily a response to growth in 
consumer demand, generated by growth in per capita incomes but with regard for the 
effects on domestic producers and in response to pressures from import suppliers -
primarily the U.S. and Australian governments. 
Under the current arrangements approximately 80 percent of the total quota is 
allocated to the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC). The LIPC has filled the 
greatest part of this quota by tendering among importers for the supply of specified kinds, 
qualities and quantities of beef. The remaining 20 percent is imported by private traders 
with a greater degree of choice of types and cuts of beef. By choosing a mix of quality, the 
Japanese government - through the LIPC - can strongly influence the sources of imports 
because different suppliers produce different types of beef. In particular, Australia and 
New Zealand specialise in the production of grass-fed beef while the United States and 
Canada are relatively specialised in grain-fed beef production. 
As well as managing the total "global" quota in response to pressures from domestic 
and foreign interest groups, the Australian government has claimed that the Japanese 
managed the details of the quota system to favour the U.S. interests relative to Australian 
interests (e.g. see Teal tl..J\1). Changes in the total Japanese beef imports and the mix 
between sources and types are shown in Figures 2. In 1970 Australia supplied 87 percent of 
all Japanese beef and veal imports and the United States supplied 2 percent. Between 1979 
and 1986, Australia's share of Japanese beef imports fell from 77 percent to 59 percent 
while the U.S. share rose from 18 percent to 35 percent. During this period Japan has 
imported increasing quantities of "high quality" beef which, in the quota specifications is 
defined as being grain-fed beef. The Japanese government has claimed that pattern of 
growth was a reflection of consumer preferences; the Australians claimed that it was a 
consequence of the allocation of the global quota between high-quality and low-quality beef 
which led to an implicit tariff structure that discriminated against the cheaper grass-fed 
beef. We suggest that the quota does more than just discriminate in favour of grain-fed 
beef (and against gras&-fcd beef) but also that it discriminates in favour of the United States 
as a source of grain-fed beef (e.g. Canadian beef is excluded from Japan). 3 
several recent papers (e.g. Wahl S<.!...fil.; Lin fil.al.). 
3Japanese policy makers have stressed the "global" nature of the beef quotas which means 
that any country could supply beef of the specified form provided that it met Japanese 
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Diaphragm Beef 
In addition, the Australians have claimed that U.S. "diaphragm beef" (which enters 
outside the quota as "offal") has displaced Australian grass-fed beef (which is subject to 
quota). The tariff rate on offals is lower (15 percent rather than 25 percent on quota beef) 
and there is no quota rent to pay. In some uses "diaphragm beef" from grain-fed cattle can 
be &ubstituted for certain cuts of grass-fed beef. U.S. exports of offal to Japan in recent 
years have been greater (in both quantity and value) than U.S. exports of beef and veal 
under quota. The Australians have argued that through the management of the quota 
system the Japane&e have encouraged the substitution of U.S. high quality (grain-fed) beef 
and diaphragm beef for Australian grass-fed beef. They proposed that it would be fairer 
and more efficient to replace the quota system with an equivalent tariff. 
Recent Reforms 
Under the four year agreements with the United States and Australia implemented in 
1984, Japan's beef imports had to increase by 9,000 mt per year made up of 6,900 mt of "high 
quality" (grain-fed) beef and 2,100 mt of "other" (grass-fed) beef. This would have brought 
the total quota to 177 ,000 mt by 1988 but in fact the Japanese increased the total quota 
beyond the agreed amount. The Australian and U.S. government filed a complaint against 
the Japanese with the GA TT in early 1988; but before GATT could take action, the 
Japanese government announced in June 1988 that it reached new bilateral agreements with 
both the Australian and U.S. governments. Under the new agreement the Japanese import 
quota will increase by 60,000 mt per year through 1990 (the transition period) prior to it 
being eliminated altogether on April 1, 1991. The current 25 percent import tariff will be 
raised temporarily to 70 percent in 1991 and thereafter lowered to 60 percent in 1992 and 50 
percent in 1993 (the post-transition period). Additional safeguards allow for an additional 
25 percent tariff in any year during the post-transition period in which beef imports increase 
by 20 percent over the previous year. 
Implications of Reforms 
Whether the U.S. beef industry will benefit from these change& ir-. not clear. There is 
fairly clear evidence that the Japanese have been favouring the U.S. industry relative to the 
Australian one both through the management of the mix of high quality and low quality 
beef quotas and through not taking action to prevent diaphragm beef entering as offal. It 
also seems likely that Japan has favoured the U.S. over the Canadian~. Current trade 
patterni,, indicate that Canada has a clear comparative advantage over the United States in 
high quality beef and that, in fact, the U.S. is a net importer of high quality beef. The scale 
effects under the new agreement amount to an increase of 50 percent or so in total imporb 
over three years with potential for further increases. Whether U.S. export& to Japan 
increase or decline depends on substitution in consumption between different qualities of 
quarantine requirements. This claim does not fit comfortably with the observations that (a) 
Canadian beef exports to Japan are virtually non-existent, (b) Canada is a net exporter of 
high quality beef to the United states, and (c) in fact the United States is a net importer of 
both high quality beef (from Canada) and low quality beef (from Australia and New 
Zealand). Moreover, the details of the quota arrangements have been settled in bilateral 
government agreements between Japan and the United States and between Japan and 
Australia. Canada and New Zealand, for instance have not been party to these 
negotiations. 
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beef (and between high quality Canadian and high quality U.S. beef) and on the capacities 
of the industries in different countries to supply an expanded marke1. 
There have been a number of econometric studies of the demand for beef in Japan 
(e.g. Teal sa_fil.; Lin sa..fil.. ; Wahl sa..fil..]. Some of these studies have attempted to &imulate 
the likely demand rc1>ponsc to the types of trade reforms that arc being implemented by the 
Japancf>c. There arc several difficulties common among f>Uch stuclie~ and the evidence i~ 
not clear.4 
It is somewhat easier to conjecture about the wpply ~i<lc of the problem. Basically 
this is becau&e the projected increase in Japanese imports i~ fairly small compared to 
capacity in any of the major exporting countries. In 1987 the Australian beef and veal 
industry exported about 580,000 mt of beef including 360,000 mt to the United State!. and 
120,000 mt to Japan. Recent Australian production figures are about two-thirds of peak 
numbers during the later 1970s. Thus the Australian indu&try would appear to have some 
capacity in the short run, and considerable capacity in the long run, to increase supply to 
Japan either by diverting product from alternative domestic and export markets or by 
increasing production. The projected total increase in Japanese imports to 1991 (say 
120,000 mt) could be supplied with a 20 percent increase in total Australian exports, a 30 
percent reduction in Australian exports to the United States or, roughly, a 10 percent 
increase in Australian beef production. 
In 1988 the U.S. beef indu~try produced over 10 million mt of beef; 277,000 mt were 
exported but 1040 mt were imported. These import!. do not include imporb of live cattle 
from Canada, worth over $400 million per yc<1r. To !.Upply a further 120,000 mt to Japan 
would be a negligible change in the total U.S. industry although it would amount to a 30 
percent increase in exports. But the striking fact is that the United States is by far the 
biggest beef importer in the world and seems to be a net importer of grain-fed as well as 
grass-fed beef. 
The Canadian cattle herd declined by about 1.5 million head from 1978 to 1988. In 
1988 the total herd si:ze was around 12 million. Canada is a net exporter of beef to the U.S., 
normally selling 60,000 tonnes of beef and over a quarter of a million head of live cattle 
every year (both on a net trade basis). Finally, it is pertinent to note that since the new 
policy was announced there is some anecdotal evidence that Japanese firms have been 
investing in cattle feeding operations to produce high quality grain-fed beef in both 
Australia and Canada. 
Although the United State~ ha5 supplied mo~t of the growth in Jap<1nesc hcef imports 
during the past ten year!., it seems likely that other countries (Canada. Australia and New 
Zealand) would have shared more in that growth under a competitive allocation of Japanese 
import quotas. As shown in Table 1, the U.S. is the world's largest importer of beef. Thus it 
would be surprising to find that the U.S. has a comparative advantage in beef and could be a 
major exporter of beef to Japan under liberalised trading conditions. Although beef is a 
heterogeneous product, allowing the possibility that the U.S. could simultaneously import 
and export beef if it had differing comparative advantage in different types of beef, we 
4First there are the usual problems with any demand analy~is of functional form and so 
forth. Second, and more specifically, the annual data that arc available arc not f>Ufficiently 
disaggregated to permit the relevant cross-elasticities to be calculated; third, it is not clear 
whether the data reflect conwmcr dcci~ion!. rather than middlemen <lcci5ion~ dbtorted by 
the cxi5ting policief>; and fourth, the policy change require!. a huge extrapolation beyond the 
range of historical experience in Japan. 
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doubt that the U .~. has a long-run comparative advantage even in grain-fed highly marbled 
beef of the type currently being exported to Japan. 
Any increase in the international demand for beef from Japan is likely to lead to an 
increase in the price of beef in aJI countries except Japan, with benefit!> to all producers 
therein. Thus U.S. beef producer& could gain from Japanese beef trade liberalisation, albeit 
indirectly. However, con&umer surplus in all countries other than Japan will decline; since 
the United States is and will remain a net importer, the U.S. as a whole will probably lose 
from beef trade liberalisation. 
Another interesting point worth raising is whether the reforms will lead to a 
significantly higher growth rate of Japanese imports than would have taken place otherwise. 
That is, the relevant issue is how much has the policy added to the future growth of 
Japanese beef imports. Japanese beef imports may well have grown quite briskly with a 
continuation of the previous policy regime. Figure 5 shows imports over the period 1970 to 
1987. Fitting a logarithmic function to the data in Figure 3 yield1> a compound annual 
growth rate of imports of 12 percent over the 18 year period. The growth rate has been 
higher (17 percent) during the latter ten years. Moreover, the annual growth rate of U.S. 
sales to Japan has been over 30 percent. Extrapolating the long-term growth rate of 12 
percent per annum from 1987 would imply total imports of about 1.8 mmt in the year 2000. 
Interestingly enough, the U.S. government projects total Japanese imports under the 
reformed policy of 1.9 mmt in the year 2000. Essentially, then, the reform amounts to an 
agreement by the Japanese to expand their imports at a rate that is in the same range as the 
long-term growth rate. In this scenario the main effect - if any - of the reform must be the 
substitution effect in the form of reallocation of market shares. Under a managed quota 
policy, U.S. sales might have continued to grow at 30 percent per year into the 1990s; such 
an outcome seems unlikely now. 
JAPANESE WHEAT TRADE 
Given the consumer preference in Japan for wheat products [>Uch as noodles and 
bread, wheat is an important part of the diet. Japan is reliant on imports for 85% of its 
wheat supply. Wheat imporb are also used as a source of revenue by the Japanese 
government to partially pay for its high cost dome~tic rice and wheat policy. 
The importation of wheat is rigidly controlled by the government through its 
Japanese Food Agency (JFA). Import quotas and high resale prices are the ba~ic policy 
mechanisms used by the JFA. The JFA's profits from wheat imports in fiscal 1986/87 
totalled approximately 200 to 240 billion Yens. In comparison, the rice subsidy programme 
costs the Japanese government about 380 billion Yen per year6 and the domestic wheat 
programme about 85 billion Yen per year. The system of wheat import quotas and high 
domestic prices is not only profitable for the government but also for a select group of 
5Data obtained from the US Embassy in Tokyo indicates that, for fiscal year 1986/87 the 
average c.i.f. purchase price of imported wheat was 33,552 Yen per mt. During the same 
year the resale price (to flour millers) was 83,979 Yen per mt and the JFA's administrative 
costs for imported wheat were 6,195 Yen per mt. This means that net profits from wheat 
imports were 44,232 Yen per mt, for a total of about 243 billion Yen. According to the Far 
Eastern Economic Review (Sept. 11, 1986:p.161) the net profitr. from wheat imports for 
fiscal 1986/87 were approximately 200 billion Yen. 
6This figure war. reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review, July 16, 1987:p.24. 
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importing agents and the flour millers. The Japanese government profits from wheat 
imports because it resells all imports at fixed domestic prices which a ·e roughly two to three 
times as high as world levels. The domestic price is fixed in Yen and it remains virtually 
unchanged year after year. For most of the 198Ch the domestic retail price was 
approximately 80,000 Yen. Any benefits from a rise in the value of the yen and the fall in 
wheat prices are captured by the JFA and the Japanese importing companies. None are 
realised by the consumer. 
Japanese farmers produce about 875,000 tonnes of wheat, which is about 15% of 
domestic usage. The nominal rate of protection for wheat in 1984 was estimated to be 318 
percent. The farm price of wheat in Japan is significantly higher than the domestic 
wholesale price paid by flour millers. In 1986 farmers were paid about 185,000 Yen per mt. 
In other words there is a negative margin on domestic purchasei. by the JFA and these 
amount to approximately 100,000 Yen per mt. 
Japan ranks as one of the largest importers of wheat in the world, normally buying 
about 5.5 million metric terns (mmt) annually. Data on market shares of Japanese importers 
of both feed and food wheat show that about 59% of Japanese imports are supplied by the 
United States, 23<y,1 by Canada and ls<fr, from Australia. Japan doe:-. not purchase wheat 
from other major exporters such as the EEC or Argentina. Canada supplied about 50% of 
the Japanese market in the early 1960s and this has declined to less than 25% at the present 
time. During the same time period the U.S. share increased from a bout 35% to close to 
60%. Australia's market share also increased, but by a small amount. 
The ability of the JFA to set its quotas so that only certain countries can fill them is 
enhanced by the way in which it treats feed wheat quotas. There are separate quotas for 
"food" wheat and "feed"? wheat imports. Only Australia and the U.S. are given "feed" import 
quota, Canada is excluded. Normally about 1.2 to 1.3 MMT of the JFA's wheat imports 
come under the "feed" budget (or 23% of total wheat imports). Of the "feed" wheat 
imported, about 45% originates from Australia and 55% from the U.S .. Generally speaking 
the imported "feed" wheat is not inferior to some of the other wheat imported for "food" 
purposes. As explained in footnote 5, the Bran Milling industry buys most of the "feed" 
wheat from the JFA. At one time (prior to the late 1960s) the Bran Millers purchased 
Canadian wheat but then they switched to U.S. and Australian wheat and Canada ha& not 
been able to get reinstated into this market. The explanation given by the Japanese 
government for this switch away from Canada is that imports from Canada in 1968 included 
rain damaged wheat which resulted in sprouting problems. However, U.S. Western White 
wheat shipments in 1967 also resulted in major sprouting problems and this did not affect 
the market share of this particular class of wheat. 
Exporters do not sell directly to the JFA, rather, they negotiate with private Japanese 
companies that are designated importers by the .JFA. These companies, in turn, sell the 
wheat (c.i.f. Japan) to the .JFA. Each fiscal year (beginning April 1) the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) in the Japanese Government sets the quota on 
7The "feed" wheat imported from Australia and the United State~ under the JFA's feed 
"budget" is largely used by the Bran Milling industry. Feed wheat import!> total about 1.3 
mmt each year and only about 20% is fed directly to animals - the remaining 80% goes to 
the bran milling industry. The bran milling industry extracts 50-55% noodle flour from this 
"feed" wheat. Although the data is sketchy, the Japanese bran millers export some of the 
flour to China and Hong Kong (and possibly other destinations). Flour exports run as high 
as 300,000 tonnes in some years. The JF A allows the millers to replace flour exports with 
the equivalent amount of imported wheat at world prices, which is a windfall for the millers. 
wheat importf>. Thc~c quota& are determined in consultation with the private flour milling 
companies and the wheat importing companies. Each milling company prepares a request 
for quantities of various cla~&es of wheat. However, the emphasis is on managed trade and a 
stable market so each milling company takes into account its historical role in the flour 
market when it is making its request for imports. 
The "license" to import wheat is granted to less than thirty companies, but the 
majority of these are small and they play a minor role in the business. The top five 
importing companies, in order of volume of imports, are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Kanematsu 
Gosho, Nichimen and Itochu. These five control about 65% of the imports and their market 
shares are very stable from year to year. The JFA discourages competition for market share 
by the individual companies. Obviously, this system does not provide the JFA with the 
lowest import price available. From International Wheat Council data, it has been 
estimated the private importing companies make excess profits (above normal returns for 
handling, transportation, etc.) in the neighbourhood of $.55/bu in some year& (C. Collins). 
This amounts to about $100 million per year. 
Japanese flour millers are very quality conscious and they have a strong preference 
for hard red spring wheat. According to a la~e Japanese flour milling company the most 
preferred wheat they can buy is No. 1 CWRS from Canada. Canadian wheat is known for 
its good milling and baking quality. In addition, the grading standards in Canada are more 
stringent than in any other exporting country and the Japanese prefer the uniformity of 
Canadian wheat which is a product of tight grading standards. Canadian spring wheat is 
used as the main ingredient in flour blending by Japanese mills but the Japanese millers are 
informally restricted (by the JFA) to a fixed amount of imports from Canada. 
Implications of Reforms 
The scale versus substitution effects from liberalisation of Japanese wheat imports 
are much more straightforward than in the case of beef. We fully expect the scale effects 
will be relatively small but the substitution effects rather large. The U.S. would most likely 
lose market share in wheat and this probably would be captured by Canadian sales. While it 
is true that U.S. wheat could be sold elsewhere (e.g. to China or Russia), it is also true that 
Japan is one of the few remaining commercial importers of wheat. Presently, U.S. sales to 
Japan are at a premium of about $30 per MT over alternative marketf.. because Japan is not 
given an export &ubsidy from the U.S .. 
We expect the &calc effect& to be small for two main rea&on&. The first is that the 
Japanese already consume about 70 lbs of wheat flour per capita (compared to 123 lbs in the 
U.S.) and this is fairly high for an Asian diet. Secondly, liberalisation would cut the 
wholesale price of wheat in one-half but this would have almost a negligible impact on the 
retail price of bread and a small impact on the price of flour because wheat is such a small 
component of overall cost (only about 5%). 
8CWRS stands for Canadian Wes tern Red Spring and No. 1 indicate& the highest quality. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Conventional trade theory cannot explain why Japan uses quot.is to control imports 
of agricultural producb. According to neoclassical trade theory quota& arc inefficient 
compared to tariffs. However, Japan has used discriminatory import quotas quite 
successfully. The way it has managed food imports with these quotas can be explained with a 
political economy model where special trade partners are given the lion's share of the 
quota. The Japanese quotas are manipulated to favour the U.S. over other exporters 
because the U.S. is politically more important to Japan. Viewed within this framework it 
appears that Japan has been acting in a perfectly rational manner by setting up managed 
quotas. 
Beef and wheat quotas were discussed as case studies in this paper. We argue that 
both beef and wheat quotas have in fact been manipulated by Japan and preferential 
treatment has been shown to the U.S. This raises the question of what will happen under 
Japanese trade liberalisation and a move away from quotas towards freer trade. Japan i!> 
being pushed in this direction by the U.S. (and other countries) and reform!> have begun in 
the case of beef. From the U.S. standpoint for these change& to be beneficial would seem to 
require offsetting benefit!> in other industries such as the feed grains industry, in other meat 
producing industries, or even in the manufacturing sector. The outcome for the U.S. may be 
very disappointing. 
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Table 1 Pacific Rim: Beef Production, Exports and Imports: 1988 
(million metric tons) 
Country Production Exports Imports Net Exports 
United States 10.88 .31 1.09 (.78) 
including offals .38 (.70) 
Australia 1. 55 .91 0.0 .91 
New Zealand .54 .41 0.0 .41 
Canada .98 .08 0.13 (. 05) 
including live animals .06 
Japan .57 0.0 0.23 (0.23) 
including otfal s 0.0 0. H ( (). 31) 
Note: All figures are for 1988; except Japdn whi clt is for 1987 
U.S.offal exports to Japan are preliminary estimates. 
Source: Complied from ddta from t.he USDA, ABARE. and Agricult~!t<-' 
Canada. 
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CHAPTER 8 
MOVING TOWARD FREE TRADE: 
A STUDY OF THE FEEDGRAIN SECTOR IN TAIWAN 
Rhung-Jieh Woo* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although Taiwan i& not a member of the GATT, it i'> attempting to follow the GATT 
rules in all respects including those relating to the agricultural sector. In recent year&, 
"trade liberalisation" ha& been one of the guiding economic policie& in Taiwan. Under this 
principle, the government ha& adjusted its agricultural and trade policies to reduce the 
degree of intervention in the production, con&umption and trade of agricultural products, 
and hence reduce distortions in resource use and trade. 
The general objective of thi& paper is to report the effort'> Taiwan has made in the 
soybean, corn and &orghum indu&tries as example& of Taiwan'& movement towards free 
trade. 
The study contdin" tour part&. A general description of the &oybean, corn and 
sorghum markeh in Taiwan i& provided fir&t. Variou& policie'> that the government in 
Taiwan ha& actively implemented to reduce the degree of trade di&tortion with respect to 
those indu&trie& are dc&cribed rn the second part. The effectivene&& of these policies are 
reported in the third part. Findlly, a summary and conclu&ion& arc presented. 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKETS 
The fa&t development of the livestock industry, in re&ponse lo the demands of a 
growing population with &teadily ri&ing per capita real incomes, ha& promoted the expan<.;ion 
off eedgrain and &oyhean demand in Taiwan. 
Taiwan relic& heavily on soybean and fcedgrain import&. In 1987, for example, 
Taiwan imported 1.96, 1.71. dnd 0.71 million tonne& of &oybean;,, corn and &orghum 
respectively. In the '>ame ye<lf, domestic production of these crnps wa& only 18, 307 and 103 
thousand tonne&. In other word'>, the 1987 self-'>ufficiency ratios of &oybeans, corn and 
sorghum were only about 1 'it, 8% and 12% respectively. (Tabk 1) 
As rice production ha'> '>Uh&tantially outgrown domestic requirement& in recent years, 
and as world market condition& were unfavourable for the expamion of rice exporb, policy 
makers in Taiwan attempted to induce fa1mers to '->Witch from rice to import-substituting 
crops, especially corn, '>orghum and soybeans. In respon~c to this policy, domestic 
production of corn, sorghum and soybeans have increased gradually during the 1980's. 
However, the increases in 4uantity demanded outgrew the inc1eases in dome&tic supply, and 
x Associate Professor, Nationdl Taiwan University. 
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imports of soybean:; and corn grew ~teadily (Table I). Becau~e of the demand potential of a 
large affluent population relative to the very limited production potential in Taiwan, 
imports of fcedgrains and soybeans arc expected to grow continuou:;Jy in the near future. 
CHANGES IN TRADE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
Generally ~peaking, tariff barriers and import controb on feedgrain and soybean 
imports have been relaxed over recent years (Table 2), and nominal guaranteed prices of 
soybean, corn and sorghum have been frozen since 1983 (Table 3). 
Tariffs on imports of ~oybeans, corn and sorghum were decreased from 10%, 5% and 
5% respectively in 1981 to 7 170, 3% and 3% respectively in 1982, and then remained at those 
levels till 1987. In 1988, the tariff rate on soybean imports was reduced further to 3.5% 
(Table 2). 
In addition to reduction& in import tariffs, the government lowered the rate of 
"harbour fees" (taxes imposed on imported goods in addition to tariff5) from 4% to only 
0.5% in 1987. Furthermore, the "base prices" (on which the tariffs arc imposed) were 
decreased gradually from 115% of the cif pricef, in 1980 to lOQ<Jt,, starting from 1986 (Table 
2). The "effective import tax rate~" for soybeans, corn and f,Orghum decreased from 16.10%, 
10.35% and 10.35% in 1980 to 41/(J, 3.5% and 3.5% respectively in 1988 (Table 2). 
Imports of :>oybeam and feed grains were subject to the provi&ions of the "Bulk 
Commodity Import Regulation" before July 1988. Under thif, regulation, imports were 
restricted to public enterprises 5uch as the Provincial Food Bureau and to member firms of 
the "Importers Joint Committee" of various industrie5. Import need~ of individual members 
were coordinated within the committees and pas&ed on to the Board of Foreign Trade at the 
end of each year for the annual buying mi&sions the following year. Import quotas for 
individual member~ of each indu5try association were then allocated on the ba&is of their 
request~. In principle, the quantity actually imported was '>Upposed to fall within a 1Yfr) 
difference of the agreed volume. However, the authorities showed com.iderable flexibility 
in revising import quota5 whenever market condition5 in mid-year warranted ~uch a 
revision. 
The Bulk Commodity Import Regulation wa& abolished in July 1988 and the "joint 
importing" r-.ystem wa& terminated at the same time. Since then, barrier& on imporb of 
wyheans and feed graim have been lowered further. 
In addition to the various efforts that have been made to reduce import barriers, the 
government has also attempted to reduce the adverse impact of production subsidies on 
trade. Although farmer& have been encouraged to 5Witch from rice production to 
alternative crop~, the nominal "guaranteed prices" on soybeans, corn and sorghum have 
been kept constant since l 983 or 1984 (Table 8.3). The guaranteed prices in real terms, 
however, have decreased &ince then. 
Furthermore, the value of the NT dollar ha& appreciated tremendously in recent 
years. The exchange rate of US$ to NT$ decreased from 39.90 in the year end of 1985 to 
35.55 and 28.60 in December 1986 and 1987 re&pectively. The exchange rate decreased 
further to about 25.80 m April 1989. The trcmendou5 appreciation of the New Taiwan 
dollar provides a more favourable condition for grain exports to Taiwan. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY EFFECTS 
Tahlcs 4 to 6 show the protection effects of trade policie~ on soybean'>, corn and 
sorghum since 1980. Generally speaking, the nominal tariff rates and the effective import 
tax rates have decreased gradually in recent years. Although the d(1mestic prices have abo 
declined &incc 1980, the nominal rates of protection (NRP) did not show significant 
decreases. 
The analy:>i& revealed that the producer-to-horder price ratirn, for soybeans, corn and 
sorghum in Taiwan were still high. Moreover, the ratios showed increasing tendencies 
(Table 3). One of the reasons is that domestic guaranteed prices were kept constant while 
world prices decreased. The appreciation of the domestic currency in recent years was 
another major rea<,on responsihlc for this phenomena. Acrnrding to Hathaway, farmers 
respond to prices received in their own currencies and to their own production costs. It is 
farmers' incentives that need to he dealt with and the producer-to-border price ratios may 
not do this. Therefore, what should be fro7en is the ab&olute price in the local currency 
where that price is a function of a subsidy or protection programme. 
According to the results, trade policies had harmed consumers but benefitted 
producers, importer<; and the government. The importers were the major group who 
bencfitted from the protection of various trade policies. Producers, on the other hand, 
gained only slightly. For example in the corn industry, it can be calculated from Table 5 that 
only 6.7% of the increase in consumer expenses in 1988 was tram.ferred to the producers, 
15.0% of it was the government tariff revenue, and the rest of it (roughly 78%) was 
transferred to the importer-.. The resulb imply that when trade protections are removed, 
the importers, not the farmers, will suffer the largest losses. 
Table 7 shows the eflerh of price support policies on soyheam., corn and sorghum. 
According to this analy'>i'>, the price support policies revealed significant effect:> in 
improving farm incomes. For example farm incomes increased by roughly 42, 33 and 52 
thousand NT dollars per hertare for corn, :o.oybean and sorghum production respectively in 
1986 under the protection of price :o.upport policie:o.. However, since the average farming 
area for each farmer in Taiwan is small, the policy effects in increasing total farm income 
arc limited. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The ultimate objective of the current GATT round of multilateral trade negotiationli 
is lo achieve greater liberalil.ation of trade in agriculture and bring all measure!> affecting 
import access and export competition under strengthened and more effective GATT rules 
and disciplines. 
In respon&e to the trend to liberali&ation, the government in Taiwan recognilied that 
the time had arrived I or fundamental decision& to be made concerning both the rules for 
international trade in agriculture and the nature of its domestic agricultural support 
system:-.. Various adjustment!> have been made to reduce import barriers of many types for 
agricultural product~ J'> well a'> to reduce the negative effects of exi&ting sub&idies on 
agricultural trade. For example, import tariff!> were reduced. other taxes attached to the 
imports were dccrea~cd, the "Bulk Commodity Import Regulation" wall abofo,hed, the 
guaranteed priceli were I 1 o/cn and the dome~tic currency WJ<, dramatically appreciated. 
These adjustment'> rqHe-,cnl d major &tep toward free trade. 
{\1 
Although Taiwan has been adjusting its trade and agricultural policies in the 
direction of free trade, there is still room for improvement. The necessity of continuous 
adjustments toward a system that minimise& distortions in production, con&umption and 
trade of agricultural products is recognised. 
Q? 
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Table 1 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Production and imports of soybeans, corn and sorghum : Taiwan 
Domestic production 
(1000 tonnes) 
soybeans corn sorghum 
26 115 9 
16 96 12 
12 118 13 
9 143 13 
10 190 33 
12 226 87 
15 272 97 
18 307 103 
15 320 118 
Imports 
(1000 tonnes) 
soybeans corn sorghum 
939 2603 417 
1113 2611 840 
1150 2548 743 
1414 3459 534 
1345 2960 597 
1470 3017 564 
1739 3071 810 
1958 3707 726 
2098 4459 98 
Self-sufficiency* 
(%) 
soybeans corn sorghum 
2.7 4.2 2 .1 
1.4 3.5 1.4 
1.0 4.4 1. 7 
0.6 4.0 2.4 
0.7 6.0 5.2 
0.8 7.0 13.4 
0.9 8 .1 10.7 
0.5 7.6 12.4 
0.7 6.7 54.6 
Source: Taiwan Provincial Government, Department of Agriculture and Forestry. 1988. 
Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook. 
Approximated by: domestic production/(domestic production + imports) 
Table 2 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Tariffs and effective import taxes of soybeans, corn and 
sorghum 
Tariff rates 
(%) 
soybeans corn sorghum 
10 5 5 
10 5 5 
7 3 3 
7 3 3 
7 3 3 
7 3 3 
7 3 3 
7 3 3 
3.5 3 3 
Effective import tax rates* 
(%) 
soybeans corn sorghum 
16.10 10.35 10.35 
16.10 10.35 10.35 
12.65 8.05 8.05 
12.10 7.70 7.70 
12.10 7.70 7.70 
11. 55 7.35 7.35 
11.00 7.00 7.70 
9.84 5.84 5.84 
4.00 3.50 3.50 
Source: Inspectorate General of Customs, January 1989. 
* 
Customs Import Tariff of the Republic of China. 
"Effective import tax rates" = (tariff rates + harbour fees)x(a) 
Where (a) = 1.2 1980 1982 
1.15 1983 - 1984 
1.1 1985 
1.0 since 1986 
"harbour fees" = 4%, before August 1987 
0.5%, since August 1987 
96 
Table 3 Guaranteed prices of soybeans, corn and sorghum : Taiwan 
Guaranteed prices (NT $/kg) 
Year at current prices at constant 1986 prices Guaranteed-to-border price ratios* 
soybeans corn sorghum soybeans corn sorghum soybeans corn sorghum 
1980 16.25 9.50 10.50 19.83 11. 59 12.81 1.45 1. 57 1.84 
1981 19.50 11.80 12.60 20.45 12.38 13.22 1. 54 1.68 1.88 
'° 
1982 24.00 14.33 13.90 24.45 14.60 14.16 2.09 2.50 2.65 
-4 
1983 25.00 15.00 17.00 25.13 15.08 17.09 2.38 2.64 3.10 
1984 25.00 15.00 14.00 25.13 15.08 14.07 1. 93 2.35 2.46 
1985 25.00 15.00 14.00 25.18 15.11 14.10 2.36 2.68 2.93 
1986 25.00 15.00 14.00 25.00 15.00 14.00 3.88 3.42 3.78 
1987 25.00 15.00 14.00 24.87 14.92 13. 93 3.57 4.93 4. 73 
1988 25.00 15.00 14.00 24.56 14.73 13.75 3.32 4.25 4.28 
Source: Taiwan Grains & Feeds Development Foundation. 
* Guaranteed prices I import prices. 
Table 4 Protection effects of trade policies on the soybean industry: Taiwan 
------(,) ( 2) (1) (/•) (5)-1 (1)/ (6) (7) (8)~! (3)-(11)] (9)~1 (3)-(4) l ( IO)~(?)x (ll)=(l.l)-(9) 
(/•) 1-1 xl(6)1(7)f x(6) (l1)x(7) -( 10) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Tar Hf Effective Domestjc Import Nominal Domest1.c Imports Increase in Increase in Government Increase ln 
rat cs import prices prices role of produc I 1011 l'Ol\t.\Ul!tC'\·~ 1 J>l.l)(\UC.f"l !l 1 I .it l f I l iriJlOI I ('In I 
I nx prol eel f 011 t'xpe11d LI u re rcvcnnc l CVCllllC l eVClllll' 
rates 
(NT$/ (NT$/ ( 1000 (1000 (NT million (NT million (NT nn.111011 (NT m1 llion 
(%) (%) kg) kg) (%) mt) mt) $) $) $) $) 
1980 10 16.10 14.45 11. 21 28.90 26 939 3126 84 1695 1310 
1981 10 16.10 15.58 12.64 23.26 16 1113 3320 47 2266 963 
1982 7 12.65 14.38 11. 50 25.04 12 1150 3348 35 1674 1669 
\/:I 1983 7 12.10 14 .22 10.50 35.43 9 1414 5292 32 1796 3488 00 
1984 7 12. 10 15.17 12. 92 17 .41 10 1345 3047 21 2102 694 
1985 7 11. 55 12.79 10.61 20.55 12 1470 3231 27 1801 1100 
1986 7 11.00 11.29 8.69 29.92 15 1739 4561 39 1663 2448 
1987 7 9.84 8.80 7.00 25.71 18 1958 3557 32 1349 2176 
1988 3.5 4.00 10.01 7.53 32.93 15 2098 5240 47 632 4571 
- ----
Snnn·!': 'fnlwnn Provfnc-1nl c;nvrrnm0nt ' Dcpnrt mc>nt of /\p,rjculturc and Forestry. 1988. 
I_aiwan __ ~ricult ural Yearbook. 
Taiwan Grains and Feeds Development Foundation. 
Inspectorate General of Customs. 
Table 5 Protection effects of trade policies on the corn industry: Taiwan 
(l) ( 2) (3) (ii) (5)=1 (3)/ (6) (7) (8)=[ (3)-(4) I (9)=[ (3)-(4) l (10)=(2)x (11)=(8)-(9) 
(4) 1-1 xl(6)+(7)) x( 6) (4)x(1) -( l D) 
---- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Tariff Effective Domestic import Nominal Domestic Imports increase in Increase in Government increase in 
rates import prices prices rate of production consumers' producers' tariff importers' 
tax protection expenditure revenue revenue revenue 
rates 
-------------------------------------------------------
(NT$/ (NT$/ (1000 (1000 (NT million (NT million (NT million (NT million 
(%) (%) kg) kg) (%) mt) mt) $) $) $) $) 
1980 5 10.35 7.54 6.04 24.8 115 2603 4080 173 1628 2279 
1981 5 10.35 8.47 7 .03 20.5 96 2611 3899 139 1900 1860 
\C 1982 3 8.05 6.91 5.73 20.6 118 2548 3147 140 1175 1832 
\C 
1983 3 7.70 6.95 5.69 22.l 143 3459 4539 180 1516 2843 
1984 3 7.70 7.94 6.39 24.3 190 2960 4883 294 1456 3133 
1985 3 7.35 6.62 5.59 18.4 226 3017 3341 233 1240 1868 
1986 3 7.00 5.51 4.39 25.5 272 3071 3744 304 944 L496 
1987 3 5.84 4.36 3.04 43 .4 307 3707 5298 405 658 42J5 
1988 3 3.50 4.30 3.53 21.8 320 4459 3680 246 551 2883 
Sources: See Table 4. 
Table 6 Protection effects of trade policies on the sorghum industry: Taiwan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=[ (3)/ (6) (7) (8)=[ (3)-(4) l (9)=[(3)-(4)] (10)=(2)x (11)=(8)-(9) 
( 4) ]-1 x[ (6)+(7) l x(6) (4)x(7) -(10) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Tariff Effective Domestic Import Nominal Domestic Imports Increase in Increase in Government Increase in 
rates import prices prices rate of production consumers' producers' tariff importers' 
tax protection expenditure revenue revenue revenue 
rates 
-------------------------------------------------------
(NT$/ (NT$/ (1000 (1000 (NT million (NT million (NT million (NT million 
(%) (%) kg) kg) (%) mt) mt) $) $) $) $) 
1980 5 10.35 7 .10 5. 72 24.1 9 417 588 12 247 329 
...... 
1981 5 10.35 7.35 6. 72 9.4 12 840 714 8 584 122 
0 
0 1982 3 8.05 5.93 5.25 13.0 13 743 514 9 314 191 
1983 3 7.70 6.46 5.48 17.9 14 534 536 13 225 298 
1984 3 7.70 6.88 5.69 20.9 33 597 749 39 262 448 
1985 3 7.35 5.46 4. 78 14.2 87 564 443 59 198 186 
1986 3 7.00 4.71 3.70 27.3 97 810 916 98 210 608 
1987 3 5.84 3.91 2.96 32 .1 103 726 788 98 125 565 
1988 3 3.50 4.08 3.27 24.8 118 98 175 95 11 68 
----
Sources: See Table 4. 
Table 7 Effects of price support policies for corn, soybeans and sorghum 
Commodity corn soybeans sorghum 
Item 1985 1986 1985 1986 1985 1986 
(a) Domestic production lOOOmt 226 321 12 15 87 97 
(b) Government purchases lOOOmt 185 211 10 12 81 89 
(c) = (b)/(a) .819 .656 .837 .812 .930 .922 
loo' (d) market prices NT$/kg 6.62 5.51 12.79 11.29 5.46 4.71 0 
loo' 
(e) guaranteed prices NT$/kg 15 15 25 25 14 14 
(f) = (e)-(d) NT$/kg 8.38 9.49 12.21 13. 71 8.54 9.29 
(g) Yield Kg/ha 3614 4186 1716 1576 4554 4168 
(h) Production subsidies NT$/ha 15800 15800 15800 15800 15800 15800 
(i) Income increase NT$/ha 40589 41856 33343 33353 51961 51508 
per hectare 
=(f)x(g)x(c)+(h) 
Source: Chen, S.H., 1988. 
CHAPTER 9 
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND FEASIBLE ADJUSTMENT 
FOR THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY IN TAIWAN 
Tsu-tan Joe Fu* 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural trade i:>suc~ have formed a large part of the recent GA TT negotiations. 
During the Uruguay Round of the GATT meetings, one of the main issues is to promote 
trade liberalisation for agricultural commodities. 
The volume of international agricultural trade is significant in Taiwan. Agricultural 
exports ~hare of total export~ from Taiwan was 6.8%, whereas agricultural imports share of 
total import was 14.1 % in 1987. The influence of international trade liberalisations could 
be realised through bilateral or multilateral trade relations between Taiwan and it:> trading 
countries or areas. Therefore it is essential to re-examine Taiwan's agricultural trade 
policies and develop an appropriate scheme to accommodate the impact of the agricultural 
trade liberalisation. 
The purpo<,er, of this paper are to mea&ure the impacb of trade liberalisation in 
selected livestock productr,, and to develop feasible adju&tment :>chemes for the Taiwan 
livestock industry. The paper provides a description of supply, comumption and trade 
conditions for variou:> live'>tock products in Taiwan, followed by cros&-country comparisons 
of nominal import tariff rates and producer &ubsidy equivalents for selected livestock 
product!>. From these, an effective means of reducing Taiwan's livestock trade barriers is 
derived. The eff eels of trade liberalisations in livestock products and the associated gains 
and costs to producers and consumers are analysed, and the paper concludes with a 
discussion on feasible adjustment processes for Taiwan's livestock industry. 
PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND FOREIGN TRADE 
Livestock production in Taiwan includes cattle, hogs, goats, sheep, horses, deer, 
chickens, ducks, geese, turkeys, eggs and dairy products. The value of livestock production 
was 30% of total farm prnducts in 1970, rising to 41% in 1987. Hog production is the major 
enterprise, accounting for about 62% of total live:> tock production, followed by chicken 
raising. Owing to the scarcity of land in Taiwan, cattle farms do not achieve scale 
economics compared with the hog and poultry farms. Domestic production of cattle and 
dairy products is very limited. Except for fresh fluid milk, about 90% of marketed beef and 
dairy products arc imported. 
*Associate Research Fellow, The Institute of Economics, Academid Sinica, Taipei. 
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Table 1 gives production, consumption and trade volumes for meats, eggt> and dairy 
products in 1987. As mentioned earlier, pork and poultry (mainly chickens) are the major 
production items. While beef and dairy products (mainly milk powder) are the major 
imported goods, pork is the largest export product in livestock industry. The self-
sufficiency ratio for major meats is 111 %, of which pork is 120% and poultry about 100%. 
However self-sufficiency ratios are only 11 % for beef and 6% for mutton. Eggs are totally 
domestically supplied, fresh milk is 100% locally supplied and milk powders are 100% 
imported. 
The food consumption pattern in Taiwan indicates that pork, poultry, eggs and dairy 
products are major items for daily consumption. However, information on changes in 
consumption over time are interesting due to a recent sharp increase in GNP per capita, 
from US$2,669 in 1981 to US$6053 in 1987. The rate of growth in livestock product 
consumption, the last column of Table 1, showed that mutton had the highest rate of 
increase in meat consumption although the quantity consumed is small, followed by poultry 
and beef. Pork consumption showed the slowest growth rate. Annual per capita 
consumption of fresh milk increased from 2.69 kg in 1981to7.13 kg in 1987, a 165% rate of 
increase. 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY 
A simple measure of government interventions in commodity trade is the nominal 
tariff rate (NTR). In addition, aggregate measures such as nominal rate of protection 
(NRP), effective rate of protection (ERP), and producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) are 
widely used in measuring government interventions in agriculture. 
The NTR is used to support domestic production of a particular commodity by 
increasing the landed price of comparable foreign-produced goods. The NRP measures 
how output prices received by producers have been changed by government policy, as the 
percentage difference between the domestic price that producers receive and the world free 
trade price that they would receive without government intervention. Policies captured by 
the NRP include border measures and policies that change producer prices such as 
producer subsidies and taxes. While the NRP ignores the effect of price distortions on 
intermediate inputs, the ERP incorporates the influence of government intervention on 
both output and input prices. An ERP is calculated as the percentage difference in the 
value added of a sector with and without trade distortion. Lastly, the PSE measures the 
income transfers to farmers that result from government policies, including the effect of 
both direct government spending on agricultural programmes and the effect of policies such 
as import quotas that transfer income from domestic consumers to producers, as a 
percentage of the total value of production. 
Due to the lack of data, only the nominal tariff rate and PSE were used in this 
analysis. Pork and chickens, as major domestic production items, and beef and dairy 
products representing major imported livestock products were included in the analysis. 
Countries or areas used for comparison included Japan, the USA and European Community 
(EC). These countries or areas have a significant trade in livestock products with Taiwan. 
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The Nominal Import Tariff Rate Comparison 
During the last three years, Taiwan has implemented tariff reductions for a wide 
range of agricultural and non-agricultural products. A further reduction of tariffs for 
selected agricultural products is to be expected. Table 2 gives a cro:;s-country comparison 
of the NTR for various livestock products in 1987. A country or a product with a higher 
value of NTR is assumed to have a higher degree of government intervention. 
The NTR for beef is 23.8 NT$/kg for good grade round steak and 30 NT$/kg for 
medium grade flake steak, or about 30% cif import prices for beef in 1987. Such a tariff 
rate for beef is the highest figure among all countries in the Table. The NTR for Taiwan 
pork is 15% which is higher than for Japan and US but lower than for the EC. However, as 
shown in Table 1, Taiwan is a major pork exporter, so the tariff for pork is usually not 
realised as virtually no pork is imported. 
The chicken industry in Taiwan was highly protected by a 40% import tariff in 1987 
which is the highest of all countries in the Table. It should be noted that the import of 
frozen chicken meat requires a government import permission, and only very small volumes 
have been imported in recent years. As a result, the NTR of chickens in Taiwan is not 
effective. 
Since almost all the imported dairy products are milk powders, this commodity is 
used to represent the NTR for dairy products. The NTR for milk powder (containing by 
weight more than 1.5% fat with no added sugar or other sweeteners) in Taiwan was 20% in 
1987, which is lower than that of Japan but slightly higher than the EC. 
The PSE Comparison 
While Table 2 provided information on the limits to access due to tariffs for various 
livestock products, Table 3 measures the government intervention& in livestock product& 
that resulted from domestic farm policies. Five ranges of PSE values were used in 
measuring the degree of trade distortions in Table 3. A product or a country with a higher 
PSE exhibits a higher level of government protection for that product or country. The USA 
had the lowest level of livestock products protection with PSE values in the range of 0 to 9% 
for every product examined. Table 3 also shows that the Taiwan livestock industry has 
relatively lower PSEs than Japan and the EC, indicating a lower level of government 
protection relative to Japan or the EC. On average, Japan has the highest PSE's among all 
the countries compared in Table 3. 
Comparing livestock products in Taiwan, dairy product& has the highest PSE value, 
falling within the range 25% to 49%. Since almost all the domestic production of dairy 
products is fresh milk, this indicates the extent of government protection of the fresh milk 
industry in Taiwan. 
Other Livestock Product Trade Regulations in Taiwan 
Trade regulations that restrict imports of livestock products for national health or 
sanitation purposes, or that restrict trade in certain scarce animals exist for most of the 
countries in the world. In addition to these regulations, imports of pork, beef, poultry, and 
dairy products in Taiwan are under government quantity control. Meats such as beef and 
poultry all require import permissions issued by the government. With over-supply of pork 
in Taiwan, import controls are not usually required. Although Taiwan is not self-sufficient 
in beef production, the import of frozen beef has been almost free of quantity controls in 
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recent years. However, poultry meat imports have been virtually banned until 1988. 
According to agreements reached during the US-Taiwan bilateral trade negotiation in 1988, 
Taiwan would open its markets for turkey and duck meats. Currently, great pressure is also 
being exerted by the USA to open the chicken meat market to imports. Fresh milk is subject 
to very strict import controls. An import levy for milk powders was not terminated until 
1987, with such levies used as a fund for the development of domestic dairy production in 
Taiwan. 
Tables 2 and 3 show that the Taiwan livestock industry has relatively high trade 
distortions in terms of NTR measures, but relatively low government protection as 
measured by the PSE. Given the already relatively low government spending and income 
transfers, it is difficult to reduce trade distortions by a further reduction of government 
spending. Besides, equity among income groups is heavily emphasised in Taiwan, making it 
very difficult to implement a farm policy that will decrease producers' incomes. Therefore 
further trade liberalisation in Taiwan should centre on the reduction of import tariffs. In 
addition, the non-tariff restrictions on imports should be eliminated in the process of tariff 
reductions. 
IMPACTS OF TRADE LIBERALISATION IN THE TAIWAN LIVESTOCK 
INDUSTRY 
The analysis of the impacts of trade liberalisation reported here involved a reduction 
of the NTR for beef, milk powder, and chicken meat. The pork industry is excluded because 
Taiwan is an exporter of this product. To evaluate the effects of a tariff reduction, the 
Carden/Johnson model was used to estimate changes in welfare costs attributed to 
producers and consumers (Bale and Greenshields). 
Border prices 
Information on prices for the various producb is provided in Table 4. There are dual 
tariffs for frozen beef: NT$23.8/kg for good grade steak and NT$30/kg for other (medium) 
grade steak. Given that almo~t 95% of imported beef is good grade, the former tariff was 
used in the analysis. Total elimination of the import tariff for beef would mean a 
NT$23.8/kg price cut, or a 11 % reduction in the producer price and a 14% reduction in the 
retail price. Similarly a 20% import tariff reduction for milk powder implies a NT$12.08/kg 
price cut in the domestic retail price or equivalently a 19% price reduction. Only a very 
limited amount of milk powder is produced domef>tically from excess fresh milk in the 
winter season, so the milk powder analysis did not extend to the farm level. 
Finally, since there is no import reference price for frozen chicken& in Taiwan, the cif 
import price for Japan was used as a proxy. 
Supply and Demand Elasticities 
Supply and demand elasticities for various livestock products in Taiwan are also 
required for the model. Recent studies (Liu, Hsu, Lee) on supply and demand analysis for 
Taiwan livestock products were the source~ of thef>e data. Table 5 indicates that domestic 
beef supply is lesf> price responf>ive with an elasticity of 0.12, whereas chicken supply is 
relatively price elastic with a 0.47 elasticity. 
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On the demand side, all the livestock products are relatively price elastic. The 
elasticity of demand for imported beef, rather than that for domestic produced beef, is used 
in the analysis, :;ince about 90% of beef consumption was imported in 1987. 
Changes in Production, Consumption, and Economic Surplus 
The effects of tariff eliminations on beef, milk powder, and chickens are shown in 
Table 6. Changes in production, consumption, and imports were calculated assuming a 
zero tariff rate, as were the associated net social gains in production and consumption. 
Owing to the low supply elasticity for beef, a NT$23.8/kg of beef tariff cut would 
cause only a 1.2% decrease in beef production, whereas the relatively elastic demand for 
beef would result in a 17% rise in beef consumption and 19% increase in beef imports. The 
effects of the milk powder tariff cut, by NT$12.08/kg, include a 5% increase in both 
consumption and imports. 
In the case of the chicken meat industry, the impacts of trade liberalisation are 
relatively pronounced. With a NT$16.72/kg tariff cut, production would decrease by 12%, 
consumption would increase by 18%, and imports would rise by 143.6 thousand metric tons. 
Combining both production and consumption effects, the elimination of import tariffs 
would increase social welfare by NT$1200 million for chicken meat, NT$75 million for beef 
and NT$21 million for milk powder. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS ON FEASIBLE ADJUSTMENT 
The fundamental spirit of trade liberalisation is that it will enable a country to make 
more efficient use of its national resources. Cross-country comparisons of nominal import 
tariff rates and producer subsidy equivalents for various livestock products showed that 
Taiwan has a relatively high trade distortion a& measured by the NTR, but relatively low 
transfers to farmers as indicated by its low PSE values for livestock products. This seems to 
indicate that an effective trade liberalisation for Taiwan livestock products should aim at 
the reduction of import tariffs rather than at changing domestic farm policies. 
The effects of tariff reduction in Taiwan livestock products were analysed in this 
study. The information on welfare gains in production and consumption generated from 
this study may be used as guides of resource adjustment for livestock industry. The results 
of the analyses for beef and milk powder in Table 6 indicated consumption gain greatly 
outweighed the production gain which implies a relatively low adjustment coi.t in moving 
producers out of beef and milk powder industries and a relatively high benefit for 
consumers. Thus, tariff reductions seem a feasible policy for trade liberalisation in both 
beef and milk powder. 
The tariff cut for chickens caused a 12% reduction in domestic production and a 
relatively high social gain in production, which could imply a high adjustment cost. It is 
possible that adjustment costs may outweigh the benefits of cheap imports, especially when 
the income losses imposed on producers are taken into account. Trade liberalisation 
recognises the goal of efficient resource use, whereas other goals such as the improvement 
of equity and income distribution, and the improvement of food security, may be politically 
important. A huge producer loss may imply a further deterioration of equity or distribution 
of income between farmers and non-farmers. It would be impractical to announce a trade 
liberalisation for the chicken industry without recognising those political pressures that may 
come from farmer groups. 
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A scheme that comider& the length, speed, and pattern of the adjustment process for 
the chicken industry is thus important for smoothing the tran&ition period. Dynamic 
simulation analyses may be useful in designing such schemes that incorporate gradual policy 
changes through time. Some restrictions on the quantity or pattern of import of chicken 
meat may be useful in the initial adjustment stage of such scheme&. For example, Taiwan 
consumers usually favour chicken legs more than chicken breasts. On the contrary, US or 
western peoples show the reverse preference. As a result, chicken leg is expensive in 
Taiwan but cheap in the US or EC. For a given amount of total chicken imports, an import 
of low cost foreign chicken legs would have higher impacts on domestic chicken producers 
than that from the import of chicken breast or whole chickens. Therefore, a policy in the 
initial adjustment period could allow the import of chicken brea&t in parts or whole chickens 
only, with temporary restrictions on the quantity of chicken leg~ imported. Such a strategy, 
combined with a gradual tariff reduction scheme may help Taiwan chicken producers adjust 
towards free trade. 
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Table 1 Production, Consumption and Trade: Taiwan Livestock Products 
Category 
Meat: 
Pork 
Beef 
Mutton 
Poultry 
Sub-Total 
Eggs 
Milk: 
Fresh 
Evaporated 
Condensed 
Powder 
Butter 
Sub-total 
Production Foreign Trade 
Import Export 
Self 
Sufficiency 
Consumption 
1987 1987/1981 
------------------1000 MT-----------------------kg/capita----------
1137.9 0.1 192.6 120.0% 34.83 37% 
4.2 32.8 11.4% 1. 89 52% 
0.6 10.9 1.0 5.7% 0.54 145% 
399.8 2.9 3.5 100.2% 20.43 54% 
------------------------------------------------------------------
1542.5 46.7 197.1 110. 7% 57.69 44% 
225.2 0 1. 5 100.6% 11.45 34% 
144.4 0 0 100.0% 7.13 165% 
1. 8 2.5 0 41. 8% 0.21 75% 
0 0 0% 0.00 0% 
0.3 69.0 0 0% 3.25 19% 
6.7 0 0% 0.34 126% 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
146.5 78.2 0 65.0% 10.93 92% 
Source: Taiwan Food Balance Sheet, 1981-1987. 
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Table 2 Nominal Import Tariff Rates for Selected Livestock 
Products: Taiwan, Japan, U.S.A. and EC 
Item Taiwan Japan U.S.A. EC 
Beef 23.8NT$/kg 25% 4% 20% 
(good grade) (good grade) 
30.0NT$/kg 10% 
(medium grade) (medium grade) 
Pork 15% 10% 2.2USc/kg 20% 
Poultry 
Chickens 40% 20% llUSc/kg 18% 
Turkey 15% 20% llUSc/kg 18% 
Ducks 45% 10% llUSc/kg 18% 
Geese 50% 10% llUSc/kg 18% 
Dairy 20% 30% 3. 3-13. 7USc/kg 18% 
(Milk Powder) 
Table 3 P.S.E's for Selected Livestock Products: Taiwan, 
Japan, U.S.A. and EC, 1982-86 (%) 
Taiwan Japan !L...S_,_ E C 
Beef 10-24 50-74 0-9 25-49 
Pork 0-9 25-49 0-9 10-24 
Poultry 10-24 25-49 0-9 25-49 
Dairy 25-49 75-99 0-9 25-49 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture 
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Table 4 NTR and Border Prices for Beef, Milk Powder 
and Chickens, Taiwan, 1987 
Beef Milk Powder Chickens 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -NT$/kg- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
NTR 
Domestic farm price 
Domestic retail 
price 
Import price cif 
Amount of tariff 
for free trade 
cut 
Change in farm price 
[(5)/(2)] 
Change in retail price 
[(5)/(3)] 
23.8 for good 
grade steak; 
30.0 for other 
medium grade 
steak 
220.9 
300 for domestic 
beef steak; 
166.7 for imported 
beef steak 
87.2 
23.8 
11% 
14% 
20% 
60.4 
12.08 
'> .1% 
a. A weighted price of adult formula (187) and baby formula (295). 
b. Japan c.i.f. import price for frozen chickens (whole with bone), 1987. 
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40% 
55.9 
71. 3 
41. sb 
16. 72 
25.2% 
19.3% 
Table 5 
Item 
Beef 
Pork 
Chickens 
Dairy 
(milk 
Estimated Supply and Demand Elasticities for 
Selected Livestock Products: Taiwan 
Supply 
0.12 
0.27 
0.47 
powder) 
Sources: Estimates were adopted from Lee,Liu and Hsu. 
Table 6 Effects of Beef, Milk Powder and Chicken Tariff 
Reductions: Taiwan, 1987. 
Beef Milk Powder 
Demand 
-1.21 
-0.97 
-0.93 
-0.97 
Chickens 
--------------
1 000 MT ----------------
Change in: 
Production (decrease) 
Consumption (increase) 
Imports (increase) 
0.05 
( 1. 2%) 
6.27 
(17.0%) 
6.32 
(19.0%) 
3.43 
(4.9%) 
3.43 
(4.9%) 
56.37 
(11.8%) 
87.25 
(17.9%) 
143.6 
Net social gains: ----------------NT$ million-----------
Producer3 0.6 
Consumerb 74.6 20.7 
Total net social gain 75.2 20.7 
a. Net social gain in production = ~ (change in farm price) 
x (change in production) 
b. Net social gain in consumption ~ (change in retail price) 
x (change in consumption). 
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471.3 
729.4 
1200. 7 
CHAPTER 10 
TRADE LIBERALISATION AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
IN FARMLAND UTILISATION POLICY: THE 
CASE OF TAIWAN 
Shun - Cheng Lee• 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent dramatic changes in Taiwan's economic struclure have produced several 
impacts on the production and marketing of the agricullural sector. For example the 
incrca!>ing trade halancc <,urplu~ led to trade negotiation.<, with the USA. Of concern here i!. 
that tho~c negotiation'> have created impact!. which make domc~tic production adju11tmcnl 
even harder to achieve than expected. 
Furthermore, the trade liberalisation policy effective since 1987 has required that the 
agricultural sector urgently search for appropriate i.tructural adjustment processes. Such 
processes must be evaluated in terms of resource reallocation, culture/organisation 
changes, policy /institution changes, and technology changes in order to rebuild the 
agricultural sector to face future challenges. 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN AGRICULTURE 
Taiwan's economic growth rates fall within the range 5.1 % to 11.6%, and averaged 
8.8% for the period 1953 - 1987 (Table 1). Agricultural production growth rates varied 
between -1.6% and 5.8% and averaged 3.4% over 1953 - 1987. Significant changes in the 
relative importance of agricultural products occurred particularly the dramatic decline in 
crop production's share relative to those of fisheries and livestock. 
Taiwan has been heavily dependant upon multiple cropping for agricultural 
production. However, as measured by the multiple cropping index, this land cultivation 
technique has declined from 189.7 in 1964 to 142.3 in 1987 (Table 2). 
The number of full-time farm households has declined relative to total farm 
numbers, from 49.3% in 1960 to 11.4% in 1985. Part-time farm households have increased 
their shares from 50.7% in 1960 to 88.6% in 1985. Among the part-time households, the 
agriculture-oriented houl'>eholds have decreased from 30.9% of total farms in 1960 to 19.8% 
in 1985. Thui. the side-line households have increased their shares from 19.8% in 1960 to 
68.8% in 1985. 
* Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, National Taiwan University, Taiwan. 
Substantial technical material involving an aggregate production function analysis of the 
efficiency of farmland usage has been omitted from this edited version of the original 
paper. Readers requiring the original should contact the author. 
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As shown in Table 4, of the total cultivated farmland of 627,300 hectares in 1985, a 
share of 60.7% was held on farms of less than 1.5 hectarei. in i.i1c and was owned by 86.9% 
of the total number off arm households. 
Table 5 reveals that the gross domestic fixed capital formation attributed to the 
agricultural sector has been declining steadily from NT$470 million (24.2%) in 1952 to 
NT$20,912 million (3.5%) in 1987. However that attributed to the industrial sector has 
been increasing from NT$582 million (30.0%) in 1952 to NT$278,944 million (46.8%) in 
1987. 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND TRADE PROBLEMS 
Taiwan's island economy of about 20 million people relies heavily on trade. The 
island's export-expansion policy dramatically changed its export mix from mainly rice and 
sugar before the 1960's to electrical and electronic manufacture, textiles, metal products 
and machinery in the 1980s. Except for the recession of 1974/75, Taiwan has consistently 
enjoyed a foreign trade surplus since the early 1970s. The surplus with the United States, 
on which country Taiwan depends for about half its exports, has made Taiwan a visible 
target for foreign criticisms on its trade barriers. 
The share of the agricultural sector in the whole economy has been continuously 
declining from 31.4% in 1961 to 6.1 % in 1987. At the same time, the share of agricultural 
product exports to the total value of Taiwan's exports has also declined from 62.4% in 1961 
to 6.8% in 1987. Agricultural production, agricultural export volumes, agricultural import 
volumes, and both agricultural export and import prices have increased since 1961 (Table 
6). 
Table 7 summarises general trends in agricultural exports and imports over the 
period 1951 to 1987. The total value of agricultural product exports amounted to US$160 
million in 1961, US$1,956 million in 1981 and US$3,617 million in 1987. Agricultural 
imports were valued at $111 million in 1961, rising to US$4,827 million by 1987. 
It is quite clear that in contrast to her overall trade success, Taiwan has run a trade 
deficit in agricultural products since 1970. The deficit peaked at US$1,731 million in 1984, 
and stood at US$1,210 million dollars in 1987. 
During past decades the agricultural trade relationships between Taiwan and the 
United States can be divided into three phases: (1) Taiwan's agricultural export expansion 
period, 1952-1964; (2) Taiwan's agricultural import substitution period, 1964-1969, and (3) 
Taiwan's agricultural import period, 1970-1987. 
Of concern are the composition of the trade deficits and their causes. As illustrated 
clearly in Table 8 agricultural imports from the United States have increased on average by 
30% per year while agricultural exports to the United States grew at an average rate of 
22.8%. As a result Taiwan's agricultural trade deficit increased at an annual average rate of 
33.1%. 
It is also important to observe that the agricultural trade deficit with the United 
States relative to Taiwan's total agricultural trade deficit varied between 127% and 75% in 
the period concerned. Thus agricultural trade from the United States has played an 
important determining role in Taiwan's total agricultural trade deficits. 
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Table 1 Taiwan's Major Agricultural Economic Indicators 1953-1987 
Period Economic Growth Rate of Agricultural Structural Composition of 
Growth Production (%) Agricultural Production (%) 
Rate 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(%) Total Crops Forestry Fishery Livestock Total Crops Forestry Fishery Livestock 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1953-56 8.1 4.9 4.0 1.8 11. l 8.6 100 67.1 5.3 9.0 18.6 
1957-60 7.0 4.2 3.1 15.2 5.7 4.7 100 63.1 6.4 9.5 21.0 
1961-64 9.1 5.8 4.8 9.5 8.9 7.0 100 64.4 4.8 8.5 22.3 
.... 1965-68 9.9 5.7 4.5 0.3 13 .6 8.9 100 62.8 5.7 9.6 21. 9 .... 
Vi 1969-72 11.6 1. 5 o.o -0.9 6.1 6.7 100 55.4 5.4 14.4 24.8 
1973-75 7.8 3.3 2.7 -6.3 5.7 7.1 100 54.2 4.2 15.2 26.4 
1976-81 9.8 2.7 0.8 -8.3 5.1 10.2 100 48.2 2.6 19.9 29.3 
1982-87 8.2 1.6 -0.9 -3.8 5.0 7.0 100 45.1 1.3 24.2 29.4 
1985 5. 1 2.0 0 .1 -8.7 4.4 6.9 100 47.0 1.0 24.8 27.2 
1986 11. 6 -1. 6 -6.2 8.8 4.9 4. L1 100 41.8 1.1 26.3 30.8 
1987 11.0 5.1 2.3 -19.4 11. 7 8.2 100 41.4 1.2 28.2 29.2 
Source: Basic Agricultural Statistics, Council of Agriculture, Taiwan, 1988. 
Table 2 Multiple Cropping Indices 
Year Planted Cultivated 
Land Area Land Area 
(1000 ha.) (1000 ha.) 
1952 1521 876 
1962 1618 872 
1963 1613 872 
1964 1673 882 
1972 1586 899 
1982 1380 891 
1987 1261 886 
Source: Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook, Taiwan 
Province Department of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 1988. 
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Multiple 
Cropping 
Index 
173.6 
185.6 
185.0 
189.7 
176.4 
154.9 
142.3 
.... 
.... 
.....i 
Table 3 Numbers of Farm Households: Full-time and Part-time 
Household 
Category 
Year 
Total Farm 
Full-time Farm 
Part-time Farm 
- With Agriculture 
1960 
Numbers of 
Households 
776002 
382578 
393424 
239981 
as Main Occupation 
- With Sideline 153443 
as Main Occupation 
% 
100.0 
49.3 
50.7 
30.9 
19.8 
1970 
Numbers of 
Households 
879398 
274281 
605117 
369570 
235547 
% 
100.0 
31. 2 
68.8 
42.0 
26.8 
1980 
Numbers of 
Households 
871705 
78318 
793387 
313496 
479891 
% 
100.0 
9.0 
91.0 
36.0 
55.0 
1985 
Numbers of % 
771906 100.0 
88001 11.4 
638905 88.6 
153193 19.8 
530712 68.8 
"'"" 
"'"" 00 
Table 4 Numbers of Farm Households and Cultivated Land Area by Size of Farm: Taiwan 
Size of Farm 
Total 
Under 1.5 ha 
1.5 - 5.0 ha 
Over 5.0 ha 
Total 
Under 1.5 ha 
1.5 - 5.0 ha 
Over 5.0 ha 
1955 
Households 
(I 000) 
738.6 
585.4 
147.6 
5.5 
Area 
(1000 ha) 
836.0 
408.l 
130.3 
297.7 
% 
100.0 
79.2 
20.1 
0.7 
% 
100.0 
48.8 
15.6 
35.6 
1975 
Households 
( '000) 
866.4 
741.6 
120.8 
4.2 
Area 
(1000 ha) 
743.7 
441.0 
274.8 
27.9 
% 
100.0 
85.6 
14.0 
0.4 
% 
100.0 
59.3 
36.9 
3.8 
1985 
Households 
('000) 
771.9 
670.8 
96.5 
4.5 
Area 
(1000 ha) 
627.3 
380.6 
213.6 
33.1 
% 
100.0 
86.9 
12.5 
0.6 
% 
100.0 
60. 7 
34.0 
5.3 
Source: Basic Agricultural Statistics, Table 8, p9, Council of Agriculture, Taiwan, 1988. 
Table 5 Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation in Taiwan, 1952 - 1987 
Year Total Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services 
-------------NT$million-------------
----------%----------
""" 
1952 1940 470 582 888 24.2 30.0 45.8 
""" 
1962 
'° 
11623 2128 4583 4912 18.3 39.4 42.3 
1972 74978 6389 38550 30039 8.5 51.4 40.l 
1982 488618 18452 228762 241404 3.8 46.8 49.4 
1985 449149 15788 193305 240056 3.5 43.0 53.5 
1986 500802 21382 230645 248775 4.3 46.0 49.7 
1987 596610 20912 278944 296754 3.5 46.8 49.7 
--
Source: Basic Agricultural Statistics, Council of Agriculture, Taiwan, 1988. 
Table 6 Agricultural Trade and Development in Taiwan, 1961-1987 (Base Year: 1971) 
Ratio of Ratio of Index of Index of Index of Index of Index of Rate of Grovth 
/\gricultural Agricultural /\gr icu l tura l /\gricuJtural /\gricultural l\gricultural /\gricultural Self S1Jfficiency P.ale of 
Year Expert Value Expert Value Production Product Product Product Product of Foodstuff ti Population 
to Total to Total Ex per is Imports Exvort Price Import Price 
Production Exp0rt Value 
Value ( % ) ( % ) 
1001 31.'M G2.40 G7.0 41 26 42 65 98.42 74.4 
1006 26.23 47.78 84.7 86 36 89 91 108.69 86.6 
Hm H.PI> 18.m 100.0 100 100 100 100 95. ()() 100.0 
H)7G 13.35 13.13 1113.3 134 197 212 177 m.3<.l 110.1 
mn 12.44 12.ITT 121.0 156 217 210 194 94.41 112.l 
1978 11.24 11.29 118.7 170 267 217 183 92.40 114.3 
..... 
N 1979 10.33 10.00 124.9 177 Z74 234 209 n2.GO 116.B c 
1980 9.20 D.50 124.9 187 28G 323 m 00.93 118.7 
1981 8.()8 8.66 124.1 1B5 312 301 Z78 00.10 120.9 
1982 9.92 8.X 125.3 173 308 319 248 93.78 123.1 
1983 8.81 7.71 127.3 204 314 285 285 ~.14 124.9 
1984 7.62 6.77 129.6 217 358 301 259 90.52 126.8 
1985 11.28 6.87 132.3 200 378 291 219 95.24 128.4 
1980 7.18 7.18 124.1 249 430 320 201 - 131.6 
1987 B.80 6.80 127.1 258 504 49..1) 223 - 124.7 
Source: Agricultural Trade Statistics, Council of Agriculture, Taiwan, 1987 
CHAPTER 11 
POLICY CHANGES AFFECTING PACIFIC BEEF TRADE: 
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
David Harris, Greg Corra and Ian Shaw* 
INTRODUCTION 
The economic welfare of the Australian and New Zealand cattle industries is heavily 
dependent on export sales to Pacific Basin markets. More than half the beef produced by 
Australia and New Zcdland is exported to countries such as the United Slates, Canada, 
.Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. However, these trade flows arc restricted by an a~sortment 
of import policy interventions which distort the transmission of price signah. to beef 
producers in both importing and exporting countries. Domestic producen, in importing 
countries benefit from the protection levels provided by these policies, which vary 
according to the type of intervention (for example, tariffs, quotas, voluntary export 
restraints) and the extent of restriction on trade flows. 
Over recent years the two largest importers, the United States and Japan, have 
purchased around 80 per cent of combined export sales from Australia and New Zealand. 
Both countries impose import duties and quantitative restrictions on beef imports. Japan 
has negotiable quotas, while the United States negotiates voluntary export restraint 
agreemcnb with supplying countries when free market import lcveb are anticipated to 
reach a predetermined 'trigger' level. Compared with a free-trade environment, these 
policy interventionr:. reduce trade flows and generally rer:.ult m higher prices, lower beef 
consumption and higher levels of beef production in importing countries. They also 
contribute to lower, more unr:.table beef prices in exporting countries resulting in lower 
production and higher levels of domestic consumption. 
Following a period of intense negotiations with the United State& and Australia in 
1988, Japan has agreed to gradually phase out its beef import quotas. Essentially the 
agreement involves replacement of quotas with ad valorem tariffs beginning in Japanese 
fbcal year (JFY) 19911 following three years of substantial expansion in quota levels 
commencing in JFY 1988. This agreement represents a major reduction in the degree of 
intervention in the .Japanese beef market. A further development in the Pacific Basin beef 
market is the re-emergence of South Korea as an importer of heef. Following several years 
of no trade, South Korea re~umed beef imports during 1988 and i<; expected to purchase 
around 60-70kt (shipped weip,ht) in 1989. ~outh Korea'"> import quotas have recently been 
subject to a GATT inquiry which could lead to ..,u;.taincd long term access for imported 
product through bilateral negotiations. 
*Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Canberra 
1 Year beginning 1 April 1991. 
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The objective in this paper is to analyse the effects of the new Japanese beef import 
system and of possible changes in Korean beef import arrangements. The analysis will focus 
on beef trade and market price impacts as well as on the changes in producer and consumer 
surpluses of major beef trading countries in the Pacific. Quantitative results are obtained 
from forecast simulations using ABARE's econometric model of Australian broadacre 
agriculture (EMABA). The paper begins with an overview of the Pacific Basin beef market 
and a discussion of some theoretical considerations including a review of the relevant 
(EMABA) beef supply .md demand elasticities. A description of the !>imulation cxperimenb 
i!-1 presented foil owed hy a discussion of the results and a summary of the main conclusions 
that may be drawn from the analysis. 
THE PACIFIC BASIN BEEF MARKET 
The Pacific Basin beef market may be defined as the regions of North America (the 
United States and Canada), North Asia (Japan and South Korea), Oceania (Australia and 
New Zealand), South-East Asia (Taiwan and other countries) and the Central American 
countries. Trade flows link these regions to form a trading bloc separate from the rest of the 
world. 
This separation within world beef trade is largely due to a ban on beef imports from 
countries where foot-and-mouth disease is endemic, imposed by the major importing 
countrie!-1 of the Pacific Basin. The major Pacific importing countries of the United Stales, 
Canada, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan arc fool-and-mouth free and impm.e this animal 
health trade restriction. Australia, New Zealand and the United States arc the main export 
suppliers of foot-and-mouth free product and together account for more than 90 per cent of 
beef traded within the Pacific Basin. Ireland and Denmark offer the only significant non-
Pacific supply of foot-and-mouth free product. However, their penetration of Pacific 
markets has been limited by relatively high transport cosb to Asian markets and the 
Andriessen-Kerin Agreement which prevents the European Community from using export 
restitutions to sell beef in Australia's 'traditional' Pacific markets. 
There are some small trade flows both into and out of the Pacific Basin beef market. 
Under GATT minimum access quota arrangements, small quantitie1' of foot-and-mouth 
free beef flow from Australia and the United State1' to the European Community and from 
the latter to North America. In recent years small quantitie1' of South American beef have 
also been shipped into certain South-East Asian markets which have relaxed their foot-and-
mouth trade restrictions. Trade flows from Pacific suppliers to the Middle East - the only 
1'.ignificant non-quota controlled outflow of product - have declined to negligible levels due 
to competition from sales of subsidised EC beef. Significant price declines in the Pacific 
Basin or large price rises in the rest of the world would be required before this Middle East 
trade flow would affect developments in the Pacific Basin beef trade. In recent years the 
total movement of product both into and out of the Pacific has accounted for less than 5 per 
cent of total imports and total exports by Pacific Basin countries, respectively. 
Beef produced, consumed and traded within the Pacific Basin is a non-homogeneous 
product. Production systems in each country have particqlar features which distinguish their 
product from that of other countries. Three types of beef production system are used in the 
Pacific. Of these, Australia, New Zealand, South East Asia and South Korea are all 
predominantly producers of pasture or forage fed beef. Production in Australia and New 
Zealand is based on extemivc pasture grazing, while the production system in South-East 
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Asia and Korea i& largely based on intensive feeding with forage based rations. 
Consequently consumers in these countries are accustomed to a forage fed beef product. 
North American beef production is based on intensive feeding of grain based 
concentrate rations to feeder cattle raised in pasture based cow-calf operations. The 
product from grain fed cattle is referred to as 'fed' beef, while production derived from the 
gras& fed culled breeding cattle is referred to as 'non-fed' beef. Mo&t of this non-fed beef is 
combined with fed beef fat trimmings to produce a variety of processed beef products such 
as hamburger. For consumers, these 'processing beef' products form a distinguishable 
segment of the beef market from the fed beef products sold as 'table beef' Jn Japan beef 
production is almost entirely based on intensive grain feeding, as culled breeding animals 
are also finished on grain based rations due to a shortage of grazing land. The Japanese beef 
market is also closely linked to the dairy industry, with grain fed dairy steers and culled 
dairy cows supplying around two-thirds of total beef production in recent years. Consumer 
demands for processed beef products are supplied from imports of manufacturing beef and 
domestically produced beef obtained from lower grades of culled breeding cattle. The 
remaining domestically produced and imported grain fed product is sold as 'table beef'. 
As indicated in Table 1, the Pacific Basin beef market is dominated by the United 
States, which was the largest producer, consumer and importer of beef in 1987. Access to 
the US market has been regulated since 1965. In 1980, the meat import law (MIL) was 
introduced to set annual maximum access levels based on a countercyclical formula. If 
imports are anticipated to exceed a predetermined trigger level, acces& is restricted through 
the negotiation of voluntary export restraints with major suppliers. The countercyclical 
aspect of the formula is intended to lower (increase) access during periods of increasing 
(decreasing) per person cow beef supplies. Canada has a similar meat import law, although 
its control on access levels is more discretionary. In the past the triggering of US import 
controls often led to the imposition of Canadian import restrictions, due to the close 
relationship between their beef markets. In free access periods, imports by both countries 
are determined by market prices adjusted by relatively small import duties. 
The United States is also a substantial exporter of beef. Apart from small quantities 
of high quality grain fed beef shipped to South-Ea&t Asia for the 'hotel' beef trade, most of 
these exports have been lower quality grain fed beef cuts dc&tincd for the Japanese market. 
In addition, there arc substantial US exports of diaphragm beef to Japan, a product that 
escapes the quantitative restrictions of that market due to the Japanese defining it a& 'offal'. 
Australia and New Zealand are both larger exporters of beef than the United States, 
although the Oceania suppliers export a grass fed product in contrast to the US grain fed 
product. Generally, more than three-quarters of total shipmenb from Oceania are exported 
to North America and Japan. Shipments to North America arc manufacturing quality beef 
destined for the 'processing beef' market. Similarly, Australia and New Zealand export 
large quantities of manufacturing grade beef to Japan to supplement Japan's supplies of 
'processing beef'. In addition, a significant quantity of Australia's beef exports to Japan are 
composed of higher quality grass fed cuts (for example, chilled and aged beef) that compete 
with imported and domestically produced grain fed beef for sales in the Japanese 'table 
beef' market. 
Apart from North America, the other major beef importing countries in the Pacific 
are Japan and South Korea. The South-East Asian countrie'> generally allow free access for 
beef imports, apart from the use of small import dutie~ in some countries, yet they remain a 
relatively small market in term:; of production, consumption and imports. 
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South Korean imports are controlled by non-negotiable quotas and an ad val ore m 
tariff of 22.5 per cent. In the past Korea has announced its import requirements by 
dispatching tenders to supplying countries. As access to this market could be closed without 
warning, this import policy contributed to uncertainty in the Pacific Basin beef trade. The 
Korean Government suspended beef imports in late 1984 and the market remained closed 
until mid-1988 when imports were once again resumed. 
Japanese beef imports have been restricted since the early 1960s by a combination of 
import quotas controlled by a quasi-government importing agency and ad valorem tariffs 
(currently 25 per cent). From the late 1970s, import quota levels were negotiable on the 
basis of four-year bilateral agreements between Japan and the United States and Australia. 
Prior to the 1988 agreement to phase out import quotas, the last set of bilateral 
negotiations, in 1984, provided for a quota increase of 9 kt (shipped weight) per year for the 
four-year period from JFY 1984 to JFY 1987. In addition, large quantities of US diaphragm 
beef, which substitutes with some cuts of grass fed beef imported from Oceania, enters 
Japan at a lower tariff rate of 15 per cent and outside the quota arrangements. 
Restricted access for imported beef in Japan and South Korea has provided 
substantial assistance for domestic beef producers. To obtain estimates of protection levels, 
prices of identical products at the same point in the marketing chain are compared in Table 
2. It is important to recognise that these estimates imply perfect substitution between beef 
from different countries of origin, and should only be regarded as indicative of assistance 
levels. From the previous discussion it would appear that the 'homogeneous product' 
assumption is invalid. However, Australian and South Korean forage fed beef would seem 
to be similar products, as would US and Japanese grain fed dairy beef. Gorman and Mori 
(1988) suggest that imported US product is substitutable with Japanese dairy steer beef; 
comparison with the higher quality wagyu steers would therefore not be appropriate. The 
estimates indicate that protection levels for Japanese producers of dairy beef have more 
than doubled over recent years. Much of this rise in protection occurred following the 
appreciation of the yen relative to the US dollar. 
During periods when imports were allowed access, Australian product has held a 
dominant share of the ~outh Korean imported beef trade, with imports of US grain fed beef 
restricted to the 'hotel' market segment. As the Australian product is made available for 
general consumption it appears to be substitutable for domestically produced beef. The 
estimates indicate that South Korean producers have also obtained substantial assistance 
from import controls. Interestingly, protection levels in South Korea have halved over 
recent years. This result largely reflects a decline in domestic beef prices induced by 
increased cattle slaughterings following a peak in prices during 1983. 
The effect of protection on agricultural markets in the Pacific Basin has been the 
subject of recent research. Dewbre and Harris (1985) estimated the historical impact of US 
import controls on Australian and New Zealand beef producers, under alternative 
assumptions as to the distribution of the tariff equivalent rents obtained on sales to the US 
market. In a later paper, Dewbre, Harris and Sheales (1986) analysed the combined costs of 
US and Japanese import controls on the Pacific Basin beef market. Their results suggested 
average net gains for the economies of Australia and New Zealand of US$510m per year in 
the absence of US and Japanese import controls, over the 1968-84 period. The analysis also 
suggested average Japanese consumer welfare gains of US$2165m a year from the removal 
of Japanese import quotas alone, over the same period. 
Tyers and Anderson (1986) analysed the effects of complete liberalisation of all 
protective arrangements for food products in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Their results 
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suggested that retail price& of ruminant meats in Japan and South Korea would fall by over 
70 per cent and that world prices would rise by 9 per cent. Accordingly, Japanese imports of 
ruminant meat would ri&e by 2100kt. Anderson (1986) analysed the liberalisation of the 
Japanese beef import trade and suggested declines in retail beef prices of around 70 per 
cent, yielding an increase in imports of 380-580kt. 
In mid-1988, bilateral agreements between Japan and the United States and Australia 
provided for the phased removal of Japanese import quotas. The agreement requires Japan 
to increase its import quota by 60kt (shipped weight) per year, &tarting from the JFY 1987 
quota level of 214kt, for a three-year period. This will raise the import quota to 394kt in JFY 
1990. In JFY 1991 the quota will be abolished and replaced by a declining tariff regime: 
70per cent in 1991, 60per cent in 1992 and 50per cent in 1993. An additional safeguard 
allows Japan to impose an emergency tariff of an extra 25per cent during the three years 
after quota removal, should imports appear likely to exceed either 120 per cent of the 
previous year's imports or the JFY 1990 quota level compounded by 20 per cent per year, 
whichever is the higher. Unless supplying countries agree to limit imports the emergency 
tariff will apply to all beef imported during the remainder of the year after the prescribed 
level is reached. After JFY 1993, tariffs on beef imports will be subject to the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Tariffs on diaphragm beef will remain at 15 per 
cent in all years of the agreement. 
The Japanese agreement to phase out import quotas represents a major structural 
change in the Pacific Basin beef trade, and it can be expected to have a major impact on the 
Japanese market as well as on the main supplying countries, Australia, New Zealaud and 
the United States. At the same time, South Korea has resumed beef imports, with expected 
purchases of 60-70kt in 1989. Korea's import restrictions are also currently subject to 
GATT investigations which could lead to the establi&hment of more permanent access 
arrangements for beef imports. An indication of the effects of the&e changes in Japanese 
and South Korean import arrangements is reported in this paper. 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Figure 1 represents export market equilibria under the alternative scenarios of 
quantitative restrictions in Japan and the United States, free acces& in the United States and 
replacement of Japane&c quotas with tariffs For expo&itional purposes, producer level 
prices are used, and exchange rates, processiiig cost& and transport charges are ignored. 
Panel a shows an aggregation (Dd) of the domestic demand schedules in exporting countries 
and the demand schedule& of free access importing countries. Panels b and c contain 
existin~ tariff adjusted demand schedules for imported beef (Dj, Du) and import quotas 
(D~ Du) for Japan and the United States respectively. Panel b also represents the 
reJJ1acement of Japane&e import quotas (Dj) with a larger tarriff adjusted demand schedule 
(D~, according to the recent Japanese imported beef agreement. An afgregate supply 
schedule(S) is presented in panel d, as well as the aggregate liberalised (Da~ and restricted 
access demand schedules (Df, Dl) of an exporting country. 
In the situation of import quota& in Japan but free acce&& cl&ewhere including the 
United Stater-., the relevant aggregate demand &chedule i& D~ A· D~ , and the market 
·1·b . . 0 d . . 0 0 0 d 0 . l 1 d d . I equ1 1 nates at pnce p an quantities qd,qj, qu an qa m panes a, b, can respective y. 
The replacement of quantitative restrictions in Japan with a tariff i'> repre&ented in panel b 
by the demand &chedule or and in panel d by a shift and rotation of the aggregate demand 
schedule from Df Aj D~ to D~ D}, with a new equilibrium price and quantity pL and q;. It 
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'>hould he noted that the removal of the planned tariff in Japan would result in a further 
outward <ohift and rotation in both the Japanese and aggregate demand 1>chcdules. 
In the dom(·'>tic market:'> of exporting countrie1> and free <t(TC1>1> importing countricf>, 
the higher bed p1ice1> yidd rcduction1> in con1>umer <,Urplu1>e'> and concurrent incrca1>e1> in 
producer i.urpluses. In Japan, to the extent that domestically produced beef and imported 
product are substitutable, liberalising access for beef imports results in lower beef prices to 
both consumers and domestic producers. 
An important alternative scenario, in which Japan liberalises its beef import policy 
but access to the US market is restricted, is also depicted in Figure 1. The imposition of 
voluntary export restraint~ can be seen in panel c as a shift and rotation of the demand 
schedule from Du Du to DJ DJ and a concurrent shift and rotation from~ Di to~ Au 
D} in the aggregate demand schedule in panel d. In Japan (panel b) and in the domestic 
markets of the exporting countries and free access importing countries (panel a}, the 
resultant equilibrium price p1 is lower than the previous price outcome under liberalisation, 
pL. The extent of this price decline will depend both on the si1e of the US import restriction 
and on the relevant demand and supply elasticities. In addition to changes in comumer and 
producer surplu!>es, US import restrictions have an important distributional consequence 
concerning the capture of tariff equivalent rents on imported beef. Thc~e renb result from 
differences between US domestic prices and the lower prices received by producers in 
exporting countries and free access importing markets. With voluntary export restraints the 
rents on US beef imports accrue in the first instance lo beef exporting countries. 
The distribution of changes in consumer and producer surpluses between importing 
and exporting countries as a consequence of liberalising a restrictive beef import policy will 
depend on the ~'/e of the quantitative restrictions and the relevant elasticities. Similarly, 
the sharing of deadweight los::;es associated with trade restrictions between market 
participants is determined by the same parameters. 
From an exporting country per::;pective, an additional co!>t of restrictive beef import 
policies such as those adopted by South Korea is the increased instability of market prices. 
As suggested earlier, if South Korea resume'> beef import::; on a more permanent basis, the 
effect is to both rotate and shift to the right the aggregate demand schedule (D~) facing 
beef producers in exporting countries. Random shifts in exporting countries' supply along 
this more elastic aggregate beef demand schedule yield smaller fluctuations in prices 
received than previously. The instability effects of import rco;trictions have already been 
addressed by Tyer~ and Anderson (1986) and arc not considered here. The Pacific Basin 
price effects of a sustained opening or liberalisation of the South Korean beef market will 
be addressed empirically in this paper. 
THE MODEL AND SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
The analysis reported here is based on simulation experiment~ conducted with 
ABARE's Econometric Model of Au!.tralian Broadacrc Agriculture (EMABA), originally 
documented in Dewbrc, Shaw, Corra and Harris (1985) and Harris. Corra, Shaw and 
Dewbre (1985). For Australian agriculture the model incorporates annual dynamic, 
industry-level determination of market demand, supply and price in the cattle, sheep, crop, 
pig and poultry sectors. Improvements to EMABA since the original documentation include 
models of: 
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- New Zealand !>hecp and beef industries (Shaw 1986; McLeif>h and Spill 1987); 
- apparel wool demand in eight OECD countries (BAE 1987); 
- pigmeat and poultry !>Upply in Australia and the Uniled States 
(McLeish and Spill 1987); and 
- Japanese beef supply (Corra, Dickson and Teal 1989) and demand (Teal, Dickson, 
Porter and Whiteford 1987). 
EMABA is a spatial equilibrium model which incorporate!> 21 countries for which 
demand and/or supply of up to seven commodities is represented (!>ee Table 3). It includes 
beef and wool representation!> of foreign demand which explicitly incorporate product 
heterogeneity, barriers to trade and the dynamics of !>upply respon!>e by competing foreign 
producers. In addition, for the purposes of this analysis a preliminary model of beef supply 
and demand in South Korea was estimated and incorporated into EMABA. 
Specifically for beef, EMA BA models market price determination in five Pacific 
Basin countries: the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. Beef 
supply behaviour is comprehen&ively represented for each country with the exception of 
South Korea, for which beef supply is modelled in a simple partial-adjustment framework. 
The three interrelated US beef production systems - calf rearing, feedlot operations and 
non-fed cattle raising - arc all modelled in EMABA, yielding estimates of supply response 
for both table and processing beef. 
Supply respon1>es in the model are explicitly time dimensioned, with the nature of an 
individual country's response determined by such factors a~ the phy!>ical constraints 
inherent in beef inventory dynamics and by lags in the adjustment of producer expectations, 
peculiar to each country. For this analysis, assumptions affecting the time path of the supply 
response in individual countries are important for the results. Table 4 contains EMABA 
estimates of medium term beef supply elasticities for each country. It r,,hould be noted that 
for all countries the supply elasticities are considerably smaller in the first two years, and 
somewhat larger in the longer run, than the five-year responses reported in Table 4. 
Beef demand in EMABA is determined within a framework of consumer level 
domestic meat demand systems and constant-markup retail price equations for each of six 
countries, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand. For 
the United States and Japan, demand is modelled within the Almost Ideal Demand System 
framework (Deaton and Mucllbauer 1980), and the meats considered include beef, chicken 
and pork in both countries as well as :;;eafood in Japan. The framework used to model meat 
demands in the remaining four countries is a system of market share equations (see Dewbre 
et al. 1985). For South Korea and Taiwan, beef, chicken and pork demands are modelled as 
well as seafood in ~outh Korea. The Australian and New Zealand meat demand systems 
model beef, chicken, pork, Iamb and mutton. In other, smaller beef importing countrie& 
excess demand is modelled af> a function of price and exogenou!> factors such as income. 
Table 5 contains estimates of elasticities for domestic beef demand with respect to farm 
level prices in each country. (These should not be confused with retail price elasticities, 
which are substantially higher.) 
Beef trade in the EMABA model is represented in a trade share framework in which 
beef is differentiated by country of origin (Dewbre and Harris 1985). There are two general 
types of equations in the beef trade systems: total import demand equations for each beef 
consuming country, and import share equations which allocate total import demand among 
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competing suppliers on the basis of relative prices. The complete model includes nine 
individual countries for which import demand is modelled in thii. way. 
The effects of various import policies on Pacific Bai.in beef trade are examined in the 
context of dynamic forecai.t simulations experiments. Initially, a forecai.t simulation of the 
Pacific trading environment with Japanese import quotas phased out and replaced by tariffs 
was prepared for the 1989-1995 period. The result1' of thii. 1-imulation are referred to ai. 
JAPNEW and summarised in Table 6. They represent a set of long term projections of the 
effect of the 1988 Japane&e imported beef agreement for a given set of assumptions 
imposed on exogenous variables. All exogenous variables in the model were set at values 
reported by ABARE as medium term projections at it& 1989 National Agricultural Outlook 
Conference (ABARE 1988). In dynamic simulations lagged endogenous variables are 
known at each point in time from solutions for previous periods. An out-of-sample, 
dynamic, forecast :-imulation is an important test of model performance. The results of the 
forecast simulation JAPNEW provide a plausible set of long term projections for 
endogenous variables, indicating a satisfactory level of model performance. 
In generating the JAPNEW forecast simulation the Japanese beef market is cleared 
on the wholesale price of dairy steer& when simulating the quota years of JFY 1989 and 
1990. For the simulation of subsequent non-quota years, the Japanese domestic dairy beef 
price is assumed to fall to the import-quantity-share weighted average of the prices of grass 
fed (Australian beef price) and grain fed beef (US fed steer price) adjusted for tariffs, 
freight, exchange rates and unloading charges. Japanese ad valorem tariffs were assumed 
to remain at 50 per cent during the post-1993 period. This border price of beef i<> expressed 
in estimated dressed weight terms, equivalent to the Japanese wholesale dairy beef price. 
Beef demand and the supply of dairy beef adjusts to this new price level and, with fixed 
supplies of wagyu beef, imports are then determined as the residual of Japanese domestic 
demand and supply. The same procedure is used for simulating non-quota periods in South 
Korea, with the domestic market adjusting to a border price of Australian grass fed beef. 
As indicated earlier, the model does not include endogenous supply response for pig 
and poultry meats in Japan and South Korea. For simulation purposes these intensive meat 
prices were assumed to reflect endogenously determined movements in US intensive meat 
prices adjusted for exchange rates. While US pigmeat prices are determined by equating 
supply and demand, US poultry prices are determined by an equation applying constant 
markup to feed costs. The assumed level of (exogenous) US feed grain prices remains 
unchanged in all simulations. 
The effects of various import policies affecting the Pacific beef trade are assessed by 
comparing the forecast simulation of removing Japanese import quotas (JAPNEW) with 
alternative dynamic forecast simulations. The exogenous a&sumptions used to generate 
JAPNEW remain unchanged in alternative simulation experiments apart from certain 
variables related to beef trade policies. Price and quantity differences between JAPNEW 
and other simulatiom arc used to calculate changes in the future stream of producer and 
consumer surplu!>e!>. Clearly, the values of these cxogenou1> variables will influence the 
absolute sizes of gain& and losses in each country. Consequently, the e&timated changes in 
surpluses should only be regarded as indicative. 
The four alternative simulation experiments included: 
(1) JAPOLD: Japanese import quotas retained and restricted to a 9 kt annual increase 
for the 1989-1995 projection period, with tariffs on beef imports maintained at 25 per 
cent. 
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(2) USFREE: Removal of US import control!> for the 1989-1995 projection period, with 
changes to the Japanese imported beef arrangements unchanged from J A PN EW. 
(3) KORlMPO: A 10 kt annual increase in South Korean import quotas commencing 
from a 1989 base of 50 kt, with changes to the Japanese imported beef arrangements 
unchanged from JAPNEW. 
(4) FREETRD: Complete free trade for the 1989-1995 projection period, with the 
removal of all quantitative and tariff restrictions on Japanese, South Korean and 
United States beef imports. 
The gains from removal of Japanese import quotas can be assessed by comparing the 
JAPNEW forecast simulation results with an alternative simulation of continued Japanese 
import quotas (JAPOLD). For illustrative purposes it was assumed that import quotas 
would be restricted to a 9 kt annual increase - a continuation of the previous set of bilateral 
agreements signed in 1984. The sizes of these gains are dependent on the assumed 
hypothetical levels of the Japanese import quotas. The remaining simulations (USFREE, 
KORIMPQ and FREETRD) are compared with JAPNEW to assess the additional effects of 
further changes in existing Pacific Basin import policies. 
QUANTITATIVE RES UL TS 
A summary of the JAPNEW forecast simulation results is presented in Table 6. 
These results represent a full dynamic simulation of the phased removal of Japanese import 
quotas in favour of a tariff regime commencing in JFY 1991. The simulation did not impose 
Japanese emergency tariff procedures in those years when the projected level of beef 
imports indicate they would be triggered. Apart from being used as a base case for 
comparing with alternative simulations, JAPNEW represents a set of long term projections 
that incorporates the change in Japanese import policies as set out in the 1988 agreement. 
Therefore, before discussing the simulation comparisons a review of the main features of 
JAPNEW may be of some interest. The most interesting aspects of JAPNEW include the 
following. 
(1) Increasing Japanese demand for imported grass fed beef generates substantial price 
rises as well as lower domestic consumption in Australia and New Zealand and, to 
some extent, a redirection of their exports away from the US to the Japanese market. 
Following an initial negative supply response, production in Australia and New 
Zealand expands gradually as continued high wool pricef> constrain the rate of herd 
buildup. 
(2) Although US exports to Japan rbe substantially, the increase in US fed beef prices is 
much smaller than the rise in grass fed beef prices, and US domestic beef 
consumption falls marginally. Trigger levels for US import controls decline steadily 
over the projection period and, despite reduced shipments from Australia and New 
Zealand, voluntary export restraints are applied in 1992 and subsequent years. 
(3) Replacement of Japanese import quotas with a 70 per cent tariff in JFY 1991 causes a 
reduction in domestic beef prices by a third, higher Japanese beef consumption and a 
large rise in beef imports relative to 1989 levels. The pro.jected level of Japanese beef 
imports (net of diaphragm beef) in JFY 1991 indicates a 25 per cent rise on the 
preceding year, which would trigger emergency tariff procedures. 
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(4) Based on relative pncc movements, Japanese beef imporb from Au!>lralia and the 
United Mate<, increa&e from around 170 kt and 220 kt in 1989 lo 400 kt and 370 kt 
(shipped weight) respectively by 1995. Australia's share of total Japanese imports 
(inclusive of diaphragm beef) rises from 41 per cent in 1989 to 49 per cent in 1995 
while the US share falls from around 52 per cent to 46 per cent over the same period. 
Estimates of change!> in producer and consumer surpluses resulting from alternative 
simulation experiments are provided in Tables 7 and 8. The estimates are the summations of 
the 1989 net present value of changes in the stream of producer and consumer surpluses 
over the 1989-1995 period, u&ing a discount rate of 10 per cent. 
Before discus&ing the results some caveats are worth noting. The results are derived 
from a partial equilibrium model and as such are first-round approximations of the gains 
and losses. A more complete representation of supply response in Japanese and South 
Korean intensive meal production might alter the results. However, the&e effects are likely 
to be small as available evidence suggests that beef demand in these markets is relatively 
unresponsive to changes in competing meat prices. 
Some caution is required in interpreting the size of these estimated changes in 
producer and consumer surpluses because of the nature of the experiments performed. The 
model structure incorporates product differentiation between grass and grain fed beef in 
the Japanese beef import trade. The estimated substitution relationship between these 
products is based on historical data that were influenced by the purchasing activities of 
Japan's Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC). This relationship could change 
once Japanese consumer preferences are allowed to determine the respective imported beef 
demands. 
The model structure also does not allow Japanese consumers to distinguish between 
the different types of imported and domestically produced beef. In effect this implies that, 
once Japane!>e importer!> purchase the respective quantities of grass fed and grain fed beef, 
they are able to pre&ent it to consumers as a product indistinguishable from domestically 
produced dairy beef. Wagyu beef demand is assumed to be unaffected by the changes in 
price for imported beef and dairy beef. In the South Korean case the model structure 
implies that consumers are unable to distinguish between imported grass fed beef and their 
domestically produced beef. 
These assumption~ arc open to challenge, and funher empirical work on the 
substitutability between different types of beef in the Japanc&e and South Korean beef 
markets is planned. It should be noted, however, that import controls have been used to 
support domestic beef prices in both countrie&. It ~cemr. unlikely that, if imports did not 
substitute for locally produced beef, these policie5 would have been needed. For Japan 
there i& some evidence that imported beef is largely po!>itioned in the dairy steer market 
segment and is not substitutable for wagyu beef (Gorman and Mori 1988). 
There may also be some question about the reliability of the estimated retail demand 
elasticities for beef in Japan. The fall in Japanese retail beef prices following the removal of 
import quotas may be in excess of the observed historical changes on which such estimate& 
are based. However, the estimated beef demand elasticity of -0.28 with respect to farm level 
prices is consistent with elasticity estimates reported for most free access, developed 
country beef markets. Therefore the estimate of this parameter may not be particularly 
sensitive to the overall level of retail prices. 
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Alternative One: Gains From Japanese Import Agreement 
In order to evaluate the gains from the removal of Japanese import quotas, a 
simulation of continued Japanese quotas (JAPOLD) wa& compared with JAPNEW. For 
illustrative purposes it was assumed the import quota expanded by 9 kt per year. a 
continuation of the previous Japanese quota agreement negotiated in 1984. The JAPOLD 
results show that diaphragm beef imports - an endogenous price determined component of 
the model - expand rapidly to partially compen&ate for the re&triction of beef imports. By 
1995 diaphragm beef imports are around 275 kt which is an import level considered to be 
greater than available supplies (Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation 1983). With 
lower diaphragm imports Japanese prices and production may be higher and consumption 
somewhat lower than these (JAPOLD) results would suggest. Consequently, the disruption 
to Japanese beef producers caused by the removal of import controls (JAPNEW) may be 
larger than the results indicated by a comparison of JAPOLD with JAPNEW. 
As expected, price and production outcomes in Australia and New Zealand are much 
lower and domestic consumption higher in the JAPOLD simulation. To a lesser extent, 
similar results apply in the US market, although US import controb are triggered one year 
earlier (1991) under the JAPOLD scenario. The South Korean beef market is unaffected, as 
the import quota levels there are unchanged from JAPNEW assumptions. 
Producer and consumer surplus effects 
Removal of Japanese import quotas generate large gain& in producer surplus for the 
major supplying countries - Australia, New Zealand and the United States - and 
corresponding losses in consumer surplus (sec Table 7). Net gains for the economies of 
Australia and New Zealand are adjusted for tariff equivalent rents received from sales to 
the US market during periods of restricted access. The US economy experiences a &mall 
lm>s, as the loss in consumer surplus is greater than the producer gains. In Japan the 
estimated effects on producer and consumer surpluses arc much larger, with consumer 
gains substantially in excess of the losses to producers. To the extent that the level of 
Japanese diaphragm beef imports may be overestimated in JAPOLD, these changes in 
Japanese surpluses could prove to be underestimates. Even with this qualification, the net 
figure of about US$25 OOOm suggests there are large gains for the Japanese economy. 
Equally, gains for the economies of Australia and New Zealand could also be larger than 
their respective estimates of US$774m and US$144m. 
Alternative Two: Removal of US Import Controls 
The JAPNEW simulation results suggested that US import controls would be 
triggered for much of the forecast period. The US Meat Import Law (MIL) is another major 
trade distorting policy affecting the Pacific Basin beef trade. To estimate the effect of the 
MIL, a simulation experiment involving free access to the US market (USFREE) was 
performed. For this experiment the Japanese import agreement was assumed to be 
unchanged from JAPNEW, and the South Korean beef market was again assumed to be 
unaffected. 
Toward the mid-1990s, LJS import controls projected under JAPNEW become 
progressively more restrictive and their removal provides a further boo&t for saleyard prices 
in Australia and New Zealand. By 1995 Australian beef prices are 9 per cent above 
JAPNEW levels while US beef prices are marginally lower and US imports almost 100 kt 
higher. US beef exports to Japan rise and there is a redirection of Australian and New 
Zealand exports away from Japan in favour of the United States. An increase in grass fed 
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hecf pricef, increaf,e\ the competilivene% of US grain fed product and the \hare of the latter 
in the Japanef,e imported hccf trade. By 1995 the ref,pcctive import markelf, f>harcf, for 
Au~tralia and the United ~lalcf, arc approximaldy 47 per cenl each, indicating f>omc 
potentially significant gains for the United States beef trade with Japan if US import 
controls were abolished. 
Unrestricted access to the US market increases overall beef demand in the Pacific 
Basin. Higher grass fed beef prices and larger imports of higher valued US grain fed beef 
contribute to higher domestic beef prices in Japan due to the higher weighted average price 
of imported beef. This result suggests that the adverse effects of switching to a tariff based 
import system for Japanese beef producers would be lessened if the MIL were to be 
abolished. The siLe of this benefit to Japanese producers would depend on the 
substitutability between imports and dairy beef. 
Producer and consumer surplus effects 
Removal of US import controls yield further gains in surplus for Australian and New 
Zealand beef producers and losses for consumers in those countries. The economies of both 
countries experience small gains after adjustments for tariff equivalent rents generated by 
US import controls. Free access to the US market results in substantial losses in US 
producer surplus and gains for US consumers, suggesting that US beef producers receive 
significant levels of assistance from the MIL in the latter part of the baseline simulation. In 
Japan, the higher domestic beef prices yield total estimated gains of US$178m in producer 
surplus and larger reductions in consumer surplui.. 
Alternative Three: Increased Korean Import Quota 
Future developmenti; in South Korea's imported beef trade will depend on the 
current GATT examination of South Korean import controls. One possible outcome is the 
introduction of negotiable import quotas that would provide for a steady expansion in beef 
imports over coming year!>. The impact of this type of development was examined in a 
simulation experiment (KORlMPQ) imposing a 10 kt annual increase in the South Korean 
import quota, commencing at 50 kt in 1989. Under this scenario, fixed quota shares based on 
historical results were allocated to the three supplying countries - Australia (75 per cent), 
New Zealand (15 per cent) and the United States (10 per cent). All other Pacific Basin trade 
policies were unchanged from the JAPNEW scenario. 
Assuming a strong preference for grass fed beef in the South Korean import quota, 
the results are substantially higher beef prices in Australia and New Zealand and, 
consequently, lower domestic consumption and higher leveb of beef production. Compared 
with the projections in JAPNEW, Australian saleyard prices are 7 per cent higher by 1995. 
Australian exports are significantly higher, with larger sales to South Korea and reduced 
shipments to both Japan and the United States. Market prices in the United States are also 
higher, and import controls are still triggered from 1992 through to 1995. US exports to 
Japan are again higher, due to the improved price competitiveness of US grain fed product 
relative to the landed price of Australian grass fed beef. These results suggest significant 
gains for the US beef industry from a sustained opening of the Korean beef market. 
Although US shipments to Korea could rise only marginally, there are gains from an 
increased share of the Japanei.e imported beef trade and reduced pressure for a triggering 
of import controls under the MIL. 
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In Japan, higher imported beef prices again imply higher domestic beef price& than 
would be the case under the JAPNEW trading environment. By 1995 the KORIMPQ trading 
environment indicates total Japanese import and consumption levels are lower and beef 
production marginally higher relative to JAPNEW projections. Increased access for 
imported beef has a major impact on South Korea's beef industry. Domestic prices are 
estimated to be around 33 per cent lower by 1995, with comequent falls in dome&tic 
production and higher levels of beef consumption. (It should be noted that these South 
Korean domestic market impacts arc preliminary, and further empirical work is required to 
confirm the initial elasticity estimates that generate these results.) 
Producer and consumer surplus effects 
There are significant gains in producer surplus and losses in consumer surplus for 
Australia and New Zealand due to increased sales to South Korea (see Table 8). Producers 
in the United States and Japan also gain substantial benefits. The estimated US$319m rise 
in Japanese producer surplus indicates that Japan's beef producers have a significant 
incentive to support moves to open up the South Korean beef market. These gains are at 
the expense of reductions in consumer surpluses in all four countrie~. In contrast, beef 
producers in South Korea experience large losses in producer surplus. However, these 
lo~ses arc more than offset by gains in consumer surplu~, yielding an e~timated total net 
gain for the South Korean economy of US$560m. 
Alternative Four: Free Trade in the Pacific Basin 
The final simulation experiment concerned the combined effects of all beef trade 
distorting policies in Japan, South Korea and the United State. Korean import quotas, the 
US MIL and the phased tariffs for import quota controls in Japan will be the main trade 
policies affecting the Pacific Basin beef trade during the 1990s. To evaluate their influence, 
a simulation of immediate and complete free access (that is, no quotas or tariffs) to all three 
markets (FREETRD) was compared with JAPNEW. 
The combined effect of these trade policies on Australia and New Zealand is 
substantial. Relative to JAPNEW, Australian prices are estimated to be 14 per cent higher. 
Australian shipment& to Japan and the United States are significantly lower as product is 
redirected to supply the South Korean beef market. Beef price~ are al&o higher in the 
United States, with higher exports and lower level~ of domc~tic comumption. De!>pite the 
loss of protection afforded by the MIL, US producers gain through higher price!. and 
increased sales to Japan and South Korea. Strong demand for gras~ fed beef in Japan and 
South Korea also ensures that the 1995 level of US beef imports from Australia and New 
Zealand is only marginally above the projected restraint level in the JAPNEW scenario. 
Domestic beef prices in Japan decline under complete free trade even though 
imported beef prices increased substantially. As a result, domestic production levels are 
lower and the quantities of beef imported and consumed rise further. The US share of the 
Japanese imported beef trade is greatly increased due to the reduced price competitiveness 
of grass fed beef relative to US grain fed beef. By 1995, Australia's share of the Japanese 
market is estimated at 41 per cent, as against 49 per cent under JAPNEW trading 
conditions. Free trade also has an impact on the South Korean beef industry, with beef 
prices 47 per cent lower by 1995, domestic production substantially lower and total imports 
rising to 163 kl due to the large increase in beef demand. 
133 
Producer and consumer surplus effects 
The removal of all trade distorting policies over the 1989-1995 period would generate 
large gains in producer surplu&, as well as large falls in consumer surplus in Australia, new 
Zealand and the United State& (see Table 8). In both Japan and South Korea the e&timaled 
con&umer surplus gains, of around US$16 400m and US$4800m respeclivcly, arc far in 
excess of the loss in surplus experienced by producers. These results suggest that beef 
consumers in the North Asian countries of Japan and South Korea have the most to gain 
from moving to a free trade environment. In addition, the economies of all countries except 
the United States could expect to obtain large benefits from the removal of restraints of 
beef trade in the Pacific Basin. As the US remains the net importer of beef the decline in 
consumer surplus is larger than the gain in producer surplus. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The removal of trade-distorting import policies can be expected to provide 
substantial benefits for beef producers in the major exporting countries of the Pacific Basin. 
Forecast simulations of a partial-equilibrium model of the Pacific Basin beef trade were 
used to provide an indication of the size of these producer benefits. The magnitudes of the 
results are indicative only, as the estimated changes in surplus measures are dependent on 
assumptions incorporated in the simulation experiments. 
The result& confirm that beef producers in Australia and New Zealand would receive 
large benefits from a further lowering of protection level& in importing countries. These 
benefits would be in addition to the expected gains from the removal of Japanese import 
quotas and are partially offset by losses in domestic consumer surplus. 
In the United States, removal of the protection provided by the MIL would reduce 
producer surplus and raise consumer surplus during periods of import control!>. The 
estimated sizes of these gains and losses depend on the degree of import restraint, as the 
results of this analysis indicate for the projected restraint level& toward the mid-1990s. 
However, a further lowering of protection levels in Japan and South Korea, in exchange for 
abolishing the MIL, would generate rises in US producer surplu& and losr,es in US consumer 
surplus. These results include gains in the US share of the Japanese imported beef trade 
due to the increased price competitiveness of US product relative to Australian grass fed 
beef. 
Japaner,e producers of dairy beef could benefit from reduced protection levels in 
South Korea and the United States. The size of these benefits will depend on the degree of 
substitutability between domestically produced beef, imported US grain fed beef and 
imported Australian gras& fed beef. These producer gains, which would be at the expense of 
losses in consumer surplu:-., would offset some of the losses generated by the replacement of 
import quotas with tariff&. However, in a complete free trade environment, Japanese 
producers would experience losses in surplus, which suggests the ad valorem tariffs will 
still provide significant levels of protection from imported product. At the same time 
Japanese consumers would stand to receive large increases in surplus in a complete free 
trade environment. 
A lowering of protection levels in South Korea would result in reductions of producer 
surplus on a much smaller scale than those experienced in Japan. This result reflects the 
relative size of the two markets and the fact that protection level& appear to be much lower 
in the South Korean market at the present time. The reductions in producer surplus are 
more than offset by significant gains in surplus for South Korean beef consumers. 
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Further research i5 required to confirm the size and direction of the estimated 
changes in producer and consumer surplus presented in thi5 paper. This research effort 
should proceed in three main areas. First, the elasticity estimates incorporated in the South 
Korean beef model required confirmation, particularly in relation to beef supply response. 
Second, a more complete representation of intensive meat supply response in Japan and 
South Korea would improve the quality of these beef results. Finally and most importantly, 
an empirical analysis of the substitutability between different types of beef in the Japanese 
and South Korean beef markets would allow some improvement of the substitution 
assumptions imposed in this analysis. 
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Table 1 Pacific Basin Beef Production, Consumption and Trade Flows, 
1987(a) 
Production Consumption Imports Exports 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
kt(b) kt(b) kt(c) (kt(c) 
Oceania 2,063 735 830 
- Australia 1,508 615 555 
- New Zealand 555 120 275 
North America 11,863 12' 613 747(d) 315 
- United States 10,886 11, 638 675 243(d) 
- Canada 977 975 72 72 
North Asia 792 1,235 222 
- Japan 565 1,008 222 
- South Korea 227 227 
South-East Asia 226 374 99 
- Taiwan 4 53 33 
- Other 222 321 66 
Total Pacific Basin 14,944 14,957 1,068 1,145 
(a) All quantities are for calendar year 1987 except for Australia 
(financial year ended June 1987) and New Zealand (year ended 
September 1987). 
(b) Carcass weight equivalent. 
(c) Shipped weight. 
(d) Includes trade between Canada and the United States, which imported 
around 71 kt from Canada and exported around 13 kt to Canada in 
1987. 
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Table 2 Estimated Rates of Protection for Japanese and South Korean 
Beef Producers. 
Landed price of Australian 
steers in Japan (b) 
Landed price of US fed 
steers in Japan (c) 
Saleyard price of Japanese 
Dairy steers (e) 
Japanese rates of protection 
relative to: 
- Australian.grass fed beef 
- US grain fed beef 
Landed price of Australian 
steers in Korea (d) 
Saleyard price of South 
Korean native steers (f) 
Korean rates of protection 
relative to: 
- Australian grass fed beef 
Unit (a) 
USc/kg 
USc/kg 
USc/kg 
% 
% 
USc/kg 
USc/kg 
% 
1983 
91 
163 
312 
243 
91 
92 
521 
466 
1984 
90 
180 
310 
244 
72 
91 
445 
389 
1985 
82 
161 
315 
284 
96 
82 
304 
271 
1986 
86 
159 
460 
435 
189 
87 
267 
207 
1987 
98 
176 
522 
433 
197 
98 
300 
206 
(a) All prices are per kilogram live weight. Landed prices are adjusted 
for freight rates and unloading charges, assumed to be 10 percent of 
the landed price. 
(b) Based on Brisbane steer prices (estimated dressed weight 251-300 kg). 
(c) Based on Omaha choice fed steers (900-1100 lb live weight). 
(d) Based on saleyard price of dairy steers. 
(e) Based on native steer slaughter price (350 kg live weight). 
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Table 3: Country-Commodity Coverage in EMABA (a) 
Wool Beef Lamb & Mutton Pigs & Poultry 
Country Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply 
Australia (b) E 
Argentina 
European 
Community (c) E 
South East 
Asia (d) 
Japan E 
New Zealand 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
United States E 
Uruguay 
Rest of world E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
x 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
x 
(a) E, endogenous; X, exogenous. 
E 
x 
E 
E 
E 
x 
E 
E E 
E E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
x 
x 
x 
x 
E 
(b) EMABA also includes a detailed endogenous representation of Australian 
crops supply. 
(c) Includes separate endogenous representations of wool demand in Belgium, 
France, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands and United Kingdom. 
(d) Includes separate endogenous representations of beef demand (exogenous 
beef supply) in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. 
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Table 4 continued 
Australia New Zealand 
0.32 0.24 
United 
States 
0.32 
Japanese 
dairy beef 
0.20 
South 
Korea 
0.81 
(a) Percentage change in quantity supplied resulting from a permanent 
and immediate 1% change in farm level beef prices. Elasticity 
estimates are calculated on 1987 prices. 
Table 5 Uncompensated Farm Level Price Elasticities of Beef Demand (a) 
Australia New Zealand 
-0.35 -0.42 
United 
States 
-0.28 
Japanese 
diary beef 
-0.27 
South 
Korea 
-0.26 
(a) Percentage change in quantity consumed resulting from a permanent 
and immediate 1% change in farm level beef prices. Elasticity 
estimates are calculated on 1987 prices. 
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Table 6 Summary of Forecast Simulation Results (JAPNEW) for Pacific 
Basin Beef Market (a). 
Unit 1989 1991 1993 1995 
United States 
Production (b) kt 10,149 10,150 10' 733 11,065 
Consumption (b) kt 10,859 10, 671 11, 153 11, 521 
Imports (c) kt 635 601 556(j) 569(j) 
Exports (c) kt 243 326 362 376 
Farm level price (d) USc/kg 179 200 197 204 
Japan 
Production kt 573 5/5 553 523 
Consumption kt 1, 177 1,353 1,503 1,680 
Imports (e) kt 420 545(k) 667(k) 812(k) 
Farm level price (f) Y/kg 737 516 477 441 
South Korea 
Production kt 219 237 253 272 
Consumption kt 240 263 288 314 
Imports kt 15 19 25 30 
Farm level price (g) won/kg 2,534 2,494 2' 391 2,345 
Australia 
Production kt 1,571 1,431 1,427 1,614 
Consumption kt 590 526 529 532 
Exports kt 634 580 575 699 
Farm level price (h) cA/kg 247 312 283 267 
New Zealand 
Production kt 574 591 744 934 
Consumption kt 126 109 139 192 
Exports kt 282 298 372 452 
Farm level price (i) cNZ/kg 194 252 238 230 
(a) Calendar year outcomes for the United States and Japan, financial 
year ended June 30 for Australia and year ended September 30 for 
New Zealand. 
(b) Production and consumption figures are in carcass weight 
equivalents. 
(c) Import and export figures are in shipped weight. 
(d) llOOlb choice fed steers, liveweight. 
(e) Includes imports of diaphragm beef. 
(f) Medium grade dairy steers, liveweight. 
(g) 400 kg slaughter steers, liveweight. 
(h) Weighted average saleyard price of all cattle, estimated dressed 
weight. 
(i) 'M' grade cow, estimated dressed weight. 
(j) US import controls triggered. 
(k) Japanese import quotas replaced by tariffs. 
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Table 7 Estimated Net Present Values of Total Changes in Producer and 
Consumer Surplus, 1989-1995 due to Japanese Import Agreement 
and Removal of US Import Controls (a). 
Simulated impacts of: 
Japanese import Removal of US 
Country agreement (b) import controls (c) 
Australia 
Change in consumer surplus 
Change in producer surplus 
Net gains to the economy (d) 
New Zealand 
Change in consumer surplus 
Change in producer surplus 
Net gains to the economy 
United States 
Change in consumer surplus 
Change in producer surplus 
Net gains to the economy 
Japan 
Change in consumer surplus 
Change in producer surplus 
Net gains to the economy 
US$m 
-659 
1, 774 
1,082 
-105 
524 
399 
- 2,054 
1,907 
-147 
38,096 
-13' 148 
24,948 
US$m 
-204 
568 
237 
-39 
191 
76 
1,686 
-1,504 
182 
-686 
178 
-500 
(a) Assuming net present value discount rate of 10 per cent. 
(b) Derived from comparing continued Japanese import quotas (JAPOLD) 
with baseline simulation (JAPNEW). 
(c) Derived by comparing baseline simulation (JAPNEW) with simulation 
of free access to US beef market (USFREE). 
(d) Includes changes in tariff equivalent rents from exports to the 
United States. The values of these rents were measured by the 
difference between US cow beef prices under free and restricted 
access conditions and the quantity of restricted access entries 
from Australia and New Zealand. 
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Table 8 Estimated Net Present Values of Total Changes in Producer and 
Consumer Surplus, 1989-1995, due to Korean Import Expansion 
and Free Trade in the Pacific Basin (a) 
Country 
Australia 
Change in consumer surplus 
Change in producer surplus 
Net gains to the economy(d) 
New Zealand 
Change in consumer surplus 
Change in producer surplus 
Net gain to the economy(d) 
United States 
Change in conswner surplus 
Change in producer surplus 
Net gain to the economy 
Japan 
Change in consumer surplus 
Change in producer surplus 
Net gain the to economy 
South Korea 
Change in consumer surplus 
Change in producer surplus 
Net gain to the economy 
Simulated impacts of: 
Korean import Free trade in the 
expansion(b) Pacific Basin(c) 
US$m US$m 
-480 -1 323 
1 331 3 746 
770 2 296 
-71 -185 
369 978 
249 868 
-2 237 -8 946 
2 110 8 526 
-127 -420 
-1 108 16 422 
319 -5 221 
-789 11 201 
2 356 4 812 
-1 787 -3 140 
569 1 672 
(a) Assuming net present value discount rate of 10 per cent. (b) Derived from 
comparison of baseline (JAPNEW) with simulation of expanded beef imports 
(KORIMPQ). (c) Derived from comparison of baseline (JAPNEW) with simulation 
of free trade in the Pacific Basin (FREETRD). (d) Includes changes in tariff 
equivalent rents from exports to the United States. The values of these rents 
were measured by the difference between US cow beef prices under free and 
restricted access conditions and the quantity of restricted access entries 
from Australia and New Zealand. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE INFLUENCE OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON PRODUCT 
DIFFERENTIATION BY EXPORTERS: A CASE 
STUDY OF BEEF IN JAPAN 
Ian S Jarrett* 
INTRODUCTION 
The objectives of this paper arc: 
(i) to illustrate how Japan's restrictions on beef imports have influenced the ability 
of, and incentives for, exporters to undertake brand promotion and product 
differentiation in Japan; and 
(ii) to investigate the extent to which brand premiums and discounb. have hcen paid at 
wholesale level for imported beef in Japan. 
Brand promotion is an important component of the marketing of many products in 
Japan. Japane!>e consumers have a reputation for being very brand conscious. This 
situation reflects the concern of many consumers with the quality (including appearance) 
and presentation/packaging of many products, including beef (Jarratt and Longworth 
1987). Producer brand names have been established very successfully at wholesale and 
retail level for certain types of domestic beef, especially wagyu (traditional) beef. Several 
brands of wagyu beef, such as Kobe, Matsuzaka and Omi, which are based on place of 
origin, are well known and promoted at wholesale and retail level. Such brands sell for 
susbtantial premiums over other beef. For example, in December 1985, female carcasses of 
Omi brand wagyu beef achieved a 15.7% premium at the Tokyo wholesale auction relative 
to the average price of a reference brand (Jarratt and Kagatsume). The successful 
establishment at retail and wholesale level of individual brands of wagyu beef reflects 
mainly the very high prices paid for wagyu beef, especially for beef from the top grades of 
expensive cuts such as striploin and tenderloin, and the resultant luxury image of this type 
of beef. 
Brand names of imported beef do not appear to have been promoted as successfully 
as domestic brands for several reasons including the quotas on imported beef. The 
distortionary impacts of the import quotas on the import of substitute products (e.g., beef 
offals); the types of beef improted (e.g. grainfed vs grassfcd beef); and the market shares of 
exporting countries (e.g., USA and Australia), have been investigated by several 
researchers including Longworth, George, and Teal et al. However, the distortionary 
impact on brand promotion and product differentiation by individual beef exporters has not 
been examined by many researchers. An exception is the measurement of the premiums 
and discounts paid for brands of imported beef in Japan reported by Jarratt and Longworth 
(1989). 
*Queensland Department of Primary Industries, Australia. 
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In June 1988 the Japane~e Government announced its intention to abolish quotas on 
imported beef on 1 April 1991 and to increase rapidly the size of the total annual quota by 
60,000 tonnes per annum from 214,000 tonnes in Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 1987 to 
394,000 tonnes in JFY 1990. The administration of the quotas will also change substantially 
during the transitional period. However, the 25% ad valorem tariff will remain. After 1 
April 1991 imported beef will be subject only to an ad valorem tariff which will decline from 
70% to 50% over a 2 year period. Since the Government's announcement, the scope for 
brand promotion and product differentiation activities in the market has attracted increased 
attention by individual exporters and exporting countries/areas. This study is a 
contribution towards increased understanding of the factors which have influenced, and 
may influence, brand promotion and product differentiation by exporters. 
THE INFLUENCE OF JAPAN'S BEEF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS 
ON BRAND PROMOTION BY EXPORTERS 
Imported beef (excluding beef offals), mainly from the USA and Australia, 
accounted for 36% of Japanese beef consumption in 1987. A wide range of boneless cuts, 
bone-in beef is not normally imported, and types (grass fed and grain fed) of beef are 
imported, in chilled or frozen form, via a complex quota system. Full details of the 
development of, and proposed changes to, the import quota system are provided in 
Longworth, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (Chapter 8) and 
Johnson and Fisher. 
Figure 1 shows the current channels for the importantion and distribution of beef 
under the quota arrangements. In recent years about 80% of the total quota has been 
controlled by the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC), a statutory body 
responsible for the stabilisation of the prices received by Japanese beef producers. The 
General Quota, which accounted for 90% of the total quota in JFY 1987 is a global quota 
able to be supplied by any country. However, the financial and administrative 
arrangements applicable to each of the parts of the General Quota have resulted in 
substantial differences in the types, forms, and origins of beef imported under the various 
parts of the General Quota (Teal et al, Johnson and Fisher). 
The main segments of the total quota in JFY 1987 were: 
Private quota 
LIPC purchase by competitive tender 
LIPC purchase, resale by simultaneous 
buy sell (SBS) tender 
LIPC purchase/resale by "one touch" allocation 
LIPC purchase/resale by ~et price tender 
Hotel quota 
Other quotas 
TOTAL 
147 
Tonnes· % 
19,400 
131,340 
17,460 
9,400 
16,400 
4,000 
.1f4QQQ 
214.000 
(9.1) 
(61.4) 
(8.1) 
(4.4) 
(7.7) 
(1.8) 
(7.5) 
(100.0) 
The large1.t quota segment, LIPC purchase by competitive tender, accounted for 61 % 
of the total quota in JFY 1987. Under this system, which is used only for frozen beef, the 
LIPC announce& the amount!. and specification!. of each type (grain fed/grass fed) and cuts 
of beef to be purchased. Approved importers negotiate with exporters and present offers to 
the LIPC to supply the tender. The LIPC accepts bids for each cut from the lowest bid up. 
Consequently, exporters appear to have no incentive to supply product superior to that 
specified or to undertake brand promotion at wholesale or retail level. 
In contrast, the type of simultaneous buy and sell tender (SBS) system which 
operated from early 1985 until mid 1988 appeared to provide :>ome incentive for exporters 
to attempt to secure higher prices and promote demand for their products by brand 
promotion. The potential existed because the LIPC took account only of selling out prices 
to end users in the second stage of the selection procef.~ (bids were awarded in descending 
order of price). This could have encouraged exporters to try to obtain brand premiums 
and/or premiums for higher quality from end Uf.ers. 
The other !.egments of the quota which appeared also lo provide some incentives for 
exporters to promote their brands and/or supply product of superior ~pecificationi, were 
the LIPC's one touch system for chilled beef imports (where a fixed levy was paid to the 
UPC for various product categories); the Private Quota for frozen beef (which involved the 
payment of fixed levies to the Japan Meat Conference (JMC)), and the Hotel Quota for 
frozen beef (which also involved the payment of fixed levies to the JMC). 
The LIPC's set price tender system for imports of chilled beef appeared not to 
provide an incentive for brand promotion or product differentiation because of the 
emphasis on the lowest bid prices. Thus in JFY 1987 only about 23% of the imported beef 
was imported via segments of the quota which appeared to provide any significant incentive 
for brand promotion or product differentiation by exporters. The percentage was smaller in 
previous years. 
The major changes to the import arrangements announced in June 1988 to apply until 
1 April 1991 involved mainly the SBS system. Firstly, the amount and proportion of total 
beef import made under this f>ystem will expand rapidly to 196,700 tonnes, representing 50% 
of total imports, by JFY 1990. Secondly, the system has been simplified and made less 
discriminatory against lower value beef products (AMLC 1988). Specifically the LIPC will 
accept bids in order of the largest difference between the buy in and sell out prices rather 
than largely on the sell out prices under the previous system. This change should at least 
maintain and may even increase the incentive for exporters to undertake brand promotion 
and product differentiation for product sold via the SBS system. 
Thus, during the transitional years to the cessation of quotas in 1 April 1991 a major 
increase is likely in the amount and proportion of beef imported via arrangements which 
provide some incentive for individual exporters to promote their brands at wholesale 
and/or retail level and/or to undertake product differentiation. Consequently, interest by 
exporters in such activities is likely to increase rapidly during the transitional period, in 
response to both the abovementioned changes and the opportunities which will exist after 1 
April 1991. 
PREMIUMS AND DISCOUNTS FOR BRANDS OF IMPORTED BEEF IN JAPAN 
A~ mentioned above, in JFY 1987 incentive& appeared to exi!.l for individual 
exporters to undertake brand promotion and/or product differentiation for only about 23% 
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of their beef export~ to Japan. The extent to which individual exporter~ actively undertook 
brand promotion or product differentiation during and before JFY 1987 is not known. 
Indeed, the use of individual exporter brand names in the marketing of beef in Japan 
has not been the subject of much research so far. This partly reflects the difficulty 
ofobtaining suitable data for analysis. For example, the only published data on whoJc~ale 
prices of imported beef arc the representative prices for certain frozen and chilled cub 
quoted in the trade press. The only prices quoted for a specific brand of imported beef are 
for the US brand IBP (Iowa Beef Packers) grain fed, frozen, striploins and tenderloins. In 
1987 these tended to be about 5% higher than other prices which suggests that some 
exporter brand names are used in wholesale trading. (In early 1989 the premium for IBP 
striploins was about 12% and for tenderloins about 4% ). 
At monthly auctions held throughout Japan, the LIPC sells to the meat trade a wide 
range of frozen boneless cuts of grass and grain fed beef purchased from exporters via the 
competitive tender system. These are the only sources of publicly available comprehensive 
data on the wholesale price of imported beef brands. However, as noted earlier, because of 
the tender system used by the LIPC to purchase the beef sold at the auctions, exporters 
would not appear to have any incentive to exceed the minimum specifications set by the 
LIPC. This conclusion is also supported by Mori and Gorman. 
To investigate the extent to which brand premiums and discounts are paid for 
imported beef sold at the LJPC's monthly auctions data were obtained on individual lot& of 
beef sold by the UPC at the monthly Tokyo auction for 11 months from October 1986 to 
September 1987 inclusive (no data were available for January 1987). 1271 lots were sold 
involving 52 brands and 22 cuts ( 12 grain fed and 10 gras& fed). 
The hypothesis tested was that brand premium and discounts did not exist. 
Due to the wide range of cuts and type& of beef &old and the focus on brand premiums 
and discounts, sub sets of the data based on cut and type were selected for analysis. The 
model specified for each cut/type was: 
price = f (brand, month, weight of lot) 
Due to the small number of observation& for several brands and cuts, many 
observations had to be excluded from the analysis. Consequently, sufficient data were 
available for the analysis of only 556 lots covering only four cut~/types of beef, two cuts of 
grainfed beef, short plate (n = 119) and tenderloin (n = 99), supplied only by U.S. 
exporters, and two cuts of grass fed beef, chuck (n = 65) and aged beef full sets (consisting 
of 12 different primal cuts) (n = 273) supplied only by Australian exporters. 
An equation for each cut/type was estimated using OLS multiple linear regression 
analysis. Each month and brand variable was specified in the equation a~ a dummy variable 
and a reference month (April) and brand (19 for grass fed cub and 5 for grain fed cuts) wa~ 
used for these categoric variables. 
The regression results, and other relevant statistics, are shown in Table 1 for grass 
fed cuts and Table 2 for grain fed cuts. The coefficients for all month and brand variables 
represent values relative to the reference variable shown in the table. 
The final equation estimated for each cut explained a very high proportion of the 
variation in price (Jt2 > 0.9) and all the F values were significant at the 1 % level or less. 
The variables for month accounted for most of the variation in the price of each cut. Weight 
of lot had very little influence on price. 
149 
The main re&ults for the grass fed cuts were: 
Ten brands of aged sets were included in the equation but the coefficients of six 
brands were not significant at the 5% level. Relative to the mean value of the reference 
brand, the premiums for the four brands significant at the 5% level were small ranging from 
0.8% to 2.1 %. 
Six brands of chuck were examined but the coefficient& of only three were significant 
at the 5% level. The premium for brand 14 was relatively large, 4.5% of the mean value of 
the reference brand. The discounts for brands 28 and 15 were small being only -1.5% and 
-1.2% respectively. 
None of the four brands included in each equation had a statistically significant 
coefficient in both. Thus comparisons of premiums and discounts for brands between cuts 
were not possible. 
The main results for the grain fed cuts were: 
The positive coefficients obtained for two of the three short plate brands examined 
were significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of the remaining brand was not significant 
at this level. The premium for brand 2 was 51.l yen/kg, 6.3% of the mean value of the 
reference brand and for brand 1 was 2.3%. 
Both the tenderloin brands examined had statistically significant (at the 5% level) 
negative coefficients indicating discounts relative to the reference brand (brand 5) Thus 
the reference brand is a premium brand. The discount relative to the value of the reference 
brand was 7.6% for brand 1 and 8.6% for brand 43. 
Comparison of brand coefficients between cuts was only possible for brand l the 
coefficient of which was &ignificant in both equations. For short plate the brand achieved a 
small premium (2.3%) but for tenderloin there was a large (7 .6%) discount. 
Contrary to prior expectations, the null hypothesis for brand coefficients was not 
supported for any equation i.e., premiums and discounts were paid for several brands of 
each cut analysed. There are two possible explanations for these results. Firstly, contrary 
to expectations, there may be commercially important differences between some of the 
brands sold at the auctions. Such differences may relate to matters such as: product quality 
characteristics (tenderness, meat and fat colour, fat marbling etc), yield of saleable meat, 
packaging, quality and product presentation. Whether or not i>uch differences exist between 
brands could only be determined by detailed examination of the products sold and/or a 
survey of buyer perceptions of inter-brand differences. Such examinations or surveys could 
not be undertaken for thi~ study. 
If there arc inter-brand differences in any of the factors mentioned above, because of 
the competitive tender process in which the exporters participate they are more likely to 
reflect low than high cost expenditure by exporters. Thus differences may reflect the 
influence of relatively low cost activities such as processing procedures and 
packaging/product presentation rather than the use of intrinsically higher quality, higher 
cost, beef. Some aspects of product quality can, of course, be influenced by low cost 
processing procedures, e.g. electrical stimulation to improve tenderness. 
The second possible explanation of the price premium& and discounts for brands may 
be that buyers buy according to general perceptions of commercially important differences 
between brands experienced with beef obtained via other quota segments such as the SBS 
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system, or the private and hotel quotas under which exporters appear to have incentives to 
differentiate their producli.. 
The validity of these possible explanations cannot be assessed conclusively from the 
data analysed in this paper and indeed both may be true. However, the validity of the 
second explanation is partly supported by the fact that in the analysis the largest percentage 
premiums and discounts measured were for grain fed tenderloin. This is one of the two cuts 
for which separate prices are quoted for brands in the meat trade press and large quantities 
of this cut are imported under quota segments which encourage brand promotion and 
product differentiation. 
DISCUSSION 
This paper has highlighted the limited scope which existed until JFY 1988 for 
individual beef exporters to undertake brand promotion and/or product differentiation in 
Japan. In JFY 1987, due to the various import arrangements under the quota system, such 
scope existed for only about 23% of imports. Information is not available about the extent 
to which brand promotion etc. was undertaken by exporters. However, the existence of 
separate price quotatiom in the trade press for 2 cuts supplied by a US brand, IBP, mainly 
via import arrangements which provide scope for brand promotion suggests that brands 
were promoted and used in some wholesale trading. 
Contrary to expectations, brand premiums and discounts were identified amongst 
frozen imported beef purchased by the LIPC by competitive tender and sold at auctions. 
The existence of these brand premiums and discounts may reflect buyer perceptions of the 
brands obtained from beef imported under other systems which encourage brand promotion 
and/or product differentiation. However, they may also reflect the ability of exporters to 
significantly differentiate al very low or zero cost the products auctioned by the LIPC. 
The main conclusiom of this paper are: 
(i) although the import arrangements which operated before JFY 1988 provided 
limited scope for exporters to earn premiums from the successful promotion of 
their brands in Japan, some exporters were able to achieve significant brand 
premiums at wholesale level; and 
(ii) the scope for successful brand promotion at wholesale, and perhaps even at retail 
and restaurant level, will increase markedly during the next 2-3 years ai> the 
importance of the SBS segment of the LIPC quota increases rapidly until April 
1991. The proportion of the LIPC quota imported under the SBS system is 
scheduled to increa~e from 30% in JFY 1988 to 45% in JFY 1989 and 60% in JFY 
1990 when the ~BS imports will account for .50'ff1 of total imports. After April 
1991, when quotas will be abolished and only an ad valorem tariff will apply to 
imported beef, exporters will have major incentives to differentiate their products, 
promote their brands and establish brand loyalty. The adoption by Japan of an 
EEC type variable levy system to control imports rather than a percentage ad 
valorem tariff would have reduced the incentive for exporters to promote brands 
because imports under such a system would have been less assured. 
There are already signs that individual exporters are seeking to establish and 
promote their brands in Japan. For example, an Australian grain fed brand, Beef City, is 
reported to be promoting its brand at retail level in conjunction with the "Aussie Country 
Beef" brand promotion undertaken by the Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation 
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(AMLC 1989). Recent moves by Japanese organisations to acquire complete or partial 
equity in segments of the meat processing industry in exporting countries such as Australia 
and the USA may aho represent a move towards greater promotion of exporter brands, 
and/or the use of imported beef to supply domestic brands. 
The promotion of country or region of origin brands by exporter organi:>ations is also 
likely to increase rapidly during the next few years as organi:>ations seek to protect or 
increase market shares of the expanding annual quota and to po:>ition themselves for the 
post April 1991 quota free environment. Major promotional campaigns are already 
underway for Australian and US beef and several US States, such as Iowa and Kansas, are 
also promoting their beef. 
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Table 1 Imported Grass Fed Beef: Estimated Equations for Lots 
Sold at LIPC Auctions in Tokyo from October 1986 to 
September 1987 (Yen/Kg) 
Aged sets Chuck 
(n-273) (n-65) 
Coefficient t value Coefficient t value 
Intercept 1308.3 (140.5) 886.0 (144.5) 
Brands 29 4.3 (-0.8)n.s. n.a. 
45 6.0 ( 1.0)n.s. -9.9 -2.1) 
Reference 12 26.5 ( 5.7) n.a. 
= Brand 19 20 16.9 ( 4. 3) -8.7 ( -l.8)n.s. 
22 17.1 ( 3.7) -5.9 ( -1.4)n.s. 
17 -5.3 (-1.2)n.s. n.a. 
23 10.0 ( 2. 3) n.a. 
14 n.a. 40.2 8.3) 
18 4. 4 ( 1.2)n.s. n.a. 
28 n.a. -13. 4 -3.5) 
15 5.1 ( 1.4)n.s. -10.3 -3.1) 
21 -0.8 (-0.2)n.s. n.a. 
Weight (lOOOkg) 0.08 ( 1.2)n.s. 0.06 1.8)n.s. 
Months* Oct. -52.5 (-11.5) 244.8 ( 47.3) 
Nov. -101.1 (-22.8) 123.5 ( 22.9) 
Dec. -106.1 (-23.2) -5.6 ( -1.0)n.s. 
Feb. -91.1 (-19.0) -11. 3 ( -1.2)n.s. 
Reference Mar. -60.5 (-12.3) -1. 5 ( -0.2)n.s. 
= April May -13. 5 ( -3.0) -27.8 ( -4.3) 
June -6.0 ( -1. 3) -25.8 ( -5.0) 
July -49.5 ( 10.7) -57.0 ( -8.8) 
Aug. 38.7 ( 8 .1) -14.7 ( -3.0) 
Sept. 40.5 ( 9. 9) 23.0 ( 4. 9) 
R2 0.930 0.992 
Mean 1 292 920 
S.D. 55.9 88.6 
n.a. not applicable 
n.s. not significant at the 5% level 
* no data available for January 1987 
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Table 2 Imported Grain Fed Beef: Estimated Equations for Lots 
Sold at LIPC Auctions in Tok.yo from October 1986 to 
September 1987 (Yen/Kg) 
Short Plate Tenderloin 
(n-273) (n-65) 
Coefficient t value Coefficient t value 
Intercept 96.3 97.0) 2701.0 (167.5) 
Brands 1 18.3 ( 3.5) -205.8 (-19.6) 
Reference 2 51.1 ( 7.8) n.a. 
Brand 5 10 5.5 ( 1.0)n.s. n.a. 
43 n.a. -235.4 (-24.1) 
Weight (lOOOkg) -1. 0 2.1) 2.9 2. 8) 
Months* Oct. 98.9 ( 9.9) -164.7 -8.9) 
Nov. -122.4 (-13.8) -63.7 -2.5) 
Dec. -156.9 (-16.5) n. a. 
Feb. 123.5 (-11.7) -66.6 ( -2.7) 
Reference Mar. -17.9 ( -1.S)n.s. 31. 6 ( 1.2)n.s. 
= April May -165.5 (-18.7) 107.1 ( 5.3) 
June 179.8 (-19.0) 16.4 ( 0.9)n.s. 
July -263.4 (-26.2) 0.7 ( 0.04)n.s. 
Aug. -227.0 (-23.2) -47.0 ( -3.2) 
Sept. -260.0 (-29.1) 257.7 ( 16.4) 
R2 0.967 0.943 
Mean 852 2693 
s.o. 112.6 121.8 
n.a. = not applicable 
n.s. not significant at the 5% level 
* no data available for January 1987 
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CHAPTER 13 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
LIVESTOCK COMMODITY SYSTEM IN INDONESIA 
Faisal Kasryno, Pantjar Simatupang 
I Wayan Rusastra, Arti Djatiharti and Bambang Irawan* 
INTRODUCTION 
ln an increa&ingly interdependent world, domc&tic policic& in a country can be 
easily transmitted to other countries. It should be clear that not only trade policies, but 
also commodity production and consumption policies a& well as macro-economic fiscal 
and monetary policies of one country can be harmful to other countries. Under such a 
situation, cooperation among trading partner& is needed to harmonise policie5 for mutual 
benefit. 
The objectives and interests of each country may differ. Regional cooperation 
among a smaller number of countries would be more plausible both economically and 
politically. Accordingly, economic cooperation among the Pacific countries should be a 
feasible proposal. 
Indonesia i& a net importer of livestock and dairy products and a net importer of 
feedgrain~ (c&pecially corn and soybean). With increasing income and population the 
demand for meat, egg~, milk and other livestock product& will increa&e at a rapid rate. At 
the current level of income, demand for livestock product& i~ elastic. 
In the last 20 years the rates of growth in production of meat, egg and milk were 
7 .3%, 14.8% and 12.6% respectively. In addition, the livestock subr,cctor plays an 
important role in the national economy. This subsector contributed about 10% of the 
agricultural GDP and provided almost 4% of employment in agriculture. 
At current levels of comumption, domestic production of chicken meat and eggs ha& 
satisfied domestic demand. That of beef has been &lightly below consumption and dairy 
products have only been able to provide 40% of domestic consumption. 
To meet the increasing demand for live~tock products the Government of Indonesia 
has implemented a set of policies on livestock production, fcedgrain production and 
trade. These policie& aim to provide incentives lo producerr.. and to protect consumer& 
from international price fluctuations. 
"' Director and Agricultural Economists, Centre for Agro Economic Research Bogar, 
Indonesia. 
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METHODOLOGY 
lndonc:,ia i::-. <1 large country, and rc:,ource potential'> vary I rom region to region. A 
study of comparative advantage, therefore, should be conducted on a regional rather than 
aggregate basis. This regional disaggregation is also useful to capture regional biases in 
the government incentives, which have been major issues in Indonesian economic 
development. 
In addition to appropriate disaggregation, another important aspect of 
comparative advantage study is the assumed trade regime. There are three scenarios 
investigated in this study: interregional trade (IR), import substitution (IS), and 
export promotion (EP). 
The Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) of producing a commodity can be measured as 
the ratio of the domestic opportunity costs of production to the difference between the 
border price of output and foreign (or tradable) costs. A comparative advantage will exist 
when this ratio is less than one. 
This study used both secondary and primary data. Secondary data were obtained 
from various institutions such as Ministry of Agriculture, Central Bureau of Statistics, 
National Logistic Agency, and research institutions. Primary data were collected through 
field surveys. 
GOVERNMENT POLIClES 
Livestock Production Organisation 
Livestock production in Indonesia exhibits three development patterns: small holder 
household farming, large scale private farming, and nucleus c,mall holder farming systems. 
Household farming mainly uses family labor, is small scale, and managed by the 
householder. The private enterprises are of a larger scale, mainly employ hired labor, and 
the manager is not necessary the owner of the enterprise. 
The nucleus farming <>ystem is a new production organi?ation in Indonesia. It 
involves cooperation between a number of small (homehold) farmers and a large private 
enterprise or cooperative. The small farmers arc the 'plasm' and the large 
enterprise/cooperative is the 'nucleus'. The nucleui> may take various roles such as the 
buyer of products, input supplier, product handling and processing, and financing. 
Indonesian livestock production is dominated by household farming. who own at 
least 94 percent of the animal populations. The private enterprises have significant roles 
only in poultry and pig farming. 1l is not surpri ... ing, therefore, that the livestock 
development programmes are concentrated on household farming and are designed lo 
increase production (value added), farm incomes, labor ahsorption, exports, import 
substitution, and human nutrition. 
Household farming development is encouraged through the cooperative system. 
This system is the recommended economic organi:rntion according to the national 
constitution, and various government incentives arc channeled through the cooperatives. 
The success of the milk cooperative system is the result of extensive government 
intervention, especially regarding milk marketing. The fresh milk domestic market is 
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controlled by the government by fixing the amount of fresh milk supplied lo the processors 
and the price. Thu&, cooperative members have a guaranteed market for their milk. In 
addition to creating market certainty, the cooperative members also obtain various 
incentives such as credits (usually in the form of cows and feed), artificial insemination 
services, and animal health services. 
Livestock Credits 
Livestock farming finance comprises four sources: commercial credit, livestock 
development programmes, government aid, and foreign aid projects. Commercial credit 
is the ordinary commercial bank credit. It can be obtained individually with the usual 
banking credit procedures. This type of credit is usually provided for larger farmers. The 
government programme related credit is organized by the government as part of a 
particular development package. It is usually provided to small farmers. Foreign aid 
projects are livestock development programmes funded with foreign aid, u&ually with 
counterpart funding from the government. The government aid programme is a special 
aid for the poorest farmer&. 
Without doubt, commercial credit is important in the livestock sector, especially 
since the rapid development of livestock-related private enterprises since the late 1970's. 
The increase in the number and si?e of private enterprises is especially high in feed 
manufacturing, milk processing and poultry farming. 
Cooperative credit is given to poor farmers, members of rural cooperatives. Those 
who have experience in livestock farming, even who may not own livestock, may 
qualify to obtain this credit. 
The largest volume of credit is channeled through the BANKOP (cooperative aid). 
This is an indicator of the Government objective to promote livestock farming through 
the cooperative system. 
Livestock Product Trade 
Livestock product markets are among the most heavily controlled by the 
government. This may be partly due to the role of livestock products as basic food. The 
government regulates both international and domestic (especially interregional) trade. 
The trade regulations, however, are quite selective and vary across products. In general, 
the livestock trade policies are designed to protect domestic industry, farmers and 
consumers. 
Perhaps in an attempt to protect domestic consumers, exports of meat and eggs are 
controlled by the government. Beef and dairy cattle exports are strictly prohibited. 
Chicken meat, pig, goat and meat may be exported but with special permi&&ion. 
Indonesia'& meat exports have been very small in recent years. 
Import tariffs vary from zero to 40 percent. Imports of breeding animals do not 
attract a tariff. The tariff policies are partly designed to protect domestic industry and 
farmers. 
In the spirit of farmer protection, the government also places quantitative 
restrictions on milk imports, in addition to a tariff. The quantitative restriction is 
commonly known as the milk ratio. Milk importation is linked to the processors' use of 
domestic milk through a quota system. The milk import quota is given to each milk 
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processing company in proportion to the amount of domestically produced milk used by 
the company. 
Livestock interregional trade is regulated by government through a quota system. 
The amount and direction of interregional trade is determined every year by the 
Director General of Livestock. 
Occasionally, the government may intervene directly in the market to stabilize the 
meat price. The market operation may be conducted by the National Logistic Agency 
(BULOG). 
Feed Stuff Production 
Feed stuff can be either green vegetation, agricultural wastes or feed concentrate. 
The basic ingredients of feed concentrate are corn, soybean, cassava and wheat pollard of 
which wheat is not produced domestically. The government involvement in green 
vegetation production is very limited, basically in the provision of high yielding seed. The 
major government involvements are in corn, soybean, and cassava production, the most 
important policies being fertiliser and pesticide subsidies. These subsidies, however, 
have been gradually reduced in line with the government's economic deregulation 
programme. Currently, the pesticide subsidy has been phased out although fertili&er price& 
arc still subsidised at rate5 of 40% to 60% 
The Government aho &cts floor price& on corn and &oybcan, but not cas5ava. Their 
ratios to the floor price of paddy have decreased over time, indicating that support price 
policy has been biased toward rice production. 
Feed grains and tubers are in competition with rice production. Rice is the main 
food in Indonesia, and government policies are highly biased toward rice production. Rice 
production not only enjoys input subsidies, but also price 5Upport, extension and 
irrigation services. Such assistance discourages feed grain and tuber production. 
Feed Grain Trade 
Mo5t trade in feed stuffs such as corn, soybean, soybean cake, and fish meal, are 
controlled by the government. Importation of the&e products is the monopoly right of 
the National Logistic Agency (BU LOG), which then distributes the product to users. 
Dome&tic markets arc controlled by BU LOG by changing the price level and quantity 
of the products it di5tributc&. The purpose of the government market intervention is to 
stabilize the price al a level which is considered fair to both producers and consumer. 
Domestic procurement of corn has been insignificant. The floor price has been 
ineffective in the sense that it has always been below the market level. In addition storage 
of domestically produced corn is difficult because of its high moisture content. Market 
operations aimed at stabilising the price and supply facing the local feed industry is 
achieved by releasing corn from stocks, and importation. 
Domestic procurements of soybean grain and meal are also very small, and the floor 
price has been far below the market price. The main instrument for price stabilization has 
been import controls. 
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Feed Industry 
The feed industry expanded very rapidly in the early 1970's. This rapid expansion 
had been closely related to the rapid growth of the poultry industry due to the introduction 
of modern poultry farming techniques. 
In 1986 there were 71 feedmills registered with the Directorate General of 
Livestock. Total feed mill production capacity was 304,280 tons/month. The five largest 
potential production regions are East Java, West Java,Jakarta, North Sumatera and 
Lampung, although capacity utiHsation is very low in all provinces except Jakarta. 
Such low capacity utilization rates indicate over expansion of the feed mill industry, 
which has been partly induced by government policies. In the early 1970's the industry 
enjoyed various incentives such as low interest rates, an over-valued exchange rate, easy 
credit, and free importation of raw materials. At the same time the demand for feed was 
increasing rapidly. Government policies then changed, with the importation and 
distribution of feed raw materials taken over by the Government to comerve foreign 
exchange and to assist small scale feed mills. The growth rate in the demand for feed also 
slowed down, but the f eedmills were already constructed with more than sufficient 
capacity to supply effective feed demand. 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 1 
Corn production is economically feasible under the interregional trade and 
import substitution trade regimes. Hence, production should be used primarily for 
domestic use. However, by improving yields corn production could be efficient as an 
export commodity (Table 2). 
The most efficient corn producing regions in Indonesia are Bali and Nusa 
Tenggara, South Sulawesi and Kalimantan. Presently, however, corn production, is 
concentrated in Java and Sumatra. Various public support programmes are also 
concentrated in these two islands. Such biased government policies are not consistent with 
the economic efficiency criterion. Accordingly, the government should shift its supports 
toward other regions such as Bali and Nusa Tenggara, Sulawe!>i and Kalimantan. These 
three regions have high potential for corn production, not only because of production 
efficiency but also because of land availability. The land in the~e three regions is relatively 
more abundant than in Java or Sumatera. In addition, corn production in these regions is 
still unintensive. Corn productivity could be increased significantly through intensification 
programmes. [n other words, corn production in Kalimantan and Sulawesi could be 
increased significantly by increai.ing both planted area and yield. 
Soybean production is economically efficient if produced in Sulawesi, Bali and Nusa 
Tcnggara, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Central Java, under all trade regimes (Table 2). In 
fact Indonesia can be highly competitive in the world soybean market. The most efficient 
producing regions are Sulawesi, Bali and Nusa Tenggara, Sumatra, Central Java and 
Kalimantan. The government, therefore, should promote soybean production in these 
regions, and inhibit soybean production in West Java and East Java where it is generally 
economically inefficient. 
1 Detailed results are to be found in Kasryno fil_fil. 
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Soybean producers enjoy high government protection under the interregional and 
import substitution trade regimes. Clearly, such protection is biased towards the domestic 
market which is reasonable since soybean production is more efficient under the import 
substitution and interregional trade regimes. Moreover, Indonef>ia if> still a net importer of 
f>oybeanf>. 
The structure of government protection can be improved. West Java, which is the 
most inefficient soybean producing region, enjoys the largest protection whereas 
Sulawesi, the most efficient producing region, enjoys the lowest protection. Accordingly, 
the government should rearrange its corn incentive policies toward the most efficient 
producing regions. 
Indonesia is very efficient in cassava production (Table 2). The domestic resource 
cost ratios are very low in all regions. Government incentives to cassava producers do not 
exist. In fact producers are discouraged by a negative effective rate of protection. Since it 
is highly efficient and competitive in the world market, the government should promote 
the production of cassava. The export of cassava can be promoted by deregulation and 
improved efficiency of cassava marketing. 
Pork production in Indonesia is economically feasible either for domestic use 
(interregional trade and import substitution) or for export (Table 3). The Pork exports are 
highly competitive in the international market. The intensive household pig farming is 
more efficient than corporate farming systems. This indicates that pork production in 
Indonesia should be directed toward household intensive farming methods, which is 
consistent with government objectives to increase farmers' incomes and improve the 
income distribution. 
A problem with pork production is the existence of excessive government 
disincentives, and the effective protection rates on pork meat are negative. The largest 
disincentives are faced by the household farmers who are the more efficient producers. 
Since pork production is highly competitive in international markets, these incentives 
should be removed to promote exports and development of the pork industry. 
Indonesia has comparative advantage in chicken meat production (Table 4). The 
domestic resource cost ratios are very small in all producing regions and all trade 
regimes. Indonesia is highly competitive in the international chicken meat market. In 
other words, Indonesia has a high potential for exporting chicken meat. In all producing 
areas, the most efficient trade regime is import substitution. followed by interregional 
and export regimes. Indonesia has not yet exported chicken meat. Promotion of exports 
could be a very important factor in broiler industry development. 
Although chicken meat production is highly efficient economically, it is inhibited 
through government policy disincentives. The effective protection rates on chicken meat 
are large and negative. Since chicken meat production is highly efficient and competitive 
internationally, then it should be encouraged by the government. Thus export of chicken 
meat should be initiated by the lifting of restictions including non tariff barriers. Trade 
deregulation campaigns presently conducted by the government would enhance the 
broiler industry development. 
Presently, egg production is heavily concentrated in West Java where it is highly 
efficient under the import substitution regime (Table 4). It is even more efficient in 
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Lampung (Sumatra) from where exports would be economically feasible. Accordingly, egg 
production in West Java should be directed for domestic consumption. Financially, egg 
production in West Java generates negative value added under all trade regimes. 
Economically, however, the value added is positive. This shows the existence of high 
disincentives on egg production in this region. These high disincentives have reached 
the prohibitive point where production is not even financially profitable. The disincentives 
on egg are channelled through both outputs and inputs. Accordingly, these disincentives 
must be lifted for the development of the egg industry. A recomended policy is the 
deregulation of both egg and feed markets. 
Beef production in Indonesia is highly efficient and competitive in international 
markets (Table 5). The most efficient trade regime is export, followed by import 
substitution and interregional trade. The present trading system, where the beef produced 
in East Nusa Tenggara and East Java is then transported to West Java, Jakarta and other 
deficit regions, is not efficient economically. A more beneficial trade arrangement is 
the export of beef from the producing region&, with import from abroad satisfying the 
meat requirements of the deficit regions. 
Household beef farming is more efficient than corporate farming. Therefore, beef 
farming development may be concentrated on the household sector. This is also consistent 
with income distribution and employment creation objectives. Without doubt, beef family 
farming is more labour intensive than large corporate farming. 
The effective protection rates on beef are negative in all producing regions and all 
trade regimes. The highest disincentives are under the export regime, and then followed by 
import substitution and interregional trade respectively. This indicates that beef 
production is directed primarily for domestic use. The disincentives should be removed to 
promote beef farming which is shown to be highly efficient economically. 
Indonesia does not have comparative advantage in milk production (Table 6). 
Clearly, from an economic point of view it is more beneficial for Indonesia to import milk 
than to produce it domestically. The interregional trade regime is particularly inefficient -
if milk must be produced domestically, then it should be intended for import substitution 
within the production region. This means that milk processing plants mu:>t be located in 
the same location as the dairy farms. Such a consolidation of dairy farms and milk 
processing plants allows reductions in transportation costs. 
The deficit in each milk production/processing region may be imported from abroad, 
rather than transported from other fresh milk producing regions. Thus the government 
should allow importation of milk raw materials to meet the deficit in large processing 
regions such as Jakarta. This kind of trade and industrial location arrangement is 
proposed until domestic milk farming efficiency cdn be increased. Improving 
production efficiency should be the first priority for the long-term survival of the 
domestic dairy sector. 
The dairy sector i!> highly protected by the government, as evidenced by extremly 
high effective protection rate~. This indicate:> that the !>urvival of the dairy sector is due 
primarily to the protection, most of which is channelled through enhanced milk prices. 
The study also indicated that the cross breed animal i~ more ~uitable than imported breeds 
in Indonesia, and shows that the small family farm is more efficient than large corporate 
farms. Accordingly, dairy farming development should be directed toward small family 
farms using cross breed animals. 
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Table 1 Nominal Protection Rates of Livestock Production 
By Region, 1987 (%) 
Region 
Central Java 
East Java 
Jakarta 
Swine 
meat 
-32.12 
-13.93 
1. 70 
East Nus a Tenggara-42.34 
Bali -39.40 
South Kalimantan 0 
Lampung 
Beef Poultry 
carcass meat 
-24.89 -38.85 
-32.70 -36.45 
-20.41 -38.04 
-52.38 -38.04 
-39.38 
-23.40 
-42.34 
Chicken 
egg 
-11. 58 
-22.12 
-23.78 
24.28 
Table 2 Feedcrop Comparative Advantage Indicatorsl 
Anhydrous 
milk fat 
158. 71 
161. 08 
162.26 
Skimmed 
milk powder 
137. 93 
141.22 
142.87 
Region Corn Cassava Soybean 
West Java 0.9 0.5 1.4 
Central Java 0.5 0.4 0.7 
East Java 0.7 0.5 0.9 
Suma tar a 0.5 0.3 0.6 
Bali and N.T. 0.4 0.3 0.5 
South Sulawesi 0.8 0.3 0.5 
Kalimantan 0.5 0.3 0.8 
1 Figures in the table are domestic resource costs. 
The import substitution trade regime is assumed here for corn and 
soybean, and the export regime for cassava. 
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Table 3 Summary of Swine Meat Comparative Advantage Criteria 
Producing 
region 
Bali 
Bali 
Central Java 
Technology 
Intensive 
Unintensive 
Corporate & 
Intensive 
Trade 
regime 
IS 
EP 
IS 
EP 
IS 
EP 
Wholesale 
/Port 
Bali 
Bali 
Bali 
Bali 
Semarang 
Semarang 
Table 4 Comparative Advantage Indicators for Poultryl 
Producing Region Trade regime Chicken Meat 
Lampung lS 0.3 
EP 0.3 
Tasikmalaya lS 0.2 
EP 0.5 
Bog or lS 0.2 
EP 0.3 
1 Figures in the table are domestic resource cost ratios. 
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Domestic 
resource Cost 
0.25 
0.26 
0.57 
0.58 
0.59 
0.60 
Eggs 
0.2 
0.2 
0.4 
2.3 
0.4 
1.0 
Table 5 Summary of Domestic Resource Cost Criteria of Beef 
Production, 1987 
Producing 
region 
East Nusa 
Tengarra 
East Nusa 
Tengarra 
Central Java 
West Java 
Technology 
Free grazing 
(Household) 
Tied system 
(Household) 
Fattening 
(Household) 
Fattening 
(Corporate) 
Trade 
regimes 
IS 
EP 
IS 
EP 
IS 
EP 
IS 
EP 
Domestic 
Resource Cost 
0.30 
0.28 
0.28 
0.26 
0.48 
0.44 
0.59 
0.54 
Table 6 Summary of Comparative Advantage Criteria for Milk Production 
Producing 
region 
Corporate 
Household 
Technology 
Imported 
breed 
Cross breed 
Imported 
breed 
Cross breed 
Trade 
regime 
IR 
IS 
IR 
IS 
IR 
IR 
IS 
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Wholesale 
location 
Jakarta 
Salatiga 
Jakarta 
Salatiga 
Jakarta 
IS 
Jakarta 
Salatiga 
Domestic 
Resource 
Cost 
5.02 
2.88 
2.20 
1. 70 
3.52 
Salatiga 2.40 
1. 74 
1.45 
CHAPTER 14 
LIVESTOCK POLICY AND PRODUCTION IN MALAYSIA 
Tan Siew Hoey* 
INTRODUCTION 
Domestic farm policies often impact adversely on the direction of international 
trade. Food policies in particular have tended to be most interventionist. Whether in the 
developing or industrial market economies, there is in general a failure to set "prices right". 
In the latter group of countries, farm programmes are targetted at maintaining farm 
incomes long after the sector has lost its competitiveness vis-a-vis other sector& in the 
national economy and the rest of the world. The developing countries however promote 
policies aimed at achieving domestic food security goals through attaining self-sufficiency. 
On an aggregate basis policies in other areas negate or contradict food policy objectives. 
Priority to urban consumers in many Third World countrie!> for instance, has rendered 
domestic food availability more insecure. While the food situation in some countries can be 
attributed to their own internal policies, countrie!> which are export-dependent suffer from 
the surplu& subsidised production of industrialised market economics, the net impact of 
whose policies is to drive food prices to unprecedented lows. Thus border prices have 
become very distorted in recent years. 
Against this perspective, Malaysia represents a unique case among developing 
countries. Malaysia's economic prosperity has its basis in a highly efficient agriculture 
sector specialising in export crop production, especially food commodities such as palm-oil 
and cocoa. Farm programmes are characterised by taxation of export crops and fiscal 
support for food crops produced for domestic consumption. Food policy directed at 
domestic consumption has all along been biased in favour of producers. Policy orientations 
have followed closely the dictates of the prevailing development theology. Accordingly, rice 
policy has moved away from more than three decades of active intervention to recent 
attempts at structural adjustment in the padi and rice industry (Tan, S.H., 1989). So too are 
efforts made to reduce the burden of export taxation on producers. In livestock production, 
policy evolution follows closely the pattern in the rice sector, though not to the same 
pervasive extent in terms of direct financial transfers by the government, even though both 
sectors contribute around 1 % each to GDP. In the livestock sector, there is a tendency to 
nurture the development of the less efficient ruminant sector through direct government 
support while the non-ruminant sector develops rapidly under the quantitative restrictions 
on imports. The Malaysian government's National Agriculture Policy (NAP) introduced in 
1984 clearly documents priority in commercial viability in the choice of agricultural 
activities. 
*Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur. 
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For an import-substituting strategy to be productive, the incentives accorded to the 
supported sector must result in savings in foreign exchange. In the case of rice it is clear 
that the country does not have a comparative advantage in domestic production (See Tan, 
S.H., 1987). In livestock production, the issue of resource allocation has so far not been 
examined on a comprehensive basis. While efficency considerations have not been the 
primary motive for farm programmes the world over, it is still useful for policy planning to 
have some indications of the economic costs of commodity programs. This paper reports on 
the findings of a study funded by the Asian Development Bank to examine comparative 
advantage in the livestock sector under three different trade regimes-import substitution, 
production for export and interregional trade. While the study covers the entire country, the 
emphasis is on Peninsular Malaysia in which 83% of the population reside. The other 
terrritories of Sabah and Sarawak are at a different level of development and are self-
sufficient in non-ruminant poultry products. Trade in livestock products between the 
territories is inhibited by high transport costs. These two territories should merit separate 
treatment as there is little basis for comparison. For this reason Sabah and Sarawak are left 
out in this paper. 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND INCENTIVES IN LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
As a country highly dependent on trade, Malaysia practises a very liberal trade policy 
as compared to her other Asian neighbours. The incidence of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
has in general tended to be low (DeRosa). In the livestock sector, the pursuit of food self-
sufficiency goals has been the major motivation to which income enhancement subsequently 
became an important objective. The difference with the advanced countries which support 
farm programmes is the perceived need to maintain farm incomes while in most developing 
countries, farm programmes are seen as an important device to raise rural income and 
employment. In areas where comparative advantage is lacking, the question is seldom asked 
whether keeping farmers in low income activities is a good strategy in rural development. 
Incentives specific to the livestock sector can be classified on the basis of direct and 
indirect assistance. Besides policies specific to the sector, there are policies at the periphery 
or directed at other sectors which conflict with or complement those pertaining to livestock 
production. Such policies are designed with other goals or interest groups in mind but 
nevertheless impact strongly on livestock production. For example the attractive incentives 
given to rice production discourage diversification into other short-term crops such as 
maize. The 13% duty on soybean meal protects soybean crushers but raises the cost of this 
feed to livestock producers. Duties on other feed materials are sometimes imposed at 
budget time to meet revenue purposes. In the case of beef production, the import of cheap 
Indian beef is allowed under a bilateral trade arrangement with India which is a major 
importer of palm oil. 
In addition, an important macro-economic tool is exchange rate policy as it alters the 
terms of trade between exports and imports. While the ringgit was overvalued in the early 
'80s (World Bank), the real effective exchange rate hovered around parity in 1986 at the 
rate of M$2.50 == US$1 (IMF). With an import elasticity of 1.3 estimated for the period 1970-
88, Malaysia has so far not manipulated the exchange rate regime for purposes of trade 
advantage. 
Indirect Interventions in Livestock Production 
These interventions refer to policies or regulations specific to livestock production 
but which do not entail direct financial assistance from the government. 
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1. Health and sanitation regulations on the importation of live an mals for breeding; 
2. Control of Newcastle disease in the case of poultry and Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) for cattle and swine fever for pigs; 
3. Licensin:~ and regulating the slaughtering of animals; 
4. Research and development in breeding and adaptation of exotic breeds to local 
conditions; and into varietal improvements inf eedgrains/f eeds tuff s; 
5. Quantitative restrictions on the importation of day-old chicks, live birds and live pigs 
for purposes other than breeding; 
6. Import-duties on chicken parts and processed pork items: 
7. Exemption from duty on soybean meal for those producing for exports. 
Direct Interventions in Livestock Production 
These incentive& to livestock production involve direct financial assistance by the 
government or the direct undertaking of commercial activities by the State. 
1. Subsidised cost of animals for beef, dairy and mutton production; 
2. Price support and marketing scheme for milk with the government-run Milk 
Collecting Centres as the nuclei; 
3. Institutional credit for purchase of animals provided by the Agriculture Bank; 
4. Subsidised costs of slaughtering cattle and goats. 
Incentives for the Feedmill Industry 
The feedmill industry essentially caters to the captive domestic market for pig and 
poultry feeds. The indmtry enjoys the usual incentives given to pioneer industries during 
the first phase of the indu&trialisation programme. The industry is protected via a 13% levy 
on imports of formulated feeds. Over time, the costs of feedgrains and feedstuff imports 
have been adjusted through reduction or elimination of various duties and taxes. However 
some duties remain, the most significant of which is the 13% duty on soybean meal which 
forms a rather significant portion of pig and poultry rations. 
This duty is imposed to protect the soybean crushers. Similarly, the 13% duty on rice 
bran is also directed at protecting the domestic rice industry. Other than this, the feedmills 
are free to source their imports from whichever country they wi&h and unlike some other 
industries, there are no quota allocations on imports of raw materiab by the feedmills. 
PUBLIC ALLOCATIONS TO THE LIVESTOCK SECTOR 
The amount of public expenditure going to the livestock sector forms less than 4% of 
the total allocations to agriculture in all five Plans (Table 1). Owing to the more attractive 
returns in palm oil and rubber cultivation, the major part of public expenditures went into 
land settlement schemes which are an important means of employing rural labour, earning 
foreign exchange and eradicating rural poverty. On a programme basis (Table 2), less than 
$10 million a year were spent on each since 1981. 
Over the period 1981to1988, a total of 32,336 heads of beef cattle were distributed to 
about 25,700 farmers. Prior to 1984, one or two animals were given to each participant. In 
the dairy programme, a total of 9,112 animals were dir,tributed over the period 1981-87. Up 
to 1987 a total of 6,800 farmers have participated in the milk collection scheme. Animal 
herd si7e is the largest in the sheep/goat programme. Table 2 <>how& falling participation 
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rates by the farmer~ and in the number of animals given out each year, except in the case of 
sheep which is a relatively new programme. These numbers indicate that the drive towards 
self -sufficiency in these livestock products will certainly be a long and arduous one. 
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS 
With the incentives accorded the sector, non-ruminant livestock production ha~ 
progressed from a backyard type of operation to a sophisticated multi-million dollar 
industry in the space of less than two decades. Pig and poultry production has been able to 
reap the benefits of advances made in breeding and animal husbandry which were easily 
replicated world-wide. In ruminant production the picture is very different. It is much more 
difficult to adapt exotic breeds to local climatic conditions. In addition, the availability of 
good quality pasture is practically non-existent. The dairy programme depends on the cut-
and-carry method, supplemented by feed concentrates, since there is no land for the cows to 
graze. In beef cattle a similar arrangement in the form of the feedlot system is practised 
with palm kernel cake (PKC) as the main feed. Livestock farming in the ruminant sector is 
still very much a smallholder undertaking. 
This divergence in the development of the livestock subsectors is reflected in the self-
sufficency ratios for the various meat items (Table 3). Self-sufficiency was attained in 
poultry, egg and pork production since 1970, with growth rates in production exceeding 
consumption in the period 1970-87. Consumption levels are commensurate with those in the 
developed countries. Jn 1985 for instance, the Belgians each consume 14.5 kgs of poultry 
meat and 243 eggs, the Dutch 12.4 kgs poultry and 200 eggs and the British 16 kgs poultry 
and 237 eggs (Babjee). Comparable figures for Malaysia are 16 kgs of poultry meat and 221 
eggs. 
Beef and mutton production, however, exhibited drastic declines in the self· 
sufficiency ratio. Mutton production in particular registered a negative growth rate in the 
1970-87 period. Besides the difficulties in adapting imported breeds to the local 
environment, an important factor in the decline of beef and mutton production is the rapid 
growth of the industrial sector and the country's programme of affirmative action via 
modernisation of the rural sector. The net effect of these policies is to draw farmers into 
higher value farming activities such as export crop production, and into industrial 
employment. In the case of beef production, the introduction of double-cropping in the rice 
growing areas led to rapid mechanisation and inevitably the demise of the buffalo as a 
draught animal and with it a source of meat in the rural areas. 
There was also no pronounced increa~e in the per capita comumption of beef and 
mutton, as was apparent in the consumption of pork, poultry and eggs. As for milk 
production, Malaysia produces less than 5% of the total liquid milk equivalent (LME), with 
the bulk of milk consumption imported in powdered form. Although milk production has 
increased rapidly, this is due to the very small base (Table 4). It is unlikely that the dairy 
milk programme will ever amount to anywhere near being a threat to imported powdered 
milk. Per capita consumption is around 43 litres of LME. 
Consumption patterns reflect cultural habits among the three major ethnic groupE> in 
the country. While overaJl sufficiency has been attained in meat production, pork is 
consumed almost exclusively by the Chinese, whose consumption of beef and mutton is 
negligible. Poultry meat and eggs are the only two items consumed by the whole population. 
The growth in poultry and pork consumption in particular confirms the expectation of such 
increases with the growth in income. Over the period 1970-89, average real GDP growth 
rates have exceeded 6%. Measures of income elasticities from household budget surveys are 
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lacking. The o Jly available source is the 1980 H ou&ehold Expendit ire Survey which is by 
now dated and of lamentable quality. The HES income cla&ticities for all meat items show 
consumption to br.; income inelastic for all three ethnic groups despite apparent disparities 
in mean incomes. Time ~cries analysis is hampered by the inadequacies in per capita GNP 
figures which are not published according to territory. Per capita income series by ethnic 
groups are non-existent. 
ISSUES SURROUNDING LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
Given the current production situation, some policy-makers have exhorted livestock 
farmers to capture export markets for pork and poultry and to step up efforts in import-
substitution in beef and mutton production. Con:>ideration is also given to import substitute 
feed requirements as the industry has thus far developed independently of a feed belt. This 
is the most vulnerable aspect of Malaysia's import substitution strategy in livestock 
production. 
Motivating the exhortations is the large food import bill which exceeded M$3 billion 
a few years ago. As a percentage of the availability of foreign exchange however, gross 
livestock and feedi>tuffs imports constitute less than 3% of export earnings in the 1980-86 
period. A careful examination of the food import bill indicates that the net food import bill 
is much lower than M$3 billion as a significant part goes into the food manufacturing sector 
and is re-exported (Table 5). Though net edible livestock imports accounted for more than 
20% of the food bill between 1980-86, there is in reality very limited scope for import 
substitution as the difficulties in raising the cattle and sheep population testifies. 
While net edible livestock imports have fallen since 1983, feedstuffs remain 
substantial in the import bill of the livestock sector. Maize production in Malaysia is mainly 
for direct human consumption rather than a& a feed grain. Maize imports reached 1 million 
mt in 1988 and will continue to increase in future with the increase in population. 
Compound feeds used in pig and poultry farming produced by about 26-30 larger feedmills 
totalled 735,800 tonnes in 1985. Output from the smaller mills is excluded and so is &elf-
mixing by some of the larger farms. The continued expansion of the pig and poultry industry 
to meet demand arising from population increases would require almost a doubling of feed 
requirements by the turn of the century. While a variety of crops, by-products and agro-
industrial by-product~ can be utilised as animal feeds, they are either suitable for ruminants 
only, or have declined in production for one reason or another. Malaysia continues lo 
depend on imports of fecdgrains for the monogastric ~ector, the most important of which is 
maize which f ormf, about 50% of the ration for poultry. 
MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
The standard resource cost methodology has been refined to account for domestic 
transportation and distribution costs. A substantial literature exi:o.ts on domestic resource 
cost (DRC) methodology and this will not be dwelt upon in this paper. All assumptions 
regarding non-tradeables and conversion factors can be found in the main report (Tan, S.H. 
et al). 
The analysi& is ba~cd on a :o.urvcy of 175 livestock farms and 15 traders/processors 
and feedmillers in Penim.ular Malaysia. The survey covers the major producing areas which 
are divided into regions and analysed according to trade regime'>. In the ruminant sector the 
country is divided into North, Central, South and Ea~t regionf.. Attention is confined to 
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Peninsular Malaysia. Pork and poultry production are not important in the Eastern region 
and this is excluded. 
Financial Evaluation 
Financial analysis indicates the largest private profitability in the non-ruminant 
sector lies in pork production (Table 6). Private margins as a percentage of costs range from 
10.2% in the Central region to 30% in the South. Next in terms of profitability of farm 
operations is egg production where profit margins range from less than 3% in the Central 
to almost 22% in the South. Farms in the South account for 70% of all pigs exported from 
the country owing to their proximity to the Singapore market. Thus farmers there command 
higher farm-gate prices -- a situation similar to that enjoyed by farmers in the Central 
region. The latter i& a densely populated area and thus on balance a deficit region. Except 
for broiler production, ruminant livestock production is most profitable in the South. 
Private margins for broiler production are even lower than that for dairy production. 
At the post-farm level, private profitability is generally several multiples of farm 
level profits for all commodities for most region&. Profits are particularly large at the 
wholesale level of egg distribution, ranging from 3 to 6 times the cost outlay. These results 
confirm the complaints by farmers of excessive middlemen profits resulting from their 
market power, with a small number of wholesalers to the many livestock farmers. 
Advances in the farm sector have not been matched by similar advances at the post-farm 
level. The source of this disparity can be traced to the insecurity in land tenure of most pig 
and poultry farms. This prevents such farmers from access to institutional credit and led to 
their reliance on market intermediaries to fund their activities. 
In the ruminant sector, the feedlot system results in negative financial returns lo 
cattle farmers in all regions. The largest losses are incurred by farmers in the North, while 
farmers in the East su1.tain the lowest level of losses. Beef production is no longer 
profitable with the increase in PKC prices from $190/mt a few years ago to over $260/mt 
today, an increase of more than 40%. 
Of the ruminant sector, dairying is the most profitable activity. This is not surprising 
as it is the programme with the most intervention mechanisms. In addition to the subsidy on 
livestock, dairy farmers enjoy a price subsidy which will alway1> ensure a positive return for 
their effort. Production costs for milk range from 62 cents in the East to 102 cents in the 
North. This compares with the guaranteed price of 75 cents for milk delivered to the Milk 
Collecting Centres and about $1.00 to $1.60 if the farmers were to market their milk to 
vendors or directly to the consumers. 
The farm survey covered sheep production only in the Central and South regions. 
Production costs are very high in the Central region, exceeding that in the South by more 
than 30%. As such only in the South are there positive private returns of about 39% over 
production costs. At the wholesale level, profits are about 24% in the South while losses are 
indicated in the Central. Thus wholesale profit levels for sheep do not exhibit the wide 
profit margins characteristic of the other livestock products. This is probably due to the low 
killing-out percentage of 50% and the small quantity handled. 
Other than in the ca&c of sheep, wholesale profit levels are several multiples of farm 
profits -- a manifestation of the market imperfections characterising livestock marketing in 
the country. In beef marketing, the margins arc excessive ranging from 205% in the East to 
523% in the South. This is particularly inequitable considering that farmers are making 
losses. In this context the move by the Federal Marketing Authority (FAMA) to set up 
farmers market in the urban areas is commendable. Direct selling is the only way by which 
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beef farmers can imernalise some of the marketing margins. It should he noted that it would 
be difficult for farmer& to replace the intermediaries completely. Th'! feasibility of direct 
marketing would depend on farm location and the distance to the nean.st towns. 
Economic Analysis 
The incentive& accorded the livestock sector, whether in the form of direct price 
support and subsidies or quantitative restrictions, are captured in the differential between 
the domestic and border prices. In both nominal and effective terms, the ruminant sector is 
protected at several multiples the level of the non-ruminant sector (Table 7). The tariff is 
highest in the case of dairy cattle particularly in the East -- so was the effective protection 
rate at several times the nominal rate. The effective protection rate (EPR) for dairy 
production in the East is the highest at over 530%. Protection rates are lowest for sheep 
production. 
In general Malaysia lacks a comparative advantage in all types of ruminant livestock 
production as is evident from the results presented in Table 7. Beef production exhibits the 
highest domestic resource cost ratio (DRC) in the East. The high costs of PKC swamp the 
high quality adjustment for beef which is about 50% above the derived border price. 
Sensitivity analysis performed on beef production reveals that Malaysia would have a 
neutral advantage in beef production at a cif price between $7.50/kg to $8.50/kg, depending 
on the region and assuming costs of production remain con!>lant (Table 8). Thi!> implies an 
increase of between 29(71<1 to 46<7<1 above the border price of $5.81 /kg derived in the study. A 
fall in PKC prices to $190/mt, the price prevailing a few years ago, does not appear Lo alter 
the comparative disadvantage (Table 8). PKC prices would have to fall to rock bottom for 
Malaysia to be indifferent between producing and importing. 
In dairy production, import substitution entails the use of domestic resources at 
between about two to three times the official exchange rate. Dairy production is more 
intensive in resource use than beef production. Domestic resources are transformed at the 
rate of $4.71 to $8.91 to the US$ compared to the exchange rate of $2.49= US$1 prevailing in 
1987, and compared to between $4.28 to $7.29 for beef production. It appears that sheep 
production has the best potential among the three ruminant animals. 
Sheep production has so far proven to be costly in resource use in spite of the belief 
that production costs arc marginal considering that the animals have accesi. to free forage. 
However, the animals need supplementary feeding in the form of feed concentrates. 
Compared to beef and dairy cattle production, it has indicated a greater potential 
comparative advantage, but is still in the experimental i.tage. Sensitivity analyi.is reveal!> 
that it would require an increase in border prices by more than 60% above the derived 
border price of $9.20/kg to $15/kg for Malaysia to be indifferent between domestic 
production and importing in the Central region (Table 8). In the South this status is attained 
with a border price of $12/kg. The prospects for sheep would lie in stepping up R & D to 
improve fertility than in anticipating quantum leap& in border prices. 
Nominal protection in the non-ruminant sector is les~ than 12%, with some regions 
exhibiting implicit taxation (Table 7). The lower.t rates are found in swine production, which 
in the Central region is implicitly taxed. Effective protection in swine production however is 
positive for all regions except the Central where it is effectively taxed at almost 23%. 
Similarly, broiler production in the South is implicitly taxed in both nominal and effective 
terms. 
The DRC for all three non-ruminant livestock product!> indicate distinct comparative 
advantage in import r.ubr.titution. The Central region exhibits the lowest DRC for all three 
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products, with the DRC for pork at 0.55. This implies domestic pork production cost& half 
what it takes to import. Both layer and pork production yield substantial net economic 
benefits while in broiler production, such benefits are marginal (Table 6). The low values of 
net economic hcncfib arc due not only to the low cif price but also because private profits 
are already low in a highly competitive industry. The shorter production cycle facilitates 
easy entry into and exit out of the industry. 
Production of eggs, broilers and pigs for export is in general less advantageous than 
for import substitution. Whether exporting to the Singapore market or to the local market 
farmers receive the same farm-gate price. The difference lies in the transport costs which is 
a function of distance from farm to port or wholesale market. This results in lower 
economic value-added and hence a higher DRC. In broiler production, there is a distinct 
disadvantage in producing for export in all regions, while in layer production comparative 
advantage is very marginal in all the regions. Only in pig production is there a clear 
advantage in exporting, particularly in the Central and South. Having a comparative 
advantage in pig and egg production is one thing, but the reality of capturing export 
markets is quite another matter. 
The result& for the inter-regional trade flows &how a greater advantage for surplus 
regions to supply deficit regions in the Peninsula than for such regions to export. This is 
true for all the non-ruminant livestock products. However, whether such trade is more or 
less advantageous than production for direct import substitution is rather inconclusive in 
the case of broiler and egg production. In pig production, it appears that interregional trade 
is the most efficient. 
The recent depreciation in the exchange rate by about 10% to around M$2.70 = US$1 
does not alter the direction of comparative advantage in the import substitution regime for 
pig production. Using only pig production as an illustration (as similar effects would 
logically arise in poultry and egg production) both output prices and input costs move in the 
same direction, with the latter increases being smaller in magnitude when transmitted into 
final production costs (Table 7). Though the exchange rate depreciation enhances 
comparative advantage in import substitution, its impact is very marginal. In the case of 
production for exports, the impact is more significant as it makes production for export less 
advantageous. This is because producers receive the same farm-gate prices while 
production costs increase as imported feedstuffs cost more with the currency depreciation. 
DOMESTIC MAIZE PRODUCTION 
The monogastric livestock sector has thus far developed by relying on imported 
feedgrains. Anticipated industrial development in Thailand and recent increases in border 
prices have raised the issue of domestic production. An examination of the costs of 
commercial mai7e production was undertaken by the Malaysian Agricultural Research and 
Development Institute (MARDI) in 1986. This was based on experiments with maize 
production in the North. The financial analysis was done for a 500-hectare farm, a size 
widely believed to be the commercially viable farm size for a mechanised mode of 
production. MARDI's experimental trials indicate a yield of 2.5 mt/ha dry corn. On the 
basis of a price of 41 cents/kg ex-farm, the average financial returns over a 5-year period 
amount to M$63,392 or M$25/ha annually. From MARDI'S computations it is apparent that 
the economic analysis would yield rather large losses once the returns from alternative 
crops are taken into consideration. A 500-hectare plot of land if used for palm-oil 
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production w.:mld yield an annual return exceeding M$290,000 or M$580/ha 1. So long as 
alternative returns from other crops remain more lucrative, donestic maize production 
would not appear to be the answer to the further development of the pig and poultry 
industry. 
LIMITATIONS 
The re&ults of the domestic resource cost analysis confirm a priori notions of 
comparative advantage that can be gleaned from the aggregate information on performance 
of the livestock industry. Thus the presence of comparative advantage in the import 
substituting regime of non-ruminant livestock production is not surprising given the 
performance of the sector in meeting the country's requirement& at declining or stable real 
prices over time. 
Comparisons by region have to be interpreted with cau1ion particularly in the 
ruminant sector owing to the small number of farms covered. With regard to the resource 
cost methodology itself, measures of comparative advantage are indicative rather than 
absolute. The results depend very much on the classification between resource costs and 
tradables. It is also a static measure and the results change not only with changes in border 
and relative price& but abo with technological progress which impact on production cost&. 
However, when the DRC' is several times above 1, a distinct comparative dir,advantage is 
indicated. 
CONSTRAINTS TO FURTHER EXPANSION OF LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
Though the results of the analysis indicate a distinct comparative advantage in import 
substitution of pork and poultry and in certain regions for exports as well, the question 
remains as to the future of this sub-sector. With the presence of a lower cost neighbour 
(Thailand), it remains to be seen whether Malaysian producers can continue in production 
with complete market liberalisation. What the results imply is that the protection accorded 
the pig and poultry sector has been very marginal and that the incentive policies have 
resulted in the development of an efficient sub-sector. 
With regard to the export is~ue, so far Singapore remains the only significant market. 
Of late, however, this market ha:,, been on the verge of losing its 'captive' nature. Producers 
in Singapore are venturing into high technology capital investment particularly in egg 
production. This is instantly reflected in the drop in egg price'> by about 4 cents/egg to 
below costs of production. Further expansion in pig production is constrained by the 
limitation of land given the sensitivity of pig production in a Muslim country. The Singapore 
government also intends to impose rather stringent sanitary regulation&, effectively making 
it difficult for Malaysian producers to continue supplying that market. Other markets are 
illusory as besides having to compete with lower cost producers, the shipping charges are 
another disincentive. 
lThis number is derived from prices for fresh fruit bunches (FFB) les~ production costs. 
The average FFB price in 1987 was M$139 per tonne. Average smallholder yield is 20 
tonnes per hectare. Long run average cost is M$110 per tonne (Tan, RT.). Net returns 
from palm oil cultivation are: M$(139-110)*20*500 -= M$290,000. 
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The issue of feed availability remains unresolved. Even with the implementation of 
the proposed restructuring of the rice industry, as long as relative price ratios between the 
two crops are in favour of rice, it is unlikely that farmers will switch to coarse grains. 
Freeing the existing institutional and legal constraints regarding padi land use in the single-
cropped areas will only mean a switch to the more lucrative export crops. For the ruminant 
sector, the attractive price of PKC obtainable in the European market will continue to price 
the feed beyond the means of local beef farmers. The search for other feeding materials 
must necessarily reside in the area of agro-industrial by-products. The current dependence 
on imported feedgrains for the non-ruminant sector has not rendered it inefficient. Nor has 
foreign exchange availability been a constraint in sourcing imports. 
CONCLUSION 
The Malaysian government's intervention in the live&tock sector has been efficient in 
pig and poultry production but not in beef, dairy and sheep production. On this basis, 
incentives given to the less productive ruminant sector in effect penalise the non-ruminant 
sector. While the programmes in the ruminant sector were not motivated by economic 
considerations alone, it remains questionable whether encouraging farmers to take up such 
livestock activities is a good strategy for raising rural incomes. Except for dairy production, 
these activities have not proven financially rewarding. In the case of beef it appears that the 
major beneficiaries of the intervention are market intermediaries. 
Policy direction should aim rather at removing obvious inconsistencies and 
contradictions. This is with regard to policy in one area impacting on another as in the case 
of subsidies to rice production which render other short-term crops non-lucrative from a 
private viewpoint. Another peripheral impact on the livestock sector is the protection given 
to domestic &oybean crushers which raises the cost of soybean meal. Again in exempting the 
exporters of livestock products from this duty, those producing for the domestic market 
(and who are highly productive) are penalised, resulting in an inequitable distribution of 
private benefits. 
Though most duties imposed on feed components have been removed, several 
remain. Those on soybean meal and rice have been discussed. On other items like 
groundnut meals there is in reality no necessity for such duties. These levies are usually 
imposed at budget time to raise revenue without due consideration for their impact on other 
sectors. Since the analysis here has shown a very efficient non-ruminant sector, the 
government should avoid penalising a very productive sector through the unintended 
incidence of its policies elsewhere. Though such feed components form a very small portion 
of the feed ration at present, this may not be true in future. The duty on such items 
discourages the intensity of their use as a substitute in feed rations. 
Malaysia does produce agro-industrial by-products and wastes which are suitable 
mainly in ruminant livestock production. Though research and development should 
continue in breeding and using domestic feed resources to overcome some of the current 
technical disadvantage&, policy planners should be realistic about the prospects of 
satisfying either output or redistributive goals, given the awesome constraints posed by 
environmental and climatic factors in ruminant livestock production. 
177 
REFERENCES 
Mustaffa Babjee, 1986. Keynote address at the Seminar on "Recent Advancei, in Livestock 
Marketing Development and Practices", Kuala Lumpur, 24-26 November 1986. 
Dean A.DeRosa, 1988. "Asian Preferences and the Gain!> from MFN Tariff Reductions", 
The World Economy, Vol. II, No.3, September 1988. 
Department of Veterinary Services, 1987. Feed Industry in Peninsular Malaysia. Investors 
Guide Series No.7. 
Federation of Livestock Farmers' Associations of Malay!>ia, 1985. Annals of 1985 and Data 
Supplements. 
IMF 1988. International Financial Statistics. November 1988. 
Government of Malaysia, 1984. National Agricultural Policy 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1986. "Business Proposal for the Commercial Cultivation of 
Commercial Grain Maize". Prepared for the Ministry by the MARDI Task Force. 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1981. "Analysis of the 1980 Household Expenditure Survey". 
Tan Bok Thiam, 1987. "Cost of Palm Oil Production in Major Producing Countries". Paper 
presented at the International Oil Palm/Palm Oil Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 
June 29 - July 1. 
Tan Siew Hoey, 1987. Malaysia's Rice Policy: A Critical Analy:.is. ISIS Issues Paper, Kuala 
Lumpur 
Tan Siew Hoey, 1989. Government Interventions in the Padi and Rice Industry of Malaysia. 
Undertaken for the World Bank. 
Tan Siew Hoey, Zainal Abidin Mohamed, Mad Nasir Shamsuddin and Eddie Chiew, 1989. 
Government Incentives and Comparative Advantage in Livestock and feedstuffs 
Production : Malaysia Country Study. Undertaken for the Asian Development 
Bank. 
World Bank, 1984. Incentive Policies in A2riculture: Sector Report on Malaysia. 
178 
Table 1 Development Expenditure Allocated Under Various Malaysia 
Plans for Agriculture and Livestock (Killion M$) 
Agriculture Livestock 
Livestock 
as % of 
Agriculture 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
First Malaysia Plan, 
1966 - 1970 
Original Allocation 
1st Revision 
Second Malaysia Plan, 
1971 - 1975 
Original Allocation 
1st Revision 
2nd Revision 
3rd Revisioi:i 
~hird Malaysia Plan, 
1976 - 1980 
Original Allocation 
1st Revision 
2nd Revision 
Jrd Revision 
Fourth Malaysia Plan, 
1981 - 1985 
Orig~nal Allocation 
1st Revision 
2nd Revision 
Fifth Malaysia Plan, 
1986 - 1990 
Original Allocation 
900.2 
1, 177.9 
1,956.Q 
2,197.2 
2,369.0 
2,279.4 
4,735.5 
4,821.8 
7,364.9 
6,448.3 
8,629.6 
8,306.0 
8,013.6 
11,aoo.o 
Source: Various Issues of Malaysia Plans. 
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33.8 
2 9. 0 
4 .J • 1 
72.3 
8 1 • 1 
6 1. 8 
17 9. 0 
1,79. 0 
218. 9 
168.8 
24 1. 0 
233.11 
137.77 
185.23 
3. 0 
2.s 
2 • 3 
3. 3 
3.4 
2. 7 
2. 0 
2.s 
1 • 7 
1 • 6 
...... 
00 
~ 
Table 2 Livestock Development Programme in Peninsular Malaysia 1981-88 
1981 1982 1983 1984 19 8 5 1986 1987 198 !:l 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beef Cattle 
-----------
Allocation ( $m) 1 5 5.939 1. 9 7 2 8 8.855 5.75 
Expenditure ( $.n) 14.SBJ 3.563 2.879 7.95 7. 2 1 5 5.575 
Livestock Numner 2951 3948 8837 6144 4611 2067 
Numner of Far,ners 2951 3948 7722 5502 1823 1236 
Dairy 
-----
Allocation ( $m) 4 4. 15 1.328 1 • 5 1. 8 2.68 
Expenditure ( $,n) 3.47d 5.923 1.327 1. 3 99 1. 6 49 2.491 
Livestock Nu,noer 131 0 17J4 1698 1790 1707 407 
Numner Of Far1ner s * 2960 3704 4263 5954 6457 6733 
Sheep/Goats 
-----------
Allocat:i.on ( $m) 1 0.44 0. 0 8 1 0. 151 0.24 o.76 
Expenditure (Sm) 0.472 0. 3 1 4 0.066 0. 1 39 0. 2 1 7 0.639 
Livestock Number 2184 74 955 680 849 3778 
Numner of Farmers 704 45 210 1 1 4 128 401 
Note * Number of farmers refers to all Lhose participatin~ in the milk 
collection prograffime and is coffipiled on a cumulative basis. It is 
not possiole to identify the number of farmers receiving the co~s 
each year. 
Source Planning Division, DVS 
3.52 6. 0 19 
2.72 2.b57 
2285 1493 
1 J a 1 1 160 
Q.867 2. 2 1 
o.846 
466 
6800 
3. 2 3.8 
2. 9 1 
4502 
458 
Table 3 Livestock Production and Consumption in Peninsular Malaysia 1987 
Commodity Production Consumption 
mt growth*% mt growth*% 
SSL 
% 
Per Capita 
Consumption(kgs) 
1970 1987 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beef 
Mutton 
Pork 
Poultry 
Eggs** 
Note: 
12,365 0.35 34,071 5.88 
496 -3.33 6,595 6.61 
156,900 6.97 137,400 6.05 
277' 200 9.19 242,881 7.92 
3,450 7.29 3,234 6,73 
* Average annual growth rate 1970-1987 
** In millions 
*** kg 
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36 2.9 4.3 
8 3.3 3.6 
us 16.6 26.7 
ll4 6.7 17.4 
109 122 231*** 
Table 4 Dairy Programme Development, 1974-87. 
YEAR 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
19o2 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
NO. OF 
PARTICIPATION 
86 
198 
363 
7 1 7 
863 
927 
1146 
2960 
3704 
4263 
5954 
6457 
6733 
6800 
CATTLE MILK PRODUCTION 
ALLOCATION (LITRES) 
1'.J0,837 
74 427,271 
206 906,132 
222 1,364,432 
221 2,043,402 
961 2,493,567 
553 2, 731, 156 
131 0 2,670,967 
1734 5,441,729 
1698 6,048,682 
1790 7,950,372 
1707 8,931,898 
407 10,616,121 
466 11,478,636 
Source: Department of Veterinary Services 
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Table 5 Ratio of Livestock and Feedstuffs Importts to Total Exports 
Malaysia 1980-86 
Livestock Products & Feedstuffs Net Edible Trade in Food Net Total i L ms tock t Gross 
--------------------------------
L1vestcck 
_,.. ______________ 
Food Exoort to llet Food Livestock 
Year Imports Exo:irts Net Imports Imoorts Imports Exports Imports Earn in gs Imports to Exports 
(1) ( 2) ( 3) ( 4) ( 5 l ( 6) [ 7) ( 8) (9):(4)/(7) ( 10 l =( 1 l t (al 
---~------·------------------------------~------------------------------------------------------------------------
1980 71U 1 g1 .a 519.5 316.5 2,444.3 1, c 13. 2 1,431.~ 28, 171. 6 22.1 2.5 
1981 m.1 227 .3 sc.s 410.1 2,941.0 1, rn.s 1, 8C5. 5 27,109,4 22.7 2 ') 
1982 880.6 :32.9 637 '; 454., 2,999.4 I ,152.5 t, 346 '3 28, 108.2 25. 1 3'' 
1983 927.9 218.? 709.2 4t1.4 2,984.5 1 , 27 2. 9 , I 711.5 32,771.2 2U 2.8 
1984 1 '035. 8 2CC.8 81U 400.0 3,227.1 1,m.a 1, 7H .2 33,646.9 22.9 2.' 
1935 9:i0.7 248.4 682.3 318.3 3,075.4 1, 662' 1 1, 413': 38' 327.3 22.5 u 
1986 778 .1 ' ~ .. ,. 't J .... 3EU t 67. 5 2,557.6 1,964.5 593'. 35,801.0 28.2 2.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source : Comou~ed from Quarterl1 Econom1c Bulletin, Ban~ Ue~ara; 
and De:artment of s~~:1st1cs 
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Table 6 Farm and Post-Farm Costs and Profits (KG/CW*) 
Financial Costs 
Farm Production Costs Processing & Marketing Costs 
Region North Central South East North Central South East 
Ruminant 
Dairy 0.66 1.02 0.74 0.62 0.33 0.27 0.15 0.20 
Beef 7.68 7.07 7.79 7.87 1.00 0.60 0.47 o. 71 
Sheep 10.51 7.48 4.90 3.90 
Non-Ruminant 
Broilers 2.81 2.83 2.79 0.38 0.36 0.37 
Layers 156.29 154.01 151. 30 6.55 5.06 7.05 
Pigs 4.03 3.81 3.91 0.49 0.36 0.53 
Financial Profits 
Net Farm Profits Net Wholesale Profits 
Ruminant 
Dairy 0.04 0.47 0.08 0.36 0.38 0.62 0.08 0.48 
Beef ( 1. 90) (0.63) (1.47) (0.54) 2.05 3.06 2.46 2.14 
Sheep (0.19) 2.91 (3.05) 0.93 
Non-Ruminant 
Broilers 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.51 0.73 0.18 
Layers 3. 72 10.42 32.34 22.52 32.76 42.52 
Pigs 1.02 0.39 1.17 1. 26 0.63 1.42 
Note: * Values for dairy production are expressed in $/litre 
Values for layer production are expressed in $/100 dozen eggs 
Numbers in brackets denote negative values 
Source: Tan,S.H. et al., 1989. 
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Table 7 Protection Rates and Comparative Advantage ($/KG CW*) 
Nominal Protection Rate(NPR) Effective Protection Rate(EPR) 
Region North Central South East North Central South East 
Ruminant 
Dairy 201.3 137.6 127.2 248.3 420.7 243.3 322.1 536.1 
Beef 81. 3 81. 2 81. l 78.2 250.0 207.7 234.3 312.6 
Sheep 32.1 32.4 45.5 40.1 
Non-Ruminant 
Broilers 4.1 11. 2 (6.0) 3.3 15.4 (13.9) 
Layers ( 1. 0) 3.9 8.9 (1. 8) 6.7 19.5 
Pigs 7.2 (10.7) 8.7 8.8 (22.7) 11.1 
Import Substituting Regime 
Domestic Resource Cost Ratio 
(DRC) 
Net Economic Benefit 
(NEB) 
Ruminant 
Dairy 3.27 1.89 3.58 3.51 (0.47) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) 
Beef 2.47 1.72 2.32 2.95 (2.57) ( 1. 54) (2.22) (2.47) 
Sheep 1. 90 1.28 (5.38) (2.02) 
Non-Ruminant 
Broilers 0. 77 0. 77 0.75 0.45 0.46 0.51 
Layers 0.70 0.67 0.68 27.31 30.06 28.99 
Pigs 0.69 0.55 0.67 0.91 1. 32 1.02 
DRC Export Regime DRC Interregional Trade Regime 
Non-Ruminant 
Broilers 1. 52 
Layers 0.98 
Pigs 0.96 
1. 53 
0.95 
0.81 
1. 50 
0.93 
0.88 
0.74 
0.61 
0.68 
DRC Exchange Rate Depreciation (US$1=M$2.70) 
Import Substitution Export Regime 
Pig 0.63 0.51 0.62 1. 06 0.89 
0.97 
0.70 
0.58 
0.96 
*Values for layer production expressed per 100 dozen eggs. Those for 
dairy production are computed on a per litre basis. 
Numbers in brackets denote negative values. 
Source: Tan, S.H. et.al. ,1989. 
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Table 8 Beef and Mutton Production : Sensitivity Analysis : J:>omestic 
Resource Cost Ratios for Import Substitution Regime 
BEEF PROD UC .rION MUTTON 
------------------------------------------
CIF Region CIF Re:JiOn 
Price ------------------------------------ Price ------------------
Nortn Central South East Central South 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
6.50 
7 .·O 0 
7.50 
13. 0 0 
a.so 
9.00 
9.50 
PKC 
Price 
0. 19 
0. 1 5 
0. 1 0 
Note 
1. 77 
1. 4 7 
1. 2 6 
1 • 1 0 
o.97 
o.87 
0. 79 
1. 7 0 
1.45 
1 • 2 2 
1 • 3 0 
1 • 1 1 
o.96 
o.85 
0.16 
o.69 
o.63 
1.28 
1 • 1 2 
o.97 
1. 65 
1. 36 
1 • 16 
1 . 0 1 
0.89 
o.80 
0.73 
1. 55 
1.28 
1. 04 
1 . 9 1 
1. 5 2 
1. 2 7 
1. 0 8 
o.95 
0.84 
0.75 
1.64 
1.32 
1. 0 5 
9.00 1. 9 7 1. 32 
10.00 1.68 1. 15 
1 1 . 0 0 1. 46 1. 0 2 
12. 0 0 1.29 0.92 
13.00 1 • 16 0.87 
14. 0 0 1 • 0 1 0.77 
15. 00 0.96 0. 7 1 
Reference price used in actual computations is $5.81/kg c.w. 
for beef and $4.81/kg c.w. for mutton 
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CHAPTER 15 
NEW GOVERNMENT POLICY THRUSTS AND THE 
PHILIPPINE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE FEEDS 
AND LIVESTOCK SECTORS 
L.S. Cabanilla .. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Among the ASEAN countries, the Philippine~ i" probably the most in need of 
drastic policy changes. It is presently undergoing important socio-economic reforms as it 
becomes apparent that past policies have stifled the overall growth performance of the 
economy. From an inward-looking, import-substituting stance, policies arc slowly being 
transformed to an outward-looking export promoting stance. The overall economic plan 
has specifically put emphasis on rural and agricultural development and agricultural-led 
growth. 
This type of strategy has won strong support from policy makers for obvious 
reasons. More importantly, almost seventy percent of the population live in rural areas, 
most of whom subsist below the poverty line. Programmes and policies that promote 
rural development would not only help solve the nagging income inequality problem but 
also increase aggregate demand, an important boost to the sagging industrial sector. 
Two major policy changes have been implemented during the last two years. They 
attempt to improve agriculture's terms of trade vis-a-vis the industrial sector, and 
redistribute society's wealth more equitably. The trade liberali7ation programme which 
ultimately aims for equalisation of tariff protection rates among all economic sectors is one 
f>Uch policy. Under this scenario, most agricultural product\ will en.joy higher tariff rates 
as they have been receiving very low tariff protection in the past, while tariff!> on the 
highly protected industrial products will gradually decline. The other major policy reform 
is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme - an effort to redistribute resources 
among the rural people more equitably. 
Understandably, within these broad macro-level policy agenda, micro-level policies 
and programmes will have to be implemented. Specific production undertaking!> 
promising good economic potential will be promoted while activities that show inefficiency 
in the use of economic resources will have to be penalised. In a broader context, it should 
be noted that these macro-policy shifts will have implications for trade relations with 
other countries. This is important in the light of the growing global interest in redirecting 
trade policies (notably, the call for freer trade) of major agricultural producing and 
exporting countries. 
*Associate Professor, University of the Philippine~, College, Laguna, Philippine._. 
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This paper attempts to shed light on some of the issues that inevitably arise out of 
the policy change!> being implemented in the Philippines, with special focus on the feeds 
and livestock sectors. It is composed of three major parts. The first describes the 
Philippine feed!> and livestock sectors, the second reviews past policies affecting the 
Philippine feedstuffs and livestock sectors, and the third evaluates economic incentives 
resulting from government policies and comparative advantage of specific feedstuffs and 
livestock production activities. 
It draws mainly from previous work on the Philippines feeds and livestock 
sectors. More specifically, it uses results of a research study funded by ADB in 
collaboration with the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (Cabanilla 1983 and 
1988). 
NEW POLICY THRUSTS 
The strong political sentiment in favour of the agricultural sector is manifested 
by the present administration in two major policy changes -- the trade liberalization 
program and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). A tax reform 
program, mainly a shift from gross lo value-added-taxation, is also being implemented, 
but it seems that the tax agency is finding extreme difficulties in implementation. 
Needless to say, most agricultural production activities (before processing) are exempted 
from VAT. 
This section briefly describes these new policy thrusts as they affect both the 
livestock and feeds industries. The discussion, however, is more focused on trade policies. 
Livestock 
(a) Trade Reforms 
Since 1957, when the Tariff and Customs Laws of the Philippines (Republic Act 
1937) was approved, trade policies in livestock have gone through several changes. This 
is manifested mainly in tariff reforms. 
Both tariff duties and quantitative restrictions have been used in the past to regulate 
the flow of live animals (for food) and livestock products into and out of the country but 
except for the ban on the importation of eggs in 1951 and live hogs export in 1976, trade in 
livestock products has been regulated mostly through tariffs and import/export permits. 
Tariffs not only provide government revenues but also give protection to domestic 
livestock producers by raising domestic prices above border prices. Tariff protection 
however, has been historically more favourable to poultry than the other animal species. 
Starting in 1957, the tariff rate was 70 percent for poultry meal and 100 percent for 
eggs while other forms of meat were subject to 15 percent duty. Live poultry was subject 
to a 60 percent tariff rate, while young animals of other species (i.e., horses, bovine, pigs, 
sheep and goats) were tax-free. 
The high tariff for poultry served as an effective means of preventing the inflow of 
cheap poultry products from abroad. During the mid-sixties for example, there had been a 
constant threat of Danish chicken meat flooding the domestic market so that in the 
succeeding revisions of the tariff code, that for poultry remained high. 
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In lhe 1972 revir,ion of lhe la riff code, laril f ralc& for pouhry meal and egg fl 
remained at 70 percent and 100 percent, respectively, but tariff fl on other forms of meal 
declined to 10 percent. Duties on live animals likewise changed. The tariff on live poultry 
declined to 50 percenl while tariffs on other live animals increased lo 10 percent. It will 
be noted that in this revision there was a significant change in the tariff duty on processed 
meat, particularly corned beef. From 15 percent, (75 percent for other canned meat) the 
tariff duty inc~eased to 100 percent. Tax-free imports of corned beef, which started 
upon the creation of the National Marketing Corporation (NAMARCO) in 1955 also 
stopped. Although this development was a form of protection to the local meat 
processing industry, cattle producers shared part of this through a greater demand for 
beef as raw materials for processing. It has also put upwards pressure on the demand for 
carabaos, one of the most common sources of raw material for the meat processing 
industry. 
Another amendment to the tariff code was instituted in 1980. Although this time 
there was a general decline in tariff rates, the structure remained favourable to poultry. 
Imports of poultry meat (by 1981), and eggs (by 1982) faced a 50 percent tariff. Pork and 
beef are now subject to only 5 percent duty. 
Under the present trade liberalisation programme, the lariff rate for poultry meat 
remains the same while those of pork and beef are now increased from 5 percent to 20 
percent. On the other hand, tariff rates for live animals (for food) remain the same. Nole 
further that tariff rates for meat preparations remain high at 50 percent -- an 
indication of the government's effort to protect the manufacturing sector. 
The implication of this tariff structure in livestock production is that in the absence 
of other policies that negate its impact on relative price& in lhe domestic market, the 
tariff structure will result in a situation where domestic prices of poultry products 
relative to border prices will be higher than for pork and beef. 
Another trade-related policy of the government is the granting of monopolized 
importation privileges to an entity known as PHILBAI. It was not very clear whether 
PHILBAI operated as a government or private monopoly but at least until 1985, it had the 
sole authority to import beef from Australia. Under the new political administration, 
PHILBAI was abolished. Today, import permits for meat are issued only to meat 
processors and large hotel and restaurant operators. 
The Philippines has a Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) with the re&t of the 
ASEAN countries on several livestock products but there has been no significant trade 
with other ASEAN countries. The PTA usually involves reduced tariff rates on 
products traded with the other ASEAN countries. However, the pathetically low volume 
of agricultural trade, particularly livestock and feeds with the ASEAN countries may 
imply that other forms of cooperation within the region arc needed. 
(b) Agrarian Reform 
The latest government policy considered by livestock raisers a& one of their most 
serious problems has to do with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). 
More specifically, what concerns them most is Section 32 of the CARL specifying that 
pending transfer of land exceeding the 5 hectare retention limit, commercial livestock 
farms are mandated to execute a production-sharing plan with their farm workers. 
Under this plan, a farm with gross sales over P5M, is mandated to distribute three 
percent of gross sales to regular and other farmworkers as additional compensation over 
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and above what they currently receive. In the event that the firm realizes profit, an 
additional 10 percent of the net profit after tax shall be distributed. It further stipulates 
that during the transitory period, at least one percent of gross sales shall be distributed 
to managerial, supervisory and technical staff. 
Apart from its distributive aspects, the main long-run effect is to make livestock 
production more land-intensive. Although the livestock industry is already relatively land-
intensive -- having one of the highest value of agricultural output per unit of land, the 
law will force it to become even more land-intensive. As shown by some commercial 
farms, land is not a major constraint to higher production levels. Through adjustments in 
housing systems it is possible to produce a given output with a smaller land area. 
It must be emphasized however, that while producers make the necessary 
structural adjustment lo conform with the five-hectare limit, the immediate effect is to 
make livestock a high cost industry. Section 32 essentially increases the variable costs of a 
firm operating above the land retention limit, and may force it to produce at lower 
output levels. 
Feeds Trade Policy 
Under the old Tariff and Customs Code, the tariff on prepared animal feeds was 
40 percent. Ingredients like flour meal, meat and bone meal, fish meal and by-products of 
cereals and leguminous plants were subject to 10 percent tariff. 
In the 1972 revision of the tariff code, the duty on mixed feeds was increased to 50 
percent but the tariffs on ingredients essentially remained unchanged. Also in the same 
year, the importation and distribution of vital ingredients like yellow corn, soybean meal 
and wheat grain, from which wheat bran is derived, became a government monopoly 
under the National Grains Authority (now called the National Food Authority). The 
tariff rates put upward pressure on the domestic price of feeds. And, since the NFA 
imports ingredients tax-free, its marketing monopoly on yellow corn and soybean meal 
may dampen or further increase domestic price depending on its pricing policy. 
Copra meal and molasses exports were subject to a 4 percent tax. All things the 
same, the export tax would make the domestic prices of these ingredients at least 4 
percent lower than the border price. This will cushion the impact of the implicit tariffs on 
fishmeal, meat and bone meal. It will also counteract whatever price wedge may arise 
from NFA's marketing monopoly on yellow corn and soybean meal. 
All export taxes were removed under the trade liberalisation program, and 
effective 1985, the government monopoly on the importation of soybean meal and yellow 
corn was abolished. Tariff rates were likewise revised. Mixed feeds are now subject to 30 
percent tariff; corn, 20 percent and other ingredients, 10 percent. Under the trade 
liberalisation programme, any representative from the private sector can import feed 
ingredients at these tariff rates but since import permits have to be secured and because 
there are economies of scale involved, only a few are able to import the vital ingredients 
like soybean meal and fish meal. 
It will be noted further, that in the midst of the trade liberalisation programme, 
the government banned imports of corn from 1986. In addition, strict controls on the 
issuance of permits for the importation of corn substitutes like wheat by-products are 
enforced. 
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INCENTIVES AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
As the country goes through policy reforms, some key issues need to be addressed. 
For example, in the face of the growing importance of trade in the economy, does 
government policy promote production activities that arc efficient in saving or earning 
foreign exchange? The importance of this question is underscored by the fact that foreign 
exchange has proved to be a major constraint to the economy's growth. 
Similarly, within the scenario of a corn import ban, who benefited more from the 
protection afforded by the ban -- the farmers or the traders? This is important because 
the ban was imposed mainly to improve the income potential of the corn farmers. It is also 
important in the face of the imperfections in the domestic market arising from 
deficiencies in marketing infrastructure. 
In this section, the above issues will be dealt with. Estimates of Nominal 
Protection Rate (NPR) and Effective Protection Rate (EPR) will be presented to 
determine the incentive structure afforded by policies to the different feeds and livestock 
production activities. 
Estimates of Domestic Resource Cost Ratios (DRC's) will also be presented to 
establish whether or not the country possesses comparative advantage in feeds and 
livestock production, and to determine whether the incentive structure promotes those 
which possess comparative advantage. 
Nominal Protection Rates 
Table 1 shows that from 1981-1986, the average NPR for chicken was 52%, eggs 
36%, pork 19%, dairy 50% and beef 22%. It is important to note that the protection rate 
for chicken has declined through time. This is consistent with the decline in the tariff rate 
under the trade liberalisation programme but as in the previous years, it still received 
the highest protection. 
Recognised as the most important feedstuff in livestock production, corn has 
received a favourable protection level. Up until 1984 when the National Food Authority 
enjoyed monopoly in importing yellow corn, the average implicit tariff for corn was 20%. 
In that period, livestock raisers paid a price for corn in the domestic market 20% higher 
than the world price. This dropped to 7 percent in 1985 when corn importation was 
privatised but beginning in 1986 the implicit tariff for corn was well over 50 percent. 
Coupled with strict controls on importation of corn substitutes, livestock raisers had to 
face domestic prices of corn well over the world price. This has created a favourable 
incentive to corn producers resulting in a 2 percent annual increase in area planted to 
corn. 
However, this served as a disincentive to livestock raisers. The trend in the price 
ratio of corn to livestock products shows that after the ban was imposed, the price of corn 
relative to the prices of eggs, chicken and pork have increased (Figure 1). 
Like corn, soybean imports used to be under government monopoly at which time 
the NPR was estimated to be arour.d 59 percent (Cabanilla, 1983). After the 
deregulation in imports, however, it remained high at 43%. Apparently, the deregulation 
has not substantially decreased the wedge between domestic and border prices of 
soybean meal. This is largely due to the oligopolistic nature of the market. Only a few 
firms are granted import permits, and able to take advantage of the economies of scale in 
international trading of soybean meal. 
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Nominal protection rates for different grades of poultry and hog feeds have been 
computed from the individual implicit tariff rates on the various feed ingredients. 
The NPR computed for poultry feeds was 37 percent and for hog feeds, 32 percent. 
The difference lies mainly in the proportion of corn in the feed ration. These values have 
increa!>ed over time due to the corn import ban, and also to the removal of the export tariff 
on exportable ingredients like copra meal. 
Corn explains about 45 percent of the cost in poultry feeds and 35 percent in hog 
feeds. Since feeds comprise about 70 percent of the cost of producing poultry and hogs, 
this implies that corn explains about 30 percent of the price of chicken and 25 percent of the 
price of pork. Assuming that these are fixed relationships, they would indicate the 
responsiveness of meat prices to changes in corn prices. Thus, all things equal, a 100 
percent increase in the price of corn would result in increases in chicken and pork prices 
of about 30 percent and 25 percent respectively. 
What this simple analysis implies is the high domestic price of corn brought 
about by the corn import ban is creating a larger wedge between domestic and border 
prices of meat. This is particularly true for chicken. 
Effective Protection 
Table 1 shows that average EPR for chicken is 47%, for hogs 15%, cattle almost 
zero, eggs 32% and dairy 38%. For feedstuffs, it is 54% for corn and 26% for cassava. 
The numbers arc clearly consistent with the nominal protection rates in the 
previous section, with chicken receiving the highest effective protection among the 
livestock enterprises. What is most interesting to note is the very low effective protection 
rate for cattle, despite a higher nominal rate of protection. This is primarily due to hidden 
penalties in marketing which are more prevalent among large ruminants. Interviews with 
traders of live animals reveal that there is a high "tong" collection at government check 
points along land routes. 
Comparative Advantage 
Of critical importance in the following discussion is the issue of whether or not 
economic policies have promoted the efficient livestock-feedstuffs production activities. 
Likewise, since it has now become a regular agenda in policy discussions, the issue of 
whether or not it makes more sense to protect corn farmers at the expense of the livestock 
raisers will be analysed. Calculation of domestic resource cost ratios indicated that except 
for poultry, the country in general possesses comparative advantage in livestock 
production. 
The case of poultry presents on interesting issue because while it is the most 
highly protected activity, the results indicate that it is relatively inefficient in saving or 
earning foreign exchange. Interpreted very simply, it would be better for the economy to 
import than to produce chicken domestically. Then, a high corn price policy is justified. 
However, the issue is not as simple as that, and needs closer scrutiny. 
Should the government decide on a high corn-price policy along with fully 
liberalised trade in meat, it is not only poultry that suffers. The hogs sector which is 
efficient in saving and earning foreign exchange will also suffer. This policy scenario, 
therefore, results in a drastic decline in demand for corn as both poultry and hogs 
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inventory will inevitably decline. Further analysis showed that if surplus corn was exported, 
and poultry and pork supplies imported, then the country would suffer a net loss of welfare. 
The results for ruminants, particularly beef cattle and carabaos, lend support to any 
government programmes that promote domestic production of these animals. They are 
efficient converters of plant biomass into meat. Furthermore, since raising these animals 
is enmeshed in the farming systems of smallholders, programmes that promote the 
production of these animals would also address poverty issues in rural areas. In the 
advent of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme, cattle fattening can serve as a 
livelihood project which would supplement the limited incomes of farmers. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
As the Philippine economy grows, the role of the feeds and livestock sectors becomes 
more prominent. It is a well documented fact that demand for livestock products rises as 
per capita income increases, therefore structural transformation in the feeds and 
livestock sectors inevitably occurs as the economy develops. 
This structural transformation may not be unique from other developing countries 
but because of differences in resource constraints faced, and programmes that need to be 
implemented, policy issues dealt with are quite unique. For example, within the ASEAN 
Region, the Philippine economy is the most sick -- being the most debt-ridden and having 
the most chronic BOP deficit problems, and therefore facing the most serious foreign 
exchange constraints. As a result the government, now more than ever before, has to 
allocate its budget more judiciously -- to be consistent with its broad objective of 
attaining growth and equity. It could not afford to be inefficient. Through appropriate 
policies, it needs to tailor the flow of resources to the most efficient production 
undertakings. 
Against this backdrop, past and future structural transformations in the feeds-
livestock sectors become more focused. One of these transformations was the growing 
commercialisation of the hogs and poultry sub-sectors in response to the rising demand 
for meat. This phenomenon, in turn, brought about another important transformation --
corn utilisation. From a human food commodity, corn has slowly been transformed to a 
major feedgrain and it is in this context that interests of the domestic feedstuff growing 
sector are perceived to be in conflict with the livestock sector. The government ban on 
corn imports has underscored this perception but as will be pointed out, the corn and 
livestock sectors are complementary and could, in an economic sense, co-exist fruitfully. 
Future demand for corn rests on the growth of the livestock sector. On the other 
hand, the price of corn spells to a large extent the comparative advantage in livestock 
production. If only for purposes of improving the income potential of corn farmers, who 
are among the poorest groups of the society, the ban is praiseworthy. 
However, as already pointed out in the last chapter, the government needs to 
ensure that benefits from the ban are not captured mainly by traders. Post-harvest and 
transport facilities must be improved. The feeds information capability of the government 
also needs to be improved. It is rather disappointing to note that while government data 
show substantial corn stocks, no corn could be bought from the market. In the long run, 
investment in improving the information system will have a high pay-off. It does not only 
save policy makers' time arguing with the private sector on locating corn, it also 
facilitates the decision making process of both the private and government sectors. 
Had there been a more efficient information system in the past, imports of the right 
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amount could have been made at the right time. Very broadly, it minimises imperfections 
and makes the corn market operate more efficiently. This in turn improves the 
comparative advantage not only of the corn sector but the livestock sector as well. 
Incidentally, the ban on corn imports should not be absolute. Imports must be 
allowed during times of serious shortages to prevent unnecessary dislocations in the 
livestock industry. ln addition, controls on the importation of substitutes must be relaxed 
especially during periods of shortage. These substitutes (such as wheat by·products) have 
minimal adverse effects on corn farmers as substitutability is not complete. Hogs and 
poultry could biologically take only limited amounts of these corn substitutes. Without 
carefully balancing the corn and livestock interests, the government may have to resort 
to corn exports. Our analysis, however, has shown that this is a more costly alternative. 
The hog and poultry subsectors serve as the direct connecting link between the 
crops and manufacturing sectors. The increasing commercialisation of these subsectors 
encouraged the development of the feedmilling and meat processing industries and clearly, 
past government policies have been instrumental in this. The relatively high protection 
rate afforded by policies has created a favourable environment under which the poultry 
sector has developed. New husbandry techniques have made the technical performance of 
this sector closer to those in temperate countries. What is slightly disturbing is the high 
DRC coefficient for chicken meat production which implies that it is not efficient in 
saving foreign exchange. We hasten to add, however, that this disadvantage is mainly due 
to penalties imposed on the input side, particularly corn. In the long run as the corn 
subsector improves, the comparative advantage of poultry likewise improves. 
In addition to corn, the import dependence of poultry on breeding stocks also 
partly explains its disadvantage. Maintaining a great-grand-parent stock involves 
economies of scale and at present this venture does not seem feasible in the country. 
However, this activity could be one possible undertaking in the context of an ASEAN 
Regional cooperation. With a great-grand-parent farm in the ASEAN region, import 
dependence is minimised, and comparative advantage in poultry among the ASEAN 
countries improves. 
Agricultural trade within the Region has not been very encouraging due to the 
competitive nature of the products traded. As a result, the PTA of the ASEAN 
countries, particularly on agricultural products, has remained essentially a document of 
good intentions. Maybe regional cooperation in agriculture could come in other forms and 
the feeds and livestock sectors offer a good venue for cooperation. Technology 
development could be one. As noted elsewhere (Cabanilla, 1988), research budgets could 
be a heavy burden to each country's resources but this could be remedied through 
cooperation. Technical know-how and resourcei., especially genetic materials must be 
shared. Soybeans wi11 remain a significant import item in the feeds sector ancl there is 
definitely a high benefit in developing and promoting a variety suitable for ASEAN agro-
climatic conditions. 
The Philippines' comparative advantage in hogs and the large ruminants including 
dairy largely rests on these animals' capacity to convert indigenous materials at very low 
opportunity costs. Since raising these animals are part and parcel of smallholder farming 
systems, programmes that promote their production will go a long way to increasing the 
livelihood of the rural population. 
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f«H dairy, becau<,e ol the limitations imposed by unavJi\ahility ol high 
performing dairy herds, projecb would he biased for the U">C of upgraded \,)cal herds. 
Dairy projects would also have to be purely livelihood projects aimed primarily at 
augmenting smallholders' incomes and improving the nutrition level of the rural 
population. 
On the other hand, the long term prospects of red meat production depend to a 
large extent on domestic demand. The proliferation off ast-f ood centres will continue to 
provide a good source of demand but meat quality through better feeding management 
needs to be improved. To a lesser extent, the foreign market offers another opportunity but 
the country needs to eradicate foot and mouth disease among hoofed animals to realise 
this prospect. On both counts, the government needs to intervene. Definitely, as incomes 
grow, demand for higher quality meat products increases. Investment in cleaner 
slaughterhouses will therefore be necessary. At present, most public slaughterhom;es 
are substandard in nature and deserve to be closed if not renovated. 
In the face of the high expectations of aid money and fresh loans to reconstruct the 
ravaged Philippine economy, some of the vital investment activities relevant to the feed<; 
and livestock sectors that the government may consider arc as follows: 
l. Roads connecting the major corn producing areas to market centres must be 
improved. Feeder roads and bridges in Mindana(1 need lo be improved to 
minimise trans.port costs. The road that link!> the Bicol Region, an important corn 
growing area needs urgent improvement. As a result ol the road condit10n, ill'> role 
as a major supplier of corn to feedmillers in Manila ha~ been greatly diminished. 
2. Communications facilities in rural areas must be improved. This gives farmers 
better access to price information and allows market<; to function more efficiently. 
3. Handling facilities in major ports must be improved. In ('ag,lyan de Oro and 
General Santos, two of the ma_jor loading ports of corn. it takes from 4 days l\l a 
week to load 4,000 mt of corn due to the antiquated method of handling. This 
usually results. in high shipping and handling costs. not to mention the physical 
losses in the product being handled. 
4. Improved post harve'>l facilities must be con<,tructcd in ma1or corn producing areas. 
The lack of driers in Mindanao has resulted in large lo'>'>C'> during the peak harvest. 
which happen to be rainy months. 
). Marketing '>llpport to farmers raising large ruminanh must be increased. 
Government invc'>trnenb in livestock auction markeh have proven to be useful hut 
there is now an apparent need to expand the capacity, ,wd improve the lacilitic~ in 
some of the:>c markets. 
6. Slaughterhouse'> in major consuming centre'> badly need improvement. PuMic 
pressure for the do:>urc, if not renovation, of 5ome large slaughterhou~es in Metro 
Manila is slowly mounting and the government should invest in the improvement of 
these slaughterhouses. Otherwise, it may encourage the private sector to 
undertake this effort. 
There is a seriou<> need to eradicate foot and mouth disea5e in the country. 
Experts say that now i~ the most opportune time to undertake a nationwide 
eradication programme for FMD, while the livc<>tock populatton is at a very low 
level. 
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Table 1. Summary of Nominal and Effective Protection Ratesl 
Livestock 
Chicken 
Hogs 
Eggs 
Cattle 
Dairy 
Feedstuffs 
Corn 
Cassava 
NPR 
52 
19 
36 
22 
50 
40 
50 
EPR 
47 
15 
32 
0 
38 
54 
26 
1. Assuming an import substitution trade regime (1981-86 values). 
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CHAPTER 16 
COMPETITIVENESS OF ANIMAL FEED AND LIVESTOCK 
PRODUCTION IN THAILAND 
Suthad Setboonsarng* 
INTRODUCTION 
During 1970-1987, lhe Thai economy has been growing steadily at about 3.9% per 
annum. This healthy economic growth together with the rapid expan'>ion of the population 
(about 2.5% per annum) ha& puf>hed up the demand for live&tock product&. The production 
of livestock product& ha:> in lurn grown to meet this increa&ed demand. Thi& expansion ha& 
resulted in a change in the production structure in the livestock &ector. The response from 
each livestock product has varied according to their degree of flexibility. In Thailand, 
poultry and swine output have shown a higher degree of responsiveness. By the early 1980s, 
the production of chicken meat had not only grown fast enough to meet domestic demand, 
but had become an export commodity. One important factor that enhances the growth of the 
livestock sector is the availability of animal feed& . Most of these feed ingredients are 
products of the crop sector which is the biggest agricultural sub-sector1. and the abundant 
fertile land has been the major source of growth of crop output during the past two decades. 
Thailand is an exporter of many feed ingredients, especially maize and tapioca pellets. 
Thailand currently exports maize, tapioca pellets, chicken meat and eggs and imports 
soybean meal, beef and dairy products. This pattern of trade reflects the competitiveness of 
feed-stuffs and livestock production in Thailand. 
Thailand i& richly endowed with feed grains and agro-wa~te products that can be used 
as animal feeds. Thailand is a net exporter of feed ingredient&. Although there is a &urplus 
of energy feeds (e.g., broken rice, mai.,e, cassava and molasses). there is a deficit in protein 
feed (e.g., soybean meal). 
* Research Fellow, Thailand Development Re&earch Institute. This paper is based on the 
result of the Study on the Government Intervention and Competitivener,s of Feedstuff and 
Livestock Industry in Thailand, funded by the Asian Development Bank. 
1Among the four major agricultural subsectors - crop, livestock, fishery and forestry - crop 
sector accounts for as much as 75% of the total value added originated from the agricultural 
sector. 
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Given the number of livestock (excluding indigenous cattle and buffalo), the total 
amount of feed required in 1986 i& calculated. From the '>hare of feed ingredients for each 
livestock product, the derived demand for fishmeal, soybean meal, mai.1e and rice bran are 
calculated (Table 1). The quantity of pig feed is the biggest while chicken feed ranks 
second. In terms of ingredients, maize is the major one while rice bran ranks second. 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS AND THEIR MEASUREMENT 
Government intervention in the livestock industry 
Government intervene& in the livestock market at different levels: farm, processing, 
domestic trade and foreign trade. Table 2 summarizes these interventions for the five 
major livestock products: broiler, egg, pork, beef and dairy. The interventions in each of 
these markets are discussed below. 
a) Broiler and egg 
Government mea&ure& and regulations that directly affect the broiler and egg 
industries are few. The absence of di&tortionary intervention in thi& market seems to be a 
key factor that enables this industry to expand faster than other livestock sectors. 
At the farm level, there is a credit subsidy for agricultural production, including 
livestock. However, broiler producers usually obtain a small fraction of their total 
requirement at the ~ubsidi1:ed rate because the total amount of credit need for each farm is 
quite large. Public research on chicken breeding is very limited and has very little impact. 
Commercial broiler and layer raisers depend mo&tly on foreign technology for breeding. 
Import of Grand Parent Stock (GPS) and Parent Stock (PS) are exempted from import 
tariffs. 
There are taxe& on imported inputs, particularly vaccine and preventive medicines 
(import tariff rate i& about 20 percent). Some imported feed ingredient& are also subject to 
an import tariff e.g., soybean meal. 
An important service provided by the government is the monitoring of the 
slaughtering proce&s and certification of the qualified export f>laughterhouses. 
Since 1977, the Board of Investment (BOl) promotion privilege extended to the 
export of proce&sed chicken. The main benefit& are the reduction of import tariff& on 
machinery and equipment, exemption of export tax and sale& tax and exemption from 
income tax for the f ir&t five years of the operation. The export tax of 0.50 baht per kilogram 
of chicken is collected if the firm does not have promotional privileges. 
The layer farm& and egg production are &Ubject to the same government controls. 
b) Pig 
Government control<; in the pork market aim at controlling domestic processing and 
trading. Pig raise1 s receive the same privileges as for broiler producers in terms of the 
credit subsidy and are subject to similar taxes on imported inputs (e.g., vaccine and soybean 
meal). However, the most important government control on the pork industry is in the 
ownership of slaughterhou&e. 
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The Animal Slaughtering and Meat Sale Control Act (B.E. 2502) requires that all 
slaughterhouses he owned by the municipal or local administration and all pigs slaughtered 
require a slaughter permit. The inadequate slaughtering facilitie& and the cost of the permit 
leads to illegal slaughtering activity. Since 1985, the BOI was able to allow private 
ownership of slaughterhouses for export purposes, but currently only two companie& have 
been established with BOI assi&tance. 
An important supportive measure of the government is in negotiation& with foreign 
government agencies to recognize disease-free zones and disea&e- free farms. This will 
enable more pork to be exported to both Asian and European markets in future. 
c) Beef 
The government ha& been trying to promote the beef industry for the purpose of 
helping small farmers in rural areas. There are breeding &talion~ located around the 
country that provide artificial insemination and vaccination services to farmers. Some 
success has been achieved in the introduction of higher quality beef q1ttle in the Northeast 
of the country. 
Although there is control on slaughterhouses for beef cattle, it is not a major 
constraint on the beef cattle industry. Most of the cattle arc illegally slaughtered at the 
village level. 
There is an import tariff of 60% for beef and an additional fee of 5 Bahl per kg. for 
inspection cost. Although there is an export quota on cattle, it is ineffective because of the 
limited quantity exported during recent years. 
d) Dairy industry 
Dairy production is a highly subsidized activity in Thailand. The Dairy Promotion 
Organization (DPO) was set up in 1971 to assist the industry in Thailand. Breeding cows 
are imported and artificial in&emination is given free of charge. 
Milk processing is one of the activities promoted by the BOI. Currently there are 
many processing plants around the country, including one milk powder factory which has 
just been established with assistance from the BOI. 
To produce drinking milk, the producer is required to use domestic fresh milk. The 
ratio of fresh milk to recombined milk is currently &ct at 1 to 1. This proportion i& 
increasing annually as the domestic production of fresh milk increase&. 
Another important protection given the domestic milk indu&try i& the import 
requirement. To import one unit of skimmed milk powder, ready to drink milk or flavored 
drink, the purchase of 20 units (by weight) of locally produced fre-.h milk is required. On 
top of this requirement, the import of milk and dairy products is &ubjected to import tariffs 
ranging from 1to40%. For skimmed milk powder, the tax rate was 25% in 1986, reduced to 
5% in 1988. 
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Government intervention in feedstuff markets 
A summary of government intervention in the four major animal feed markets is 
given in Tahlc ). 
a) Rice policies 
The export tax on rice was the major distortion in the rice market for many years. In 
1985, when the world price of rice bottomed out, the government abolished essentially all 
the export tax on rice. Since then it has not been reintroduced. 
In term!> of crop inputs, the government provided free iirigation services, research 
and extension to the farming community. The Bank of Agriculture and Co-operative was 
set up to provide credit to the farmer at a subsidised rate. However, government controlled 
the import of fertiliser which effectively resulted in a tax on fertiliser. 
In 1986, there was almost no direct government intervention on the production and 
trading of rice. The government attempted to encourage exports by allowing exporters to 
di">count their commercial papers at a low di,.count rate. 
b) Maize 
The Thai government stopped intervening in the trading of maize in 1981. The 
objective of government intervention is improvement in farm incomes. This is delivered in 
the form of resear<:h and extension. Many new varieties of mai1e have been introduced by 
the government during the past decade. There is virtually no distortion in the maize 
market. 
c) Soybean 
The major intervention in soybean markets came in 1984 when the government 
imposed a quota on the import of soybean meal. To import soyhean meal, the importer was 
required to purcha&e a fixed proportion of domestically-produced soybean meal. The 
soybean crusher, in turn, agreed to buy the soybean from the farmer at the government 
announced price. The quota limited the quantity of soybean meal import and led to an 
increase in the domestic price of soybean meal and consequently, soybeans. 
Since 1984, the import of soybeans and soybean oil have been subject to similar quota 
controls. To import soybeans and soybean oil, a purchase of a given quantity of domestic 
soybean and soybean oil was required. However, because of the relatively low price of oil 
and meal in the domestic market, this control amounts to a ban on the import of both 
soybean and soybean oil. 
On top of the quota system, the import of soybean meal is subjected to a 6% import 
tariff and a 0.6% import surcharge. 
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d) Cassava 
In 1982, a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) was imposed by the EC on Thailand. 
The VER constrained the export of cassava and left a large surplus ill the domestic market. 
To encourage the export of this excess cassava, the government rewarded exports to non-EC 
market:. with a~ export quota to the higher-priced EC market. 
For this study, the VER is treated as given. Therefore, only the export subsidy to 
non-EC markets is considered. 
Measurement of government interventions 
If the world price of a traded commodity is assumed lo reflect its social value, the 
direct government intervention can be measured by the divergence between the existing 
market price and its border price. 
Examples of such direct interventions are export taxes, quotas, levies and import 
tariffs. For a small country in a particular market, the social value of the traded commodity 
is its border price (i.e., c.i.f. price of importables and f.o.b. price of exportables). 
For maize, soybean, soybean meal, chicken meat, egg, beef and milk, Thailand is a 
price taker in the international market. However for rice and cassava, Thailand is a major 
trader. The abolition of the export tax and export subsidy will change the quantity of export 
and consequently their world prices. To account for this change in the world price, the 
elasticity of world demand for rice and cassava was used in the calculation of their free 
trade world prices. 
In addition to the divergence between domestic and border prices (nominal 
protection) the effective rate of protection (ERP) measures the government intervention on 
the value added of a particular commodity. It is the rate of divergence between the value 
added at market prices and the value added at social values. 
Livestock industry 
Results are given in Table 4. 
The NPR is very small for chicken and eggs. For pork, a surplus of domestic product 
existed in 1985 and early 1986. To prevent the price of live pigs from falling further, a group 
of pig raisers exported their pigs at a loss causing the domestic price to be higher than the 
export price and therefore a positive NPR. Since this wedge is not caused by government 
intervention, the interpretation of the NPR has to be made carefully in this case. 
Beef and dairy products are importables. The positive NPR's indicate protection of 
each of these commodities. The protection is as high as 90-100% for beef and 56-64% for 
dairy. 
For the protection on value added, the table shows that ERP's are negative for 
chicken and egg and positive for pork, beef and dairy products. This means that there is a 
tax on the production of chicken and egg, a subsidy on the production of pork and 
protection on beef and dairy. 
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The export tax on chicken (about o<;i,) comes partly from the 0.50 Bahl/kg export fee 
for chicken. The export of eggs is subject to higher taxe:-. (about 2o<ft,). 
Animal Feed Commodities 
The table shows a minimal tax on the export of maize and rice. There is a subsidy of 
33% on the export of cai.sava pellets and a 30-37% tariff on soybean meal. 
Import tariffs are levied on traded inputs in all the cropi., i.e. on fertiliser and 
pesticide in rice and maiL·e production. Since rice uses more fertiliser and pesticide than 
maize, the tax on rice is larger. 
Cassava pellet production is also penalised from the tax on transportation (truck!> and 
fuel) which is a relatively bigger cost component in cassava pellets. 
Soybean meal inputs are priced well above world levels because of the protection 
given the soybean crushing industry. While the protection for the <,oybean grower can be 
determined by comparing the domestic price of soybean against its c.i.f. price, the 
protection for the crusher is measured by comparing the crushing margin in the domestic 
market to that in the foreign market. It i11 found lhal the domestic crushing margin is about 
1.63 Bahl per kilogram of bean while the foreign crushing margin (ba!>ed on their c.i.f. 
Bangkok prices) is 0.72 Bahl per kilogram. This implies a protection of 126% for the 
crusher. 
In terms of the protection on the value added, the table shows that there is a tax on 
value added in mai7e, but a subsidy for the export of rice and cassava pellets. For soybean 
meal, protection is relatively high. 
In conclusion, for the three commodities that affect the domestic feed and livestock 
industry (rice, mai7e and soybean meal), there is very little government intervention in 
maize and rice but a high level of protection for soybean meal. 
COMPETITIVENESS IN FEED GRAINS AND LIVESTOCK INDUSTRIES 
Livestock industry 
At the exi11ting export trading regime, DRC values for chicken, egg and pork, are all 
le<;<. than one (Table 5). This clearly indicates the co1it competitiveness and wcial 
profitability of exporting these three products. However, the DRC for beef and dairy are 
greater than one at their existing trade regime (import substitution), except for beef 
production in the Central region that utilises pineapple waste as a major feed. This result 
suggests that Thailand does not possess comparative advantage in beef and dairy 
production. This result is consistent with the existing trade pattern, i.e. Thailand is 
exporting commodities in which there is comparative advantage and importing those that 
have is comparative advantage. 
Animal feed commodities 
The DRC results in Table 5 suggest that Thailand ha~ a ~trong comparative 
advantage in producing these animal feeds. 
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An interc-.ting re5Uh lo note i5 that for 5oybcan meal. Dc!>pite a high level of 
government protection, the domestic production of 5oybean meal 5till generate~ a po5 itive 
return to the nation. This means that Thailand should be expanding soybean meal 
production to take advantage of this favorable condition. The production of soybean has 
been expanding rapidly during the past few years because of thi& high profit. However, the 
land area available to grow soybean& is a major constraint to further expansion. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Broiler and eggs 
The analyses show that Thailand has strong comparative advantage in producing and 
exporting frozen chicken and egg&. Sensitivity analyses indicate that even when the feed 
ingredient price increases to about its 1988 level, or when the death rate of birds waf> raised 
10% Thailand still maintained a comparative advantage in broiler and frozen chicken 
production. This is mainly due to low labour cost in production and procef>sing. 
The magnitude of the direct negative protection (taxe5 on input and output) are very 
&mall. Negative protection mostly stemmed from the indirect policy measures that distort 
the market. 
Pork 
The main government intervention in the pork market is that controlling ownership 
of slaughterhouses. However, Thailand has a comparative advantage in producing and 
exporting pork and there is a strong potential for expanding pork production. At least 
three factors give the basi!> for this assertion: the awareness and skill of the pig farmer, the 
availability of high quality breeds and the role of government in organizing and handling the 
disease problem. 
Beef 
High quality beef cattle raising is still at its initial stage of development. Most 
production units are small and high quality beef raising remain!> a backyard activity. The 
work of the Department of Livestock has been concentrated on breed improvements and 
disease control. 
The beef industry receives protection through the import tariff. The main constraint 
to the expansion of beef production is quality. Domestic beef f etche5 about one-third the 
price of the imported beef. If this quality difference can be eliminated, there is a large 
potential for the dome!>tic production of high quality beef, not only for the domestic market 
but also for export. 
Dairy 
There is a high degree of protection for the production of fresh milk in Thailand, and 
the country does not have comparative advantage in producing milk. Expansion of dairy 
farming is envisaged to face problems with roughage shortage and fresh milk surplus. 
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Animal feed commodities 
Among the four major animal feed commodities analysed, rice (rice bran) and maize 
are relatively free from direct government interventions while soybean meal is protected 
and cassava pellet export is subsidind. There are taxes on imported inputs used in the 
production of thc~c cornmoditic&. ERPs arc negative for rice and rnai'lc hut they arc small. 
ERPs are positive for i.oybcan meal and tapioca (cassava) pellet and they arc quite 
significant. 
The magnitude of the indirect intervention is about 10% for rice and maize. For 
soybean meal, the producer is protected on the output '>ide hut taxed on the input side. 
Hence, the effects offset each other. Subsidie& for the export of tapioca pclleb are off-set 
by the implicit tax on input<. through the higher price of traded input&. 
There are comparative advantages in producing all these four commoditie& for 
export, especially when sourced from the surplus regions in the country. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Broilers and eggs 
Since direct government interventions are presently small, the improvement of 
breeds, quality of feed~ and management may be targets for policy measures. To reduce the 
effect of indirect intervention ( overvaluation of foreign exchange), the first best policy is to 
do away with those trade policies in the non-agricultural sector that induce tho::.e 
distortions. 
Pork 
The proper role of the public sector in the expansion of the pork industry is to 
withdraw itself from controlling this industry, e.g., controls on ~laughterhouses &hould be 
abolished. This wilJ also assist the improvement of the pork quality consumed in Thailand 
as the domestic demand for pork is expanding quickly. 
Trade negotiations to develop potential markeb are the direct role of government. 
The public sector should be prepared both in terms of infra&tructure and personnel, in these 
areas. 
Beef 
To realise the potential of high quality beef, efforts to stimulate the awareness of the 
general public about the quality of locally produced beef ~hould be done alongside the 
promotion of breeding, research on feed use and disease control. 
Dairy 
Improvement of breeding and feeding practices should be continued. The location of 
the dairy processing industry has to be carefully planned to match the location of the 
farming areas. The government should assist the farm and processing sectors in identifying 
appropriate locations. 
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Animal feed commodities 
For the healthy expan&ion of the livestock industry, the supply of animal feed is the 
key factor. Thailand ha& a surplus in energy feeds but a deficit in protein feed. To enhance 
the growth of both the feed grains and livestock industry, the government should allow for a 
more flexible import of soybean meal to complement the use of other agro-waste in the 
livestock industry. 
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION 
ASEAN is a livestock and feed deficit region. Since this region is growing rapidly, 
the demand for livestock products will increase very quickly. To cater for this increase in 
demand, a structure should be developed to explore the future potential of livc!>tock and 
feed grain production in this region, and to recommend a long-term strategy for the region 
and for each country. 
In general, the structure of production in each ASEAN country is quite similar, hence 
the potential to increase intra-regional trade is limited. Eff orl in regional co-operation 
should emphasise negotiation with the rest of the world for better treatment of this region's 
exports. 
There are two specific problems that currently face Thailand: transportation of pig 
carcasses through Malaysia to Singapore, and joint-ventures in fishing in Malaysian waters. 
With a long-run regional view of the livestock and feed industry, these problems may be 
resolved to the benefit for both countries and for the region. 
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Table 1 Derived Demand for Animal Feeds, 1986 (000 tons) 
Animal Feed Fishmeal Soybean Maize Rice Other 
Demand Bran 
Chicken 915.20 91.52 137.28 576.58 18.3 91.44 
Parent Stock 128.70 6.44 19.31 81.08 2.57 19.23 
Small Layer 15.00 1.05 1.50 8.25 1. 50 2.63 
Layer 540.00 37.80 54.00 297,00 70.20 80.92 
Pig 1125 .00 101. 25 45.00 112.50 517.50 348.69 
Duck 42.00 3.36 6.30 0.00 12.60 19.70 
Layer Duck 585.00 35.10 8.78 0.00 146.25 394.85 
Shrimp 50.00 17.50 5.00 0.00 10.00 17 .47 
Dairy cow 71.18 0. 71 3.56 17.79 7.12 41.95 
Fish 40.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 4.00 11. 95 
---------------------------------~-----------------------------------------
Total 3512.08 302. 73 288.72 1101. 20 790.05 1029.38 
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Table 2 Summary of Government Intervention in the Livestock Industry 
Farm Level: 
Credit 
Feed 
Chemicals 
Research 
BOI promotion 
Processing: 
Slaughter-
house 
Sanitary 
regulations 
BOI promotion 
Trade: 
Domestic 
Foreign 
Tax 
Non Tax 
Broiler/egg 
Interest Subsidy 
Import control on 
soybean meal 
Import Tariffs 
Some breeding 
and vaccine 
YES 
Private 
ownership 
Disease 
inspection 
for export 
YES 
Price control 
Export tax 
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Pork 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
Breeding 
and vaccine 
YES 
Public 
(except BOI 
promoted firms) 
Disease-free 
farm and zone 
YES 
SAME 
Export 
Tax 
Beef 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
YES 
Public 
YES 
SAME 
Import 
Tariff 
Dairy 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
YES 
Public 
YES 
SAME 
Import 
Tariff & 
Domestic 
purchase 
Table 3 Summary of Government Intervention in 
Four Animal Feed Ingredients 
Rice/rice bran Maize Soybean Meal Cassava 
--------------------------------------~--------------------------------------------
Farm Level: 
Credit Interest subsidy 
Fertiliser Import tariffs 
Chemicals Import tariffs 
Research & New Variety 
Extension 
Processing: 
BOI promotion YES 
Trade: 
Foreign Tax Packing credit 
Non-tax 
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SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
YES 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
YES 
Import 
tariffs 
Domestic 
purchase 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
SAME 
YES 
Subsidy 
of export 
to non-EC 
Table 4 Nominal and Effective Protection Rates (%): Thailandl) 
Region North Northeast Central South 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- .... 
Chicken 
- NPR 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 
- EPR -6.1 -5.7 -6.l -6.5 
Egg 
- NPR 1. 8 1. 8 1 7 1. 8 
- EPR -21.0 -19.9 -19.9 -22.6 
Pork 
- NPR 20.6 
- EPR 25.8 
Beef 
- NPR 108.0 95.7 90.7 
- EPR 155.3 110. 3 99.9 
Dairy 
- NPR 56.4 64.6 
- EPR 76.3 79.5 
Maize 
- NPR 0 0 0 0 
- EPR -2.9 -2.3 -5.3 -6.0 
Cassava 
- NPR 32.8 32.8 32.8 
- EPR 34.9 34.8 35.4 
Rice 
- NPR -2.5 -3.7 -4.2 -4.3 
- EPR 11.0 11. 0 11.0 11.0 
Soybean meal 
- NPR 35.4 30.8 36.9 
- EPR 28.4 28.8 30.3 
1. The export trade regime is used for each commodity with the exception 
of beef, dairy products and soybean meal for which the import trade 
regime is chosen. 
NPR = nominal protection rate 
EPR = effective protection rate 
Not calculated 
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Table 5 Comparative Advantage Indicators: Thailand1 
North Northeast Central 
Chicken 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Egg 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Pork 0.8 
Beef 1.6 1.1 0.7 
Dairy 1. 3 l.1 
Maize 0.7 0.8 0.7 
Cassava 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Rice 0.6 0.8 0.7 
Soybean meal 0.6 0.6 0.6 
South 
0.6 
0.5 
1. 9 
1.1 
1. Figures in the table are domestic resource cost ratios. They measure 
the shadow cost of domestic inputs per unit of output relative to 
value added per unit of output in domestic currency at the shadow 
exchange rate. Assumed trade regimes are similar to those of Table 4. 
Not calculated. 
215 
CHAPTER 17 
MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALISATION: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR SUPPLY CONTROLLED INDUSTRIES IN CANADA 
J.D. Graham•, R.J. MacGregor••, K.D. Meilke••• and B.K. Stennes* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the fascinating aspects of agricultural policy i~ the political power of the 
agricultural electorate. ln most Industrialized Market Economic/> (IME) agriculture i1> a 
relatively !>mall ~cctor in terms of national output, lahour or population. However, 
government~ arc often reluctant to introduce change~ that advcr&cly affect thi~ &ector. 
Rural rcprc&cntation bias in elected a&scmblies, concern& over food security, the de!>ire to 
protect the family farm, a hesitation to remove or alter exi!>ting policie& that affect wealth 
and other reasons explain this somewhat perverse relationship. 
Regional aspects of this political power base are also important. One often finds a 
specialisation of production patterns in certain regions of a country and this means that 
lobbying efforts arc abo often concentrated on selected commodities. It is argued that, in 
Canada, given the political clout of milk producers in Quebec, one is fighting a losing battle 
if policy changes to this sector are to be considered. Quebec currently produces 48 per cent 
of all industrial milk in Canada and elected officials from rural riding& find it hard not to 
support their local producers and the rural infrastructures. Likewise, milk and poultry 
producers who operate under supply management schemes and administered prices have 
resisted pressure from consumer groups and others for change. One ha& seen the values of 
production quotas in the&e sectors increase substantially in the last decade. If policy 
changes are to be considered, it is often the costs and benefits within and between regions 
that are important. One needs information for policy makers that is region-specific and one 
needs to be abJc to determine exact changes facing producers in these different rural areas. 
This information i& often lacking when trade liberalisation is&ues are comidered. 
• Associate Professor and Graduate Student, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
University of British Columbia. 
•• Head, Impact Analysis, Policy Branch, Agriculture Canada. The view and option& 
expressed in this paper reflect those of the author and not necessarily those of Agriculture 
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Thi'> paper <l1'>Cll'>'>e'> J model developed in Canada, the Canadian Region..tl 
Agricultural Model (CRAM), which i" being u~ed to a-,,,e~-, tra<k libc1,1li'>ation l'>'>Ue'>. One 
of the stengths of the model is its regional disaggregation. It 1s abo somewhat unique in 
that econometrically estimated supply elasticities have been incorporated into the supply 
blocks for livestock in what is essentially a linear programming model. The methodology 
adopted to deal with the impacts of trade liberalisation on supply controlled industries is 
also detailed in this paper. 
BACKGROUND 
Models generally used to evaluate trade liberalisation scenarios (OECD ( 1987), 
Ronningen (19~6), lATRC (1988), Tyers and Ander&on (1986), Parikh ct ;tl. (1988), and 
Cahill (1988) are multi-commodity, multi-country, partial equilibrium agricultural net trade 
models. Although these models all tend to reduce com pl ex policy i"~ues for each country to 
a relatively simple set, the information they provide has moved the multilateral trade 
negotiatiom. (MTN) forward. They have indicated in rather broad term'> the aggregate level 
of coi:.ts and benefit<, that may be derived from liberalisation and which countric" and 
producer& will gain or lose. ~ome of thefie models have gone further lo indicate possible 
wealth change implicatiom.. However, questions that have arisen in Canada and need to be 
answered include: 
Which producer'> in which provinces will benefit (or lose) from liberalisation and by 
how much? 
How will a change in policy in one sector affect producer<, in other sectors and how,. 
are the~e changes distributed regionally? The livestock/feedgrain interface is 
particularly important in this respect. 
Will compem.alion and adjustment programmes be required and how arc tradcoffs 
between regiom and commodities to be handled? 
Should alternative lcs\ trade distorting programmes be Cllm.idercd to rcplacc current 
programmes? Will policies for one region or sector have impacts on another? 
In the case of t.upply controlled indui:.tries what changes are expected following 
liberalisation and how do these changes affect producers in the different provinces 
and sectors? 
If adjustment is required what will the changes be over time? 
World agricultural trade models arc not very good at addrc'>;tng the'>C sorts of 
questions. They do not represent any one particular country in sufficient detail to 
adequately respond to these questions. These questiom are best left to more detailed 
national agricultural models. 
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THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING 
During the pa~l <lc('a<lc a con<;cnsus has I ormc<l on the need for domc'>lic policy 
rel orm in OECD member countries. The OECD and others have dearly '>Cl out the causal 
linh between past policy incentives and the present problems in trade ( OECD, 1987). In-
dustrialised countries have created a system of competitive subsidisation of agriculture that 
wastes economic resources, imposes enormous costs on treasuries and results in regressive 
redistribution of income within and between countries (NCFAP, 1988). 
Countries have designed domestic agricultural support and stabilisation policies to 
achieve certain domestic objectives including those of food security, income support and 
stabilisation, and rural development. Border policies were imposed to protect domestic 
policies and to limit government's fiscal exposure arising from domestic support policies. 
Litde regard was given to the international implications of such policies and most countries 
were not concerned about trade distortions that might arise in the world market or how 
other countries would be affected. Many of today's support policies date back more than 
fifty years. The end re'>uh is that much of the world''> agricultural oulpul i~ being produced 
in the wrong place which '>acrifices agricultural output a~ wc.:11 as a '>ignificant level of 
national income and welfare once the general equilibrium effects of '>Uch policies arc taken 
into account (Schuh, 1988). 
To solve some of these problems a consensus now exists that domestic policy changes 
and trade reform are required. The Uruguay Round of MTN commenced in the fall of 1986 
and is slated to conclude in 1990. The aim of these negotiations is to achieve greater 
liberalisation of trade in agriculture and bring all measuret. affecting import access and 
export competition under strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules. 
In April 1989 the Negotiating Group on Agriculture (NGA) met in Geneva to 
overcome the impas&e of the Montreal Mid-term Ministerial Review. The impasse was due 
to the concern of some members, notably the EC, over the degree of reform and the speed 
at which it would occur. In Geneva the NGA reached agreement on both the long-term 
elements for reform plus a set of short-term relief measures. Of particular note is the fact 
that future negotiations will encompass all measures affecting directly or indirectly import 
access and export competition including: quantitative and other non-tariff access barriers; 
waivers, protocol& of accessions or other derogation& and exceptions; and all measures not 
explicitly provided for in the GATT. Thi& include& the variable levy-export re&titution of 
the Commom Agricultural Policy of the EC. It is within this setting that domestic policy 
reforms in Canada are being examined. 
Attempts have been made to assess the impact of trade liberalisation on world 
markets, as well as on domestic market&, and on the welfare of the various economic agents 
(producers, consumers and taxpayers). Examples include IATRC (1988), OECD (1987), 
Tyers and Anderson (1987), Parikh S<.t fil. (1988). In each case an economic model has been 
used to investigate the implications of total or partial trade liberalisation using either a 
PSE/CSE approach or a tariff equivalent approach to measure current market distortions. 
The SWOPSIM (Static World Policy Simulation Model) model of Ronningen and 
Dixit (1988) and others has adopted and expanded upon the methodology used by the 
OEDC (1987) in order lo quantitatively assess how trade liberalisation would affect trade 
and economic welfare for various countries. It draw& upon a 22 commodity, 36 
country /region data base with 1986 being the current base year. This model was employed 
in a recent study to investigate the implications of agricultural trade liberalisation by 
Industrial Market Economies. In this analysis all government programmes as captured by 
the PSE (either as direct payments or price wedge&) were removed and the model solved for 
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a new equilibrium. The rc~ulls arc ~ummari~ed in IATRC ( 1988). Beside~ world price 
impacts, national level impacts were provided for various countries including Canada. 
The question of importance to federal and provincial policy makers, and to producers 
in each of the different regions in Canada, revolves around changes that may be expected as 
one attempts to di~mantlc price and support schemes in Canada within a multilateral 
framework. However, in addition to the aggregate effects, it is important to know if 
protection is gradually reduced, what types of changes may be expected within each of the 
provinces of Canada? Thif> is not straightforward because Canadian policies do not apply 
equally across the country. Some policies have tended to fix production patterns and 
resource use and significant cross commodity affect& are anticipated. Also, some markets 
have been largely disconnected from world markets, such as poultry and dairy, while in most 
others the price transmission elasticity has remained relatively high (Parikh~ fil. 1988). 
The Canadian Regional Agricultural Model (CRAM) has been used in the past to 
examine these sorts of questions (MacGregor et.al., 1988). However, the supply managed 
sectors (dairy, broilers and turkeys, eggs) have never been treated adequately. This is 
partly due to lack of knowledge on just what the relevant t>upply parameters for these 
industries are. Another consideration is that industry cost structures vary from region to 
region, as do production alternatives, which implie& a degree of variability regardless of the 
policy implications. 
THE CRAM MODELLING SYSTEM 
Agriculture Canada maintains a number of economic models, including a large scale 
dynamic econometric forecasting and policy simulation model called FARM, an input-
output model with a disaggregated farm sector, a sy&tem of representative farm models and 
a world trade model referred to earlier called TASS. CRAM wat> developed to complement 
the other models by providing regional level production and trade detail. Because of the 
federated nature of the Canadian government, with both levels of government sharing 
jurisdiction over agriculture, information at the provinciaL or sub-provincial level is 
required by policy makers. 
Briefly, the CRAM modelling ~ystem ii. composed of: 
1) A set of data file& that contain region specific resource, production and demand 
information; • 
2) A fortran matrix generator which has the flexibility of generating linear 
programming matrices with different structures depending on the nature of the 
problem being tackled; 
3) An optimising or simulating feature; 
4) A report writer that helps to interpret output; and 
5) A set of &preadt>heels that generate the comparative t>tatic& information that is 
reported. 
The underlying ~ltcngth of the model i~ the ~pecification of production respon&e~ aC 
the regional level and the linking of output with provincial demand and world market& 
through a transportation matrix. 
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It is a multicommodity, multiregion programming model. The model represent!. 
Canada's agricultural sector with 29 crop regions producing wheat (4 grades), barley and 
other coarse grains, flax, canola, corn, soybeans, hay, pa&ture and other crops. Livestock 
production is modelled at the provincial level for beef, dairy, hogs and poultry. Shipments 
of livestock, livestock products and grains occur to meet provincial demand levels, with 
excess domestic demand or supply being met by import or export activities. Demand for 
beef, pork and grains are endogenised using stepped functions. Opening inventories of 
livestock arc adjusted through incorporation of retention functions responding to own 
price, feed grain price and other effects. Trade requires that export and import prices be 
established; a domestic floor and ceiling price is specified. A small country as:>umption is 
adopted which means that Canadian trade will not affect world prices. The following 
summary provides some additional features of the model. 
MODEL CHARACTERISTICS 
Static, spatial, partial equilibrium linear programming model focused upon the major 
agricultural 1>ectors. 
Contains 5 major geographical levels - national; east and west; provincial (combining 
the maritime provinces); crop region, and export or shipping points. 
Contains 29 crop regions - 22 in the Prairies and one for each of the remaining 
provinces. 
Grains, oilseed!., dairy, beef, pork, egg!.,and poultry are included. Fruit and 
vegetables arc excluded. 
Fairly detailed production input relationship!. are included in the model, allowing 
examination of both the direct and indirect effects of changes in government policy. 
Unit costs, opening grain stocks, livestock inventories, and certain import and export 
levels arc exogenou!.ly specified. 
Models supply and demand relationships for all major commodities. 
Uses assumed ela1>ticities of supply and demand, based on literature searche!>, whi(.h 
represent the expected responsiveness of supply /demand to price changes. 
Shipment& of live&tock, livestock product& and grains occur to meet provincidl 
demand level&, with cxcc1.s demand/supply met by import/export activitie&. 
Trade activitie1> rer.pond to export and import prices, 1>pecified in the model as 
domestic floor and ceiling prices. 
The model assumes Canadian trade will not affect world or North American prices. 
THE CROP BLOCK 
Crops modelled include wheat (4 grades), barley (including other coarse grains), flax, 
canola, corn, soybeans, hay, pasture and other crops. 
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The model permit~ choice among the various crop~. given the con'>traints of soil and 
climate on yield. 
Choice also occurs between grain crops, hay, pasture and fallow (using a set of fallow 
ratios). 
Crop rotations are very important, since yields will vary when planted on fallow vs. 
stubble. 
Crops are grown in 29 geographic regions, differentiated primarily by soil and 
climatic zones. 
Crops produced in these regions are transferred to the provincial level to meet the 
demand for livestock feed and domestic consumption, or tram.fcrred to port for 
export. 
THE LIVESTOCK BLOCK 
Beef, pork and dairy production activities are modelled in detail, while the poultry 
sector is modelled as single activities for each of broiler, egg and turkey production. 
Diets are expressed in terms of stored forage, pasture and barley for beef and dairy 
animals; barley for hogs; and wheat for poultry. Protein supplement feeding is not 
accounted for at this time. Grains input substitution is possible. 
Opening stocks, input requirements (including diet and cash costs), and replacement 
ratios are all specified to determine yield, closing stocks and price. 
Livestock inventories, prices and government payments are set at 1986 levels, and the 
demand functions are calibrated to replicate prices and consumption in that year. 
Livestock inventory retention functions specified are hased on econometrically 
estimated relationships. 
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES 
Expected payouts under each of the various programmes are used to supplement 
market returns. 
Programmes explicitly modelled are: 
Western Grain Stabili:ration Act 
Agricultural Stabili7ation Act 
Crop Insurance 
Federal and Provincial Red Meat Stabilization Programs 
Two Price Wheat Program 
Input Subsidies 
Special Canadian Grains Program 
Western Grains Transportation Act 
Dairy levies and subsidies 
Feed Freight Assistance 
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The benefit~ of '>Upply management for the dairy and poultry sectors arc captured. 
The model assume'> farmers view government payments a'> equivalent lo market 
receipts. 
THE POLICY COMPONENT OF CRAM 
One component of the CRAM model that needs to be described relates to the 
domestic policies which have been the incorporated into its structure. Most major 
agricultural policies are incorporated either explicitly or implicitly. Direct payments by 
governments to producer'> are specified for production or marketing activities in order to 
reflect government stabilisation payments or other assistance paymepts and these differ for 
each province. Similarly, assistance payments to livestock producers arc dealt with using 
the livestock retention functions. The elasticity for govern mcnt pay men ts is currently '>Cl 
equal to that of product price responses. For supply managed commodities, provincial 
production quotas arc modeled by fixing output (including both fluid and industrial milk) 
and for dairy "in-quota" and "over-quota" producer levies and the industrial milk subsidy are 
included. Grain policies such as Two-Price Wheat, Initial Payments (pool deficits), Feed 
Freight Assistance and the Western Grain Transportation Act (subsidised grain freight 
rates) are incorporated through producers prices or transportation costs. It is this detailed 
regional specification of policies, along with differential regiondl production responses that 
is critical in determining who benefits from changes in policy that might arise from the 
MTN. 
TRADE PRICES 
In world trade models prices are endogenously determined. These models provide 
the basic information required by domestic models, such as CRAM, in which border prices 
are taken as exogenous. In these trade models domestic prices are often linked through 
price wedges or margins, or tariff equivalents lo world prices. When trade liberalisation is 
simulated it is these margins that are changed. 
The world price impacts and implications for Canadian prices as calculated by 
Roningen and Dixit arc shown in Table l. Canadian producers face new world price levels, 
there is an elimination of direct payments from governments and the removal of the wedge 
attributed to government support. These three changes determine the net change in 
Canadian domestic producer prices I. 
To illustrate, take the case of wheal as noted in Table 1. The farm gate price for 
wheat in 1986 was $117 /tonne. Producers also received a direct payment of $47 /tonne from 
various stabilisation and deficiency payment programs. In addition, some Canadian 
programmes, mainly WGT A, provided additional support which keep farm gate prices 
cJm,er to the world price levels. For example, under the WGTA rail freight costs are 
subsidised by about $23/tonne (1986) Under a MTN liberalisation scenario a 29% increase 
in the world price of wheat is reported. In Canada, farm gale prices move from $117 /tonne 
to $130/tonne (an 11% increase). Producers who were receiving $164/tonne now see their 
1Thc SWOPSIM model i!'. used for comparative static analysis and exchange rate!'. arc 
assumed to remain com.Lant and all transmission elasticities arc set equal to 1.0. 
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direct total returns falling from $164/tonne to $130/tonne (21% decline). Following the 
same procedure, price changes for all major commoditic~ arc shown in Table 1. 
REGIONAL SUPPORT DIFFERENCES 
Before reporting on the impacts of trade libcrali~ation it may help to e&tabfo,h &ome 
of the key regional differences that exist in Canadian agriculture. The importance of 
agriculture to each province's economy varie& quite sub&tantially. This commodity mix in 
each province is very different as shown in Table 2. The importance of grains and oilseeds 
in the Prairies is noted a& is the importance of livestock and poultry in Ontario and Quebec. 
For example, in Saskatchewan 54% of all farm ca&h receipts in 1986 came from the grains 
and oilseeds sector, livestock accounted for 18% and an additional 22% came from 
government payments. In Ontario the respective value& are 12%, 61 % and 3 percent. 
An important feature of Canadian agricultural policy and our programmes i& that 
many of the principal safety-net programmes arc commodity specific and, further, even 
federal programmes may be region specific. In the case of the Western Grain Stabilizatitm 
Act (WGSA), which cover& most grains and oilseeds, it i& the Prairie provinces that benefit. 
The Agricultural Stabili.1tion Act (ASA) cover& the re&l of Canada and can cover crops not 
covered in the WGSA (e.g. corn in Ontario). Grain and oibcc.:d producer& in the Prairie~ 
are therefore covered by the WGSA programme, by Crop In~urancc programmes and they 
are also the primary beneficiaries under WGTA. lncquiticf.> can ca&ily ari&c in federal 
government support payments and in addition provincial governments too have their own 
support mechanisms. 
In 1987 /88 it is estimated that some 63% ($3.8 billion) of federal expenditures on 
agriculture will be directed to the grains and oibeed sector. In 1986, 80% ($1.8 billion) of 
direct government payments went to Western Canada (Table 2). In large part this is due to 
the different mechanism& used to provide support and the commodity mix that prevails. 
An important feature, especially in relation to this study, is the mannner in which the 
two main policy support programmes operate. The&c are market stabifo.ation programmes 
which receive direct government payments and supply management schemes where 
government payments are minimal but consumers are taxed fairly heavily. Hence, an 
obvious regional split occur& in dairying and poultry activities as the majority of milk and 
poultry is produced in the ea&t and less in the west. 
In the red meat& &ector Martin and van Duren (1987) have provided estimates of the 
level of support payments made to producers by both provincial and federal government&. 
Wide differences in payment levels between provinces are noted. For example, in 
Saskatchewan producers have received $18.4 per market hog per year (1981-85 average) 
while in Ontario this payment has been $6.6 per market hog. Cow-calf producers in Quebec 
have received $162 per cow while ranchers in Manitoba receive $16. 
It is clear that differing federal and provincial programme payments will impact on 
trading positions to varying degrees depending on their levels and the manner in which the 
different programmes are operated. 
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RESULTS: U•PLICATIONS OF MULTILATERAL TRADE LIBERALISATION 
Under the scenario examined Canada is assumed to be a price taker with world price 
levels being set at the levels indicated earlier. In addition, all production controls are 
removed. Table 3 indicates the percentage change in output for each of the commodity 
groups by province and for Canada. The factors that determine thef.e changes are changes 
in own price, feed grain prices, an elimination of government payments (and levies) and 
removal of production and trade controls. 
Since this study emphasises supply controlled industries, changes in the milk and 
poultry sectors are dealt with first. Milk production expands in every province with total 
Canadian production being up by 32%. The range is from 18% in the Maritimes to 46% in 
British Columbia. Ontario and Quebec which currently produce 78% of total milk expand 
production by 32% and 35%, respectively. In the prairies production increases average 29 
percent. The net impact of these changes is an increase in gross farm incomes and a 
corresponding increase in net sector earnings (Table 4). 
Net sector earning~ (Ta hie 4) arc defined as market price plu~ government payments 
le&s transport costs and cash costs of production, including the value of forage and feed. 
For the dairy sector net &ector earnings increase by 38% ($0.9 billion) mainly due to higher 
production (32%) and higher returns for industrial milk. Higher returns for Eastern 
Canadian producers are offset by higher grain costs and lower prices for fluid milk. 
Interesting regional shifts occur. The western provinces (except Saskatchewan) fair 
better than the national average reflecting the advantage of lower feed grain prices. 
Saskatchewan has the highest supply price of milk of any province indicating a lack of 
comparative advantage in dairying relative to the other provinces. 
Of significance is the increase in Quebec ( 43%) relative to Ontario (31 % ). The 
estimated supply price in Ontario is somewhat higher at $32.60/hl versus $31.58/hl in 
Quebec. However, Quebec benefits to a larger degree because Quebec produces more 
industrial milk relative to fluid milk which are now assumed to receive the same market 
price. Industral milk prices increase while fluid milk prices decline with freer trade. This 
implies that because of fixed historic production patterns under supply management 
Quebec is better placed to take advantage of trade liberalisation. Its relative advantage 
might also be explained by the fact that Quebec producers have tended to align their costs 
of production for the industrial market rather than the higher priced fluid market. The 
region that tends to fair the worst is the Maritimes. This is a common feature of all the 
results for all sectors. 
Changes in the poultry sector vary by province and differ by product. Canadian 
broiler and turkey meat output expand by 14% and 46% respectively and egg production is 
also increased by 15% (Table 6). Gross earnings of broiler producer& are up 19%, those of 
turkey producers increase by 52%, while egg producer& gross earning& increase by 1 %. Net 
sector earnings for all poultry producers are up 3% (Table 4 ). 
British Columbia poultry producers gain proportionately more than other producers. 
Net earnings increase by 21 %. Ontario producers sec their net returns increa&e by 4%, 
while those of some other provinces remain fairly constant or fall. Net poultry sector 
earnings fall by 5% for Saskatchewan producers and by 27% for Maritime producers. The 
increase in earning& in the broiler and turkey sectors is in&ufficient to offset lower egg 
prices for these provinces. However, in general, there is a 3% increase in all poultry sector 
earnings. 
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One factor dampening output growth in the livestock sector in Ear>tern Canada is the 
fact that grain prices rise hy 24% (Table 1). In Western Canada they remain relatively 
nrnslant once WGTA i& removed. This change in relative feed gram price'> between 
W e\lern and Eastern Canada aff ecb. all livestock sector'>. 
A number of factors explain these changes in the supply managed commodities. The 
existence of positive quota values means that the marginal co~t pricing point is below 
current domestic prices. The price impacts from the SWOPSIM analysis has Canadian 
domestic prices rising above current support levels for industrial milk, and br0ilers2 and 
falling only for eggs. The milk and broiler sectors would gain substantially under free trade 
based upon these results. However, we may need to temper thc:;e conclusions. Firstly, the 
dairy component of the SWOPSIM model may not represent the industry satisfactorily and, 
secondly, it does not appear to capture Canadian supply management schemes adequately. 
THE GRAIN AND OTHER LIVESTOCK SECTORS 
Canadian graim and oilseeds production declines by 2% as shown in Table 3 (1.4 
million metric tonnes (m.mt)). Coarse grain:; production declines by 1.5 m.mt (11%) offset 
somewhat by an increase in wheat plantings on fallow land. Canola and flax production also 
fall. The greatest percentage decline occurs in Manitoba. 
Production remains relatively price inelastic over the price range used in this 
simulation. In the Prairies there is a shift towards less intensive cropping patterns as the 
use of summerfallow increases by 16% (1.5 million hectares). No land is left idle. Since, in 
the analysis, the beef breeding herd changes very little there is no additional demand for 
forage and with few alternatives, the land will continue to be cropped at lower levels of 
profitability. This will eventually lead to lower land prices. In Ontario and Quebec no land 
Uf>e changes are recorded partly due to lack of disaggregation of cropping alternatives for 
these provinces and because the price of corn, the major crop, declined by only 4%. Both 
provinces produce much of their own feed for their livestock. With the dairy herd 
expanding significantly this would offset the incentive to reduce crop production when crop 
prices fall assuming the two enterprises are complementary. 
Net crop sector earnings are reported in Table 4. Although net earnings for the grain 
sector declines by 10%, its market earnings increase by 16%. This increase in returns from 
the market is insufficient to off set the loss in direct government payments of $1.7 billion, 
but it docs off set higher freight rates and other indirect payments. However, government 
budget savings exceed the reduction in gross sector earnings which amount to $0.6 billion. 
Overall, net sector earnings for the grain sector falls by $0.4 billion. 
The beef cow herd declines marginally in the cast and increases marginally in the 
west. Beef price& do improve, however, these are offset by lower government payments to 
producers and in the cast by higher feed grain prices. The increa~e in beef production noted 
is almost entirely due to the increase in the dairy herd. A 32% larger dairy cow herd will 
mean more culls and also a similar increase in dairy ~teer calves and surplus heifer calves 
which transfer to the beef sector. 
2sWOPSIM does not contain a spearate sector for turkey and i~ included with chicken. For 
the purpose of this analysis the price change for chicken is imposed on the turkey i.ector in 
Canada. 
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In terms of trade, with relatively constant domestic demand, exports of high quality 
beef increase and for low quality beef Canada change& from a net importer in the base of 
36,000 tonne& to a net exporter of 19,000 tonnes (Table 5). One interesting regional shift is 
the relatively small increase in high quality beef production in Ontario. This is because 
fewer feeder animals are shipped from the west. The west, taking advantage of relatively 
lower priced grain to feed out more of the beef calves it produces. There is a 8% increase in 
net sector earnings for beef producers. The Prairie provinces benefit the mo&l. 
The hog sector responds to an 8% increase in market prices, higher feed grain pricer; 
in eastern Canada (where 68% of hog production occurs) and the elimination of 
government direct support by a 2% decline in the sil'e of the sow herd. However. in the west 
there is a slight increase. Reflecting this change, net sector earnings in the west improves 
by about 18% while it changes very little in Quebec and Ontario. Net sector earnings in the 
Maritimes decrease by 7% in line with a 9% decrease in production. 
TRADE IMPACTS 
Domestic demand generally declines slightly due to the generally higher domestic 
product prices under this trade scenario. Eggs, fluid milk and wheat domestic prices fall 
and domestic consumption increases slightly. Net trade represents the difference between 
demand and production. From Table 4, it is clear that Caaada gains significantly from trade 
liberalisation, at least in this partial framework analysis. Our small country assumption 
with a perfectly elastic export demand curve may not hold for all commodities. 
Interesting changes occur in the supply managed industries. Except for continuing 
cheese imports, Canada becomes a net exporter3. At these liberalised world prices, Canada 
would apparently be competitive on world markets even for those commoditici; which are 
highly protected at thif> time through supply management f.chemes and import controls. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study is exploratory. An attempt has been made to incorporate prior 
information on regional supply response relation&hip& for supply controlled industries into 
the CRAM modelling framework. The supply parameters assumed dictate the direction and 
magnitude of changes reported. Changes in world prices derived from a commodity based 
world trade model are used to generate more detailed country information, especially 
regional information. 
This analysis indicate& that, with multilateral liberalisation, Canadian producers of 
milk and poultry products can compete in the international market place. This would allow 
these industries an opportunity to expand. Under current controls, they are restricted to 
relatively stagnate domc<;tic markets. British Columbia. Ontario and Quebec arc the big 
gainers. In poultry, Ontario gains relative to Quebec but for dairy the reverse is true. 
Quebec is a relatively low cost producer of milk. With libcralbation, world and domcstk 
prices for industrial milk increahe while fluid pricci; decrease and Quebec has historically 
geared its production to industrial milk. 
3si7eable net exports of butter and SMP could be converted to cheese so the mix of expNts 
could change subi;tantially depending on how the industry respond'>. 
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A consideration involve~ the extent to which world price increa&e~ would change 1f 
the Canadian &upply response differs to that predicted by the SWOPSIM model. The 
SW OPS IM result& for Canada underestimate the net export position reported for the wpply 
managed industrie& and beef in this study. They arc !>imilar for wheat. Coar~c grain net 
exports are less in this &tudy, largely due to the expansion in dairy. Pork exports increase 
whereas in SWOPSIM they declined slightly. Overall, the differences arc not expected to 
have a large impact on world prices which are taken as exogenous in this study. 
The regional impact& reported vary signficantly from the weighted national average 
impacts. Past distortion& in feed grain pricing in Canada has had major implications, 
especially for western Canadian livestock producers. 
Prairie grain growers do not see world prices rising &ufficiently under liberalisation 
to offset the combined lo!.s of support they now receive from direct !>tabilisation and 
deficiency payment programmes and from indirect subsidy supports (mainly WGTA). 
Western red meat producers fair somewhat better under freer trade although strengthening 
world prices are largely offset by a loss of direct government payments. The Maritimes is 
the region that docs not fair well under liberafaation. It i& a grain deficit region and has 
received very high level& of support for red meats. 
Thi& analysis docs not addre&s the i~sue of future market price and income imtability 
that may arise under liberalisation with open borden.. Although world prices would be 
more stable than they arc currently, they may be les~ ~table than currently achieved in our 
domestic markets under supply management. However, even under supply management, 
producers have not been totally immune from world market price changes. The levy on 
disposal of surplm skim milk powder over the last couple of years has fluctuated between 
$3/hl and $6/hl relative to target prices of $45-47 /hi. 
One note of caution is required. In previou~ analyse& of trade liberalisation 
Canadian producers have generally been found to be f.lightly wor~c off relative to their 
current situation. Improvements in world prices under liberalised trade and reduced 
support have not been strong enough to fully compensate for the lor,r, of income transfers 
currently obtained from government programmes. In this analysis the opposite conclusion 
is reached. Although the grains and oilseeds sectors are slightly worse-off, the earnings for 
the other commodity sectors generally improve, especially in the dairy f.ector. Overall, net 
sector earning~ improved by clor,,e to $0.7 billion and to this ha'> to be added the r,ignificant 
budget savings by taxpayers. The question of ju'>l how competitive Canadian supply 
managed industric<; arc under a liberalised market environment rcmainf. an open question 
but the possibility that Canadian dairy and poulLry producers could compete at undistorted 
world market prices should not be dismisf.ed out of hand. 
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Table l Canadian price Impacts of Liberalisation based on SWOPSIM model Results 
(m. tonnes) (1986 - ($1 US = 1.3895 CDN)) 
WORLD CANADIAN 
Free Trade Wedge Other Total 
Base Price Free Trade % Farm Gate Direct Total Farm Farm Gate than Direct PSE 
(World) Price Change Price Payments Gate Returns Prices Payments Ue.dg~ 
Product ($US/unit) $US/unit) ($/unit) $/unit (% change) 
(1) ( 2) [ 1 +2 J 
160 207 29 117 47 164 130 35 82 
(-21%) 
Coarse Grains 114 137 20 65 27 92 66 23 so 
(-28%) 
~ Corn 121 150 24 87 25 112 108 8 33 ~ 
= (-4%) 
Soybeans 289 297 3 234 51 285 219 23 74 
(-23%) 
Cano la 450 511 14 199 90 289 202 48 138 
(-30%) 
Flax UL 64 235 164 46 110 
(-30%) 
Beef 2905 3428 18 2800 74 2874 3087 234 308 
(7%) 
Pork 3235 3611 11 1793 28 1821 1967 192 220 
(8%) 
Poultry 1505 1744 18 1507 0 1507 1720 56 56 
(14%) 
Eggs 2980 3125 5 3471 0 3471 3125 491 491 
(-10%) 
Source: SWOPSIM model results (Roningen and Dixit - International Ag. Trade Research Consortium Symposium, 
(lQRR)) 
N 
~ 
.... 
Table 2 Farm Cash Receipts and Distribution by Commodity and Percentage for Each Province, 1986 
Feed 
Wheat Grains Oilseeds Cattle Hogs 
Poultry 
Dairy & Eggs 
Other Cash Gov't 
Receipts Payments Total 
Provincial 
Tota:i.. 
(billion$) 
Province 
-------------------------------------- % --------------------------------------------------------
B.C. 1.0 0.6 0.3 15.8 5.5 23.1 16.0 32.0 5.7 100 1.0 
Alberta 13.8 9.1 7.3 29.3 7.2 6.0 3.5 6.6 17.2 100 3.7 
Sask. 39.2 6.9 7.9 12.0 2.6 2.2 1.2 5.5 22.3 100 4 .1 
Manitoba 25.8 8 .1 10.4 14.2 11. 7 5.2 4.7 9.5 10.5 100 2.0 
Ontario 2.2 5.9 4.4 21.1 12.5 17.7 9.8 23.8 2.5 100 5.4 
Quebec 0.5 5. 3 o.o 9.3 28.9 31.4 11. l 12.6 9.0 100 3.2 
Canada 13.8 6.4 5.2 17.6 10.4 13.8 7.1 14.4 11.3 100 
Canada 
(billion $) 2.8 1. 3 1.1 3.6 2.1 2.8 1.4 2.9 2.3 - 20.4 
a. Other Cash Receipts includes Canadian Wheat Board advances plus net change in deferred grain receipts 
which totalled $250 million. 
Source: Statistics Canada. 21-603. 
Table 3 Changes in Production Levels Under Liberalized Trade, by Province 
Grain & Beef 
Milk Broilers Eggs Turkey Oilseeds HQB LQB Pork 
Province (Hectolitres) (Tonnes) (Doz.) (Tonnes) (Tonnes) (Tonnes) (Tonnes) 
(Percentage Change) 
B.C. 46 33 42 42 0 27 -10 1 
N Alberta 27 16 41 6 -3 6 4 2 
~ Saskatchewan 25 15 -2 40 -2 6 10 0 
Manitoba 35 13 39 14 -7 8 6 8 
Ontario 32 16 58 21 0 3 2 -1 
Quebec 35 9 35 9 0 165 67 -2 
:-1aritimes 18 -1 9 -26 0 10 10 -7 
Canada 32 14 46 l !> -2 11 7 0 
Source: Simulation results. 
Table 4 Net Sector Earnings for Under Trade Liberalization 
Scenario with Percentage Change from the Base Year 
Shown in Brackets (m.$) 
Dairy Poultry Crops Beef Hogs 
Province Producers 
BRITISH COLUMBIA 268 75 40 51 45 
(45) (21) (-13) (-13) (13) 
ALBERTA 252 50 851 551 260 
(47) (31) (-15) (10) (11) 
SASKATCHEWAN 85 16 1371 190 90 
(33) (-5) (-8) (6) (6) 
MANITOBA 120 44 28l~ 143 260 
(40) (2) (-15) (7) (19) 
ONTARIO ll05 209 670 250 384 
(31) (4) ( -6) (6) (2) 
QUEBEC 1254 132 60 97 431 
(43) (0) ( -6) (25) ( - ll) 
MARI TIMES 174 25 140 28 61 
(23) (-27) (-0) (15) (-7) 
CANADA 3357 549 3.512 1110 1531 
(34) (3) (-10) (8) (5) 
Source: Simulation results 
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Table 5 Changes in Net Trade for Selected Collll<>dities Under 
Trade Liberalization (000' tonnes) 
Base 
Butter 0 
Cheese -8 
Skim Milk Powder 67 
Chicken -30 
Turkey -3 
Eggs 5 
Wheat 21184 
Coarse Grains 5264 
Flax 406 
Cano la 541 
Beef - High Quality 46 
Low Quality -36 
Pork 260 
Source: Simulation results 
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Freer 
Trade 
104 
-12 
266 
49 
50 
65 
10948 
2939 
362 
473 
103 
19 
306 
Change 
104 
-4 
199 
79 
53 
60 
-236 
-2325 
-44 
-68 
117 
55 
46 
Change% 
NA 
so 
297 
263 
NA 
NA 
-1 
-44 
-11 
-13 
254 
152 
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CHAPTER 18 
THE BENEFITS TO MANUFACTURING OF REDUCTIONS IN 
AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES IN NEW ZEALAND 
Yen-Shong Chiao* and Grant M. Scobie** 
INTRODUCTION 
The costs of agricultural protection have been a<>sessed often in the context of 
government budget expenditures and transfers between producers and consumers. 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent and Consumer Subsidy Equivalent concepts are widely used to 
quantify these direct costs. In addition, the effects on trade flows of protectionist policies 
have been well documented (McCalla and Josling, BAE, Dixit and Roningen, Tyers and 
Anderson, OECD, USDA). 
However, there is a further form of indirect costs arising from agricultural subsidies. 
The higher prices for both home goods and wage rates resulting from the protectionist trade 
policy constitute an implicit tax on other sectors. Failure to address properly these indirect 
costs can have two serious policy implications. First, the net benefits of agricultural 
subsidies are likely to be overstated. As a result the efficacy of nominal subsidies as an 
instrument to support farm incomes may be questioned. Second, subsidies can lead to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. This may undermine the country's international 
competitiveness, raising doubts about the sustainability of the subsidy policy. 
Assistance provided to any sector, be it manufacturing or agriculture, will induce 
upward pressure on the price of home goods and wage rates. These in turn raise the cost of 
inputs used by all sectors of the economy (Clements and Sjaastad ). These authors have 
shown that the price of home goods will rise at the rate of the weighted average of the 
nominal tariff rates for imports and subsidy rates for exportsl. The net effect is to 
disadvantage the unassisted industries in the form of an implicit input tax. At the same time 
the real benefits to the assisted industries are not as great as the nominal protection levels 
would first suggest. 
* Tax Economist, The Treasury 
**SER, 44 Hillcrest Road, Hamilton, New Zealand 
This project was partially funded by Policy Services, MAFCorp, The New Zealand Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheriei-.. The views cxpresi-.cd arc thoi-.e of the authors and not 
necessarily those of The New Zealand Treasury and the New Zealand Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. 
1They assume that imports and domestically produced importables are perfect substitutes. 
This assumption is likely to result in overstating the cost of tariff protection and subsidies 
when the substitutability is less than perfect. Chiao and Scobie relaxed this restriction. 
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The marginal cost imposed by agricultural subsidies on other industries may seem to 
he less than that imposed by tariff protection to manufacturing for two reasons. First, home 
goods and agricultural products arc not necessarily close substitutes. In addition 
manufactured goods are typically more important than agricultural commodities as inputs 
to other industries. However, the high and ever increasing levels of agricultural subsidies 
are likely to increase these direct costs. In the long run, they tend to undermine 
international competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, reducing the very base on which 
the subsidy policy is financed. 
This is specially relevant for those newly industrialic;ed countries (NIC's) whose 
international comparative advantage in producing manufactured goods has been dependent 
on a relatively low wage structure. Once the overall wage levels are inflated hy subsidies, 
the subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate will reduce their international 
competitiveness. 
In addition, transfers to the agricultural sector financed by direct taxation will add a 
further burden to the manufacturing sector. With constant competition from other 
developing countries with even cheaper labour, the comparative advantage of the NIC'i:. in 
producing manufactured goods may be eroded by this distorted trade policy. 
This paper has two objectives. The first is to derive the net benefits of trade policy 
for New Zealand since 1981. This has been a period of drastic changes in trade policy. 
Tariff liberalisation has lowered the historically very high levels of protection to 
manufacturing, and there has been a major reduction in subsidies to the agricultural sector. 
Both the direct and indirect costs of trade policy will be quantified. The impact on the 
relative price between non-tradeables and tradeables, and thus real exchange rates and 
international competitiveness, is also assessed2. 
The second objective is to generalise from the New Zealand experience to question 
the efficacy of agricultural subsidies for maintaining farm relative to non-farm incomes and 
to assess whether thir- policy would be sustainable in the long run. 
THE MODEL 
This section summarises the analytical approach developed by Clements and 
Sjaastad, and extended by Chiao and Scobie. 
Clements and Sjaastad used a 3-sector ( exportablcs, importables and home goods) 
general equilibrium model and showed that the increase in the price of home goods, 
denoted E(PH)3, is a weighted average of the increase in the prices of importables E(P1) 
and exportables, E(Px: 
(1) E(PH) = wE(P1) + (1-w)E(Px), 
2The terms home goods and non-tradeables are used interchangeably to refer to those 
goods and services whose prices are set by the clearing of dome~tic market&. 
3E(x) is the logarithmic differential operator, i.e. E(x) =dln(x). 
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with weights wand (1-w), re&pectivcly. Thi& value of w i& likely to be close to one if the 
importable& arc. clof.e &ub~titutc for home good&. Clemenb and Sjaaslad reported the mean 
value for the shift or incidence parameter, w, for several South American countries and 
Australia to be 0.66 (p. 26 ). The value for New Zealand has been recently e&timated to be 
around 0.7 (Wong). 
These empirical studie~ suggested that the substitutability between home good& and 
agricultural products are less than that between home goods and manufactured goods. 
Consequently, marginal indirect costs arising from protection to manufacturing are higher 
than that from agriculture. Most empirical studies applying the Clements-Sjaastad 
approach to date assessed the cost to agriculture of tariff protection to manufacturing (Choi 
and Cummings, Jardine et al., Chiao and Scobie). However, with the high nominal 
agricultural subsidy rates, the overall indirect costs on other sectors can be significant. 
~ince the Clcmcnb-Sjaa~tad approach doc<, not explicitly model imporh, all 
empirical ~tudief> lif.tcd above, with the exception of Chiao and ~cobic, af.~umcd perfect 
-,ub&titutability between import!'. and importable&, (ie. the prici.: ol dome&tically produced -
importables will rise by the tariff). This approach i& likely to ovcr~tate the indirect cost of 
protection if imports and importables arc less than perfect substitute&. Chiao and Scobie 
extended the Clements and Sjaastad model to allow for imperfect substitution. They 
derived an equation for the price linkage between imports (PM) and importables (P1) as 
where the parameters</> and r were estimated from a price equation 
Estimates of </> and r together with an estimate of w were u~ed lo c&timatc o, defined a& a 
"tariff-to-pricc-of-im portable~" coefficient 
o = ¢[1-w(1-¢-r>rl. 
If the change in the price of imports E(pM) arises due to the imposition of a nominal tariff 
(tM), then equation (2) can be rewritten as 
(4) E(p1) = otM. 
Based on the least square regression of equation (3), the value of </>was estimated to be 0.7 
and for r 0.28. The estimate of</> was statistically different from unity, suggesting imperfect 
substitutability between imports and importables. Applying these empirical results to 
equation (2), it can be inferred that a 10 per cent increase in tariff rates will induce a 7 per 
cent rise in the price of importables. 
Combining (1) and (3) and assuming that the changes in the prices of importablcs and 
ex portables arc due to trade policies, ie, nominal tariff rate~, t M = E( PM) and nominal 
agricultural subsidy rate&, &E = E(px), the following equation linking trade policy and the 
price of home goods is derived. 
The effect on the price of home goods can be expressed as the weighted average of tariff 
rates and subsidy rates. Note that the sum of the weights is no longer equal to unity, unless 
imports and importables arc perfect substitutes (ie. o= 1). 
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Chiao and Scobie then com.tructed an input-output table for the economy, of the form: 
XE aEE a EI am 0 XE De 
XI a IE au am 0 xr Dr 
= 
+ 
Xff a HE a HI aHH 0 Xff DfI 
M ~ ~ ~ 0 M 1:1-1 
where xi i& gross product; Di is final demand for ith good; and aij i11 the amount of the ith 
commodity required to produce one unit of the jth commodity. 
The above input-output system can be rewritten in matrix notation as 
(6) X = AX + D, or 
(6') (1-A)X = D. 
Total production required to satisfy the final demand can be easily derived as 
(7) X=(I-A)- 1D. 
Operating surplus, TC, is derived by subtracting intermediate consumption, imports and the 
wage bill from the value of gross product, 
(8) 
(9) 
TC·=x·-~·a .. x·-aM·M-aL-L· i=E IandH·and J J 1 IJ 1 J J J' ' ' 
where a prime (') denotes with assistance, so that TCj' and TC' are the jth sector's operating 
surplus with and without assistance, respectively; aLj is 16e labour coefficient in the jth 
industry, aMj is the import coefficient in the jth indu11try; Lj is total labour employed by the 
jth industry, and rj is a trade effect parameter which measures nominal assistance or 
protection to the jtli !.cctor. 
The difference between assisted and unassisted operating surplus of the jth sector is given 
by, 
The corresponding GDP's are given as 
(11) GDP = ~ TCj + aLjLj, and 
(11') GDP'=~ TCj' + (J+rL)aLjLj, respectively. 
The effect of trade policy on the different sectors can be decomposed as shown in 
Table 1. 
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THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE 
New ZeJ.land's trade policy until the early 1980s had been highly protectionist, 
characterised by both high levels of tariff protection to manufacturing, and subsidies to 
agriculture (Reynolds et al.). Since then, trade policy has changed drastically, characterised 
by the complete removal of direct price supports to agriculture, and gradual reductions in 
tariff protection to manufacturing. 
Although the main goal of this economic liberalisation i& lo remove distortions in the 
structure of incentives facing industries and improve the efficiency of resource allocation, 
this policy also tends to improve the country's international competitiveness by alleviating 
the pressure of rising prices of non-tradeables relative to tradeables, which had led to an 
appreciation of real exchange rates and a loss of competitiveness. In this section, we 
attempt to quantify the domestic impacts on the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of 
changes in trade policy in New Zealand by assessing gross benefits, direct and indirect 
costs, and net benefits. 
The empirical results relate to 1981/82, 1983/84, 1985/86 and 1987 /88. Published 
data on tariff and subsidy rates are available4, and shown in Table 2. However, as input-
output tables are only available for 1981/82 and 1983/84, the latter also was used for 
1985/86 and 1987 /88. 
A number of important results emerge from Table 2. First, the net benefit to the 
"beneficiary" sector of the sector specific policie5 is &ignificantly less than the gross benefit. 
The gross benefit is simply the nominal subsidies for agriculture and nominal tariff 
protection for manufacturing. The net benefit is then derived by subtracting the direct and 
indirect costs of trade policy from gross benefit. The net benefit to manufacturing actually 
rose between 1983/84 and 1987 /88, despite the reductions in nominal tariff protection. 
Chiao and Scobie have shown that the complete removal of price supports to agriculture 
accompanied by more gradual reductions in tariff protection, increased the true rate of 
assistance to manufacturing from 10 per cent in 1983/84 to 19 per cent in 1987 /88. This 
arose because the fall in indirect costs to manufacturing due to the removal of agricultural 
subsidies more than compensated for the reduction in level of nominal tariffs. It is evident 
that sector specific trade policy must be assessed in the broader context of the whole 
economy in order to accurately measure their effects. 
Second, the ratio of net benefits to gross benefits were found to be surprisingly low, 
(typically less than a quarter), with the exception of agriculture in 1983/84. It is a striking 
lesson for policy maker& that for every dollar of gross assistance provided to either the 
agricultural or manufacturing sector, less than 25 per cent is received as net benefit. The 
rest is off set by higher input costs resulting from these protectionist policies. 
The net assistance rate (in nominal terms), was derived by multiplying the nominal 
assistance rate by the ratio of net benefit to gross benefit ratio (see Table 2). The low 
values of the net measure of as&istance demonstrate that neither tariff protection nor price 
supports are particularly effective instruments to deliver assistance to an industry. 
The low levels of net nominal assistance are further eroded by higher wages and 
prices of home goods. We considered a measure of the real net benefit as the nominal net 
benefit minus the inflationary effect of trade policy (last row of Table 2). With the 
4see Chiao and Scobie for details. 
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exception of 1981 /82, all real net benefits were negative. Any improvement in farm relative 
to non-farm incomes that might have achieved, wa~ achieved at high costs to the economy. 
Third, the exportable sector's competilivenes& was further affected by an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Subsidies and tariff protection put downward 
pressure on the relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables. Table 3 shows that as the 
relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables has declined since 1983/84, resulting mainly 
from the reductions in agricultural subsidies. This will improve the competitiveness of the 
exportable sector. 
In summary, we found that the net benefit of trade policy in New Zealand has often 
been less than a quarter of the gross benefit, suggesting that high agricultural subsidies may 
not be an efficient instrument to raise the incomes of farmers relative to non-farm sectors. 
With the removal of agricultural subsidies, the net benefit of protection to manufacturing 
has actually increased, and international competitiveness improved after 1983/84. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES 
It is not uncommon that a country's trade policy switches in the course of economic 
development from taxing agriculture and assisting manufacturing and consumers, to 
assisting agriculture and taxing manufacturing and consumers (Anderson). In the first 
phase the main objective is to assist the potentially internationally competitive 
manufacturing to realise its potential. In contrast, the major objectives of the second phase 
are to achieve food self-sufficiency and to maintain agricultural incomes relative to those in 
other sectors. There have been successful examples of the first phase (eg. Taiwan and 
Korea). The income gap between farm and non-farm groups widens when the growth of the 
economy is led by exporting manufactured goods. The irony in the second phase is that as 
the economy grows, the need to provide even higher levels of assistance to agriculture 
becomes greater. The budgetary expenditures and consumer prices of agricultural products 
will skyrocket if the protection policy observed in the second phase continues. 
Protection disadvantages the exportable sector through higher input costs and real 
exchange rate appreciation, which erode the international competitiveness. Additional 
taxes required to fund ai.~istance to agriculture dependi. on a healthy exportable sector. The 
current form of agricultural protection policy adopted by those NlC's may be uni.ustainablc 
in the long run, becaui.e of the costs imposed on the manufacturing i.ector. 
Anderson, Hayami and Honma (1986) showed that nominal rates of agricultural 
protection in several east Asian countries have risen significantly since early 1970s. 
Surpluses rather than self sufficiency often result from price supports. This has two 
international implications. First, the domestic market is no longer available to traditional 
agricultural exporting countries. Second, to find markets for the excess production, these 
countries have to compete with agricultural exporting countries in international markets. 
The European Community has changed from being one of the world's largest importers of 
temperate zone agricultural products to now being a large exporter (BAE). Some of the 
NIC's are also stockpiling their over-supplied traditional agricultural products (i.e. rice in 
Taiwan). The domestic demand for traditional agricultural products in these countries 
declines through both substitution and income effects as their economies grow. Japan, 
Taiwan and Korea have become major agricultural importers of &ome commodities. Their 
overall food self-sufficiency ratios would be quite low. 
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From the New Zealand ca:,c Mudied, price :,upporl!:> and tariff protection have been 
shown to be relatively ineffective instrument~ for maintaining agricultural income~. The 
net benefits generated by these policies are often less than one quarter of the gross benefits. 
Although the cost lo other sectors of agricultural subsidies may be lower than the cost of 
manufacturing protection, the high and continually increasing agricultural subsidies 
observed in the NIC's could damage their manufacturing sectors through higher input costs, 
and direct taxation to fund subsidies, and eventually lower international competitiveness. 
Several NIC's with trade ~urpluses have resisted the pressure from their trading 
partners to allow their nominal exchange rates to appreciate for fear of losing their 
competitiveness. However, protection policy by these countries itself resulted in an 
appreciation of the real exchange rates, and lowered their competitiveness, producing 
potentially identical effects as an appreciation of the nominal exchange rates. 
A theory of political economy of the demand and !:>Upply for rural assistance has been 
developed by Anderson. This paper has shown that the cost!> of :,upplying agricultural 
protection by tariffs and subsidies have been unden.tated and benefits overstated in 
formulating subsidy policy in a partial equilibrium framework. As has been shown in the 
New Zealand case, net benefit of tariff protection and price supports is typically less than 
one quarter of the gross benefit, after taking into account the indirect costs of trade policy 
on the price of home goods and wage rates. Policy makers mu~t assess the economy-wide 
impacts of sector-specific trade policy in designing policy alternatives. 
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Table 1 Cost of Protection Matrix 
Trade policy 
Itemised indirect costs 
Tariffs on imports 
Tariffs effect on importables 
Effect on home goods 
Effect on wage 
Benefit from protection 
and subsidy 
Exportables 
~XE 
otwIExE 
daHEXE 
darn4: 
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Importables Home goods 
trfflrxr ~ 
otwrrxr otwm>'ti 
ciarrrXI daffi!XH 
dauLr darn!£ 
Table 2 Net benefits of trade policies in New Zealand* 
1981/82 1983/84 1985/86 1987/88 
Agri. Manuf. Agri. Manuf. Agri. Manuf. hjri. Manuf. 
Naninal subsidy rates (percent) 6 20 7 0 
Nani.nal. tariff rates (percent) 20 20 19 14 
Gross benefit ($million) 296 1923 1039 2148 408 2012 0 1590 
- direct costs 
inports ($million) 34 516 60 603 58 578 44 444 
inportables ($million) 90 433 134 501 95 469 75 371 
- inii.rect costs N hane goods ($million) 86 294 101 397 55 351 34 215 
""' Vt wages ($million) 48 330 69 440 107 317 65 193 
Net benefits ($million) 38 350 675 207 93 297 -218 367 
Ration of net benefits 
to gross benefits (percent) 13 18 65 10 23 15 
-
23 
Net naninal assistance rates 
(percent) a.a 3.6 13 2 1.6 2.9 
-
3.2 
Real net benefit (percent) -9.3 -6.5 0.6 -10.4 -8.5 -7.2 
-
-2 
*Only on-fann costs are considered, unlike Chiao an:! Scobie (1989) where the beyorrl fann-gate costs 
of trade policies are also addressEd. 
Table 3 Indirect Costs of Trade Policies 
1981/82 1983/84 1985/86 1987/88 
rise in 
home goods price and wagea 
(per cent) 12 15 12 7 
wage expenditures ($million) 1690 2363 1885 1153 
price of home goods ($million) 3735 5199 4683 2860 
total ($million) 5425 7562 6568 4013 
a. The rise in the price of home goods (d') was taken as a proxy for the 
change in wage rates given the high labour component in home goods. 
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CHAPTER 19 
GATT COMPATIBILITY OF THE 1990 FARM BILL 
Alan J. Webb and M. Praveeo Dixit* 
INTRODUCTION 
U.S. agriculture faces the convergence of two major policy initiatives in the next 2 
years -- the 1990 Farm Bill and the effort to liberalise world agricultural trade under the 
auspices of the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT). Until now, these two 
initiatives have been carried oul in separate arenas and have been largely independent. In 
the past, U.S. agricultural trade policy has been primarily a byproduct of domestic farm 
policy objectives formulated on the basb of commodity group pre&sure corn.trained by mild 
budget pressure!>. The debate on the 1990 Farm Bill, however, promise!> to be different. 
The growing budget pressure imposed by the Gramm-Rudman Hollings Act -- which 
requires the Congress to reduce the budget deficit to a specified target each year until the 
deficit is eliminated -- is forcing legislators to accept lower levels of support than they 
would have. In this environment, the gains from a mutual reduction of agricultural trade 
barriers through an agreement in the multilateral trade negotiations becomes a very 
attractive alternative. The outcome carries significant implications for future trade with the 
world and the Pacific Rim. 
The outcome of the 1990 Farm Bill will affect US trade with the Pacific Rim three 
ways. The first and most direct effect will be the impact it has on US imports and exports of 
agricultural products. The incentive to produce and export grains and cotton is determined 
by the parameters of the Farm Bill. For the two major import commodities, sugar and dairy 
products, restrictions on imports are linked closely to the level of domestic support to these 
industries. Even commodities which are not affected directly by legislation -- such as 
soybeans, fruits and vegetables -- the incentives to plant programme crops will often have a 
significant effect on the land planted to non-programme crops. 
The Farm Bill will also affect Pacific Rim trade through its links to the larger 
macroeconomic problems faced by the United States. As part of the US budget, agriculture 
affects the budget and trade deficits which drive the macroeconomic forces affecting all 
U.S. trade. 
Finally, the 1990 Farm BiH will affect Pacific Rim trade through its political impact 
on the GATT negotiations. The outcome of the Farm Bill debate in the U.S. Congress will 
provide an early indication of how serious the United States is in achieving GATT 
compatibility in its own policies. 
* Agricultural Trade Policy Branch of the Economic Research Service, USDA. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
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Our objective in this paper b to review some of the policy alternatives facing U.S. 
policy maker& with rc&pect to the 1990 Farm Bill. Before we look at alternatives, however, 
we need to explain the broad outlines of U.S. farm policy and identify the forces which have 
shaped it over the last decade. We do this in the next two sections. Our emphasis will be on 
explaining the main instruments and how they affect producer decisions and the budget. We 
will also review the changes made in the 1985 farm bill and why they were made. Next we 
will give our perception of how Congress views the performance of the 1985 legislation and 
note key concerns not addressed by the previous legislation which Congress may wish to 
address in 1990. Based on our evaluation of the current policy environment, we formulate 
three policy scenarios each of which represents a distinct policy choice. We then use a static 
simulation model of world agricultural trade to measure the effects of each of the 
alternatives on world trade and prices. 
A BROAD OUTLINE OF U.S. FARM LEGISLATION 
Our objective in this section is merely to explain the board outline of U.S. farm policy 
and the operation of the policy mechanism by which income is transferred to producers of 
major crops. The details on how these programmes operate for all programme commodities 
can be found elsewhere (Stucker and Collins, and Glasser). 
The philosophy and initial enabling legislation for current U.S. agricultural 
programmes originated in the 1930s. Although there have been major modifications and 
additions to the legislation, two concepts continue to underpin the commodity programmes 
for wheat, rice, feed grains and cotton: participation in the programme is voluntary, and, 
programme benefits are tied to programme obligations. Hence, in any given year for any 
given crop, the level of participation in the programme for that crop will depend on the 
balance of expected benefits and obligations. For commodity programmes to have a major 
impact on U.S. agriculture, net benefits must be high enough to warrant a high level of 
participation. Participation rates for most of the programme commodities have exceeded 
60 percent throughout most of this decade. 
The major source of benefits to participants is deficiency payment. It is a direct 
payment to the producer equal to the difference between the target price and the market 
price or the loan rate, whichever is higher. Figure 1 shows the target price, market price 
and the loan rate for wheat and the implied deficiency payment over the past decade. Not 
how the loan rate acts as a floor price for the market price between 1982 and 1986. This 
occurs because the U.S. government, through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), is 
committed to purchase at the loan rate all the quantities which participants have under the 
loan programme. The CCC holds these quantities in government stocks. Becau&e the 
United States is the world's largest grain exporter, this &tock-holding action will tend lo 
support world prices at the loan rate. This commitment to purchase and hold grain stocks at 
the loan rate created major problems for the United States in the early part of this decade 
(as we shall explain in the next section). 
The level at which a farmer could choose to participate in a commodity programme in 
a given year is determined by the acreage he has planted to that crop in previous years. This 
is the base acreage. Each potential participant has to have established a base acreage for 
one or more of the programme commodities - wheat, rice, cotton and feed grains (ie, he 
must have harvested one or more of the programme commodities in the previous year on 
the land he wishes to put into the programme). At the beginning of each planting season, 
the farmer has to decide, based on the programme for that year, whether to participate in 
the programme. Participating farmers are required to remove a portion of their base 
acreage from production and are eligible to receive deficiency payments on the land 
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planted. The 1 ot.il payment he receives is the programme yield multiplied by the base 
acreage planted and enrolled in the programme. The programme yield has traditionally 
been determined by yields the farmer has had in previous years. 
The major obligation for those participating in a commodity programme is that they 
also participate in acreage reduction programmes if there are any in effect. Participants in 
the Acreage Reduction Programme (ARP) must take a portion of their base acreage out of 
production and devote it to a land conserving use. The proportion which must be enrolled 
in the ARP varies from year to year and crop to crop depending on market conditions and 
the level of stocks held by the government. Over the last 7 years ARP enrollment 
requirement has varied 10 to 27 percent for wheat, 15 to 35 percent for rice, 10 to 20 percent 
for feed grains, and 12 to 25 percent for cotton. 
This basic policy structure has evolved over the pal>t 50 years and there is tremendous 
inertia in maintaining some form of the current policy structure. To the extent that the 
United States will achieve GA TT-compatibility in its agricultural policies, it will likely 
come as an adaptation of the current policy framework. 
REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT WHICH GENERATED THE 
1985 FARM BILL 
At no time since the 1930s had there been a more compelling case for a major 
overhaul in US farm legislation than in 1985. Low commodity price~, high interest rates and 
lagging exports brought on the most severe farm financial crisis in the United States since 
the Great Depression. Many of the causes of the crisis were macroeconomic -- the rise in 
real interest rates depressed the value of farmland, the decline in the rate of income growth 
in developing countries reduced global import demand for agricultural products, and the 
rise in the value of the dollar impaired the ability of U.S. products to compete on world 
markets. The farm policies set in place by the 1981 Farm Bill did little to alleviate the 
problems of the sector and, from a trade perspective, only contributed to the decline in U.S. 
exports. 
Returning to Figure 1 for a moment, we can see how this happened. Faced with 
buoyant exports and strong export prices at the end of the 1970s, Congress expected past 
trends to continue. Higher target prices and loan rates were legislated in the 1981 Farm 
Bill. Unlike earlier farm bills, however, it did not give the Secretary of Agriculture 
discretion to change these rates due to changes in market conditions. Hence, as market 
prices fell and began to approach the loan rate, the U.S. government began to accumulate 
huge stocks as farmers elected to forfeit their grain under loan programme. Grain and 
cotton which the United States would have exported was purchased and held in CCC stocks. 
The United States lost share in most of its major agricultural markets. Record grain stocks 
forced the United States to consider drastic and expensive short term measures to alleviate 
the grain surpluses. The payment-in-kind programme (PIK) was implemented in 1983 to 
reduce the level of government stocks and provide additional income support to the 
beleaguered agricultural sector. The PIK programme cost the U.S. government more than 
$9 billion and only temporarily interrupted the build-up of grain stocks. 
Competitiveness and income support were the compelling issues of the 1985 farm 
bill. Many farmers were in dire financial condition and the U.S. share of world markets had 
fallen sharply since the beginning of the decade. The European Community had increased 
its exports of subsidised agricultural products and the mood in Congress was that the 
United States needed to take drastic action to reassert our role as the world's leading 
agricultural exporter. The cost of farm programmes was raised as an issue, but in the final 
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analysis, the budget was only a secondary concern, pre&&cd primarily by the Administratil)n. 
Congre&s was willing to spend the money to help farmers out of the financial crisis and 
regain US export markets and the legislation which finally emerged clearly reflected that 
intent. 
To address the competitiveness issue, the 1985 Farm Bill lowered loan rates for all 
the programme commodities. Target prices were largely unchanged during the first few 
years of the 5-year bill, but were lowered in the later years. Consequently, outlays for 
deficiency payments increaf.ed but the accumulation of government &tocks abated. The 
export enhancement programme (EEP) was passed lo promote U.S. farm exports in 
targeted market. 
The L985 Farm Bill addressed the farm income problem hy maintaining target prices 
at levels prevailing in 1985 and relaxing the payment limitation of $40,000 per farm. The 
marketing loan (applied to cotton and rice) and Findley loan (applied to wheat and course 
grains) provisions of the bill allowed farmers to receive an additional deficiency payment if 
the market price fell below the loan rate. Hence, if the lowering of loan rates by itself was 
not sufficient to remove the U.S. role from supporting world commodities, the marketing 
and Findley loan provisions were. 
There were three other significant changes in the 1985 legislation. For the first time 
there was a conservation title in the Farm Bill which created an Comervation Reserve 
Programme (CRP) for the removal of 40 to 45 million acres of erodible land from 
production. Producers who enroll in the programme arc entitled to an annual rental 
payment from the government in return for putting the land in approved conservation usef> 
for 10 year&. 
The two other changes were given relatively little attention at the time but now loom 
as very significant for the current GATT negotiations on agriculture. First, programme 
yields and base acreages on which deficiency rates arc determined were frozen al their 1985 
levels. As a result, farmers could not increase their payments in future years by increasing 
yields in the current year. The government now has a better idea of future payment 
commitments. Proponents argue that these provisions have decoupled commodity 
programmes because marginal production decisions arc no longer based on the receipt of 
government payments. A more reali:;tic view is that once a producer has decided to 
participate, the payment has been determined and the production level will not affect how 
much a producer receives from the government. The incentives provided by the 
programmes to participate, however, clearly affect the level of production and are trade 
distorting. 
The &econd change relevant to the GA TT negotiationi-. war. a gradual reduction of 
target prices and was written into the 1985 legislation beginning in 1988. This reflects a 
commitment of the U.S. government to phase down support over time. 
Figure 2 show:; the :;,tructure of U.S. :;up port for 12 major agricultural commodities as 
meaf.ured by producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) for the year 1986. The PSEs are divided 
into direct support -- coming primarily from taxpayers -- and indirect support -- coming 
from consumers and import restrictions. AU of the direct support, which requires budget 
outlays, is on the major export commodities -- wheat, rice, feed grains, and cotton. The 
indirect support is on sugar and livestock products, e&pecially the dairy sector. 
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ENVIRONMENT FOR THE 1990FARM BILL 
Ju1.t as tl1c experience with the 1981 Farm Bill shaped the attitude& of policy maker& 
prior to the 1985 legislation, the pa&t four years experience with the 1985 legislation will 
have a major impact on the 1990 Farm Bill. How doe& Congre&& rate the 1985 Farm Bill? 
Clearly, on the major issues of competitiveness and income support, Congress would give 
very high ratings to the 1985 Farm Bill. The U.S. share of major agricultural markets has 
rebounded (see Figure 3) and farm income has reached record levels in the past few years 
(Figure 4). Farmland values which had fallen between 1981 and 1986, began to rise in 1987. 
The conservation measures have worked as expected although there is a perception that 
areas subject to groundwater and surface water pollution should be targeted as well as 
erodible land. There is also a perception that the provisions to promote U.S. 
competitiveness in world agricultural markets is al least partially responsible for getting 
other countries -- particularly the European Community -- to agree to make agriculture a 
major item on the agenda in the multilateral trade negotiations. The primary drawback of 
the 1985 Farm Bill is clearly the expense. Current farm economic conditions and the 
perceived performance of the last Farm Bill provide no compelling case for major revisions 
in US Farm Legislation. But, there are two new significant constraints on the 1990 Farm 
Bill which were not present in the last farm bill. The first is the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act, which requires that Congress reduce the budget deficit by targeted amounts until the 
budget is balanced in 1992. Second, the GATT negotiatiom. on agriculture have passed the 
midpoint of a four year process. If substantive progress is to be made on liberalising world 
agricultural trade, the United States -- as one of the world's major agricultural trading 
countrie& -- must be prepared to revise its policie& to bring them in line with the yet to be 
determined GA TT guidelines. The 1990 Farm Bill will be a signal to other participants on 
the willingness of the United States to make such revisions. 
Both of these constraints are pushing the 1990 farm legislation in broadly the same 
direction. Less government intervention in agriculture is a sufficient condition for 
satisfying both constraints; but reduced intervention is not a necessary condition for either. 
Herein lies the conflict. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings objectives can be achieved by 
merely taking items off-budget to get around the budget reduction mandate and still 
provide the support. U.S. dairy and sugar programmes arc largely off budget. Consumers 
and foreign producers bear the costs. Yet these are two of the most trade-distorting of all 
U.S. agricultural policies. 
Similarly, GATT objectives can be achieved by using non-trade-distorting policies to 
&upport farm incomes. Direct government payments to producers without any links to 
production would decouple government support from trade. Such measures, however, incur 
significant budget costs. The deficiency payment provision~ in U.S. legislation at lea~l 
require that producer!> reduce the land in cultivation which reduce:; the budget exposure. 
THE 1990FARM BILL: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS 
The actual shape of the 1990 Bill will depend both on domestic policy and budget 
objectives and GA TT concerns. How each of these elements will be weighted in the 
political process of designing new legislation is uncertain. This section of the paper 
attempts to provide quantitative asse:;sments of the economic implications of the various 
policy options under conservation. The objective of the exercise is to provide an 
understanding of the likely economic effects of the policy options rather than to provide 
accurate estimates of the final outcome. Such information can be useful not only to U.S. 
policy makers who have to design the 1990 Farm Bill but abo to trading partners who would 
be affected by any policy action taken by the United States. 
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Three 1990 Parm Bill Options 
We consider three unilateral U.S. policy option~. They arc: the Confrontation 
option, the Compromise option, and the Compatible option. The Confrontation option 
assumes that very little progress is made in the Uruguay Round of GATT and that the 
United States along with other countries would continue to pursue the competitive policie~ 
e&tablished in the 1985 Farm Bill. The Compromise option, on the other hand, assumes that 
the United States, faced with a mandate to reduce budgetary commitments and a desire to 
move toward a more GA TT-compatible agricultural policy, retains the broad structure of 
support of the 1985 Farm Bill but imposes a cap on farm spending. The Congressional 
Budget Office (1989) estimates that the agricultural budget will have to be reduced to $10 
billion by fiscal year 1991 in order to meet the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction 
target. We use this $10 billion target in the Compromise scenario. The Compatible option 
assumes that the United States would not only eliminate the $10 billion of budget support 
retained in the Compromise option but also remove all other government interventions that 
distort agricultural trade. 
Our objective here is merely to posit three policy &cenario& which will reflect three 
alternative policy choices facing the United States relative to the 1990 Farm Bill and GATT. 
None of these scenarios reflect likely outcomes for two reasons. First, none of the 
alternatives reflected in each of the scenario& needs to be pur!>ued to the exclusion of the 
other two alternatives. The 1990 farm bill, like its predecessors, will likely pursue multiple 
and often conflicting objectives. We have not tried to guei:.s at what the actual outcome will 
be. Instead, we have designed scenarios which isolate the effects of a given policy action so 
that we can quantify the impact of that action. 
Second, we are only considering unilateral U.S. policy decisions. We have done this 
to isolate the impact of the decisions facing U.S. policy makers. The results, then, give us an 
indication of areas in which the United States will be seeking counterbalancing concessions 
from other participants in the GATT negotiations. We make no assumption that these 
decisions will be unilateral. 
These three policy options were evaluated with the Static World Policy Simulation 
(SWOPSIM) modeling framework (Roningen). Implications of the policy options are 
examined across commodity markets and countries. The outcomes of these policies are 
related to producer prices, farm income, government costs, and international trade. The 
evaluation includes an analysis of the economic efficiency of the three policy options. 
The Modeling Framework 
SWOPSIM is characterised by three basic feature&: i) it is a nonspatial price 
equilibrium mode, ii) it is a static projections model that can simulate world agricultural 
markets for a future year, and iii) it is a multicommodity multiregional partial equilibrium 
model. In order to use this static, nonspatial equilibrium model to describe world 
agricultural trade, we make the following assumptions: a) world agricultural markets are 
competitive -- countries operate as if they had no market power; b) domestic and traded 
goods are perfect substitutes in consumption, and importers do not distinguish commodities 
by source of origin; c) a geographic "region", though possibly containing many countries, is 
one marketplace; and iv) world agricultural trade is in equilibrium. 
The version of SWOPSIM that we use for this study (ST86) projects agricultural 
markets in the year 1991/92 based on 1986/87 data. Twenty-two agricultural commodities, 
representing almost 90 percent of the total value of U.S. agricultural production, are 
included in the model -- beef, port, mutton, poultry, dairy products (manufacturing milk, 
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butter, cheese, and dairy others), wheat, corn, other coar'>c grain~,, rice, :>oybean& and 
products, other oih.eeds and products, cotton, :>ugar, and tobacco. The world i:> divided into 
11 regions - the United States, Canada, the European Economic Community, other western 
Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the centrally planned group of countries, 
developing country exporters, newly industrialised country importers, and a region 
reprc:>cnting the rc:-.t of \he world. 
Several types of data were required for each country to construct ST86. Supply, 
demand, and trade data were obtained from the Foreign Agricultural Service, while 
exchange rate and price information were acquired from the International Monetary Fund'& 
International Financial Statistics. The own and cro&& price ela&ticity estimate& for demand 
and supply were based on a number of empirical &tudic&. Dctaih on it are pre&ented in 
Gardiner, Liu, and Roningen (forthcoming). Information on the PSE and CSE data arc 
given in USDA (1988). Population projection estimate& were obtained from the U.S. 
Bureau of Cemus, while trend growth rates in per capita income were based on World Bank 
data for 1960 to 1985. Supply growth rates were calculated a& trends based on FAO data for 
1961to1985. 
Policy Environment 
The three policy options to be evaluated in this exercise were broadly identified 
above. The policy environment in the modeling framework are represented by summary 
measures known as producer subsidy equivalents (PSE's) and consumer subsidy equivalents 
(CSE's). For the CONFRONTATION option, we assumed that the per unit 1986/87 PSE's 
and CSE'& would remain intact in 1991/92. This meant total support to U.S. producers of 
nearly $40 billion. Two-thirds of this -- about $25 billion -- were assumed to come from 
government budgets while the rest was off-budget support borne directly by domestic 
consumers. Total support to producers in 1991/92 under the COMPROMISE option is 
e&timated at $24 billion. The lower level of :>upport reflects the budget ceiling of $10 
billion. We distributed the budget among commodities bat.ed on 1986/87 government 
expenditures on farm programmes. Since cereal producers in 1986/87 accounted for nearly 
70 percent of government payments, support to the sector declines greatly in 1991 /92 
relative to those sectors that are supported off-budget, ie, sugar and dairy. All support to 
agriculture was eliminated for the COMPATIBLE option. 
Effects on World Prices 
Our results suggest that world agricultural prices in 1991/92 would be higher if the 
U.S. were to pursue a freer trade option rather than either of the two protectionist regime!, 
(Table 1). Aggregate agricultural world price!> would be highest under the COMPATIBLE 
option. The removal of all U.S. policies that distort trade would not only lower production 
but also expand domestic demand. Prices would be lowest under the CONFRONTATION 
option because continued high levels of support to agriculture would increase production 
and dampen demand, leading to additional global excess capacity and depressed market 
prices. Price level& under the COMPROMISE option would not be very different than 
those under the CONFRONTATION option for commoditie~ other than cereal. World 
cereal prices however would be slightly higher bccau&e of the partial reduction in U.S. 
producer support necessitated by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings requirements. 
Three distinct inferences can be made about the price changes when comparing the 
policy options across commodities. First, for &ugar and dairy products, the increases in 
world prices would be much larger under unilateral U.S. liberalisation than under either of 
the other two options. These results indicate that U.S. &ugar and dairy policies are trade 
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distorting and not very GATT compatible. The extent of trade distortion~ created by a 
country's policies depends both on the level of support and a country's importance in trade. 
Both of these are projected to be relatively high in 1991/92 for U.S. sugar and dairy 
products. Second, for meats and other crops (cotton and tobacco), world price changes 
derived by the model are very similar under all three policy options, suggesting that 
agricultural policies pursued by the United States could be expected to have very little 
influence on international trade even though they may not be GATT compatible. This is 
largely because U.S. share in world trade for these commodities is rather small. Finally, 
even though assistance to grain producers is projected to be relatively high in the U.S., the 
differences in price changes are not as great as those for dairy and sugar suggesting that 
trade distortions caused by assistance to cereal producers would be rather moderate. One 
reason for this is that U.S. consumer prices arc projected to be not very distorted. Another 
is that the distortionary implications of cereal support programmes would be mitigated by 
U.S. set-aside programmes which restrict acreage expansion that would have otherwise 
taken place with high dome!>tic producer prices. GA TT compatibility therefore may need to 
be judged not only with respect to the levels of support, but also vis-a-vis the net trade 
distortions of the combined policy of producer support and production control. 
Implications for World Trade 
One would expect that a movement from a protectionist (CONFRONTATION) to a 
freer trade (COMPATIBLE) environment would increase specialisation by countries as per 
their comparative advantage and lead to larger trade. Indeed, model results indicate that 
world agricultural trade volumes would expand if the United States were to pursue a more 
liberal trading regime. In the case of sugar and dairy products, the expansion would be 
substantial. The elimination of production incentive in the U.S. leads to lower production 
and expanded imports. There would also be some expansion in the quantity traded of rice 
and beef for similar reasons. 
World wheat and coarse grains volumes would, however, contract under a freer trade 
environment. The loss in government assistance -- including export subsidies that expand 
trade -- leads to lower production and reduced exportable surpluses. This occurs despite 
the impetus for increases in production resulting from the release of land set-aside under 
government programmes. Trade in rice would be unaffected by the various policy options 
because of the off-setting nature of U.S. programmes. 
The value of net trade also changes slightly depending upon the policy option 
embraced. The U.S. would worsen its balance of agricultural trade by $9 billion under 
unilateral liberalisation (COMPROMISE) compared to a protected environment 
(CONFRONTATION). Increases in import revenues of dairy products and sugar 
overwhelm any expansion in export revenue. Because other countries continue to pursue 
protectionist policies, their balance of trade improves with U.S. liberalisation. The EC 
would improve its trade balance of trade by $10 billion, while Australia and New Zealand 
would gain about $1 billion if the U.S. were to embrace the CONFRONTATION option. 
The trade implications of the three policy options are rather clear cut. Unilateral 
liberalisation by the U.S. would worsen its agricultural balance of trade. It is therefore 
understandable why U.S. trade interest groups are so opposed to unilateral policy reform in 
the face of mounting protection from competitors. That consumers can buy cheaper 
imported products is clearly not an issue. Other countries, notably the EC, Australia and 
New Zealand would benefit from unilateral policy reform by the United States. This 
suggests that pursuit of protectionist policies by the U.S. have been costing these economies 
a substantial amount of money. This is especially true of exporting countries like Australia 
and New Zealand whose policies are projected to remain largely non-distorting. 
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Effects on U.S. Prices and Incomes 
While the world price implications of the three options may not look all that 
dissimilar, the domestic price and income implications of such policic& are very different. 
While producer prices would remain roughly at the same 1986/87 levels under the 
CONFRONTATION option because of the commitment to maintain support prices, there 
would be &ome rather large declines in producer incentive prices (prices inclu&ive of 
government support) under the other two policy optiom.. Producer prices for nearly all 
commodities would decline dramatically from 1986/87 levels if the U.S. were to unilaterally 
(COMPATIBLE option) liberalise ib policies. The largest decline would occur for dairy, 
sugar, and cereals--the three most protected sectors. The pattern of price declines would be 
slightly different under the COMPROMISE option. While wheat, corn, coarse grains, and 
cotton (other crops) prices would fall substantially, there would be very little changes in the 
prices of other commodities. 
What can we expect of producer incomes in 1991/92 under the three policy options? 
Net farm incomes would be much higher -- about $3.3 billion higher than in 1986/87 --
under a protectionist environment that under the other two situations. Such high incomes, 
however, come at a cost -- a cost of nearly $30 billion to the U.S. treasury. Net farm 
incomes would be $10 billion dollars lower in the COMPROMISE option, but so would 
budget costs -- about $15 billion less. The U.S. Government could compensate producers 
for the entire loss in incomes and still save billiom. in treasury costs. Producer losses would 
be even larger under the unilateral policy reform (COMPATIBLE) option -- a loss of 't25 
billion from 1986/87 base conditions. However, a treasury saving of $25 billion would 
cni:.uc, and this '.aving would be more than enough to completely compensate producer'> for 
the losi:. in incomes from unilateral liberalisation. 
While our model generates information on price& and incomes, the implicatiom. of 
the three policy optioni:. on factor markets arc not readily apparent. Because agriculture is 
&mall relative to the rest of the economy, and because capital and labour arc mobile 
between sectors, the choice of policy options is not likely to influence these factor prices. 
Agricultural land, on the other hand, is basically fixed in supply and so its price is bid up 
with policies that artificially raise output prices. Thus in the long run, the benefits of a 
protectionist policy regime accrue not to labour and capital which are mobile between 
sectori:., but to landowners at the time the policies arc introduced. 
What inf ercnces could we draw from these results? For \me, there is a definite trade· 
off between budgetary expenditures and farm incomes. Moreover, the transfer mechanism 
currently in place to raise farm incomes is not very efficient. Direct payments to producers 
could make them just as well-off without distorting world trade. Finally, the continuation of 
protectionist policies would benefit landowners more than any other group of agricultural 
producers. 
CONCLUSION 
The choice5 available to U.S. agriculture for the 1990 farm bill are many. We have 
evaluated only three policy options with rc&pcct to the market, government exposure, and 
GATT compatibility. The actual outcome will depend on the objectives that farm 
programmes arc designed to achieve. If sustaining farm income is the sole goal of thei:.e 
programmes, then the CONFRONTATION option which maintains high levels of support 
would be desirable. If, on the other hand, the objective is to maintain income while taking 
into account budget restrictions, then the COMPROMISE option which is largely an 
cxtcn&ion of the 1985/86 Farm Bill is suitable. If, however, GATT compatibility is our sole 
concern, then unilateral liberalisation would be the route to take. 
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Table 1 World Agricultural Price and Trade Changes in 1991/92 
Compatible 
Option 
Compromise 
Option 
Confrontation 
Option 
--Price Changes--
Compatible 
Option 
Compromise 
Option 
Confrontation 
Option 
--Trade Changes--
Commodities --percent change from 1986/87 levels--
Ruminant Meat 6.9 5.5 4 23.9 17.8 13.3 
Nonruminant Meat -1.0 -1. 9 -2.8 76.8 76.7 57.8 
Dairy Products 21. 7 5.2 5.4 69.1 25.4 24.5 
Wheat 4.1 .6 -1. 5 3.5 10.l 14.7 
Coarse Grains 7.0 .8 -.8 . 7 18.9 20.9 
Rice 4.6 3.7 3.1 67.4 74.2 74.2 
Oilseeds & products -2.1 -.7 -.4 26.2 22.4 21.5 
Sugar 15.3 3.8 3.9 34.9 7.7 8.5 
Other Products 11. 0 9.9 8.8 1.3 0 0 
Aggregate 4.4 1.6 . 7 42.7 48.l 34.5 
Table 2 Producer Price Changes in the U.S., 1991/92 
Commodities 
Ruminant Meat 
Nnruminant Meat 
Dairy Products 
Wheat 
Coarse Grains 
Rice 
Oilseeds & products 
Sugar 
Other Products 
Aggregate 
Compatible 
Option 
--percent 
-5 
-11 
-14 
-58 
-45 
-66 
-13 
-76 
-25 
-22 
Compromise 
Option 
change from 
-1 
-7 
0 
-31 
-22 
-41 
-9 
0 
-10 
-10 
Confrontation 
Option 
1986/87 levels--
3 
-3 
0 
0 
-1 
1 
-4 
0 
6 
0 
Table 3 Income, Trade, and Budgetary Changes, 1991/92 
U.S. Farm Income 
U.S. Treasury Costs 
Trade Values 
U.S. 
Canada 
EC 
Japan 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Compatible 
Option 
Compromise 
Option 
Confrontation 
Option 
--changes from 1986/87 levels ($ million)--
-25315 
- 3000 
- 7333 
682 
6377 
-653 
1213 
992 
260 
-10660 
-20000 
-756 
434 
4269 
-547 
773 
619 
3341 
-2186 
1495 
319 
3780 
-522 
623 
592 
SERIES I: 
No.10 
No.11 
No.12 
No.13 
No.14 
No.15 
No.16 
SERIES II: 
No.10 
No.11 
No.12 
No.13 
No.14 
LIST OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY PAPERS: 
A Study of the Dairy Industries and Policies 
of West Germany and New Zealand 1985 
Price 
(P.W.J. Clough & F. Isermeycr) ......................................................... $12.00 
Dairy Development, Trade and Policy Issues, 
Within the Pacific Basin 1985 
(A.N. Rae, W.A. Wilson & W.R. ~chroder) ....................................... $10.00 
The Market for Sawn Timber and Panel Products 
(Exotic Softwoods) in New Zealand 1986 
(C.W. Maughan & P.W.J. Clough) ..................................................... $17.50 
The Financial Implictions of Forestry Logging 
Traffic on Rural Roads 1987 
(P.W.J. Clough & A.D. Meister) ........................................................ $10.00 
Benefit Assessment of Recreational Land: The 
Whakapapa Arca, Tongariro National Park 1989 
(P.W .J. Clough & A.D. Meister) ........................................................ $10.00 
The Agriculture Sector in a Deregulated 
Economy 1989 (R.W.M. Johnson) ..................................................... $12.00 
The Financing of New Zealand Agriculture l989 
(R.W.M. Johnson) .............................................................................. $12.00 
PROCEEDINGS: 
Going International: Proceedings of the Third 
Business Associates Workshop 1988 
(R.W .M. Johnson Ed.) ....................................................................... $12.00 
The Livestock and Grains Study Programme of 
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference: 
Proceedings of the Second Workshop 1988 
(A.N. Rae and R.W.M. Johnson Ed.) ................................................. $19.00 
The EEC After 1992: Whither New Zealand'! 
Proceedings of the Fourth Business Associates 
Workshop 1989 (R.W.M. Johnson Ed.) ............................................. $l2.00 
Managing Agribusiness Risks: Strategic Choices. 
Proceedings of the Fifth Business Associates 
Workshop 1990 (A.N. Rae Ed.) ........................................................ $12.00 
Policies for Agricultural Trade Liberalisation and 
Adjustment in the Pacific Rim Proceedings of the Third 
Workshop of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference 
1990 (A.N. Rae and D.D. Chadcc Ed.) ............................................... $19.00 
SERIES HI: AGRICULTURAL POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS: 
No. 4 A Marketing System for the New Zealand Meat 
Industry 1981 (C.W. Maughan & W.R. Schroder) .............................. $1.00 
No. 5 Pacific Trade in Livestock Products 
Since 1965 1984 (W.A. Wibon) .......................................................... $ 6.00 
No. 6 The Impact of Macroeconomic Policies on 
Agriculture with Illustrations from the 
Argentinian Experience 1986 
(D.F. Cavallo & A.A. Dadone) ........................................................... $ 6.50 
No. 7 Frameworks, Theories and Methods for Analysis 
of Marketing Channels: A Marketing Literature 
Review 198(> (A.N. Rae) .................................................................... $10.00 
No. 8 Livestock and Feed Policy in New Zealand: 
1975 lo the Present 1986 (R.W.M. John~on) ..................................... $ 8.50 
No. 9 An Integrated Framework for Analysing 
Agricultural Marketing Issues 1986 
(S.K. Martin, A.N. Rae & A.C. Zwart) .............................................. $12.00 
No.10 Impediments lo Increased New Zealand Beef 
Trade with Japan 1988 (N.D. Fraser) ............................................... $12.00 
ORDER FORM 
Secretary 
Centre for Agricultural Policy Studies 
Massey University 
Palmerston North 
NEW ZEALAND 
Please send to: 
Name: 
Address: 
the following publication/s: 
Series 
No. 
No. of 
publ'n Title 
Date of order: ..................... . 
No. of Cost* 
copies $ 
COST $ .......... . 
PLUS postage and packing $ ........... . 
(Per copy, within NZ$1.00; 
overseas surface mail NZ$2.00, airmail, NZ$7 .00) 
TOTAL AMOUNT ENCLOSED $ ........... . 
* GST to be paid on orders within New Zealand (GST Reg.No. 11-205-615). 
